National Case Study

MOROCCO

Institut des Hautes Etudes de Management
Rabat, Morocco

HEM
La performance réfléchie

Sahwa
Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract
www.sahwa.eu

This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 613174

General Data

Country	**MOROCCO**
Localisations (name)	**MA**
Code of National Case	**NCS- MOROCCO -1**
Keywords	Informality, marginality, employment, entrepreneurship, innovation, Internet

Abstract

Short description of the main points. Summarise related with clusters.

If we were to summarise the main findings of the SAHWA national case study pertaining to Morocco, we would say that the youth are constantly torn between social, collective marginality and the individual, economic quest for autonomy. Not that political participation is absent – it is instrumental and multi-faceted, but not overtly predominant in the public sphere. This could be explained by the weak impact of education and employment policies on knowledge, the importance of virtual and alternative spaces for observing youth practices and giving them new opportunities, and the lack of confidence in institutions and migration alike. Young people's representations, in the post-2011 context, are thus directed inwardly, more towards personal success than collective actions.

Contextual introduction

Since the end of the 1990s, youth participation in Morocco has come to be seen as crucial, in terms of their capacity to be agents of change and producers of value for the future of the country. This official rhetoric and vision are very much highlighted, for instance, in the report "50 Years of Human Development and Prospects for 2025" (RDH50: 2006). Despite this interest, there is currently a lack of knowledge regarding the practices and perceptions of young people.

Before looking in more detail at this category per se, it would be useful to consider various contextual indicators pertaining to public policies, gender equity and political participation in relation with youth. This would help us understand how discrimination and incentives, as well as empowerment policies contribute (or not) to youth social involvement. Besides this, it would give us hints about their degree of marginality and/or emancipation, potential and/or real autonomy.

It is very important, at this level, to differentiate between policies launched officially and data with government stamps on it, and the actual dynamics that we only manage to gauge through field research and surveys. When we look, for example, at initiatives related to youth in Morocco, we realise that, besides education and training programmes (debated at length below), since 2011 there has been a thorough policy to coordinate youth groups at ministerial level, with the help of the World Bank, but also at NGO levels, with plenty of funds coming mainly from American and German foundations, with a specific focus on leadership, empowerment, innovation and entrepreneurship issues, as well as on SMEs, with reinforced policies on employment and self-employment.

The strategic decision to allow for fairer job access within existing economic systems is still pending in Morocco, as is the case in most non-oil-producing Arab countries. Meanwhile, we note that Moroccan public policy in this field for 2013-2016 is centred on the integration of educated unemployed candidates, giving incentives for self-employment and the development of professional training curricula. The main impact of such a strategy, so far, is that it develops access to precarious, uncertain jobs or merely to training programmes.

The new Moroccan law on self-entrepreneurship, came into force in November 2015, has certainly encouraged some young start-ups to launch their activities. This confirms the trend seen in Tunisia, for example, where 17% of job creation between 2005 and 2010 was due to small start-ups. But this formal phenomenon is still marginal compared with its informal counterpart. It is noteworthy, according to the latest data on Morocco, that the self-employment rate in the informal sector rose in the 2000–2007periodfrom 69% to 74.5%, bearing in mind the strong correlation, today, between youth unemployment, school failure and access to informal activities (developed below).

When we ask young interviewees in our national survey on a specific topic to assess the impact of public policies, we see that on entrepreneurship and start-up launching, for example, 53% still depend on their parents' assistance and only 18.3% rely on bank loans, while 17.8% use government employment aid mechanisms.

The centrality of economic issues in Morocco shouldn't veil two main youth concerns: political participation and gender. When it comes to politics, three main dimensions seem necessary to distinguish. The first has to do with the relationship of youth with political engagement and participation. The figures, in this regard, show that 76.3%are not involved at all in any sort of political or societal organisation, 82.9% neither participate in nor initiate demonstrations, 84.9% do not take part in any political activity online, and only 11.6% participate at least once a month in a political meeting or gathering.[1]

Should we explain this phenomenon by the supposed indifference of youth towards politics? Actually, as learnt from the scholarly analysis of the aftermath of 2011 in Morocco, it is clear that young people are trying to invent new forms of engagement and mobilisation. The main change that occurred in the public sphere, as the political scientist, Mounia Bennani Chraïbi, points out, has to do with the "normalisation of protests and attitude towards authority". The third dimension, which stems more clearly from our fieldwork, concerns how young people act politically in their everyday activity. As stated in our focus groups, they are doing so through "self-organisation, collective organisation and underground economy as a way to express their lack of confidence in the state".[2]

[1]Figures from variables 61 and 62 in the national survey (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016).
[2]Bennani-Chraïbi, Mounia and Mohamed Jeghllaly, "La dynamique protestataire du Mouvement du20 février à Casablanca", *Revue française de science politique* 2012/5 (vol. 62), pp. 867-894.

On men-women relationships among Moroccan youth, it is clear, as pointed out in the last sociological report dating back to 2000[3], that the gap between laws, values and perceptions is constantly growing. Change and the predominance of conservative values are actually causing unexpected drawbacks. The main one concerns the lack of gender equity in the economic sphere, the effect of which is two-fold: general and specific.

In general terms, the level of women's economic integration, evaluating their contribution to the workforce and marketplace, but also their degree of autonomy, emancipation and rights' negotiation, fell from 30% in 1999 to 25% in 2012 (the world average being 51%). These low performance levels, calculated according to the gender gap indicator established by the World Economic Forum, rank Morocco 128th of 135 countries on the scale of women's economic participation. This declining trend has been confirmed lately by the official report produced by the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (ESEC), which pointed out, via expert member Fouad Benseddik, that "there is a negative consensus about women exit from economic activities and their tendency to go back home".[4]

In more specific terms, young women are paradoxically less inclined or encouraged to work when they are graduates and more likely to have formal or informal activity when they are in a more precarious situation. For less qualified young women, working -as explained through our fieldwork-is either a way to have social recognition or to have some financial autonomy but is also associated with hard work (*tamara*) and temporary employment. Various reports by the OECD, but also by the women's entrepreneur's association, AFEM,[5] make it more and more clear that "young women do not just need any job, they need an emancipating one", which is not always the case. Limited access and the unsteady integration of women into the economy are partly due to social harassment, conservatism and patriarchy, but also to the lack of gender-centred public policies.[6]

Socioeconomic focus and mixed methodology

Youth surveys in Morocco are a very recent practice, dating back just to the mid-1990s.[7]These studies focus mostly onthe urban youth (high school and college students). In addition, they often do not address a specific issue but an array of items. And since the scarcity of investigations pushes researchers to address a wide range of questions, all youth surveys in Morocco are still explanatory.

[3]Bourqia, R., El Ayadi, M., El Harras, M. &Rachik, H. (2000); Jeunes et valeurs religieuses, Eddif, Casablanca.
[4] CESE Report on gender parity, 2016 (translated by Cesem-HEM researchers).
[5]Association des femmes chefs d'entreprises du Maroc: http://www.afem.ma/.
[6]http://economia.ma/content/egalit%C3%A9-%C3%A9conomique-au-maroc-un-simple-mirage.
[7]Rachik, H. and M.S. Janjar: "Jeunes, culture et insertion. Etat des lieux", Report by the CESE, March 2012.

However, it is noteworthy that previous research projects have so far focussed on two main topics: unemployment and values. The first has been looked at from a macroeconomic point of view, mainly to stress the lack of job opportunities and, more specifically, the lack of diversity in this regard, as it has been analysed by anthropologists from a "collective action" standpoint. In parallel, the second aspect has been thoroughly analysed from a sociological point of view and, more specifically, in relation with religious beliefs and practices.

In the SAHWA Project, we chose to look at youth in Morocco through the lenses oftheir entry into the workforce instead of focusing on unemployment. The employment phase is the key element for understanding young people's attitudes, skills, practices and strategies. As explained by one of the participants in a holistic focus group "I think that the key element is employment, since young people feel [that in this way they may] gain independence from their parents and then switch to another stage (marriage, future, and other issues that are necessarily problematic for youth)" (MA_FG_3: 3, 2015).

After conducting the fieldwork, it appeared that the focus on youth employment was a relevant point of entry from which to describe and analyse current trends in Moroccan society in general, as well as in relation to the role and position of young people in the economy and society. This helps deconstruct certain narratives associated with young people – that they are lazy, jobless and disengaged from economic activities, and so on – and allows us to document, instead, how young people manage to get by despite all the difficulties (structural, economic, social and political). In the end, the different deliverables of the SAHWA Project showed the strategies and practices of young people to escape marginality and transform their lives and environment.

It is nonetheless striking that the results from the national survey showed that 82.3% of the young respondents are not active (jobless, or still students), while only 17.8% are active. More importantly, it is noteworthy that among those 17.8% who are active, a large majority workmainly on a part-time basis in informal activities (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016).

Table 1. Youth economic status

	Number	%
Employed	355	17,8%
Unemployed (jobless, student, others)	1.645	82,2%
Total	2000	100,0%

Source: SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016.

When you look also at those who are semi-active, the same trend is emphasised, since the status of 35.1% of these semi-active youth is independent, and 29.4% are employed part time (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016).

Table 2.What is your professional situation?

	Number	%
Employer	6	1.2%
Self-employed	178	35.1%
Full time employee	96	18.9%
Part time employee	149	29.4%
Apprentice	34	6.7%
Family assistant	6	1.2%
Other	38	7.5%
Total	507	100%

Source: SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016.

While informality seems prevalent and hints at unstable and/or precarious jobs, we realise that among the young people who are employed, 70% have no contract with their employer (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016). And since the need to survive is the master of all deeds, the urge to work, even in inferior or inadequate conditions, is very high.

Figure 1



Source: SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016.

The ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in three areas (urban, semi-urban and rural) and was mainly focused on three youth categories: emergent entrepreneurs (in Rabat), informal workers at Bab El Had *joutiya* (a group of informal cultural goods merchants, mainly in Bab El Had marketplace, at Rabat Medina), and rural agricultural workers (cf. Moroccan focused ethnographies). Considering these three categories, when thoroughly analysed by our research team, we were left with a paradoxical statement: even young entrepreneurs, be they urban or rural, are aware of their marginality with regard to society and capital, but they are more and more emancipated. This is the main thread through which this report sums up the results of SAHWA's deliverables. These pertain to the four clusters identified as constructing the marginalised position of young people, namely: knowledge, practice, opportunities and representation.

I. Knowledge

The failure of the Moroccan education system, as pointed out by our interviewees, is nothing new. The "schooling crisis" has been pointed out by many reports and also by political actors. The rhetoric of "crisis" and its pending "reform" has been a mainstream discourse among Moroccan officials since the early 2000s.

According to the Moroccan National Survey (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016), 50.1% were still at school during the survey period versus 37.9% who had left. 2.1% of young people were educated at home while 9.9% are illiterate. 92.8% of the interviewed were studying in Arabic (92.8%) with only 6.2% in French and only 0.9% English.

Regarding the level of education, with 42% having high school studies, 26.7% middle school, 22.4% higher education levels and 8.3% primary level, national tendencies are confirmed. The same goes for disciplines, with most interviewees studying or having studied mathematics and natural sciences and statistics (26.7%), 17.2% arts and letters, and 15.4% commerce, administration and law.

These statistics show that school failure and drop-out at an early stage are still quite high. The reasons why young people quit school are various: 27.4% consider studies to be difficult; 11.5% are obliged to work/to help their family; 10.5% were excluded from school; 6.9% left in order to prepare for marriage (mainly girls); 5.3% leaves chool because of the lack of transportation; 5.3% because of high fees (private schools); and 4.1% because school is not important.

Table 3: You said that you have never been to school, what is the main reason for that?

Farness of school	27	13.6%
Lack of transport	28	14.1%
Education is not important to my parents	30	15.2%
School fees, high	22	11.1%
Health problem (disability, etc.)	15	7.6%

Helping parents perform a task	32	16.2%
Parents' opposition	38	19.2%
Education is not important for people of my gender	5	2.5%
Other (specify)	1	0.5%
Total	198	100.0%

Source: SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016.

The link between knowledge imparted through education and the workplace is not linear. According to these figures (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016), 34.1% believe that their education prepared them for the labour market, 37.1% believe this to be "more or less" the case, while 28.7% think the opposite is true. This stresses education policies should be redirected to focus on employability, according to the last national reports on the matter.

Considering the main findings extracted from our range of ethnographic fieldwork, the issue concern not only access to employment but also to entrepreneurship. Young entrepreneurs with a public-sector school background who participated in our focus groups negatively assessed the role played by the school and the education system in this regard: "the education system is considered to be unable to facilitate and empower future young entrepreneurs. Worst, as described by those young people, it kills potential creativity because of the teaching methods (learning by heart, no creative sessions…). This is, according to them, true from primary school to university, but the main weaknesses are languages, risk-taking approach and creativity, and the management of universities" (MA_FE_2, 10, 2015).

School structures are not flexible and do not have the adequate knowledge and attitudes to bring entrepreneurial skills, attitudes and spirit out in long people

When you compare the know-how of youth with high cultural capital, as is the case of these entrepreneurs, and that of more poorly endowed youth who left school very early and work in informal marketplaces like Bab El Had, the assessment is not very different. This last group considered leaving school because it didn't offer them any assurance in terms of employment, income or success. Salim, a 21-year-old interviewee, considered that "the school, even if my results are good, would lead me nowhere" (MA_FE_3, 9, 2015).

Let's enlarge the scope to demonstrate what we are talking about. "The most recent figures about school failure in Morocco are striking. At least 14% of young learners leave the educational system at primary school level, 35% at the preliminary stage of secondary school and 62.5% don't manage to receive a secondary school diploma. Overall, from 6.4 million children initially inscribed at school, around 2.36 million leave at less than 16 years old" (MA_FE_3, 10, 2015).

Young agricultural workers coming from rural areas didn't have the choice. They just didn't go to school. Deprived of this right or forced to leave, these rural workers have a positive

opinion about school, regret their status and are determined to make their descendants pursue their studies. Their repentance vis-à-vis school is actually a common feature of these young labourers, male and female. They regret quitting school or not having had the opportunity to attend it. They all acknowledge the value of education. Thus they all assert their will to send their children to school, in order to learn and to have a better qualified job. For Rachid, his main dream is to send his children to school in order to live in decent conditions. As for Dounia, she aims for her children to attend school and avoid passing through the same drudgery as the one she experienced so far in her life (MA_FE_1, 2015).

Our survey (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016) somewhat confirms this tendency. 22.2% of young interviewees consider that if they got the chance to return to school they would take it, while 34.1% remain reluctant and 43.7% say they would not. The school is not the only place where young people acquire their knowledge and know-how. They do so through various channels.

From the point of view of young entrepreneurs, NGOs play a major role in this sense. “Their actions tend to help, lead, mentor and follow nascent entrepreneurs by giving them managerial knowledge and motivation. They train them to establish coherent and effective business plans. As we revealed in our focus group analysis, accompanying structures unanimously identify an important lack of managerial skills (business plans, marketing and finance know-how), despite good ideas and voluntarism. The other big issue is the lack of self-confidence. In this context, every accompanying structure, specialised in mentoring or not, mentors young entrepreneurs and motivates them. These structures also to a large extent show the quality of patience and voluntarism, as we observed their strong commitment to helping nascent entrepreneurs grow” (MA_FE_2, 6-7, 2015). The skills acquired through these training programmes are numerous: self-confidence, managerial skills, networking, creativity and innovation seem to be important drivers afforded by the accompanying structures.

It is striking how these parallel paths fill huge gaps caused by school deficiency. The public education system doesn’t offer such training from the point of view of entrepreneurs, either because it lacks resources or vision. This boils down to school failure as a possible path leading to career success.

In the case of youth at Bab El Had in Rabat (MA_FE_3, 2015), the informal market space is in itself an opportunity to acquire new skills by frequenting the different social networks that compose the venue. “Being there, explains Salim, 21 years old, sales assistant, made him meet some new mates, learn how to take photos live and how to manipulate Photoshop. Salim likes to learn new things from people who have more experience. It’s exactly the same with rap music. “I first met these guys in Agadir. They live in Salé. They speak French and mix languages. I like this”. Fascinated by their “style”, he is willing to become a member of the band and is learning music to be better integrated. Being at the heart of a place that sells cultural goods could be a stimulus for young workers ... Continuously, in

scattered units, teenagers, students and freshly employed youth come here for different cultural purposes: to encode satellite dishes allowing access to international TV channels; to buy film DVDs, music CDs or download songs online; to buy new video games or charge them onto chips; and last but not least, to buy or download computer programs" (MA_FE_3, 11-12, 2015).

Nevertheless, seen in a global perspective, such an individual's career successes do not lead to more economic innovation. From our focus group on youth and Bab El Had, it appears that the "underground economy produces geniuses but not engineers. They may have a technical know-how but not the capacity of perfect designers or appliers. We should be careful not to overestimate the capacity of these workers in the underground to find innovative solutions". This diagnostic is a criterion that differentiates Morocco from other countries: "the big difference with other countries is that these geniuses in mobile phone, software and satellite technologies in the underground sphere are not polished by training. They rely totally on themselves". Therefore, these youth "may earn their living but don't have clear personal and professional perspectives, just small dreams to attain" (MA_FE_3, 11-12, 2015).

Does this mean that we should acknowledge a direct correlation between school drop-out and the informal employment of youth? The socioeconomist, Rajaa Mejjati Alami, explains how this works out. "In surveys on the underground economy, this dimension of school failure doesn't appear from the beginning as a determining factor. So far, the main causes were migration from rural to urban areas. The centrality of youth in this sector is relatively new. It dates back to the last six years. This is clear in the field were we realised how populations concerned by underground economics are largely younger than about schooling drop-out in the design of training programmes. They are not tailored for these young people who are put out of the school system early. Most of the programmes target those with baccalaureates or those who failed at the baccalaureate exam, which make our training policy elite oriented … Our deficiency in terms of public training comes from the fact that it is made for formal companies, while the majority of productive actors within the Moroccan economy are SMEs who need young qualified workers… As a consequence, Morocco is not competitive enough in international markets, because it lacks a well-trained workforce. In terms of public policies, you add school system failure to a lack of specific training programmes, you end up with masses of underground workers" (MA_FE_3, 10, 2015).

The ethnographic observation of the agricultural workers in rural areas shows that young people there usually have a low level of education. Most quit school at an early age, others, especially women, never go to school. They do, however develop other skills and knowledge ("savoir-faire") through their work experience. Regarding agricultural tasks, these young workers (men and women) learned while doing the job. By watching others and mimicking their gestures at first, they eventually acquire the knowledge to do the job and end up mastering the profession and performing the profile. "On their first days at work, most pretended to know about agricultural work. This attitude was motivated by their fear of

being rejected. Our interviewees described, sometimes in detail, their first working day, and how they managed to observe and imitate experienced workers in order to learn. They always started by doing simple, easy tasks before moving on to more complicated tasks, such as planting onions, for instance" (MA_FE_1, 6-7, 2015).

II. Practices

Youth practices are various. Regarding political culture and participation, many studies pointed out the lack of interest in politics of the youth in general (see for instance *L'Economiste*, 2006).[8]Despite the many signs of political liberalisation that the regime has advanced recently, vote abstention and declining membership of political parties remain the major traits of a dominant political culture. Young people are not up for such formal/traditional political practices. From our fieldwork, it seems that for entrepreneurs voting is problematic. They consider it something necessary in order to change things and at the same time as something useless since the decision-making is not in the elected people's hands.

Bachir: "Voting does not change much here. We elect a government with no autonomy at all, and it cannot make decisions, even small decisions. The only person who has power in our country is the King, therefore whether we decide to vote or not does not make a great change. But we need to choose the right people" (MA_FG_2, 10, 2015).

And from the three case studies of ethnographic fieldwork, none of the interviewed youth is part of a political party. Many studies (see bibliography) evoke the current trend of the de-politicisation of youth and even their "apoliticism". Such studies gave the portrait of the generation of "committed" and "highly politicised" young people in the 1960s and 1970s, in contrast to the "apathetic" and "de-politicised" of the 1990s and 2000s.

After 2011, many studies highlighted a marked difference between a formal definition of political participation and an alternative way of doing politics.[9] From our fieldwork and above all the focus groups, it is clear that the major change associated with the so-called Arab Spring in Morocco is that young people's speech was freed, as can be seen, for example, on social networks.

From our rural ethnographic study on agriculture workers, the lack of interest and lack of confidence in political institutions are the main characteristics of the political culture of these young people. They don't trust politicians and are unable to engage in collective action in order to influence local policies, for instance. But, paradoxically enough, they are more

[8]http://ires.ma/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/jeunes_et_participation_politique_au_maroc.pdf.
[9]AbdelhadiGadi, "Des mouvements alternatifs en marche", *L'Observateur du Maroc et d'Afrique*, no.350, 15-21 April 2016, pp. 23-26.

and more involved within rural areas in entrepreneurship experiences, negotiating their autonomy with elders.

The agricultural workers are more focussed on saving strategies: “Young women often present other arguments. They work in order to financially support their family and to save a little bit of money for their own “project”. Some of them want to have their own money to be able to buy whatever they want because their families are poor and cannot provide them with clothes and other feminine stuff (like perfume, make-up, etc.). One young woman we interviewed for example explained that she had taken a micro-credit with the money she had earned and bought a cow. While others, in particular young divorced women, work in order to sustain their children and “to provide a better future for their children”” (MA_FE_1, 6, 2015).

In the urban context, we note both a large tendency towards multi-functionality, with partial economic activities, informality and a capacity to adapt to critical situations, and a desperate need for innovation to survive or live better. Regarding the nascent entrepreneurs, setting up an independent business venture is already a practice linked to their goals and culture. The innovation is also a feature that characterises them. Young people from Bab El Had are also prone to innovate in their domains: “The innovative skill of young Moroccans who, being unattracted or annoyed by Moroccan TV programmes, would transform existing American existing images adapting them to their daily lifestyle” (MA_FE_3, 13, 2015).

Without considering them as an alternative, young people’s virtual practices and their degree of connection to new media and information certainly tell us as much if not more about youth priorities, consumption models and ways of interacting with the external world. While the technological gap is still high (39.5% of non-users), it is noteworthy that multi-access uses are predominant.

Table 4 - Do you use the Internet?

	Number	%
Yes	1,210	60.5%
No	790	39.5%
Total	2,000	100%
Access point		
	Number	%
Home	1,107	91.5%
Internet café	734	60.7%
School	529	43.7%
Friend’s house	624	51.6%
Work	127	10.5%

Other (specify):	15	1.2%
Total	1,210	100.0%

Source: SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016.

As far as practices are concerned, we realise from the overall picture that young people are rather individualistic, loosely tied to institutions, aware that they have to depend on their innovation and alternative channels to be integrated economically, and, when involved in their activities, more likely to engage in some sort of collective action that is not branded as political but could have an impact on the group.

III. Opportunities

There are some opportunities that can benefit the youth in Morocco. The first is mainly linked to the institutional context, such as laws, the economy and politics i.e. global and macro-policies. For instance, in the case of entrepreneurs, the "liberalisation of some economic sectors, e-business development and waves of freedom coming from social and political changes can explain the desire of young Moroccans to become entrepreneurs. Also, the lack of trust in institutions and the possibility of making money more easily in informal sector ssupport this idea" (MA_FE_2, 6, 2015).

The second opportunity is the existence in Morocco of NGOs working with/for youth and the existence of accompanying structures. In the case of entrepreneurs such structures are primordial: "The accompanying structures, such as NGOs developing entrepreneurship and mentoring skills, bank foundations and crowd funding platforms, seem to put emphasis on one formula: inspiring the young to develop businesses"(MA_FE_2, 6, 2015).

In some rural areas in Morocco (like Saïss), agriculture is the main activity in the region. "This is the combined effect of liberalisation policies, the increasing access of individual farmers to groundwater, the integration of markets that were previously unconnected and the use of new technologies. These changes strongly altered the existing cropping patterns and over the last decades rain-fed agriculture has gradually been replaced by irrigated agriculture" (MA_FE_1, 5, 2015). These dynamics "have strongly altered existing labour relations, with offering **new work opportunities** as well as an increasing demand on the labour force, of which the majority is not declared. Young people often take up these new opportunities and young men in particular consider them to positively contribute to their professional and personal development. For young women the experiences are often paradoxical. They have to negotiate their independently earned income and their partial freedom in the context of the region's prevailing gendered socio-cultural norms. As such, an "informal" highly gendered labour market is growing, which is rarely studied and is not considered by public policies" (MA_FE_1, 4, 2015).

Besides macro-level opportunities from the global environment, young people can benefit from social networks in their immediate environment. Family, friends and other people from

"weak ties" (Granovetter, 1982) constitute an important social network for the youth. In the case of entrepreneurs, "networks are one key to success. According to them, interactions between entrepreneurs can create emulation, experience effects and learning" (MA_FE_2, 17, 2015).

The agriculture workers also use their primary social network to find their first job (cousins, close friends, etc.): "The labourers who we interviewed usually started working as agricultural labourers along with a friend or family member. An acquaintance introduces them to the group and to the farmer and they usually begin with "easy tasks". In the meantime they observe how the others are working and they quickly pick up the skills and know-how and professionalise" (MA_FE_1, 11, 2015).

From the survey (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016), 33.3% and 29.8% assert that they relied on their personal and familial networks in order to find a job.

Table 5 - How did you get your current job?

	Number	%
Placement by public employment office	17	3.4%
Placement by private employment office	30	5.9%
Answering an advertisement	27	5.3%
Personal contact	169	33.3%
Family contact	151	29.8%
Sending my CV to the employers	37	7.3%
Competition or exam	8	1.6%
Contacted by an employer	21	4.1%
Allocated by school/ high school after training.	9	1.8%
Creation of my business through my capital stock	33	6.5%
Creation of my business through national employment funding	5	1.0%
Total	507	100.0%

Source: SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016.

Migration as an opportunity: Mobility is an opportunity for young people since it allows them to acquire new knowledge/skills, to network and have rich experiences. The agricultural workers interviewed in Saïss asserted that: "The majority were born elsewhere (Fez, Meknes, Zerhoun, etc.). Their parents came searching for job opportunities and brought them along. Others have family living in the region and while looking for a job opportunity decided to move the region. Now they came they consider themselves as "at home" and perceive the recent migrants as strangers (*berraniyin*)." (MA_FE_1, 6, 2015).

Such mobility for labour purpose concerns both men and women, and occurs in cross-country and rural-urban dynamics. Our interviewees (MA_FE_1, 2015) had not experienced overseas mobility even though they thought about it – but not really as an

aspiration. Female workers did know about seasonal migration and were familiar with women workers in strawberry farms in Spain. One of our interviewees, for example, spoke about labour opportunities in Spain, but she said that they are only for divorced women and not for single ones

"None of our informants has travelled abroad. Dounia considered that people have a misconception of abroad and that opportunities are everywhere: one has to work without going outside country. She argued that AinTaoujtate is considered "France's poor" (*franssa dial lmeskin*) (MA_FE_1, 13, 2015).

In the survey (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016), 84.5% said they were not interested immigrating. Such an attitude towards foreign mobility has to be contextualised. Since 2008,[10] young people's interest in Europe has decreased somewhat due to the "economic crisis".

Table 6 - Would you like to emigrate or re-emigrate?

	Number	%
Yes	165	8.2%
I am undecided	146	7.3%
No	1 689	84.5%
Total	2 000	100.0%

Source: SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016.

Once again, in terms of opportunities, the Internet seems an important criterion. Among those who have daily access to the Internet (33.5%), 40.2% use it to check emails daily, 53.6% to chat, 32.4% to surf news websites, 28.7% to play video games and 51.3% to go on social networks. Used both as a window for expression and to access information that is banned on classical channels, it is also an alternative way to look for a job (24.6%) or to do business (22.3%) (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016).

Table 7.Internet practices of daily users

SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016	Every day	
Read and write emails	486	40.2%
Chat with friends	649	53.6%
Surf general culture websites	444	36.7%
Surf news websites	392	32.4%
Download songs, films or TV programmes	395	32.6%

[10]Ait Mous, "The Interest of Moroccans toward their Euro-Med Neighbours", in: The Anna Lindh Report 2014: http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/report/interest-moroccans-toward-their-euro-med-neighbours.

Play video games	347	28.7%
Go on social networks	621	51.3%
Visit adult websites	341	28.2%
Visit religious websites	351	29.0%
Visit dating sites	385	31.8%
Visit militant websites or blogs	298	24.6%
Look for work or send CVs	296	24.5%
Online business	270	22.3%
Total	5,275	33.5%

Source: SAHWA Youth Survey, 2016.

Overall, we see that, while external mobility is no longer a collective dream, and public policies mainly produce unsuccessful programmes (Injaz[11], Moukawalati[12], etc.) and fail to regulate the marketplace, the youth are still heavily dependent on networks of family and friends and more and more aware that new opportunities could stem from alternative and innovative spaces.

IV. Representation

In 2011, when young people engaged in demonstrations, creating what so far has beencalled the February 20 Movement, some politicians stigmatised them as immature (using the pejorative Moroccan Arabic term "*brahch*"). Such an attitude says a lot about the general representation of the youth in Moroccan culture. Indeed, young people are generally perceived as immature and irresponsible.

In the other side, the dominant official discourse on youth since the early 2000s (for instance RDH50) focusses on youth as "a factor of change" and as an opportunity for Morocco. The paradox to highlight here is this dichotomy of perceiving youth as "immature" while at the same time considering them the element of change in society. From our holistic focus group, for instance, it appears that young people are associated with change, with the future, with making things happen tomorrow, etc.

After 2011, international NGOs and other actors gave youth more attention. Young people themselves got more confidence, became much more open and aware of their rights; the presence of social media has contributed to changing the youth mentality and the way they communicate before and after.

[11] http://injaz-morocco.org/.
[12] http://www.moukawalati.ma/.

As for the young entrepreneurs, they "have strong beliefs and construct their self-confidence by doing and achieving, and manage to avoid uncertainty by taking risks as far as possible" (MA_FE_2, 9, 2015). Such an attitude is a sign of a positive representation of youth as enactors of their dreams.

The other examples of young people interviewed in the SAHWA Project in Morocco showed that most of our interviewees are aspiring to change their current situation. They don't consider themselves victims, they rather do whatever it takes to get through (via work, entrepreneurship or marriage for women).

Youth strategies for overcoming difficulties (school, job, etc.):

A social differentiation can easily be noticed between the two main profiles of youth in our fieldwork (urban entrepreneurs and informal workers) regarding their strategies.

Indeed, the nascent entrepreneurs benefit mainly from the accompanying structures (Injaz, Inactus) in order to become entrepreneurs and set up their start-up. In the process, they also develop many skills: language skills and communication, taking risks, adaptation, etc. Such skills are also linked to the personal traits of these young entrepreneurs. Kawtar, for instance said: "Learning to be an entrepreneur for a young woman is hard work and a question of courage, communication and adaptation (effort and rapid adaptation)". Kawtar is "a master at multitasking, switching from organisation to communication to information, and solving problems. "*Every problem is a solution for an entrepreneur, problems are not problems for me, they are only opportunities to develop new activities*" (MA_LS_1, 7, 2015).

It's also interesting to remark that even though school is stigmatised by our interviewees, for some entrepreneurs who started their business while still studying, the school played a complementary role, even a small one. In the case of Kawtar, for instance, who seems more passionate about her entrepreneurial project than her courses (in a prestigious public engineering school), she is aware of "the idea of learning from the technical courses with the aim of helping her business activity" (MA_LS_1, 7, 2015).

Sami is another young entrepreneur who learned a lot through organisations designed to help youth. For him, networking is a main strategy to develop in order to set up a project. He's also focusing on learning more skills (language and skills linked to the idea of his project). For instance, he: "Learned as much as he could about printing. He surfed the web and used any possible media to learn about inks, machines, different types of surfaces… Therefore, once they start the business he will be capable of running the production process all by himself. In 2011, he participated in a personal development programme and started reading books on his smartphone. In an open-access library, he types "getting rich" and starts reading in English to improve his language skills" (MA_LS_3, 8, 2015).

The narratives from nascent young entrepreneurs interviewed in the SAHWA fieldwork showed clearly that this category's strategies are mainly to benefit from the accompanying structures and to develop personal skills linked to the culture of entrepreneurship (working hard, discipline, communication, networking and, more importantly, the will to help people and to make a difference).

In the informal spaces, young workers do not have such opportunities to think of making a difference. They are struggling to survive and make a living for their families. The migration and mobility inside the country seems to be the main strategy these young people develop to find solutions totheir problems. Rachid, for instance, used to live in Fes before moving to Ain Taoujtate and leaving his first job (cobbler) to become an agricultural worker. Currently Rachid has been working for 14 years in the agricultural sector and has a significant network. He explains that people trust him since each year he works with the same farmers (MA_LS_2, 3, 2015).

In the process, he has learned many skills, mainly networking and trust-building: "His know-how, network, and his professional reputation created trust among farmers who gradually gave him more responsibility in the work and provided him with the opportunity to upgrade his professional status … To become a *cabran*, Rachid explains that you need to be a trustworthy person ... Since he has been working now for many years in the sector he has developed a certain know-how and a kind of expertise. He knows the different specialities of the labourers and knows which task to give to whom" (MA_LS_2, 3, 2015).

The story of Rachid reflects a way of living on the margins where young people's concerns relate to dignity and earning money for the family. "As a male worker, through his experiences and professional network he has been able to gradually upgrade his professional status and obtain more responsibilities and a higher salary. Yet, his work as *cabran* also comes with new insecurities and risks. His story also reveals the precariousness of his "informal" livelihood and his preoccupation with survival. His job search is accompanied by a quest for dignity both professionally and socially – his wish to build a house, establish a profitable project (which is not related to agriculture) and send his children to school" (MA_LS_2, 5, 2015).

The last narrative comes from Salim, a young man who left school and migrated from Biougra to Rabat looking for job in the informal marketplace. Besides migration as a strategy, Salim's main strategy is based on saving: "Not only did Salim manage, from very little, to afford reasonable living conditions, but he moved to a better neighbourhood and bought a computer that helps him keep connected and entertained at home" (MA_LS_4,5, 2015). The other strategies developed by Salim in order to make it through an informal competitive and suspicious market were his curiosity and will to learn new skills. "Besides his curiosity and his observation skills, he learnt very quickly to go to cybercafés to know more about any new machine or software. He's not a geek, but a well-informed salesman and that makes quite a difference" (MA_LS4_10, 2015).

Salim was also very aware of networking and trust-building. “There is in Salim’s attitude a mixture of good education, morals and young businessman’s ethics. Where did he learn all this? He always talks about his mother’s guiding principles and his will to succeed without being unfair towards others, as happened to him undergoing injustice” (MA_LS_4, 9,2015).

Conclusion

"Youth in Morocco": rather than constituting a homogenous group, they have expectations and trajectories whose disparities are difficult to summarise

Whether working, investing or surviving young Moroccans are at different levels influenced by the space and the regulator's attitude. Our field observations in Bab El Had and previously in Derb Ghallef,[13] show that they manage, however, as resilient, adaptable actors, to constantly reinvent their destinies.

We may deduce from our national survey and fieldwork that young people sometimes look brave and courageous because of their active social and political involvement, but that this is true above all when we look at them individually. As mentioned by trainers who have experience in leading young people in Morocco, most of them face uncertainty collectively rather than individually. Young people in Morocco need social interactions, institutions and networks to develop their capacity for risk-taking.

In comparison with other SAHWA countries, the youth in Morocco look more centred on personal strategies and public policies that push them towards entrepreneurship and self-employment solutions. It would be highly interesting, for the sake of research, to understand how public policies and personal strategies on economic solutions to situations of stalemate or the risks of upheaval interact and influence each other.

It is also challenging, on migration issues, to dig deeper through the field research to see the extent to which media representations and geopolitical contexts have an effect on youth representations of mobility, and to identify the rationale behind differentiated practices of migration to the northern shore of the Mediterranean.

[13] http://economia.ma/content/derb-ghallef-le-bazar-de-linformel.

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Annex

Table 1: Main surveys of young people

Authors	***Year***	***Surveyed***	***Location***	***Sample size***	***Method***
Adam, 1963	*1961*	*High school students*	*Casablanca and Fes*	*418*	*questionnaire*
Pascon and Bentahar, 1969	1968	Rural youth	4 villages	296	*interviews*
Tozy, 1984	1983	Students	*Casablanca*	400	*questionnaire*
Palmer et al., 1984	1978-79	Students	*Rabat*	500	*questionnaire*
Suleiman,	1989	Pupils	*Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech*	1269	*questionnaire*
Bourqia, El Harras and Bensaid, 1996	1992	Students	Rabat	500	*questionnaire*
Bennani-Chraïbi	89-91	Young people in education	Several villages	157	*interviews*
CNJA, 1993		Young people: 19-34 years old			*questionnaire*
Bourqia El Ayadi, El Harras and Rachik, 2000	1996	Students	Rabat	865	*questionnaire*
El Yazami	97-98	Moroccans	Several villages	1500	*questionnaire*
ENV, 2004	2004	Moroccans	Morocco	1000	*questionnaire*
Min. of Youth, 2004	2001	Young people: 15-29 years old	Morocco	18,109	*questionnaire*
L'Economiste, 2006	2005	Young people: 16-29 years old	Morocco	776	*questionnaire*
El Ayadi, Rachik	2006	Moroccans	Morocco	1000	*questionnaire*

and Tozy, 2007					
Tessler, 2000	1995-96	Young people: + 18 years old	Rabat	1000	*questionnaire*
HCP, 2006	2006	Pupils, 2nd year of baccalaureate	276 secondary education institutions	1271	*questionnaire*
Bowen et al., 2008	2003-04	Young people 18-24	Fes and Tangiers	100	*interviews*
Bekkaoui et al., 2011	2010	Young people 15-30	Morocco	1054	*questionnaire*
Affaya and Guerraoui, 2006	2005	Young Moroccan leaders	-	100	*interviews*

(Source: CESE Report, 2012).

الصحوة
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This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 613174.

The SAHWA Project ("Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract") is a FP-7 interdisciplinary cooperative research project led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and funded by the European Commission. It brings together fifteen partners from Europe and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries to research youth prospects and perspectives in a context of multiple social, economic and political transitions in five Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon). The project expands over 2014-2016 and has a total budget of €3.1 million. The thematic axes around which the project will revolve are education, employment and social inclusion, political mobilisation and participation, culture and values, international migration and mobility, gender, comparative experiences in other transition contexts and public policies and international cooperation.