ATLANTIC FUTURE

SCIENTIFIC PAPER

06

# The Atlantic as a new security area? Current engagements and prospects for security cooperation between Africa and its Atlantic counterparts

**John Kotsopoulos**
University of Pretoria

**ABSTRACT**

Despite significant socio-economic strides, the question of security – human, state and regional -- remains a persistent challenge in much of Africa. Foreign actors from all corners of the globe have had varying degrees of security presence on the continent, ranging from military interventions to capacity building, and from project funding to trade in arms and equipment. Much of this foreign presence, however, has come either from individual countries or else from already established regional organisations, like the European Union. Far less has involved cooperation between more disparate actors, such as those representing either side of the North and South economic divide.

This paper thus seeks to explore nascent trends in North–South security cooperation in Africa's Atlantic region, with a particular focus on the regions represented by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). Is an Atlantic area for cooperation forming? Some progress in domains such as maritime security is already discernible. This paper also identifies further areas for cooperation. Atlantic cooperation in Africa is an idea with rich possibilities.

*The first draft of this Scientific Paper was presented at the ATLANTIC FUTURE Workshop, University of Pretoria, June 2014.*

ATLANTIC FUTURE – Towards an Atlantic area? Mapping trends, perspectives and interregional dynamics between Europe, Africa and the Americas, is a project financed by the European Union under the 7th Framework Programme. European Commission Project Number: 320091.

**ATLANTIC FUTURE SCIENTIFIC PAPER**

# 06

## Table of contents

# 1. Introduction

There has been a steady rise in Sub-Saharan Africa's economic and political prominence in the 21st century. A period of unprecedented growth[1] has coincided with important achievements in many regions of the continent in democracy and governance. This period has also corresponded with a marked appetite for pan-African and regional integration as shown by the establishment of the African Union (AU), the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the enhancement of regional groupings such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC) to name a few. And while Africa has always been a pole of attraction -- for better or for worse -- for international actors, this period has witnessed not only individual countries such as India, Brazil and China making new trade inroads in Africa, but a burgeoning multilateralisation of engagement. This is exemplified in the regular summits between, for instance, China and Africa (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation - FOCAC), Japan-Africa (TICAD), Africa-South America (ASA) and Africa and the European Union (EU), as well as an unprecedented placement of African issues on the international multilateral agenda, via structures such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the G8 and of course the United Nations (UN).[2]

Yet despite these important and largely welcome changes, Africa still remains a laggard in a host of crucial areas. From human development, to internally displaced peoples, to the number of persistent conflicts, to rising terrorism, and only the partial fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals, continent-wide indicators suggest insecurity in the broadest sense persists. Insecurity affects not only states but also the individuals residing within those states. Understanding the problem in this way has crucial policy implications, both in terms of the expansion of security cooperation within Africa and between Africa and its international partners, including many Atlantic countries.

This paper will adopt a broadened security definition to assess the multifaceted ways in which Atlantic countries from Europe and North and South America impact regional African security agendas and initiatives. The purpose is two pronged: a) to ascertain whether there is a discernible Afro-Atlantic security area and b) to identify target areas for Atlantic cooperation going forward. Furthermore, the idea of an Atlantic Future poses important questions about transcending the persistent North-South cooperation divide and exploring how and where a united approach on ostensibly equal footing is realistic. In this regard, maritime and food security will be identified as two areas of particular importance for facilitating North-South Atlantic cooperation.

## 1.1. Security redefined

The gradual expansion of the meaning of security, away from the exclusive domain of states and broadened to address threats to the individual (Krause and Williams 1996),

[1] According to the Economist, between 2001 and 2010 half of the world's ten fastest growing economies came from Sub-Saharan Africa.

[2] For instance, 2005 was declared "The Year of Africa", that same year the OECD Paris Declaration strengthened international consensus on aid effectiveness towards Africa, the G8's Commission for Africa was introduced at Gleneagles and the UN General Assembly endorsed the decision of the Secretary-General to establish the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA).

has created fertile ground for change in the way in which security issues are framed. By encompassing both the state and the individual, threats to security multiply and include previously disconnected areas such as economic, environmental, food and health security (Hough 2008). The immediate physical implication of this redefinition is that security transcends frontiers and becomes a transnational issue, rather than the exclusive domain (and responsibility) of the sovereign state. This creates compelling scenarios which contrast with the long held assumptions of the post-colonial as well as Cold War periods. Indeed, while the Cold War globalised security in a dichotomous manner it also provided predictable Soviet and American norms which circumscribed possible security action. This stands in contrast to the post-Cold War era, which is actually encumbered with many of the same persistent threats (such as terrorism, arms proliferation, internal and external population displacement, and drug trafficking) no longer has as predictable a set of responses

Thus, as the meaning of security has widened and deepened, so too have initiatives to address it. Of course traditional "hard" security threats still exist and have elicited more typical military responses, yet new focus is now given to understanding the sources of insecurity, like conflict and poverty, and long term solutions and prevention are sought. This invariably necessitates complex, coordinated and costly approaches – approaches that often cannot be afforded by African countries or regional entities by themselves.[3] Transnational approaches are a compelling way forward, with the timing increasingly "ripe" as the inviolability of the post-independence sovereign African nation-state gradually softens.

Moreover, development, which for decades was considered an entity separate from political considerations, has become increasingly linked with the sustainment of good governance and security. As former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said: "we will not enjoy development without security, or security without development" (Annan 2005). This phrase is often linked to what is labelled the "security-development nexus", signifying a belief that the two variables are mutually constitutive/dependent (Hettne 2010). The implications of this assumption have been profound since questions of development posed as potential security threats – "securitisation" -- often garner increased interest and consequently funding from the west (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). Controversially however, the nexus has also permitted donor countries to place traditional security funding under the umbrella of development assistance– often appropriating development funding originally earmarked for more traditional development purposes.[4]

## 1.2. Many voices across the Atlantic

To establish the status of, and prospects for, an Afro-Atlantic security area a breakdown of the Atlantic presence on the continent must first take place. There are a considerable number of Atlantic actors – North and South America and Europe -- with bilateral, multilateral, regional and trans-continental levels of cooperation at play. These connections often stretch back to colonial times but have become more layered in the post-independence period. Yet, as in the case of development funding which often is plagued by donor overlap and repetition, most Atlantic countries with security

[3] The bulk of the African Union's budget comes, for example, from non-Africa donors.

[4] An example has been the EU's African Peace Facility. While lauded as a large fund targeted at supporting the AU's peace and security operations, it has also been criticised since it uses money taken directly from the European Development Fund – a fund originally earmarked for aid and trade assistance within the rubric of the Cotonou Agreement.

interests in Africa tend to pursue them alone or through predictable channels (e.g. EU), not only with respect to hard security matters such as the trade in arms, but even with soft security initiatives such as police training.[5] There are of course some notable exceptions such as maritime security which will be examined below.

In terms of Europe, the EU is a security actor in Africa with a strong Atlantic heritage. It is also the most integrated regional organisation in the world, with cooperation taking place at a multitude of levels and sectors. With respect to security initiatives in Africa and beyond, a balancing act takes place between member state and EU interests. This is particularly evident in hard security matters where the modest range of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions so far deployed owe less to systematic EU-wide evaluations and more to the particular interests of a handful of former colonial member states (Styan 2012). The EU does promote cooperation between its member states in other security sectors**,** such as conflict prevention, but the organisation still remains hobbled by the challenge of coordination on matters often still considered within the domain of the sovereign state. An emphatic example is the EU Battlegroups, operational since 2007 but not once deployed.

It is difficult to identify another regional Atlantic organisation with as comprehensive a presence in Africa as the EU.[6] Attention thus focuses to the numerous key Atlantic countries with a significant presence at all levels of security (hard and soft) in Africa. In Europe, these broadly defined "Atlantic" actors are a mix of former colonial powers and countries with a long-standing presence in the region, including France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland and Spain. Across the North Atlantic there are of course the USA and Canada. In South America, Brazil stands out as a major and growing presence on the continent accounting for 70% of the USD39 billion in trade between South America and Africa in 2011(Glickhouse 2013). Argentina also has a more limited presence.

Given this disparate patchwork of Atlantic interests and voices in Africa, as well as the still prominent North-South cleavages impeding cooperation, what can be surmised in terms of an Afro-Atlantic security area? What contribution do the aforementioned actors make in areas such as capacity building, security operations and funding? Do Atlantic actors play complementary roles in the region, or is there competition? And what about the inherent contradictions, given that Atlantic countries are also direct and indirect contributors to many of Africa's security challenges, such as the often contested provision of arms or the demand for drugs? What follows is a breakdown of how this working paper will "take stock" of the situation.

## 1.3. Methodology: case selection and key variables

Clearly the range of actors, security threats, and initiatives to combat them is too broad for one working paper. However, a targeted and comparative look at cooperation between a limited number of African inter-regional organisations and their most prominent member states with their Atlantic partners is a useful exercise in identifying trends, converging and diverging objectives, and security instruments. Thus for the

[5] Cooperation between Atlantic partners has, however, been evident in security finance at African Union level. The EU and US have provided significant funding for most of the AU's peace and security missions (AMIS, AMISOM, AMIB). See (de Coning 2014).

[6] The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for example, does not have a presence in Sub-Saharan Africa. The relatively recent Africa-South America (ASA) summit process does not function under the umbrella of a South American regional organisation.

sake of analytical management and parsimony, regional organisations in Africa will be used both as instruments in their own right, but also as agglomerations of countries with an Atlantic orientation.

The first organisation to be analysed will be ECOWAS. Aside from its geographic Atlantic orientation, ECOWAS has been chosen because of the breadth and comprehensiveness of its security-sector initiatives. The second organisation of focus will be SADC, which is an organisation with an ever-expanding remit in the field of security. It is also a player in a region with its own share of security concerns, particularly in with respect to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) but also encompassing post conflict states such as Mozambique and Angola. ECOWAS and SADC also claim membership of sub-Saharan Africa's two largest and most influential economics, Nigeria and South Africa respectively.

Of course inter-regional relations tell only part of the story of Atlantic cooperation in Africa, particularly since only the EU has a significant presence in the region. Therefore to bring individual countries into the analysis, an "a la carte" approach is proposed. This means that aside from the EU and its inter-regional security initiatives with ECOWAS and SADC, separate initiatives of some the key EU member states – namely France and the UK, and where applicable others – will also be accounted for. On the Americas side, focus will be placed on the USA and Brazil and their relations with the aforementioned organisations. Finally, the same logic will also apply on the African side. Therefore the key units of analysis will be SADC and ECOWAS, but mindful of the sometimes limited range of security cooperation at the regional level, focus will also be placed on some of the more prominent members of each organization, with Nigeria and South Africa being most prominent.

The goal of this paper is to ascertain whether an Atlantic area is indeed discernible. What is the impact of European, North American and South American actors on the transformation of security threats in West and Southern Africa? What contributions have Atlantic actors made in these regions, mindful both of positive and negative impacts?

The ambition of this paper is to explore Atlantic participation in security initiatives that span the gamut, from military to human security operations. Yet, In order to keep the potentially unlimited size of such a research endeavour reasonable, the number of security related variables examined will be limited to four: : operations, capacity building, funding and trade. The first, operations, is intended to account for areas in which Atlantic actors directly participate in security initiatives. This can include European Security and Defence Policy missions, anti-piracy initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea, and other direct interventions such as the 2013 French mission in Mali. Questions to be mindful of include if the missions are unilateral or indicate signs of Atlantic cooperation. Of course operations can also take on other dimensions, such as a training capacity, hence the introduction of a second variable, capacity building, which allows focusing on one of the more popular ways in which non-African actors contribute to security sector initiatives on the continent. This can take many forms such as training, planning and management, workshops, funding/budgetary support, and also industrial cooperation. Topics addressed can include conflict prevention, management and resolution, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). Another form of contribution to security initiatives is of course helping to fund them – the third variable in the analysis. Funding accounts well for areas of multilateral cooperation, since it is estimated that 77% of the UN peacekeeping budget in 2011 was directed towards Africa (de Coning 2014). Finally, there is security-related trade. This includes arms sales, which is often a

murkier area of interaction between North and South than the other variables cited. The South African arms deal scandal in the late 1990s is a case in point.[7] The darker side of trade also serves as an important counterpoint when assessing the impact of Atlantic actors in Africa.

Finally, care will be taken to establish where any cooperative ventures between Atlantic actors in Africa is taking place. Do, for example, Brazilian and American diplomats coordinate any of their projects on the ground? Do they at least discuss them as would be expected of donors in the development, agriculture or governance domains?[8] Furthermore, are cooperative ventures more evident between Atlantic and non-Atlantic partners? Does reaction to actors from further afield such as China reinforce South-South axes within and between Atlantic actors? Ultimately then, is cooperation at a comprehensive or consequential enough level to justify the idea of an Atlantic area?

# 2. African regions: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS)

## 2.1. SADC

To understand the presence of an Atlantic community in the Southern African region, we must first understand the opportunities for cooperation that SADC offers its partners. SADC took its present form in 1992, succeeding the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (which was established in 1980). SADC is organised around a series of legally-binding protocols -- 26 in total -- touching on a wide variety of policy areas, including economic development, infrastructure, agriculture and politics, defence and security.

The latter protocol has benefitted from an institutional framework called the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-Operation (SIPO). Subsequently SIPO helped to establish several security tools such as the SADC Standby Force (SSD), the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), the Early Warning Centre, the Electoral Advisory Council, and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO). This array of tools belies, however, a lack of implementation. “The production of a business plan for addressing [SIPO’s] 130-plus objectives never materialised, and no serious effort was made to develop strategies for operationalising the Organ (sic)” (Nieuwkerk 2012). There was (and is) also the unresolved question of coordinating these tools with the African Union’s own security mechanisms. This has been further compounded by the failure of SADC members to implement the 2012 iteration of SIPO (“SIPO II”).

There has, however, been more tangible progress with respect to the creation of a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, a Standby Force and a SADC Brigade. The latter, which mixes military, police and civilian components is already operating in one

[7] The 1999 arms deal scandal in South Africa involved almost US$5b in contracts, many of which it is alleged were tainted by enormous bribes paid by a range of European contractors.

[8] Many recipient countries now undertake “System Wide Approaches” or SWAPs in order to better coordinate donor funding.

theatre, the DRC, under Tanzanian leadership. Work is also being done in cooperation with the AU on a Regional Early Warning Centre for Southern Africa.

What then does this mean for security in SADC and what space does it give partners to cooperate? First, the inconsistent performance of SADC's security tools does not mean that they are without purpose, since their overall purpose remains to serve as guides to collective behaviour by setting out common objectives and agendas. Second, many of the aforementioned bodies are in the nascent stage of their development, offering important opportunities for potential international support and the facilitation of innovative ideas.

## 2.2. ECOWAS

Established in 1975, ECOWAS is arguably the best established regional organisations in Africa. Its fifteen members represent a diverse range of countries, with significant cleavages in terms of economic development. While the vast majority of members are considered Least Developed Countries (LDC), Nigeria's recent GDP recalculation has made it Sub-Saharan Africa's largest economy, while Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Cape Verde enjoy middle income status. Originally envisioned as a vehicle for economic integration (which it remains), the remit of ECOWAS responsibilities expanded with protocols on non-aggression and mutual assistance in defence by the late 1970s and most emphatically with the launch of peace support operations in Liberia in 1989 under the auspices of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

ECOWAS has also developed numerous protocols which address conflict prevention in a comprehensive manner, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (PRMCR) which declared human rights and democracy as conditions for peace and stability (ECOWAS 1999). In 2008 the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was introduced. Of note is the Framework's embracement of the concept of human security and its multifaceted fourteen-prong approach to conflict prevention. "It represents probably the most comprehensive example of conflict prevention doctrine produced by an African regional organization" (Piccolino and Minou 2014).

> Today the ECOWAS region remains challenged by conflict and insecurity stemming from political upheavals (Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Mali), terrorism (Nigeria, Mali) and piracy (Gulf of Guinea). It is thus unsurprising that in terms of "hard" security, ECOWAS boasts the longest standing security instruments in Sub-Saharan Africa, having established itself as a legitimate security actor long before the launch of the African Union in 2002.[9] Guided by the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999), ECOWAS has deployed numerous missions in its own backyard. In turn, this level of commitment to peace and security operations has garnered a corresponding amount of attention from international partners, including those within the Atlantic realm.

[9] The AU's predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) played a historically meek role in peace and security operations, launching just four security missions in thirty nine years of existence.

# 3. Atlantic Actors' involvement in Africa: mapping out existing relations

## 3.1. Brazil

Brazil is in the process of rapidly expanding its presence in Africa, capitalising on the important historical role of Africans in the development of the country, the cultural influence of Africa and the Portuguese language which Brazil shares with several SADC and ECOWAS members. In fact, three of Brazil's four largest trade partners in Africa (Nigeria, Angola and South Africa) are from either of those two organisations (Alves 2013).

Brazil's turn towards Africa has been premised on a variety of motivations, including growing trade links, an aspiration to increase its international profile, and the notion of South-South solidarity (Alves 2013). Trade between Africa and Brazil has also grown precipitously, from US$4.2 billion to US$27.6 billion in a decade (Stolte 2012), with 90% of Brazil's imports from the continent coming in the form of natural resources. Driven by President Lula, Brazil's diplomatic presence in Africa has similarly expanded with, for example, an increase of embassies from 18 to 37 -- with an analogous increase in African representation in Brasilia (Alves 2013).

Brazil's projects in Africa span a range of activities, with the greatest allocation of funding made towards the agriculture sector (21% 2003-2010) (ABC 2010). This allocation has implications for food security, since Brazil provides capacity building and training for improved farming efficiencies, often using the Ministry of Agrarian Development and its agribusiness arm EMBRAPA (World Bank 2012). In terms of explicit security initiatives, "public security" garners 6%.

It is important to underline here just how Brazil styles itself: as a South-South leader, relating to the challenge of development through its own experience and hence making a conscious effort at breaking away from the North-South dynamic of donor-client relationships in its relations abroad.

> South–South cooperation ideally emphasizes principles of mutual respect, sovereignty, and cooperation. This contrasts with the traditional model of North–South relations, in which developing countries receive aid linked to economic and political conditions from developed countries that often include their former colonial rulers. New multilateral South–South tools—such as the IBSA Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger—are in effect sidestepping established mechanisms and organizations, in part because the traditional institutions are perceived to be dominated by developed countries' interests (World Bank (2012).

### Brazil-SADC

Brazil's relationship with SADC is marginal and instead mostly focussed on bilateral relations with the member states. In fact, Brazil's presence as a security actor (training, funding and arms trading) in several major SADC countries is notable. In Angola, Brazil's footprint is in the process of rapid expansion with a 2012 partnership agreement signed between the two countries, including a joint defence committee to

facilitate and aid Angola's wish to develop its own national military industry (SAFPI 20 February 2013).

Brazil and South Africa also share an expanding security relationship, which touches on all of the four main variables of this analysis: operations, funding, training and trade. Brazil provides military assistance in the form training and logistics, including expertise in jungle warfare. In turn, South Africa is playing a consultative role for the 2014 football World Cup. In 2013 the two sides held an inaugural Joint Defence Committee meeting, pledging exchange lessons learnt in respective UN peace support operations, and exploring greater collaboration for the future (Department of Defence South Africa 2013).

In terms of arms trade, Brazil and South Africa have a complimentary relationship which stands in contrast to the usual unidirectional nature of trade of arms to rather than from Africa. The two partners are currently engaged in the co-development of the "A-Darter" missile. The South African arms manufacturer Denel Dynamics also provides components for the Brazilian short range homing MAA-1 "Piranha" missile (DefenceWeb 2013).

Elsewhere, Brazil has since 1994 made significant investments in Namibia through its Naval Support Mission in Walvis Bay. Brazil can in fact lay claim to building much of Namibia's naval capacity. Furthermore, the programme has been a considered both a material and political success leading to Brazilian authorities pondering its extension to other countries as part of a growing presence in Africa (Seabra 2014).

**Maritime Security**

The vast bulk of Brazil's foreign trade (95%) passes through South Atlantic ocean routes (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2013) making the Atlantic region not simply a trade zone of great interest to parties on both sides of the American and African continents, but also an area in need of security – hence the Brazilian impetus to drive further security cooperation in the region amongst its strategic partners. This broadening of security focus has also coincided with a notable growth in Brazilian defence spending. The 2008 National Defence Strategy linked increased spending with the need to protect natural resources and the 2012 Defence White Paper specified the importance of an expansion of Brazil's naval fleet (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2013). The South Atlantic and West Africa were also explicitly deemed as the eastern limits of Brazil's "area of strategic interest".

In terms of multilateral cooperation, Brazil's outward security turn has resulted in several cooperative initiatives with a variety of countries with some implications for Africa. One of the more prominent of these is the South Atlantic Peace and Co-operation Zone (Zopacas) which, though established in 1986, lay mostly dormant until kickstarted again in 2007 through Brazilian encouragement. The aim of the grouping is to bring African and South American states along the South Atlantic coast together in order to create a "zone of peace and cooperation" on explicitly South-South lines (United Nations RES/41/11). Membership to the organisation -- 21 African states and 3 South American – reinforces the Southern orientation. The 2007 Luanda Plan of Action and the first Africa-South America Summit (ASA) mandated the strengthening of regional cooperation on peace and security between the two continents with specific mention of the utility of Zopacas. Since then Ministerial level meetings of Zopacas have clarified areas of further cooperation and capacity building, such as seabed mapping, maritime security, environmental security, and joint defence operations (Defesanet 2013). Much of these plans are of course very recent and have yet to come to fruition.

Cooperation in terms of a larger Atlantic Community comprising North Atlantic countries faces some challenges, including the ongoing disagreement between the UK and Argentina regarding the Falkland Islands. Underlining this point, the Zopacas Ministerial meeting in Montevideo in 2013 called for "quick and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations" (Mercopress 2013

South Atlantic naval cooperation also exists in the form of biannual "Atlasur" joint and combined maritime exercises between the fleets of South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. Furthermore, there is the UNITAS multinational maritime exercise, which has been running annually since 1959. It is evidence of North-South cooperation in the Americas, with participants from all geographic regions, and even beyond with the inclusion of the UK. UNITAS does not, at this point however, include African navies. Moreover, the scope of Atlantic cooperation continues to widen; IBSAMAR is another example of maritime coordination between the IBSA partners, India, Brazil and South Africa.

Despite Zopacas' strong rhetoric, the Brazilian government continues to seek partnerships with North Atlantic partners – particularly in the area of military technology. For instance, in 2013 Brazil began production on a US$3.95 billion joint programme with France to build conventional and nuclear submarines (Reuters 2013). Relations between Brazil and the United Kingdom have also expanded since 2010, with the establishment of annual foreign policy "Strategic Dialogue" and increased diplomatic representation in each country. Turning towards human security, in February 2014 the "UK and Brazil in Partnership for African Prosperity" was launched, with the intention of improving coordinated support of African food security, agricultural productivity, and improving resource management (Hague 2014).

**Brazil-ECOWAS**

Brazil and ECOWAS held their first summit in 2010. Unlike the MOU between SADC and Brazil which was largely limited to infrastructure and technological development, Brazil and ECOWAS targeted a broader range of areas including political dialogue and security cooperation (CEDEAO 2010). A subsequent summit was due to take place in 2012 but is still pending, making it difficult to evaluate progress at this stage.

However, Brazil has been supportive of Gulf of Guinea anti-piracy measures, having made a series of visits with naval vessels in recent years, including a frigate to Nigeria to conduct anti-piracy training in 2012. Relations with Nigeria in particular have been growing, bolstered by a state visit of Brazilian President Rousseff in 2013 and including a commitment to encourage each side's defence ministers to explore greater cooperation in the domain of peace and security (Communiqué 2013).

Brazil's largest presence in the region is in Guinea Bissau in terms not only of development focused funding and projects, but also democratic institution building. In fact Brazil was designated to take the lead at the UN Peacebuilding Commission on the Guinea Bissau file, tasked with assisting in political reconciliation and economic consolidation (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2013). But Brazil's efforts – such as the Mission for Technical and Military Cooperation -- remain fraught with challenges related to Guinea-Bissau's political fragility. More success has been enjoyed in Cape Verde, where a Naval Support Mission, reflecting the Brazilian initiative in Namibia is bearing fruit with, for instance, military personnel training in Brazil.

A breakdown of the analysis above would look as follows:

**Table 1- Brazil security presence in West and Southern Africa**

| | Operations | Capacity Building | Funding | Trade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil-SADC (+member states) | No | Naval exercises (Atlasur, IBSAMAR, UNITAS, | Food security<br><br>Agriculture technology | Arms and equipment<br><br>+ development of missiles with South Africa |
| Brazil-ECOWAS (+member states) | Yes – Gulf of Guinea interdiction | Naval training | Food security | Arms |
| Atlantic Cooperation | Yes – limited participation in US backed exercises in Gulf of Guinea | Lusophone CPLP (Felino Exercises) Zopacas | UK-Brazil Partnership for African Prosperity | No |

Clearly Brazil has met with notable success in its attempt to position itself as a champion of South-South relations and offer an alternative path for African actors and the outside world. Brazil has actively promoted not only regional South-South security mechanisms like Zopacas but also South-South groupings like BRICS and IBSA, each of which is armed with some capacity to provide assistance to developing countries.[10] This has paid dividends, situating Brazil as a leader in the global south and with growing trade revenues in Africa.

Yet this global positioning does not necessarily preclude the participation of the North – something crucial if an Atlantic Community is to truly flourish. However, the traditional leadership role of the North would have to be contained. As former Brazil President Lula put "A new global political and economic geography will only be possible if actors with similar interests chose direct dialogue and join action in international fora" (Alves 2013).

## 3.2. United States

The nature of the USA's security presence in Africa differs profoundly from Brazil's. Cold War rivalries ensured that the USA had a strong security presence in many countries. The demise of the Cold War, combined with the already miserly trade statistics between the USA and Africa[11] gradually weakened American resolve in the

[10] IBSA, for example, is armed with a fund to assist developing country with incorporating best practices for fighting poverty and hunger.

[11] According to a 2009 US Congressional report, total trade (imports and exports) between the USA and Sub-Saharan African quadrupled between 1990 and 2007 from USD17 billion to

region. Interest in security and an active presence in the region were further setback in the 1994 Somalia "Black Hawk Down" debacle, which lead to the deaths of 18 American servicemen and hundreds of Somalis in the streets of Mogadishu. Such was the gravity of the event that the Rwandan genocide of the same year suffered from international inertia and fear of engagement in what were seemingly intractable and impenetrable African security issues. However, in 1998 the twin bombings of US embassies in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi and the identification of the then still obscure Al-Qaeda network as responsible, led to renewed focus on the internationalisation of African conflicts and then fomentation of terrorism. The increasing linkage of events previously considered isolated was further solidified by the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. In 2006 General Bantz Craddock underlined American sentiment when he said that Africa posed "the greatest security stability challenge" to the United States European Command (EUCOM).

The backlash following the contested decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, plus a belated acknowledgement that more than just brute force was required to win the peace in theatres such as Afghanistan, as well as Iraq, focus began to broaden from "fighting and winning wars" to embracing conflict prevention (2010). While the former category naturally limited the extent of active American engagement in Africa, the latter opened up a myriad of possibilities for operations in areas such as capacity building (Ploch 2011). The rising tide of "joined up" approaches to security, to include other levels of government (e.g. development and diplomacy) also opened up new possibilities and cooperative ventures with African and North Atlantic partners. The budget for initiatives Africa consequently expanded as well with an average of almost USD300 million being allocated for each of the years between 2010 and 2012 (Ploch 2011).

The most prominent manifestation of the USA's new and broadened focus on security in Africa was United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). Established in 2007, AFRICOM was a manifestation of the increased strategic importance of Africa to the United States on several levels: terrorism, energy security, geo-political security. It is one of six command centres set up by the Department of Defence for its military relations with various regions of the world. Prior to AFRICOM's creation, African command operations were divided between three Unified Commands (EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM). Despite the stated mandate of AFRICOM to cooperate with African states, the AU and other regional security organisations, the prospect of an American military presence on the continent led to an almost universally negative African reaction. Amongst the chief representative countries of SADC and ECOWAS, South Africa and Nigeria respectively, opposition was explicit (Mail & Guardian 2013).

Negative sentiments about the location of AFRICOM aside, its initiatives on the continent span the gamut, touching on all of the variables in focus in this study, and include cooperation with every major region and country.

## USA-ECOWAS

Alongside its relationship with the AU, ECOWAS represents an important AFRICOM security partner – a reflection of the organisation's comparatively well developed peace and security instruments but also the historical ties between the US and some parts of the region. It is also indicative of the strategic importance of a stable West Africa,

---

USD81 billion. As a share of total US trade, the percentages were a bit less dramatic: 1.9% in 1990 and 2.7% in 2007.

where up 15% of US oil supplies are estimated to be imported from (Chatham House 2012) and where maritime security, drug trafficking, terrorism and political instability provide a range of challenges with potential international ramifications (e.g. export of terrorism, illegal migration, drugs, disruption of trade routes).

Unsurprisingly, AFRICOM initiatives in West Africa tackle many of these challenges and touch on all of the four variables under analysis here. In terms of capacity building, there is the Africa Partnership Station (APS), an initiative which brings American and international naval forces together to train Africans involved in maritime security. Training exercises related to the ambition of the APS include the Obangame Express, which is an operation specifically targeting interdiction in the Gulf of Guinea. Another naval operation, Saharan Express, occurs on a biennial basis and attracts a combination of navies from West Africa and the North Atlantic to strengthen collaborative practices in the region.

Outside of the Gulf, a prominent programme with a human security dimension is Operation Flintlock, an annual exercise which brings together other North Atlantic actors (such as Canada, France, UK, Spain) to train African armies in the Sahel region to protect civilians. Similarly, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) is a capacity building programme, which provides training for military trainers with the purpose of better equipping African militaries to conduct peace support and humanitarian relief. The programme boasts 25 African partner countries and direct or indirect training of 229,000 peacekeepers since 2005 (Kurata 2012).

While the above can be classified as capacity building, in terms of direct security operations, the United States sent a small contingent of soldiers to help evacuate American citizens and diplomatic staff from the Liberian capital Monrovia near the end of the Second Liberian War in 2003 (Operation Shining Express).

**USA-SADC**

In the early 2000s a SADC-USA Forum was created. Areas of focus included US funding support for conflict prevention and management and a US contribution to human security focused refugee protection. However, the process has lost momentum, with no meetings of the Forum having taken place since.

However, while there may not be a singular dedicated channel of interaction between the USA and SADC, areas of security cooperation exist, particularly capacity building programs run by AFRICOM and focused on numerous regions, including Southern Africa. One of the most prominent is Africa Endeavour, a programme designed to improve command, control and communication capacities (e.g. “C4”). There is also Southern Accord, a joint exercise meant to improve responses to humanitarian disasters.

Beyond SADC, the United States enjoys a comprehensive relationship with South Africa, bolstered by a doubling in total trade over the last decade to USD16.7 billion in 2011 (Cook 2013). The relationship now includes a framework, a “Strategic Dialogue”, focussed on, among other things, food security, law enforcement and non-proliferation. The two countries also have a biennial military training exercise, Shared Accord.

United States arms sales to Africa are guided by the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme. Arms sales are, according to DSCA, “a form of security assistance” and “fundamental tool of US foreign policy” authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (*Defence Security Cooperation Agency*). Obliged by law, each year the Department of Defence and State Department produce an annual report on arms exports, known as

the "Section 655" report (Foreign Assistance Act). The latest figures from 2012 reveal a range of security related equipment sold to a variety of countries mostly in West and South Africa -- consistent with an Atlantic focus -- with South Africa being the most prominent partner for both heavy equipment (SIPRI) and light arms (NISAT). Of note, little if any of the armaments in the SIPRI database could be considered of an “assault” type nature, instead supply/transport equipment (e.g. light transport aircraft). Although not hinting of any sort of broader Atlantic cooperation, the USA also provided parts for aircraft or vehicles built elsewhere, such as South African Puma (Kenya) and Matador (Gabon) armoured vehicles (SIPRI).

Breaking down the US contribution to Atlantic security endeavours in Africa would look as follows:

**Table 2- USA security presence in West and Southern Africa**

| | **Operations** | **Capacity Building** | **Funding** | **Trade** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| USA-SADC<br><br>(+member states) | No | Naval training | Food security | Arms (light and heavy) |
| USA-ECOWAS<br><br>(+member states) | Yes – Gulf of Guinea interdiction | Naval and military training | Food security | Arms (light and heavy) |
| Atlantic Cooperation | Yes (Saharan Express- North Atlantic cooperation) | Yes (Operation Flintlock – North Atlantic cooperation) | No | No |

The role of the United States as unifier of disparate Atlantic actors is somewhat of a paradoxical one. As the sole superpower and global hegemon it’s actions are often viewed with either enthusiasm or suspicion. This is certainly the case in Africa. The controversy surrounding the original wish to establish AFRICOM on African soil can be juxtaposed with the enthusiasm which African and North Atlantic armies and navies embrace AFRICOM driven joint exercises.

In terms then of driving an Atlantic security community in Africa, the USA stands with a unique form of power to attract while arguably missing the moral leverage a Southern actor such as Brazil retains with its fellow Southern partners in Africa. This will be explored in the conclusion.

## 3.3. European Union

The European Union’s relationship with Africa stems back to the very nascence of the European Community and its founding Treaty of Rome in 1957. At that time the relationship was limited to a cadre of francophone countries in West Africa and focussed on trade and aid. The association gradually expanded to include more diverse African partners yet remained a a contested arrangement, criticised by many not least larger African countries like Ghana as a form of neocolonialism (Zartman 1971). Only in 1975, with the establishment of the Lomé Convention and the alignment of African countries under the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) did

the terms of the relationship change in Africa's favour. However, the relationship remained steadfastly "apolitical", steering away from issues of security, democracy and governance. It was the reversal of development gains suffered by the majority of African countries in the 1980s, plus the end of the bipolar divisions of the Cold War, which subsequently emboldened the EU to place political dialogue onto the agenda – even if African countries feared it was merely a pretext for imposing conditions on the terms of their aid and trade arrangements.

As a regional organisation, the EU is by definition a cooperative project between nation-states, including of course many with a geographic or political Atlantic orientation. The regional and multilateral nature of the EU has also facilitated inter-regional relations with organisations throughout the world, including of course Africa. The most comprehensive of these relationships on the continent is with the African Union, benefitting from regular Africa-EU summits (every three years) and guided by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). One of the eight partnerships – i.e. drivers -- of the JAES concerns peace and security, building on already existing EU funding support for African security, in particular the EUR300 million (2008-13) Africa Peace Facility (APF). The APF has provided funding support to AU peacekeeping missions such as AMISOM in Somalia and also crucial help for African Peace and Security Architecture – an ambitious AU rationalisation of its security functions and mechanisms (*Europeaid*).

Since 2007 the EU has also had the Instrument for Stability (IfS) at its disposal; a rapid reaction funding mechanism, designed to finance conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building initiatives quickly and when other sources of EU funding are not available. Complimenting the IfS is the 2009 Peace-building Partnership (PbP) which seeks to build the capacity of partner countries in addressing crisis and conflict situations. Further strengthening the EU's capacity in this area is the Conflict prevention, Peace building and Mediation Instruments Division, housed at the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Though not an Atlantic actor *per se*, the AU as the continent's comprehensive security actor cannot be overlooked since much of the EU's support of SADC and ECOWAS is of a complimentary nature to the greater ambitions of the AU for continent-wide security integration and regional conflict prevention (Constitutive Act of the African Union) (11 July 2000). The AU is mandated to encourage regional integration on the continent. While the main focus is on integration in terms of trade facilitation, attempts have also been made to better coordinate the security instruments of regional organisations with those of the AU (Schaefer 2012). This has included cohesion with respect to rapid response and early warning intelligence – areas in which the EU is playing a supportive role.

**EU-SADC**

The EU and SADC's relationship is largely guided by the 2000 ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement, with a strong focus on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (Regional Strategy Paper 2008-2013). Much of the EU's support for SADC is hence directed at trade and aid, as well as economic integration and institutional capacity building, most recently highlighted by the announcement of a EUR20 million Regional Economic Integration Support contribution agreement (Ministerial Meeting 2013). Under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) EUR116 million was targeted for the region (Europeaid).

Security is an area of focus too. Under the "Berlin Initiative", a biennial ministerial level between the EU and SADC, political dialogue is conducted to "contribute to peace, democracy and sustainable development in the SADC region" (*eeas.europa.eu*). In fact the EU-SADC security relationship touches on the funding and capacity building variables addressed in this paper. For instance, EU's Regional Political Cooperation Programme provides EUR18 million to strengthen SADC's capacity in peace and security, as well as politics and governance. Another EUR12 million is directed from the Institutional Capacity Development Programme to the SADC Secretariat in Botswana. The Technical Cooperation Facility (EUR 6 million) is an additional fund used to improve coordination, harmonisation and development.

In terms of EU security operations, none are conducted in concert with SADC. However, despite the still relatively small operational footprint of the EU as a security actor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has figured prominently in CSDP missions. In 2003 "Operation Artemis" oversaw the deployment of French-led EU troops to prevent further violence in the North East region of Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Another CDSP mission, EUFOR RD Congo, took place in 2006 to support a UN mission during the country's elections. Ongoing operations are the Security Sector Reform Mission (EUSEC RD Congo) and the Congo Police Mission (EUPOL).

Concerning maritime security, which as we have seen has been one of the focal points for Atlantic community cooperation, both the EU and SADC have committed to sharing information since both organisations have African maritime initiatives: SADC established an anti-piracy policy in 2011 with a particular focus on piracy migrating south from Somalia and into Mozambique ("Operation Copper"; *defenceWeb* A); the EU's current CSDP mission in Africa, "Operation Atalanta" (EU NAVFOR Somalia) has played an active role in mitigating the risk of piracy in East Africa. The EU even sought cooperation with SADC in 2012 regarding the flight of pirates from the Somali coast into Southern African waters (*defenceWeb* B).

**EU and SADC member states**

The EU's funding support of the member states of SADC comes in the form of development assistance channelled through the EDF. Funding is divided into project, sector and budget approaches and guided by country strategy reports. Explicitly security-related activities tend to fall within the human security category, including for example food security support (Angola) and humanitarian assistance (Mozambique). South Africa stands as something of an exception, since it also enjoys an enhanced relationship with the EU, manifested in a partnership agreement concluded in 2007. Regular summits since then touch on an expansive range of mutually shared issues, including dialogue on peace and security on the continent (South Africa-EU Summit Communiqué, 2013).

**EU Member States and SADC**

Several of the EU's "Atlantic" members make a contribution to SADC security initiatives either as funders or capacity builders. Some states also retain lucrative arms deals with members of SADC, as shall also be explored below. France's Reinforcement of African Capacity to Maintain Peace (RECAMP) programme, targeted among other regional groupings, SADC member states armies to help augment their peacebuilding capacities (2002). The programme was subsequently brought into the EU fold and operated between 2008-2010 as a mechanism to assist with the AU's ambition of

better coordinating continent wide brigades. Germany, through its development arm GIZ, provides multimillion euro support to both the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (which is an extension of SADC's ambition to create a functioning Standby Force) as well as broader regional integration in the area of peace, security and governance (GIZ 2013).

Several Atlantic EU member states account for the sale of both heavy weapons and small arms to the SADC region, particularly South Africa. The UK, France and Germany all sold equipment to South Africa at different times in the 2000s, including missiles and submarines (SIPRI). According to the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, in 2012 the UK and France racked up multimillion dollar sales of lighter weapons to South Africa and less to other SADC members such as Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana (NISAT 2012).

The focus here has been to investigate the degree to which the EU and SADC cooperate on security issues – and by extension member states with an interest and geographic orientation towards broader Atlantic cooperation. What can be surmised is that, despite the array of security initiatives, broader inclusion of non-European Atlantic actors is limited. This may be a consequence of inter-regional relations themselves, which tend not to favour the ad hoc since, as in the EU-SADC case, they already possess a degree of structure which limits the entry of third parties. There is of course the prospect of triangularisation of regional relations, such as the case of the EU-Africa and China Dialogue (FT). In the Atlantic case this could include North and/or South America. Yet this is arguably some distance away, considering breakthrough free trade agreements with both Mercosur and the USA are still pending after considerable delay. Another roadblock has been the case of Zimbabwe and its intractable president Robert Mugabe. Northern (including EU) condemnation of his political actions has led to criticism of meddling in some Southern African circles.

**EU-ECOWAS**

The EU-ECOWAS relationship, as in the case of SADC, is largely guided by the Cotonou Agreement and five year Regional Strategy Papers and a Regional Indicative Programme. Relative to SADC, the EU has apportioned a greater share of its EDF funding to ECOWAS, earmarking EUR571 million under the 10$^{th}$ EDF. Approximately 70% of that amount was allocated for strengthening regional integration and addressing food security (e.g. productivity, upgrading, investment support). Another 20% targeted peace and security, "the systems developed in connection with early warning, conflict prevention, conflict management, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and the Convention on the control of small arms", all in respect of the African Union's APSA (EC-West Africa Regional Strategy Paper 2008-13).

EU support is mostly in the form of technical assistance and funding rather than operations. Notable is the EU Support to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate. The two sides also hold regular political dialogue meetings – the 19$^{th}$ taking place in 2013 – where peace and security issues are placed at the top of the agenda (EU-ECOWAS 2013). Despite the plethora of security challenges in the region, in terms of operations, the only CSDP mission in the region took place in Guinea Bissau in support of Security Sector Reform. An EU Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea was released in March 2014, but it is too early to assess just what the consequences of this new strategy will be. The colonial ties of several EU member states may explain why operations in the region have largely been driven at that level as shall be explored below.

Another current EU capacity building venture garnering member state cooperation is the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme (CRIMGO). It is financed by the IfS and designed to help African countries in the region better coordinate action by creating a network for sharing information. Training of coastguards is also provided. France, the UK, Italy, Portugal and Germany, to name a few member states, are involved.

**EU-ECOWAS Member States**

Considering the conflict or post-conflict scenarios affecting a wide swath of ECOWAS countries, it is not surprising that the EU targets individual member states with well funded programmes and capacity building projects. In the case of Africa's largest country by population, Nigeria, the 10th EDF allocated EUR677 million to fund three focal areas: peace and security; governance and human rights; trade and regional integration.

The EU has played an instrumental role in rebuilding Malian institutions undermined after the coup in 2012. In 2013 it brought together 108 delegations representing governments, the private sector and civil society and garnered EUR 3.285 billion in pledges – EUR1.35 billion stemmed from the EU and its member states, including EUR524 million from the European Commission (Europaid). Likewise, Cote d'Ivoire, another ECOWAS member having suffered conflict in the 21st century, has received EUR255 million in EU support for peace building, good governance, social cohesion and economic infrastructure (Ibid).

## 3.4. EU Member States

**EU Member States and ECOWAS**

Unsurprisingly, given the shared history, France is the most prominent of EU member states in the region, in terms of security operations, funding, capacity building and arms trade. The most prominent recent operations example is of course the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013. French forces also intervened twice in Cote d'Ivoire, in 2004 and 2011, first in retaliation to Ivoirien bombing of a French military installation and more recently as an intervention in the post-electoral crisis between the losing incumbent Laurent Ggabgo and the winner-designate Alassane Ouattara.

Food security has also been a focus, with Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal all targeted for assistance (Agence Française de Développement 2012). A separate 2011 agreement with ECOWAS and its Water Resources Coordination Centre designated more than EUR10 million for food security. The spate of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has also driven France to action; a Priority Solidarity Fund (FSP) was created in 2011 to strengthen the maritime capacities of Benin, Ghana and Togo. Training exercises have also been provided.

France is also the largest Atlantic exporter of small arms to the region, with armaments sold to almost all of the ECOWAS member states in 2012. It is also a notable seller of heavier equipment, such as patrol craft (SIPRI – see tables 5 and 6).

The UK's contribution to ECOWAS and its member states is profoundly different. While Nigeria represents one of the Department for International Development's (DFID) top 5 global partners and is slated to receive GBP272,469,574 in 2013-14 (UKAID), the rest of the region lags well behind target countries in East Africa. The UK Navy, however, has actively supported international efforts to improve security in the Gulf of Guinea,

working with ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to develop an integrated regional maritime strategy. Support has also gone to individual countries such Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Nigeria to improve piracy detection and maritime interdiction capacities (Nautilus International 2012). Last but not least, the UK has conducted a military operation of its own in the region, intervening in the Sierra Leone civil war in 2000 (Operation Palliser).

Portugal is also a notable security actor with a North and South Atlantic presence throughout lusophone Africa. Military training has been the most predominant form of assistance, with more than 6000 African military personnel having received specialised training in Portuguese military institutions in the last two decades (Seabra 2014).

Looking at trends in peace and security cooperation driven by the EU:

**Table 3- EU security presence in West and Southern Africa**

| | **Operations** | **Capacity Building** | **Funding** | **Trade** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU-SADC<br><br>(+member states) | CSDP DRC | Regional Political Cooperation Programme | Diverse EDF allocation | No |
| EU-ECOWAS<br><br>(+member states) | CSDP Guinea Bissau | CRIMGO Conflict prevention technical assistance | Diverse EDF allocation | No |
| Atlantic Cooperation | Cooperation limited to EU member states | Limited to EU members | Limited to EU members | No |

And the EU member state trends in the SADC and ECOWAS regions:

**Table 4- EU member state security presence in West and Southern Africa**

| | **Operations** | **Capacity Building** | **Funding** | **Trade** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU member states-SADC (+member states) | No | Naval training exercises (UK, France) | Food security | Arms scandal in South Africa including European partners |
| EU member states-ECOWAS (+member states) | France (Mali, Cote d'Ivoire)<br><br>UK (Sierra Leone) | Gulf of Guinea<br><br>Maritime Strategy (UK) | Food security | Large scale small and heavy arms sales to ECOWAS member states, particularly from France |
| Atlantic | Yes (Saharan | Yes(G8++, ECOWAS-Development partners, | | No |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cooperation | Express USA) | Operation Flintlock, CRIMGO) | | |

Due to the scale and variety of challenges facing the ECOWAS region, the range of sophisticated ECOWAS security instruments, as well as a linguistic and historical diversity which binds several key European Atlantic countries to the area, many security initiatives are in play. The EU and France provide the largest and most comprehensive presence but the USA has also clearly targeted the region because of the international implications of insecurity there (particularly in the Gulf of Guinea). Cooperation at the Atlantic level is thus more discernible here, even if still modest, than in the SADC region.

**Table 5 - Small arms exports to Sub-Saharan Africa (2012)**

| Country | USD |
|---|---|
| France | 23,942,612 |
| United States | 17,633,159 |
| United Kingdom | 3,934,444 |
| Brazil | 1,853,346 |
| Portugal | 1,161,230 |

(source: NISAT)

**Table 6 – Armaments exports to West and Southern Africa (2008-2013)**

| Supplier | Recipient | Orders | Designation | Description | Status | Year of order | Year(s) of deliveries | Delivered |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | Angola | 6 | EMB-314 | Trainer/combat ac | New | 2011 | 2013 - 2013 | 6 |
| Brazil | Burkina Faso | 3 | EMB-314 | Trainer/combat ac | New | 2010 | 2011 - 2011 | 3 |
| Brazil | Namibia | 1 | Grajau | Patrol craft | New | 2004 | 2009 - 2009 | 1 |
| Canada | Angola | 6 | PT-6 | Turboprop | New | 2011 | 2013 - 2013 | 6 |
| Canada | Botswana | 5 | PT-6 | Turboprop | New | 2011 | 2013 - 2013 | 5 |
| Canada | Burkina Faso | 3 | PT-6 | Turboprop | New | 2010 | 2011 - 2011 | 3 |
| France | Benin | 4 | LH-10 Ellipse | Trainer aircraft | New | 2010 | 2011 - 2013 | 4 |
| France | Benin | 3 | FPB-98 | Patrol craft | New | 2011 | 2012 - 2012 | 3 |
| France | Burkina Faso | 3 | Tetras | Light aircraft | New | 2012 | 2012 - 2012 | 3 |
| France | Niger | 3 | Tetras | Light aircraft | New | 2009 | 2010 - 2013 | 3 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | Niger | 3 | SA-342 | Light helicopter | Refurbished | 2012 | 2013 - 2013 | 3 |
| France | Nigeria | 2 | FPB-98 | Patrol craft | New | 2012 | 2013 - 2013 | 1 |
| France | Senegal | 8 | TR-F-1 | Towed gun | SecondHand | 2010 | 2011 - 2011 | 8 |
| France | Senegal | 1 | EDIC | Landing craft | SecondHand | 2010 | 2011 - 2011 | 1 |
| France | Senegal | 1 | RPB-33 | Patrol craft | New | 2012 | 2013 - 2013 | 1 |
| France | South Africa | 22 | Makila | Turboshaft | New | 1996 | 2011 - 2013 | 22 |
| France | South Africa | 130 | MILAN | Anti-tank missile | New | 2006 | 2008 - 2008 | 130 |
| France | South Africa | 170 | MILAN | Anti-tank missile | New | 2008 | 2009 - 2010 | 170 |
| France | Togo | 6 | VAP | APV | New | 2008 | 2010 - 2010 | 6 |
| Germany | Ghana | 2 | Type-143 | Patrol craft | Refurbished | 2010 | 2012 - 2012 | 2 |
| Germany | South Africa | 80 | SUT | AS/ASW torpedo | New | 2000 | 2006 - 2008 | 80 |
| Germany | South Africa | 25 | IRIS-T | SRAAM | New | 2008 | 2009 - 2009 | 25 |
| Germany | South Africa | 3 | 209/1400MOD | Submarine | New | 2000 | 2005 - 2008 | 3 |
| Portugal | Mozambique | 2 | Cessna | Light aircraft | SecondHand | 2010 | 2011 - 2012 | 2 |
| UK | Somalia | 25 | AT-105 Saxon | APC | SecondHand | 2012 | 2013 - 2013 | 25 |
| UK | South Africa | 12 | Hawk-100 | Trainer/combat ac | New | 2002 | 2007 - 2008 | 12 |
| UK | South Africa | 82 | Starstreak | Portable SAM | New | 2008 | 2010 - 2012 | 82 |
| USA | Angola | 6 | Cessna | Trainer/light ac | New | 2012 | 2013 - 2013 | 6 |
| USA | Botswana | 4 | CT-7 | Turboprop | New | 2008 | 2009 - 2010 | 4 |
| USA | DRC | 2 | Boeing-727 | Transport aircraft | SecondHand | 2009 | 2009 - 2009 | 2 |
| USA | Congo Rep | 32 | Cummins-6V | Diesel engine | New | 2010 | 2010 - 2010 | 32 |
| USA | Ghana | 4 | PW-100 | Turboprop/turboshaft | New | 2011 | 2011 - 2012 | 4 |
| USA | Namibia | 2 | C-280 | Diesel engine | New | 2010 | 2012 - 2012 | 2 |
| USA | Niger | 2 | Cessna-208 | Light transport ac | New | 2013 | 2013 - 2013 | 2 |
| USA | Nigeria | 1 | Hamilton | OPV | SecondH | 2011 | 2011 - 2011 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | and | | | |
| USA | Senegal | 2 | King Air | Light transport ac | SecondHand | 2011 | 2011 - 2011 | 2 |
| USA | South Africa | 9 | F404 | Turbofan | New | 1999 | 2008 - 2009 | 9 |
| USA | South Africa | 17 | F404 | Turbofan | New | 2000 | 2010 - 2012 | 17 |
| USA | South Africa | 50 | Paveway | Guided bomb | New | 2010 | 2011 - 2012 | 50 |

(Source SIPRI)

## 4. Conclusion: creating an Atlantic community?

The aim of this paper was to test for discernible patterns of an Atlantic 'community,' consisting of both North and South partners. Areas of cooperation examined were in the fields of operations, capacity building, funding and trade. A second goal was to identify areas for security cooperation going forward, keeping in mind both hard and soft security challenges. Finally, this paper sought to frame cooperation in light of altering prevailing South-South or North-driven approaches to cooperation. The results have been mixed. The following map outlines some of the security initiatives taking place with several or more Atlantic countries in the ECOWAS and SADC regions.

**Figure 1.** Atlantic Community coop

(source: author)



**ECOWAS region**

**Coordinated security initiatives**
**Maritime:**
EU CRIMGO
USA Saharan Express
G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea

**Military**

USA Operation Flintlock

**SADC region:**

**Coordinated security initiatives**
**Maritime:**
Zopacas Atlasur
Zopacas UNITAS
IBSAMAR

**Food security:**

UK/Brazil Partnership for African Prosperity

As indicated, there is no shortage of foreign initiatives targeting the spectrum of security in Africa, from hard to soft. Amongst Atlantic actors, some discernible trends are observable. First and most obvious is the sharing of a common ocean. This mutual resource provides a natural impetus for collaboration. Likewise, evolving understandings of security, with a heightened awareness of the international implications of local threats (such as in the Gulf of Guinea) has created a propitious environment for common action.

Thus, unsurprisingly, the largest number of collaborative Atlantic security projects take place "on the water" in the Gulf of Guinea. Actors from both sides of the Atlantic and all sides of the economic divide have been present in some form and at some point. Yet cleavages between North and South remain evident. Most projects are US and European driven, and include Northern and African partners. This is essentially a replication of traditional patterns of North-driven leadership and less about the formation of a broader, ostensibly more equal, Atlantic Community.

Brazil's role as the strongest voice of the South Atlantic remains of fundamental importance here if a recalibration of the way in which business is conducted is to occur. The signals certainly since the Lula Presidency are that Brazil is indeed willing to play this role. Long moribund groupings like Zopacas have been bolstered. IBSA and particularly the BRICS have become prominent. A new Africa-South America summit process has begun. These all represent a shakeup of the traditional North-driven order, even if wholesale change has not yet occurred. An enhanced and more internationally prominent Zopacas willing to embrace North American and European partners, for example, might be a compelling start.

Ironically considering the antipathy with which AFRICOM was first met, in this study the United States also appeared strongly poised to bring together disparate actors in the Gulf of Guinea region – a nod to the attraction of its dominant power and technological facilities. This is particularly true in the domain of maritime security and equally true with respect to African governments seeking to bolster their hard security capacities. Less evident is the USA as a driver of soft security collaboration, even if its own approach to security has broadened and softened since the end of the Bush Administration. US success in broadening international cooperation, particularly in maritime security has, however, meant the perpetuation of the order actors like Brazil have sought to modify.

The EU Member States tend to have less of a soft power attraction in the region given their colonial histories and the sensitivity they can still elicit on the continent. Missions such as France's recent foray into Mali, while applauded by many including the majority of locals (Diarra and Valdmanis 2013), were not designed to include even the EU (which has the collective tools to participate), let alone an Atlantic Community (which does not yet have a shape, let alone the collective tools).

The EU as a regional organisation, however, in a quiet fashion, has demonstrated its willingness to change the terms of North-South relations. The unsung JAES has been somewhat of a prototype for the African Union in the recent proliferation of its "partnerships" with actors from across the globe, including of course South America but reaching as far as Korea, Japan, China, and Brazil, to name a few. This EU willingness to entertain change, coupled with it still delivering the largest single tranche of funding

for aid,[12] translates into an opportunity to play an enabling role for a nascent Atlantic Community.

In addition, it should be underlined that EU security focus has tended to be on the African Union first, rather than on any one regional African organisation. Hence support of Atlantic oriented organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS is often predicated on the premise of enhancing coordination with the AU. The AU, after all, boasts its ambitious African Peace and Security Architecture project and an determined agenda to unify security initiatives on the continent. Given that the AU's chief institutional strength is indeed in the domain of peace and security, this leads to the observation that an Atlantic Community should be one that engages Africa at the pan-African level.

This brings up the second point, where else can a convergence of Atlantic interests and values help transcend the North-South divide and contribute to the formulation of an Atlantic Community? Food security is one area in the broader human security domain which came up consistently as an important component of each of the major Atlantic actors' programming in West and Southern Africa. Food security is a broad concept, with different manifestations and approaches including humanitarian aid, agriculture support, governance improvement and agribusiness. It, like most multiple donor initiatives, suffers from incoherence, aggravated by the fact that funding does not have a single public channel through which it could be channelled (given that agriculture is often a private sector area) (Gaus 2012).

Again the Brazilian example in Africa provides a compelling approach to food security cooperation: that is, to increasingly link it with business rather than aid or charity. This method addresses the question of public money going to an area in which the private sphere is at least as important. This way has been touted by former President Lula and echoed by other key countries of the global South, most obviously China. In the case of food security, where Brazilian agribusiness, bolstered by state support, can boast business dealings, including the transfer of technology, with countries such as Angola rather than traditional aid (ABC 2010).

Another question to consider is whether another entity outside of Brazil, USA and the EU is better poised to stimulate an Atlantic Community? The United Nations is of course the obvious choice here. Benefitting from its broad-based membership and inclusivity, the UN is invariably a forum through which diverse member states cooperate on geo-political and economic issues. For instance, the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) plays an active role in assisting ECOWAS and the AU to develop common approaches to peace and security challenges in the region. The UN Peacebuilding Commission has also targeted several West African states for assistance and elicited the help of Atlantic partners such as Brazil to carry out the tasks involved. Importantly, the UN has the legal authority to pass resolutions which serve as rallying points for concerned members, such as UNSCR (2011) 2018 and (2012) 2039 on Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. Complementing the resolutions is the work of the International Maritime Organization, which recently brought 22 African countries together to sign a code of conduct regarding counter-piracy, illegal fishing and drug smuggling (Yaoundé 25 June, 2013).

Other, looser, entities also exist to foment change. The G8++ Africa Clearing House (ACH) is a process meant to improve the coordination of donor and partner security-related engagements with the AU and African regional organisations to "maximise coherence and impact" (African Union 2013). G8 members, along with Brazil, a host of EU member states, the EU itself and the UN are brought together under the ACH

[12] The 11th EDF for 2014-20 has yet to be finalised (29/03/2014).

umbrella. The same applies for the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Experts Group, organised in 2011 to help avoid duplication of donor activities in the region. It boasts participation not only from all the major North Atlantic players, but also Brazil. Other applicable G8 initiatives include the New Alliance for Food Security and the G8 Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Experts Groups. Last, but not least, the annual ECOWAS-Development Partners conference brings together countries from the EU, ECOWAS, the UN, Canada and the USA to discuss cooperation, including in one instance important help with the creation of the ECOWAS Standby Force (Kinzel 2008). These are all examples of the potential for broad-based North-South cooperation.

Other trends include improvement of dialogue between North and South actors outside of the African context. The EU-Brazil Summit is an example. The triangulation of EU-Africa-China relations is another. The geo-political world is no longer one dominated by the global North and this realisation is better accepted now than ever before.

The path towards an Atlantic Future remains a long one, but a broad acceptance about the transnationalisation of security and the need for greater respect between the North and an emphatically ascending South mean that further progress towards an Atlantic Community is in fact likely.

# 5. References

***Official Documents***


African Union. *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, 11 July 2000.

Agence Française de Développement. *Annual Development Report*, 2012.

Brazilian Cooperation Agency. *Report on Technical Cooperation in Africa*, 2010

Europeaid, African Peace Facility, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/capacity_building/apsa_en.htm.

Europeaid, Mali http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/mali/mali_en.htm

Europeaid, APSA, (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/capacity_building/apsa_en.htm.

European Community - West Africa Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008 – 2013

European External Action Service. *EU-SADC Relations*

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/botswana/eu_sadc/political_relations/index_en.htm

European Union (Council). *The Fifteenth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment*, 21 January 2014

EU-ECOWAS. *Final Communiqué 19th EU-ECOWAS Political Dialogue Meeting at Ministerial Level*, Brussels, 16 May 2013

ECOWAS. *ECOWAS, Brazil Agree New Initiatives to Bolster their Collaboration*, 2010.

GIZ. *German Development Cooperation with SADC and Botswana*, July 2013.

Nigeria (Federal Ministry of Information). *ECOWAS, Brazil Agree New Initiatives to Bolster their Collaboration*. 2010.

Nigeria (Government of). *Communiqué from President Jonathan and Brazilian President Rousseff*, 2013.

SADC-EU. *Communique SADC-EU Ministerial Political Dialogue*, Maputo, 20 March 2013.

South Africa-EU. *Summit Communiqué*, 2013

South Africa, Department of Defence. *The Inauguration of the 1st Brazil-South Africa Joint Defence Committee Takes Place in Brazil,* 2013.

United Nations General Assembly, Keeping the promise: united to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, A/RES/65/1.

United Nations General Assembly, Declaration of a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Atlantic, A/RES/41/11, 27 October 1986.

United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency http://www.dsca.mil/programs/fms

United States Department of Defence. *Quadrennial Defense Review*. 2010.

Untied States Department of State. *U.S. Supports Development of Peacekeeping Capacity in Africa*. 2012.

United States. *Foreign Assistance Act*, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/reports/655_intro.html

UKAID. *Development Tracker*. http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/NG/

World Bank. *Bridging the Atlantic: Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa -- South-South Partnering for Growth,* 2012.

ZOPACAS. *Montevideo Plan of Action,* 2013.

***Authors***

ABDENUR, Adriana Erthal, and Danilo Marcondes DE SOUZA NETO. Brazil's Maritime Strategy in the South Atlantic: The Nexus Between Security and Resources. SAIIA 2013.

———. "South–South Cooperation and Democracy in Africa: Brazil's Role in Guinea-Bissau." *Africa Review*, 2013, 5 (2), pp.104-17.

African Union. "Meeting of the G8++ Africa Clearing House in Addis Ababa." (2013).

ALVES, Ana Cristina. "Brazil in Africa." In Chris Alden, ed. *Africa and Emerging Actors,* London: London School of Economics, 2013.

ANNAN, Koffi. *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*. Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations, 2005.

BUZAN, Ole WÆVER, and Jaap de WILDE. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* Lynne Rienner, 1998

COOK, Nicolas. South Africa: Politics, Economy, and U.S. Relations. *Congressional Research Service*, 2013.

de CONING, Cedric. "Africa and International Peace Operations." In Tim Murithi ed. *Handbook of Africa's International Relations.* Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, pp. 155-164.

DIARRA, Adama, and Richard VALDMANIS. Malians celebrate, French-led forces clear Timbuktu. *Reuters*, 2013.

EAGLES, David. The Royal Navy's Response to Maritime Security Concerns Off West Africa, *Nautilus International,* 2012.

ENGELBRECHT, Leon. SADC adopts anti-piracy policy, *Defenceweb,* 31 August 2011.

GAUS, Alexander. Food Security: A Mapping of European Approaches. *Research Paper, GPPi*, 2012, 15.

GLICKHOUSE, Rachel. "Africa-South America Summit to Boost South-South Ties." *Americas Society/Council of the Americas*, 2013.

HELFRICH, Kim. Military co-operation between Brazil and South Africa grows, *Defenceweb*, 08 March 2013

HETTNE, Björn, Development and Security: Origins and Future. *Security Dialogue*, 2010, 41 (1), pp. 31-52.

HOUGH, Peter. *Understanding Global Security*. Taylor & Francis, 2008

JONES, Vivian C. U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity ActSpecialist in International Trade and Finance. *Congressional Report Service*, 2009.

KURATA, Philip. U.S. Supports Development of Peacekeeping Capacity in Africa. *United States Department of State*, 2012.

KRAUSE, Keith and Michael C. WILLIAMS. Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 1996, 40 (2), pp. 229-254

MARTIN, Guy. Operation Copper now only with SA and Mozambique, *Defenceweb,* 20 March 2014.

MATABOGE, Mmanaledi. Africom Still Struggling to Win SA's Blessing. *Mail & Guardian*, 21 March 2013.

NIEUWKERK, Anthoni van. "SIPO II Too Little Too Late?". *Strategic Review for Southern* Africa, 2012, 35 (1), pp: 146-53.

PICCOLINO, Giulia, and Stephanie MINOU. The EU and Regional Integration in West Africa: Effects on Conflict Resolution and Transformation*. RegioConf, University of Pretoria,* 2014.

PLOCH, Lauren. Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa. *Congressional Research Service,* 2011.

SCHAEFER, Kai. "The Africa-EU Partnership and Regional Organizations." In Nicoletta Pirozzi, ed. *Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security*. Rome: Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2012, pp. 23-53.

SEABRA, Pedro. A Harder Edge: Reframing Brazil's Power Relation with Africa. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 2014, 57, (forthcoming).

STOLTE, Christina. Chatham House. *Brazil in Africa: Just Another BRICS Country Seeking Resources?* : 2012.

STYAN, David. EU Power and Armed Humanitarianism in Africa: Evaluating ESDP in Chad. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2012, 25 (4), pp. 651-68.

ZARTMAN, I. William. *The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

"Africa's Impressive Growth." *The Economist,* January 6, 2011.

"Atlantic countries concerned with UK presence in Falklands; call for talks with Argentina." *Mercopress,* 2013.

“Brazil, Angola Agree on Joint Defence Committee.” *SAFPI*, 20 February 2013.

"Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea." *Chatham House Conference Report*, London, 2012.