The Consequences of Afghanistan’s 2014 Presidential Election Impasse

Notes internacionals CIDOB, núm. 96

As Afghanistan’s election saga dragged on, the international community was desperate to have the new president in place in time to attend the NATO summit in Wales on September 4th of this year. That did not happen. Because of the inconclusive presidential election, there is uncertainty about the level of presence or complete withdrawal of the international military forces and civilian aid from Afghanistan beyond December 2014. The summit still committed to provide USD 5.1 billion annually to the Afghan security forces in the foreseeable future – one billion more than the commitment made in the Chicago conference in 2012. On the other hand, the US is eager to conclude the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the new president following refusal by President Hamid Karzai to sign the BSA despite internal and external pressures.

Internally, the past three months have been the bloodiest, according to the Afghan Defence Minister. Taliban have re-launched frontal wars in several provinces in the south and east, even north. The Afghan security agencies have constantly reported killing tens of Taliban everyday for the past year. The economy has seen a steep decline, with growth rate down to 3.1 percent in 2013 from 14.4 percent in 2012; the country is expected to lose USD 5 billion in revenue this year. The government has run out of cash to pay salaries of its employees. Afghans are increasingly looking to move out of the country in search of better job opportunities as well as to avoid an uncertain security situation in the aftermath of the expected full withdrawal of the NATO forces. The brain-drain is straining Afghan government capacity to address the impending challenges.

What is more, the Afghan polity is in tatters, as fraudulent elections since 2004 have progressively polarized the leadership. This year’s presidential election could not have come at a worse time, with the security transition taking place and foreign aid dwindling. The election also showed that the longer the process is the more divisive it becomes. The runoff was particularly damaging as the contest became increasingly ethnic, with the Ashraf Ghani-led Pashtun-Uzbek alliance facing off with an Abdullah-led Tajik-Hazara one, or at least that is how it is portrayed by some notable members of the two camps, neighboring countries, even parts of the international media.

After the runoff announcement of preliminary results put Ghani ahead of Abdullah, the frontrunner in the first round, by a million votes, an unprecedented crisis ensued. The Afghan leadership’s inability to come to a consensus over how to address the crisis prompted the international community to step in. US Secretary of State, John Kerry, had to travel twice to Kabul to broker a deal between Ghani and Abdullah, after President Barack Obama had pleaded with the two candidates not to take any unconstitutional steps or prematurely declare victory – even threatening that the US will cut all aid in such an event.

Kerry broke the deadlock, or so is claimed, through a deal. The deal envisions a national unity government headed by the winner of audited votes with the runner up taking the newly-formed position of Chief Executive, a position not foreseen by the country’s carta magna. All votes to be audited and those deemed fraudulent discarded in a UN-supervised process. Despite reaching agreement, tensions are still running high and the two camps keep using inflammatory language against each other, with no headway being made in regards to the formation of the national unity government. In fact, Abdullah once again pulled out altogether from participation in the process as recently as August 27. As it is observed, President Hamid Karzai’s administration has played the role of a spoiler for reasons not entirely known, giving rise to speculations and assumptions about his motives.

This leads one to envision a scenario whereby divisions within leadership of the country will expand and may even pan out into ethnic rivalries as the leaders will attempt to mobilize support by stimulating ethnic sentiments. It is worth mentioning that scholarship on ethnic conflicts suggests that decisions and actions of leaders can be “proximatecause” of violence. Subsequently, a national unity government, if formed, will soon disintegrate as the two camps and the apparent spoilers (e.g. Karzai’s network) will be embroiled in an intense power struggle. If no unity government is formed, the country will be more polarized than it has ever been since the Taliban were toppled, which would result in a de facto disintegration of state sovereignty. The final hypothesis is that under such a scenario, Karzai would attempt to create conditions whereby he still remains the most powerful politician around.