

Policy Paper

National policies targeting the youth in Tunisia

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Executive summary

Young Tunisians played a leading role in the revolution of 2010 that led to a change in the regime. Yet not much has changed for them since, as they find themselves unable to secure a role in the country's decision-making process and are, in the main, not consulted on issues that directly affect them. The challenges the youth are facing are multidimensional and there are very few national policies that address them. They include high unemployment rates and lack of access to the labour market, social inclusion, effective participation in the decision-making process and citizenship. Gender gaps also pose significant barriers, limiting equal access to economic opportunities despite Tunisia's gender equality policies.

There have been a few positive signs in the post-revolution period, e.g. the new Tunisian constitution, passed in January 2014, which enshrines youth participation as a key pillar of the social, economic, and political development of the country; however, given the time required to translate and implement the constitutional principles into laws, policies and practices, youth participation in the political process remains at the formative stage.

In respect to youth legislation, the Ministry of Youth, Sports, Women and Families is responsible for the implementation of youth policies. Services to young people are delivered through centralised administrative units and a network of youth centres. Amongst its many responsibilities, the ministry focuses mainly on the sports sector while youth centres focus on cultural programmes for young people. There is an issue of decentralisation and a lack of coordination of services across the agencies to effectively address youth issues, leading instead to fragmented coverage, ambiguity and overlapping roles. Tunisia had the Higher Youth Council, which was a government forum for consultation on youth issues that was totally aligned with the ruling political party whose regime was toppled in 2011. Therefore, the council is not active anymore.

Accordingly, this policy paper analytically discusses and questions the capacity of the national policies that are targeting the youth in Tunisia. It analyses the situation of young people and the problems they are facing, especially in regard to access to work and economic empowerment, social inclusion, active citizenship, civil participation, and gender inequalities. Hence, this paper questions the capability of these policies to actually respond to the challenges the youth are facing in Tunisia. It also looks into the main international initiatives implemented in the country that focus on young people.

The paper concludes that a comprehensive approach to youth development is a priority for the country's development. This should be a "National Cross-Sectoral Youth Strategy and Action Plan" that provides a multidimensional and sectoral approach to youth inclusiveness and integrates a set of national youth policies and initiatives that ensure equity and address reforms. The policies should be reformulated with participation and coordination between the government, the unions, the private sector, and youth representative bodies, who should be referred to as efficient partners in the decision-making process. This will also require the Tunisian social contract to be capable of delivering results that best address youth challenges on both the economic and social fronts.

Introduction

The Tunisian revolution of January 2011 is known as a “youth uprising”, indicating the fundamental role of the Tunisian youth who were the most affected and marginalised by the previous regime’s inability to live up to their demands. Five years after the revolution, the frustration is remounting among young people as they feel that the current leadership is not listening to their aspirations but views them only as numbers at the voting booth. Issues such as drafting a constitution and establishing democracy have taken precedence over social-equality demands.

What makes things more complicated is the fact that there is no actual body or representation of youth. Before 2011, the Tunisian Union of Youth Organizations (UTOJ) was the main body coordinating youth organisations and represented young people on the Higher Council, a government forum for consultation on youth issues. However, since it was aligned to the previous regime, it has ceased to operate.¹

Following Tunisia’s first parliamentary elections in October 2011, many of the problems that Tunisia’s youth face have remained, especially those relating to access to jobs and opportunities for the over 51% of the population which is under 30.² Unemployment slightly increased in 2015 to 15.2%, despite a minor decline in graduate unemployment (from 20.8% to 19.9%). This was down from 16.7% in 2011, but still well above the pre-revolution level of 13%.³

Building on the lessons of the “Youth Revolution” in Tunisia, policies should seriously consider interventions “to support youth aspirations, to foster their participation at the local and national levels, and to rebuild their trust in policy-making institutions” (World Bank, 2014: 20). The multidimensional youth policy should include the following main pillars: (1) participation and active citizenship; (2) access to economic opportunities; and (3) social inclusion and youth-friendly services. The three pillars reflect a comprehensive approach to youth needs and, eventually, duties. They have a strong impact on each other and on empowering youth in different dimensions and involve different sectors. Therefore, policies should be co-ordinated in different sectors which will lead to a cross-sectoral youth policy. With the aim of creating good citizens to constructively engage in the democratic process, the government should provide effective methods of participation.

Problem definition

a- General statistics on young people

In Tunisia, those aged 15–29 represent one of the largest population groups – 29% of the total population and 43% of the working age population. The main challenge they face is unemployment, which increased after the revolution to 33.2% in 2013 (ILO, 2014).

Despite Tunisia's gender equality policies and laws, young women have much higher NEET (not in education, employment, or training) rates than young men. More than 60% of university graduates are females and yet the rate of female participation in the labour force remains much lower than the male: their unemployment rate of 32% is double that of male university graduates at 16% (OECD, 2015). In many regions of the country, the unemployment rate for female graduates is over 50% (Boughzala, 2013). Overall, between one-third and one-half of all young men who, in principle, could work, are without employment (World Bank, 2014).

		Female labour participation	Male labour participation
Coastal region	Rural area	27.5%	58.1%
	Urban area	45.9%	68.0%
The southern region	Rural area	8.3%	53.6%
	Urban area	17.2%	60.3%
The interior region	Rural area	16.1 %	48.9%
	Urban area	34.4%	56.6%

Source: World Bank 2014.

Since the 1991 law, schooling has been free and compulsory for all children from 6 to 16 years of age, but girls' education, even though it has progressed, remains subject to persistent cultural barriers. The policy of free mass access to education has been implemented at the expense of training quality; nevertheless, the country has accumulated a massive stock of human capital (Boughzala, 2013) which, with proper planning, can be invested in to have a positive impact on the overall human development of the country.

At the age of 18, young people are able to vote; at 13 they can create or become a member of an association.⁴ However, young Tunisians feel that they have been excluded from politics. For while political participation is a key pillar of active citizenship, very few young Tunisians engage in any form of it, except mobilising for demonstrations. The low youth participation rate in the Tunisian national elections of October 2011 was especially worrisome. Only half of the under 30-year-olds voted (World Bank, 2014).

b- Young people's perceptions of the problems and challenges in their lives

The SAHWA Tunisia youth engagement survey tapped into a few issues related to youth engagement, including: youth engagement in political parties and organisations, youth participation in events or civil actions after 2011, and youth participation in events or civil actions before and after 2011. The data shows an increased number of young people participating in events or civil actions after 2011. The data shows that males are more engaged participants than females in all different organisations and political parties including: cultural and humanitarian groups, sports clubs, Scouts groups, unions, political parties, political movements, community services, faith-based groups and associations (Annex I).

The revolution stirred change in many young people who were enthusiastic about that change and wanted to be part of the events. Yet they soon discovered that several political parties dominated the scene. On the other hand, the associations were quite weak, as one male participant from the SAHWA Focused Ethnography group explains:

"I withdrew from political activity... it is a difficult area! To be able to take action, you need connections and belongings, it is not easy to have a career in politics; I preferred associative work, but there were lacks in associative work and there is no clear vision about where one could make a career take position, start serious work" (FE_TN_1).

Answering the question "How does the young Tunisian perceive their crisis with regard to employment and citizenship?", a female participant from another SAHWA Focused Ethnography group stated:

"Citizenship is a value in crisis which explains the small number of the young active people in associations and civil society. Those who have a stable situation do not see the utility of participation or engagement. The others, the majority, see a dark horizon ... the individual cannot think of his country unless he is granted dignity! But if you're hungry, if you're unemployed, without dignity, if we put you in prison ... if you see your parents suffer! About which home country do we talk to you?" (TN_FG_1).

Demanding social justice and improved livelihoods, Tunisia's youth took to the streets in 2011 in the hope that their voices would be included in a new Tunisia. "This revolution was made by youth. It was the youth who came to the streets and faced the police and who lost their lives in some regions," asserted Sélim Kharrat.

Yet after the revolution many young people describe feelings of political and social marginalisation, and they perceive a serious degree of disconnect between generations. They feel

that the great majority of individuals rebuilding their country are older and have chosen to pursue different agendas.

“Within the structure of the current government and parties, the average age is something like 65 ... Even those over 80 aspire to govern the Tunisian people. They are greedy for governance” (Abdrahmen Chaaban).⁵

Young people’s perceptions regarding education and employment were more or less the same: a gap between what is taught at school/university and what the market demands. As one of the interviewers in the ethnographic groups explained:

“There are fields that have no employment prospects...most lead to unemployment. That’s why having a degree is no longer valuable (NCS-Tunisia-1).

Discussion: Policy responses to young people’s problems at national level

a- National policies designed for young people

Tunisian young people were among the most active in the Arab region in terms of promoting youth activities – mostly via the youth centres – that aim to promote healthy lifestyles and prevent risky behaviour. They offer a range of leisure and occupational training activities in technology, language and the arts and aim to promote citizenship and the integration of the young into society (World Bank, 2014). Hence, Tunisia played a pioneering role in the development of youth centres in the region. The Ministry of Youth and Sport was created immediately after independence in 1956. In 1963, the first youth centre was inaugurated in Rades, a southern working-class suburb of Tunis. Today, 2,000 youth workers are employed in a nation-wide network of over 300 youth centres (Somi, 2016). In 2002, the newly established National Youth Observatory (ONJ) began organising regular consultations, information sessions and studies to promote better knowledge about Tunisian youth. The ONJ played an important role in raising awareness and building the capacity of Tunisian young people after the 2011 revolution.⁶ The ONJ is currently active in collecting the opinions of young people on their situation and on politics-related issues and publishing them.⁷

The 7th of September 1987 declaration gave priority to youth participation in the decision-making process. Accordingly, young people were able to hold seats on elected committees and in the national consultative bodies.⁸ The Ministry of Youth and Sports is the main governmental body responsible for youth policies and projects. The Ministry of Youth and Sports is responsible for the implementation of youth policies. For instance, the ministry elaborated the Youth Strategy

2009-2014. However, as youth presents a cross-cutting policy field, various ministries and departments are typically involved in the formulation and delivery of youth-related policies and services. Services to young people are delivered through centralised administrative units and a network of youth centres.⁹ The National Youth Observatory is part of the Ministry of Youth and Sports and is in charge of promoting communication and dialogue among young people, conducting surveys in order to identify young people's needs, and organising youth consultation. However, the Ministry of Youth does not play a major role in the current process of formulating an Integrated National Youth Strategy due to the lack of sufficient steering and coordination capacity.

In terms of education and employment, it must be taken into consideration that young Tunisians are not a homogeneous group and that while the situation of unemployed university graduates has often dominated national discourse and policy, other socioeconomic groups of young people face distinct challenges to inclusion. And yet very few policy instruments address them (The National Employment and Training Observatory and the ILO, 2013). There is still a lack of recognition of non-formal education because only a few individuals employed in the youth sector are conscious of the necessity to rethink education and increase access to non-formal education. The others are trapped in the academic system.

Aiming to enhance employment and alleviate poverty, Tunisia developed a large system of active labour market programmes (ALMPs), constituting the core of its labour market policy. In fact, many active labour market policies have been implemented over the last four decades, aimed at reducing the gap between labour market needs and school and university education by providing complementary training that enables jobseekers to either join the labour market with better knowledge and suitable skills or build their own businesses and become self-employed (ETF, 2014).

However, the perceived benefits remain limited. ALMPs are mostly unknown to young Tunisians. Most programmes reinforce spatial disparities by overly focusing on urban areas along the coast. Only a few programmes are available to young people in the interior and southern regions (World Bank, 2014).

Most ALMPs are also tailored to young university graduates, despite the fact that the absolute number of young Tunisians without work and without a secondary or university degree is about

3.5 times larger than the number of university graduates. In addition, most programmes lack rigorous monitoring and evaluation, inter-agency coordination, and enforcement of criteria, which creates disincentives for young people to search for employment (World Bank, 2014).

In 2015, the national dialogue on the education system's reform was launched in Tunisia under the patronage of the Education Ministry, in collaboration with the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) and the Arab Institute for Human Rights (AIHR). The reform comes as a result of the failures of the education system felt all the way to university level since a college degree does not guarantee employment anymore, and the higher the level of education, the higher the unemployment rate.

The national dialogue also opened the door for new stakeholders to have their say regarding the school-to-work transition. For while the government, represented by the Ministry of Education, remains the major stakeholder in any proposed educational reform, the other main ministries (technical, industrial, vocational training, economy, etc.), the employers' organisations, technical unions, and educational institutions (universities, higher technical institutions and colleges) must be consulted. However, no evidence or reports could be found on the consultation mechanisms implemented.

During the post-uprising era, youth policies have shifted from state monopoly to competition with international stakeholders, especially in the fields of social inclusion and civic participation (Euromed, 2012). The Tunisian state's monopoly on the design of youth policies is now being replaced by many more multilateral interventions as the growing influence of international stakeholders operates both directly and indirectly (Somi, 2016).

The revolution led to the creation of a number of NGOs and youth civil initiatives that are carrying out more dynamic and creative work on youth than any public institution. However, because of the lack of overarching coordination, particularly regarding work with public authorities, this community of NGOs often notes that their impact is minimal.¹⁰ The creation of the National Youth Council is seen as an obvious solution. For when young people get engaged in civil society, they do not do so for personal gain, but to improve their environment. The National Youth Council helps to fight stereotypes about the Tunisian youth, who are graduates that are motivated, hungry for knowledge, open-minded, open to dialogue, multilingual and ready to make great efforts and sacrifices.¹¹

b- Cooperation with international actors in the youth field in the country

Straight after the 2011 revolution, embassies and international organisations' programmes targeted the Tunisian youth directly. In addition, externally funded Tunisian organisations, thousands of which have been created since 2011, allow donors to reach young Tunisians indirectly (European Commission, 2012). One example is Sawty, "the young Tunisians' voice". It is a partner of the French Institute, the co-organiser of the 2013 Youth Forum, and is now on the board of UNESCO's NET-MED Youth programme.¹²

The international stakeholders are not only investing their resources in support of democratic transition, they are importing their ideology and trying to adapt programmes to the local context. For example, the Council of Europe's action plan entitled "Neighbourhood Co-operation Priorities for Tunisia 2012-2014" intended "to assist the process of democratic transition in Tunisia". In the sub-chapter "Investing in Young People" the stated overall objective was "to support the Government in its youth policy-making through ... promoting European democratic values amongst young people" (Council of Europe, 2012).

The European Council, in partnership with the League of Arab States, the Tunisian Ministry of Youth and Sport and the UNFPA organised a symposium called "Arab Spring: Youth participation for the promotion of peace, human rights and fundamental freedoms" on 28-29 August 2012 in Tunisia. 120 policymakers, experts, researchers, youth organisations and young people attended. In the opening speech, the President of Tunisia referred to the fact that: "The Tunisian revolution had been led by youth and needs to succeed, as the price for a possible failure would have to be paid mainly by young people".¹³

In addition to their direct and indirect interventions targeting the Tunisian youth after the revolution, foreign stakeholders are playing a growing role in the design and implementation of the Ministry of Youth's projects. Examples of such programmes are: the Agora Project designed by the British Council, which aims to train young community journalists; the World Bank's report *Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion*, and UNESCO's NET-MED Youth programme (along with the European Union). All are playing an important role in the efforts to reshape Tunisian youth policies. Hence, national initiatives are gradually being replaced by foreign ones.

The NET-MED Youth Project in Tunisia (Networks of Mediterranean Youth 2014-2017) aims to increase young people's contribution to the development and revision of public policies on youth.¹⁴ From the 4th to the 6th of March 2016, participants from the NET-MED Youth programme and other youth organisations gathered in Tunis to discuss the setting up of a National Youth Council. The council aims to serve as an appropriate framework through which young people can participate in analysing public policies, elaborating strategies and formulating recommendations related to youth issues.¹⁵

Recommendations and conclusions

The marginalisation of youth is associated with social exclusion and tends to occur simultaneously along multiple axes, so policies that address only one aspect of marginalisation, such as improved access to education, may be too narrow to overcome exclusion more generally. In this regard, a set of recommendations can be set forth for the national policymakers, as well as international organisations working for youth policies in the country.

Youth organisations have played and continue to play, an important role in youth empowerment and policy in Tunisia. Youth centres, along with cultural centres, are one of the main sources of knowledge. These institutions are educational entities that offer young people the possibility to access a wide range of recreational activities – training, raising awareness, etc. – which gives them the chance to blossom, to express themselves, and to develop their imagination. Youth centres have given youth what is considered an interesting and constructive experience. In these institutions, young people have found a mixed space of artistic and physical expression of civic and citizen participation, among others (NCS-Tunisia-1). Youth and student organisations should have the opportunity to voice concerns and offer solutions about educational policies and regulations.

Gender disparities must be addressed with proper school-to-work policies that provide a gender analysis and solution to the limited access of women, and especially educated women, to the education and labour market. Gender gaps remain significant barriers limiting equal access to economic opportunities. Despite Tunisia's gender equality policies, surprisingly few young Tunisian women are working. Hence, more in-depth studies and incentives are needed to target women.

Enabling youth voices to be heard resoundingly by enhancing initiatives, such as the Youth Council and national dialogues among the youth. These methods are efficient ways to increase youth participation in decision-making processes.

Young people and their representative bodies must be recognised as stakeholders in the implementation of national youth policies, a system referred to as co-management. This means engaging a range of youth and student organisations, as well as national and local-level youth councils that can serve as channels for the voice of youth on critical public policy issues.

Governance frameworks must be readjusted towards youth demands and needs in order to enhance the economic environment for job creation, increase the impact of youth programming, and scale up inclusive approaches to policymaking and policy and service delivery. Mainstreaming youth concerns in public governance would redirect the attention of policymakers towards an integrated framework for youth policy and more inclusive and pro-youth policy outcomes. The youth-governance relation must be discussed with a focus on public sector integrity, public budgeting, public human resource management, regulatory policy, local governance and gender equality (OECD, 2015).

It is more accurate in the Tunisian case to speak of plural strategies concerning youth than a single youth policy.¹⁶ This means national policies that target the multi-dimensional features of youth inclusion are required. Policies and programmes that target youth should include education and employment policy reform, local economic development, and innovative youth service delivery with youth participation. This is formulated into a three-lens cross-sectoral approach to reach more effective youth policies by engaging different ministries and partners such as the ministries of youth, education, economics and social affairs, the labour unions and employment organisations, and so on, as follows:

- Access to work and economic empowerment;
- Active citizenship and civil participation; and
- Social inclusion and youth-friendly services.

All should have gender as a cross-cutting theme and aim at “addressing gender inequalities”.

It is worth remembering that “Employment, Liberty, and Dignity” was the slogan used for the January 2011 Tunisian revolution. Six years later, the figures and facts show that not much has been achieved. To achieve “employment”, the focus should be on “access to work and economic

empowerment”. “Liberty” cannot be secured unless there is active civil and democratic participation of youth in all walks of society, especially the political process. And, accordingly, “Dignity” cannot be achieved if young people feel they are excluded, and if there is social discrimination.

ANNEX I

Youth engagement in organisations and political parties

		Gender of respondent					
		Male		Female		Total	
		Number	% Stratum	Number	% Stratum	Number	% Stratum
Belong to a cultural association	Yes, as a sympathiser	40	29.2%	35	25.5%	75	54.7%
	Yes, as a participant	23	16.8%	20	14.6%	43	31.4%
	Yes, as a donor	3	2.2%	0	0.0%	3	2.2%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	4	2.9%	12	8.8%	16	11.7%
	Total	70	51.1%	67	48.9%	137	100.0%
Belong to a humanitarian or charity organisation	Yes, as a sympathiser	59	33.9%	52	29.9%	111	63.8%
	Yes, as a participant	14	8.0%	15	8.6%	29	16.7%
	Yes, as a donor	1	0.6%	1	0.6%	2	1.1%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	12	6.9%	20	11.5%	32	18.4%
	Total	86	49.4%	88	50.6%	174	100.0%
Belong to a neighbourhood association	Yes, as a sympathiser	28	40.6%	24	34.8%	52	75.4%
	Yes, as a participant	9	13.0%	0	0.0%	9	13.0%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	7	10.1%	1	1.4%	8	11.6%
	Total	44	63.8%	25	36.2%	69	100.0%
Belong to a women's association	Yes, as a sympathiser	12	23.5%	32	62.7%	44	86.3%
	Yes, as a participant	0	0.0%	6	11.8%	6	11.8%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	0	0.0%	1	2.0%	1	2.0%
	Total	12	23.5%	39	76.5%	51	100.0%
Belong to a youth club, sports club or the Scouts	Yes, as a sympathiser	90	26.9%	78	23.3%	168	50.1%
	Yes, as a participant	97	29.0%	50	14.9%	147	43.9%
	Yes, as a donor	2	0.6%	0	0.0%	2	0.6%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	10	3.0%	8	2.4%	18	5.4%
	Total	199	59.4%	136	40.6%	335	100.0%
Belong to a union	Yes, as a sympathiser	28	36.8%	27	35.5%	55	72.4%
	Yes, as a participant	11	14.5%	7	9.2%	18	23.7%
	Yes, as a donor	1	1.3%	1	1.3%	2	2.6%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	0	0.0%	1	1.3%	1	1.3%
	Total	40	52.6%	36	47.4%	76	100.0%
Belong to a political party	Yes, as a sympathiser	34	33.7%	31	30.7%	65	64.4%
	Yes, as a participant	17	16.8%	10	9.9%	27	26.7%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	2	2.0%	7	6.9%	9	8.9%
	Total	53	52.5%	48	47.5%	101	100.0%
Belong to a political movement	Yes, as a sympathiser	29	51.8%	20	35.7%	49	87.5%
	Yes, as a participant	1	1.8%	1	1.8%	2	3.6%
	Yes, as a donor	0	0.0%	1	1.8%	1	1.8%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	2	3.6%	2	3.6%	4	7.1%
	Total	32	57.1%	24	42.9%	56	100.0%
Belong to a group seeking to provide services to the	Yes, as a sympathiser	33	45.8%	26	36.1%	59	81.9%
	Yes, as a participant	4	5.6%	2	2.8%	6	8.3%
	Yes, as a donor	1	1.4%	0	0.0%	1	1.4%

community	Yes, performing voluntary work	3	4.2%	3	4.2%	6	8.3%
	Total	41	56.9%	31	43.1%	72	100.0%
Belong to a faith-based group	Yes, as a sympathiser	22	56.4%	13	33.3%	35	89.7%
	Yes, as a participant	2	5.1%	1	2.6%	3	7.7%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	0	0.0%	1	2.6%	1	2.6%
	Total	24	61.5%	15	38.5%	39	100.0%
Belong to a religious association	Yes, as a sympathiser	25	45.5%	18	32.7%	43	78.2%
	Yes, as a participant	6	10.9%	1	1.8%	7	12.7%
	Yes, as a donor	0	0.0%	1	1.8%	1	1.8%
	Yes, performing voluntary work	2	3.6%	2	3.6%	4	7.3%
	Total	33	60.0%	22	40.0%	55	100.0%
Belong to another group/association	Yes, as a sympathiser	0	0.0%	2	50.0%	2	50.0%
	Yes, as a participant	1	25.0%	1	25.0%	2	50.0%
	Total	1	25.0%	3	75.0%	4	100.0%

Youth participation in events or civil actions before 2011

		Gender of respondent					
		Male		Female		Total	
		Number	% Stratum	Number	% Stratum	Number	% Stratum
Before 2011: Political meeting or activities	Every day	3	8.1%	1	2.7%	4	10.8%
	More than once a week	1	2.7%	0	0.0%	1	2.7%
	About once a week	6	16.2%	1	2.7%	7	18.9%
	About once a month	4	10.8%	5	13.5%	9	24.3%
	A few times a year	6	16.2%	10	27.0%	16	43.2%
	Total	20	54.1%	17	45.9%	37	100.0%
Before 2011: Donation to a party or an association	Every day	2	9.1%	0	0.0%	2	9.1%
	More than once a week	2	9.1%	0	0.0%	2	9.1%
	About once a week	1	4.5%	0	0.0%	1	4.5%
	About once a month	1	4.5%	2	9.1%	3	13.6%
	A few times a year	7	31.8%	7	31.8%	14	63.6%
	Total	13	59.1%	9	40.9%	22	100.0%
Before 2011: Collect signatures	Every day	2	11.8%	0	0.0%	2	11.8%
	More than once a week	2	11.8%	0	0.0%	2	11.8%
	About once a week	1	5.9%	1	5.9%	2	11.8%
	A few times a year	5	29.4%	6	35.3%	11	64.7%
	Total	10	58.8%	7	41.2%	17	100.0%
Before 2011: Night watches	Every day	24	27.3%	0	0.0%	24	27.3%
	More than once a week	7	8.0%	1	1.1%	8	9.1%
	About once a week	5	5.7%	0	0.0%	5	5.7%
	About once a month	5	5.7%	2	2.3%	7	8.0%
	A few times a year	34	38.6%	10	11.4%	44	50.0%
	Total	75	85.2%	13	14.8%	88	100.0%
Before 2011: Demonstrations	Every day	2	3.8%	1	1.9%	3	5.8%
	More than once a week	3	5.8%	1	1.9%	4	7.7%
	About once a week	4	7.7%	1	1.9%	5	9.6%
	About once a month	4	7.7%	0	0.0%	4	7.7%
	A few times a year	25	48.1%	11	21.2%	36	69.2%
	Total	38	73.1%	14	26.9%	52	100.0%
Before 2011: Strike	Every day	1	2.9%	0	0.0%	1	2.9%
	More than once a week	3	8.6%	1	2.9%	4	11.4%

	About once a week	1	2.9%	0	0.0%	1	2.9%
	About once a month	3	8.6%	3	8.6%	6	17.1%
	A few times a year	13	37.1%	10	28.6%	23	65.7%
	Total	21	60.0%	14	40.0%	35	100.0%
Before 2011: Violent action	Every day	2	11.1%	0	0.0%	2	11.1%
	More than once a week	1	5.6%	1	5.6%	2	11.1%
	About once a week	1	5.6%	0	0.0%	1	5.6%
	About once a month	2	11.1%	0	0.0%	2	11.1%
	A few times a year	6	33.3%	5	27.8%	11	61.1%
	Total	12	66.7%	6	33.3%	18	100.0%
Before 2011: Electoral campaigns	Every day	2	6.7%	0	0.0%	2	6.7%
	More than once a week	2	6.7%	0	0.0%	2	6.7%
	About once a week	2	6.7%	0	0.0%	2	6.7%
	About once a month	3	10.0%	1	3.3%	4	13.3%
	A few times a year	11	36.7%	9	30.0%	20	66.7%
	Total	20	66.7%	10	33.3%	30	100.0%
Before 2011: Political participation via the internet	Every day	6	17.6%	3	8.8%	9	26.5%
	More than once a week	4	11.8%	2	5.9%	6	17.6%
	About once a week	2	5.9%	1	2.9%	3	8.8%
	About once a month	2	5.9%	1	2.9%	3	8.8%
	A few times a year	5	14.7%	8	23.5%	13	38.2%
	Total	19	55.9%	15	44.1%	34	100.0%

Youth participation in events or civil actions after 2011

		Gender of respondent					
		Male		Female		Total	
		Number	% Stratum	Number	% Stratum	Number	% Stratum
Participated in party political meeting or activities in the last 12 months	Every day	1	1.5%	0	0.0%	1	1.5%
	More than once a week	4	6.1%	0	0.0%	4	6.1%
	About once a week	3	4.5%	0	0.0%	3	4.5%
	About once a month	4	6.1%	6	9.1%	10	15.2%
	A few times a year	28	42.4%	20	30.3%	48	72.7%
	Total	40	60.6%	26	39.4%	66	100.0%
Donation to a party or an association	Every day	1	3.6%	0	0.0%	1	3.6%
	About once a week	2	7.1%	0	0.0%	2	7.1%
	About once a month	0	0.0%	1	3.6%	1	3.6%
	A few times a year	13	46.4%	11	39.3%	24	85.7%
	Total	16	57.1%	12	42.9%	28	100.0%
Signatures or signed a petition	About once a week	1	3.4%	0	0.0%	1	3.4%
	About once a month	2	6.9%	1	3.4%	3	10.3%
	A few times a year	13	44.8%	12	41.4%	25	86.2%
	Total	16	55.2%	13	44.8%	29	100.0%
Participate in night watches	Every day	8	16.7%	0	0.0%	8	16.7%
	More than once a week	3	6.3%	0	0.0%	3	6.3%
	About once a week	2	4.2%	0	0.0%	2	4.2%
	About once a month	2	4.2%	0	0.0%	2	4.2%
	A few times a year	23	47.9%	10	20.8%	33	68.8%
	Total	38	79.2%	10	20.8%	48	100.0%
Participate in demonstrations	Every day	0	0.0%	1	2.0%	1	2.0%
	More than once a week	1	2.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.0%
	About once a week	2	3.9%	0	0.0%	2	3.9%
	About once a month	2	3.9%	1	2.0%	3	5.9%
	A few times a year	26	51.0%	18	35.3%	44	86.3%
	Total	31	60.8%	20	39.2%	51	100.0%
Strike	Every day	1	1.7%	0	0.0%	1	1.7%

	More than once a week	2	3.4%	0	0.0%	2	3.4%
	About once a week	2	3.4%	0	0.0%	2	3.4%
	About once a month	2	3.4%	3	5.2%	5	8.6%
	A few times a year	28	48.3%	20	34.5%	48	82.8%
	Total	35	60.3%	23	39.7%	58	100.0%
Violent action	About once a week	1	4.2%	0	0.0%	1	4.2%
	A few times a year	11	45.8%	12	50.0%	23	95.8%
	Total	12	50.0%	12	50.0%	24	100.0%
Electoral campaigns	Every day	1	2.2%	1	2.2%	2	4.4%
	More than once a week	2	4.4%	0	0.0%	2	4.4%
	About once a week	1	2.2%	0	0.0%	1	2.2%
	About once a month	1	2.2%	2	4.4%	3	6.7%
	A few times a year	23	51.1%	14	31.1%	37	82.2%
	Total	28	62.2%	17	37.8%	45	100.0%
Political participation via the internet	Every day	8	17.4%	1	2.2%	9	19.6%
	More than once a week	4	8.7%	0	0.0%	4	8.7%
	About once a week	3	6.5%	0	0.0%	3	6.5%
	About once a month	3	6.5%	4	8.7%	7	15.2%
	A few times a year	12	26.1%	11	23.9%	23	50.0%
	Total	30	65.2%	16	34.8%	46	100.0%

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12. It is worth mentioning that Sawty has received a grant of US\$60,000 from the Open Society Foundation. It also received funds from other international donors including the American Embassy (Somi, 2016).
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Researching
Arab Mediterranean Youth:
Towards a New Social Contract



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The SAHWA Project (“Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract”) is a FP-7 interdisciplinary cooperative research project led by the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) and funded by the European Commission. It brings together fifteen partners from Europe and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries to research youth prospects and perspectives in a context of multiple social, economic and political transitions in five Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon). The project expands over 2014-2016 and has a total budget of €3.1 million. The thematic axis around which the project will revolve are education, employment and social inclusion, political mobilisation and participation, culture and values, international migration and mobility, gender, comparative experiences in other transition contexts and public policies and international cooperation.

