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General
A Closer Look at Ukraine’s Foreign Policy. A. Oliferov, T. de Waal. Carnegie Endowment (1.08. 2012).
U.S. needs Ukraine priorities straight. Matthew Rojansky. CNN Blogs (28.09.2012).
Ukraine in search of a ‘third way’ in foreign policy. T. Iwanski. Center for Eastern Studies (14.03.2012).
Ukraine and NATO – an on-off relationship. I. Shields. International Relations and Security Network (26.07.2012).
Relations with the EU
Ukraine is one of the post-Soviet counties to which the EU offered a new instrument of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), upon which the EU was building its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) developed in 2004. The agreement marked the start of the political dialog between the two partners. Ukraine is one of the post-Soviet counties to which the EU offered a new instrument of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, with which the political dialog between the two partners started. Ukraine signed the document in 1994 with its coming into force in 1998. Ukraine was the first CIS country (Commonwealth of Independent States) to sign the PCA with the EU. In general terms, the PCA was called to establish a new trade regime and institutionalize political relations. The Agreement did not, however, include any offers or stipulations on a prospective membership or association with the EU. 1994 was at the same time the year when Ukraine declared European integration as its main foreign policy objective. The PCA laid the foundations of the classical EU approach of conditionality: association agreement, deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, visa liberalization in exchange for commitments to political, economic, social and judicial reforms and good governance in a given country.
In December 1999 in Helsinki the EU adopted a Common Strategy on Ukraine. The strategy was however limited to the welcoming the Ukrainian European integration choice and foresaw further cooperation with Ukraine as an outsider. Discussions between the Ukrainian and EU officials have been limited to declarations of the EU supporting Ukraine’s integration striving mainly because Ukraine was slow and inefficient in fulfilling its PCA obligations. By the end of 1999 country has failed to comply with 22 provisions of the Agreement.
After the Orange Revolution, massive civil uprising and pro-European incumbents coming to power, the relations between the two actors seemed to have been reinvigorated. Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko tandem declared that the question of the full Ukrainian membership in the EU can be a matter of a few years. For the first time a separate Ministry for European Integration was established. The EU, through J. Solana as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, firmly welcomed the raised aspirations but calmed down the overambitious goals, reminding that Ukraine is still too far from meeting the PCA provisions that were covering the cooperation at that time. Although the overall image and reputation of Ukraine on the world stage got immense positive boost, it did not last too long and did not bring any substantial achievements. The cooperation was hampered by the internal collision that started in the orange camp, which was one of the political u-turn reasons that allowed the Party of Region to re-gain power. The new government maintained the European integration as the main foreign policy objective, but did not frame it as an ultimate goal. The Euro-Atlantic integration and joining the NATO was deleted from the political agenda.
In May 2009 at the Prague summit the EU introduced a new framework within the European Neighbourhood Policy– the Eastern Partnership programme (EaP). The newly established forum was deemed to improve political and economic relations with the six “strategic partners”. Together with Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, Ukraine became a target country of the new instrument. The EaP was envisaged to serve as a specific instrument to approach the country. The observers remained, however, sceptical about the declared intentions. From its start the EaP has been suffering from lack of support by the bigger Member States. None of the political leaders from Germany, France or UK visited the summit, so that the carrying of the project was laid mainly upon Poland. In overall, the EaP is to provide the foundation for new Association Agreements between the EU and Ukraine. However, Ukraine expressed later its pessimistic view on the project. According to the official position it does not correspond with the Ukrainian strategic objective of European integration, because it does not contain nor does it confirm such priorities. It should be noted though, that under the EaP Poland and Ukraine have reached a bilateral agreement on simplified visa regime for Ukrainians residing within 30 km zone of the border, which covers up to million and a half citizens.
A year 2009 has also brought up negotiations on the Association Agreement (AA) between the EU and Ukraine, which was meant to replace the old PCA. The AA is an international agreement that sets an all-embracing framework of bilateral relations and normally provides bases for the progressive liberalization of trade (free trade area, customs union etc.). In general the AA is an instrument for the partnership intensification, which in some cases also foresees a future membership. In case of Ukraine the AA includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area agreement (DCFTA) coupled with the negotiations on the visa-free regime, but does not mention a membership perspective.
By the end of 2011 the completion of the negotiations was reached, but the actual signing of the Agreement and DCFTA was put on hold after the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and her former Minister of Interior Yuri Lutsenko. Brussels declared the cases to be politically motivated and based on selective justice, and urged Kiev to free Tymoshenko and other victims of politically-motivated justice immediately to avoid possible sanctions from Europe.
Stefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood, declared that the systematic problem of selective justice is one of the main hindrances on the Ukraine road to political association. “The political relationship between the European Union and Ukraine will not improve without firm commitments and the effective demonstration that the rule of law and the respect for fundamental values are applied systematically in Ukraine”, underlined the Commissioner (Speech at the European Parliament, 2012).
The latest calls from Brussels included three main demands:
- A concrete strategy to redress the effects of selective justice and prevent it from happening again;
- Free and fair elections;
- Resumption of delayed reforms already agreed in the joint EU-Ukraine “Association Agenda”.
Signature of the AA and DCFTA was supported by all the Ukrainian forces as well as by the jailed Y. Tymoshenko. Opinions on the EU decision to withhold the signing of the agreements differ. On the one hand, it is considered as an adequate EU response to the violation of human rights and basic values to be respected by a country that wants to join the EU. On the other hand, experts argue that this approach directly affects the citizens and pushes the country away, just to the Russian hands and its flagged up Customs Union. It also suspends the visa facilitation agreement with the EU.
The EU has postponed the cooperation deepening until the parliamentary elections on October 18. So, it remains to be seen whether these elections are going to be a critical juncture in the EU-Ukraine relations. On October 18 the German Bundestag claimed that it would block the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement if Yulia Tymoshenko is not released from prison.
Analyses and opinions
Die Ukraine zwischen Russland und der EU. Stefan Meister. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswartige Politik (German Council on Foreign Relations). DGAP Standpunkt, #11 (December, 2010).
The EU and Ukraine – where to next? Amanda Paul. European Policy Centre. (21.09.2011)
To sign or not to sign? – That’s the EU-Ukraine question. Amanda Paul. European Policy Centre (13.02.2012).
EU-Ukraine relations: is a breakthrough still possible? Daniel Zaborovskyy. Eastern Partnership Community. (20.02.2012)
Is free trade with the EU good for Ukraine? M. Dabrowski, S. Taran. CASE (03.2012).
EU-Ukraine: from fatigue to irritation. Nicu Popescu. European Council on Foreign Relations (02.05.2012)
The Ukraine question. M. Emerson. CEPS (4.04.2012).
The EU’s plan B for Ukraine. Olga Shumylo-Tapiola. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (14.05.2012).
The crisis in EU/Ukraine relations surrounding Tymoshenko. Tadeusz Iwanski, Artur Ciechanowicz, Anna Kwiatkowska-Drozdz, Rafal Sadowski. Centre for Eastern Studies (19.05.2012).
The EU Warned Belarus and Ukraine about Political Prisoners. Ralitsa Kovacheva. EUinside. (25.06.2012)
EU-Ukraine: next chapter. Amanda Paul. EU Observer (07.08.2012).
EU – Ukraine: Time for a Real Strategy. Amanda Paul. EU Observer (26.09.2012)
European ambassadors: Fair parliamentary elections not enough for signing of Association Agreement. KyivPost (15.10. 2012).
EU-Ukraine DCFTA: the model for Eastern Partnership regional trade cooperation. V. Movchan, V. Shportyuk. CASE Network Studies and Analyses № 445 (October 2012).
Ukraine eyes EU ‘reset’ after elections to forge closer ties. D. Krasnolutska, A. Langley. Bloomberg (23.10.2012).
Stefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Speech at the meeting of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee European Parliament, Strasbourg 14 June 2012. 14.06.2012.
ENP documents
3rd Joint progress report on the negotiations on the Association Agreement, December 2009
EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement, November 2009
Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008. Progress Report Ukraine
Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013
National Indicative Programme, 2011-2013
ENP Package, Country Progress Report – Ukraine. 15.05.2012.
Relations with Russia
The diplomatic relations has been established between two countries immediately after the dissolution of the USSR and independence proclamation in 1991. Russia became an important strategic partner and main geopolitical factor in Ukrainian foreign policy calculations.
During more than two decades of the post-soviet time the two countries managed to pile up a number of critical issues to fight about. Never-ending disputes chiefly unfold around several issues:
- The Autonomous Republic of Crimea: the territory was transferred to the Ukrainian possession in 1954 as its administrative part. Just after the USSR break down Russia began to claim about Crimea being natural Russian territory, where more than 90% of population speaks Russian and identifies itself as Russian;
- The Black Sea Fleet: being a part of the Russian Navy it is based in Sevastopol, on the territory of Ukraine, which prohibits location of foreign forces on its terrains;
- Gas and oil pipelines: the two countries constantly negotiate and conflict about the gas import prices. Ukraine inherited a gas-transport system after the USSR dissolution that transfers gas to Europe, mainly Russian gas. Accordingly, Kiev claims that Moscow has to pay adequate fee for using Ukrainian gas corridor or provide discounts for its gas export to Ukraine;
- Ukraine – NATO cooperation. Russia strongly opposes Ukraine’s attempt to get a NATO membership because it would mean extending of the NATO presence to the Russian borders. After the Bucharest NATO Summit the Russian State Duma’s committee for the CIS countries suggested that Russia should withdraw from the Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation with Ukraine if the latter joined NATO.
The character and intensity of bilateral relations have been changing depending on who was holding the presidency in Ukraine. Two terms of L. Kuchma were characterized by so called multidimensional (“multi-vector”) foreign policy, so that Ukraine was cajoling between the EU, Russia and the USA. The Orange Revolution and V. Yushchenko presidency caused an immense number of conflicts and tensions between two countries. First and foremost, the Ukrainian uprising opened a black box of Russian big fear – change of authoritarian regimes in the bottom-up way that undermines Russian control in the neighbourhood. The Orange Revolution made the issue abundantly clear that Russia is ready to oppose any political incumbents in Kiev, who does not agree with the Kremlin political discourse. It became particularly evident when V. Putin, Russian Prime Minister back then, congratulated V. Yanukovych on victory in the presidential elections in 2010 before the actual electoral results had been declared by the Central Election Commission of Ukraine.
Moscow was irritated by the Euro-Atlantic endeavours of Kiev, as well as attempts to undermine the Russian way to present the historical and cultural events that took place throughout the history. The most dramatic disputes revolved around Yushchenko’s active discourse on the famine in 1932-1933 being genocide of Ukrainian nation, and the USSR to be solely responsible for that. The tensions between Kiev and Moscow reached its highest point with the presidents (Yushchenko and Medvedev at that time) insulting each other. V. Putin went as far as threatening Kiev that Ukraine can virtually lose its statehood by Russia annexing Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in case Ukraine joins the NATO.
The tensions have been alleviated when V. Yanukovych took power in early 2010. He made a U-turn in the Russia-Ukraine relations, eliminating the Ukrainian NATO foreign policy objectives, and namely halting pursuit of NATO membership, flexibility in gas issues and rhetoric of fraternity between the two nations.
In 2010 Yanukovych and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement (known as Kharkiv agreement) about the extension of the Moscow’s lease on the Sevastopol port for 25 years, which was initially agreed till the year 2017. In exchange Kiev was expected to get a 30 percent discount on imported Russian gas. However, despite the tangible reawakening of relations, they remain heavily unbalanced mainly due to the dependence of Ukraine on Russian natural resources and Russian inclination to influence the internal politics of Ukraine.
Putin’s return for the presidency is marked with his ambitious geopolitical idea of a Eurasian Union. The idea envisages a launch of a Custom Union that would abolish customs duties and unify economic policies among participating countries. The negotiations are going between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus who welcome the idea. Ukraine is insistently invited to take part in the initiative; however Kiev remains reluctant and confused about the Eurasian Union because it is on the negotiation phase about the free trade area with the European Union. The Eurasian Union is expected to come to force by the year 2015 as a sort of supranational entity. Putin advocates that the Union will give immediate economic benefits to Ukraine unlike the EU free trade agreement that is based on complex and cumbersome provisions. Experts consider that Yanukovych reluctance to get embraced by the Eurasian Union is most likely based on his unwillingness to follow Russian rules of game, which presumably will prevail in the forthcoming Union.
Russia remains a disputable neighbour when it comes to the perceptions of the Ukrainian citizens. It should be noted that there is a divergence regarding the character of Ukraine-Russia relations among the regions. It is the case mostly due to the different perceptions of Russia, ranging from it being an inherent enemy to it being a brother nation. Eastern and Southern regions that have a big Russian-speaking population are in favour of closer thighs. These implications do cause constant shifts in the policy objectives of the power holders as well as they give a field for Russia to influence the Ukrainian domestic processes. Last years have been marked with the Russian successful use of what is ought to be the EU main instrument, and namely soft power. Moscow started to rely on normative tools and approaching the citizens of Ukraine with the rhetoric of fraternity presenting two nations as compatriots. The main instrument of cultural influence resides in the numerous “Russian World” centres, which disseminate the idea that if a person speaks Russian, he/she thinks Russian and consequently acts Russian.
Ukraine-Russia relations may only change if Ukraine integrates within the EU. Round table discussion at the Gorshenin Institute (12.12.2011).
Ukraine: balancing Russia, the West and Democracy. Steven Pifer. The Ukrainian Weekly (26.12.2011).
A ghost in the mirror: Russian soft power in Ukraine. Alexander Bogomolov, Oleksandr Lytvynenko. Chatham House Briefing Paper (January 2012).
Moving West is ‘lesser evil’ for Ukraine. David Marples. Current politics in Ukraine blog. (31.03.2012).
Ukraine’s Perilous Balancing Act. Steven Pifer. Brookings (March, 2012).
Ukraine, Russia and Two Horses. David J. Kramer, Lilia Shevtsova. The American Interest (21.08.2012).
Russia, EU and ECU: co-existence or rivalry? R. Dragneva, K. Wolczuk. OpenDemocracy (25.09.2012).
The Eurasian Customs Union: Friend or Foe of the EU? Olga Shumylo-Tapiola. Carnegie Endowment (October, 2012).
Ukraine in the international organizations
Ukraine is a member or an observer of a number of international organizations and multilateral forums, main of which are:
1945 – Founding Member of the United Nations
1991 – Commonwealth of Independent States
1992 – International Monetary Fund
1995 – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (that Ukraine will chair in 2013); Council of Europe
1997 – GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (together with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan)
2002 – Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) with observer status. Members: Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan.
2008 – World Trade Organization