


Advancing Alternative Migration Governance



Measuring Good Migration Governance with an Indicator Approach

Francesco Pasetti and Elaine Lebon-McGreor

Deliverable 7.4

2023 CIDOB Barcelona/University of Maastricht



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822625. The content reflects only the authors' views, and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains





Publication information

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Suggested citation: Francesco Pasetti and Elaine Lebon-McGregor (2023) *Measuring Good Migration Governance with an Indicator Approach*, AdMiGov Deliverable 7.4. Barcelona/Maastricht: CIDOB/University of Maastricht. Available at http://admigov.eu. ISBN: 978-84-18977-12-1

Acknowledgments

This paper has been written by Francesco Pasetti and Elaine Lebon-McGregor; and peer-reviewed by Anja van Heelsum and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas. The views presented are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the institutions with which they are affiliated or the EU. Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to: Francesco Pasetti (fpasetti@cidob.org) and Elaine Lebon-McGregor (e.mcgregor@maastrichtuniversity.nl)



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Executive summary

The AdMiGov indicators offer policy makers, academics, and other interested stakeholders an innovative and evidence-based tool to measure and assess good migration governance.

The origin of the indicators takes root in the call for safer, sustainable, and more effective migration governance raised by the international community, and shaped in the 2016 New York Declaration, the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and the Global Compact on Refugees, along with Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals.

The novelty of AdMiGov indicators is twofold. Firstly, it makes international standards - and particularly the underlying principles of protection and sustainable development - the core benchmark against which national migration governance systems are evaluated. Secondly, it moves beyond a traditional focus on policies on paper, to also evaluate the implementation of migration governance, including, for instance, the use of resources and data, the kinds of actors involved in border practices, and the presence of administrative barriers.

The AdMiGov indicators build upon and complement existing knowledge in the field of migration policy indicators (e.g., MGI, MIPEX) and have been informed by empirical insights from the AdMiGov fieldwork. Indicator construction followed a holistic approach to migration governance, examining its main areas (entry, exit, temporary and circular mobility), elements (actions, actors and resources) and stages (formulation, promulgation, implementation and evaluation).

The result is a set of 68 indicators that can be applied to evaluate national migration governance systems, allowing its users to assess a country's alignment with international standards on protection and sustainable development, to identify areas in need of development and to identify potential best practices.

Beyond constructing the tool, as initially envisaged, the report also presents preliminary insights into how the indicators can be applied by drawing on data concerning the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey, where the original set of indicators was piloted.

In general terms, the Dutch migration governance system (54/100) appears relatively more advanced and consistent with the principles of migrant protection and sustainable development, than the Spanish (34/100) and the Turkish one (34/100), which present more critical gaps and limitations.

Despite variation and significant differences across cases, several cross-cutting challenges to achieving better migration governance have emerged from the study. The first and most striking trend has been the stark differences between governance on paper and governance in practice. Notwithstanding some normative gaps that have been identified, (e.g., limited access to healthcare in the Netherlands and Turkey), the three countries appear relatively consistent with the standards of protection and sustainable development employed as regards rights and opportunities formally recognized to migrants. However, as we examine the domain of praxis and the de facto provision of such rights, migration governance appears more deficient and problematic. The discrepancy between what governance promises to do on paper and what it actually does in practice cuts across all migration



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governance's areas: entry, exit, as well as temporary and circular schemes. This gap is particularly worrying for the most vulnerable profiles, whose necessities remain often unattended.

The AdMiGov indicators detect different factors that help to explain these gaps, concerning both the elements of the governance system (e.g., insufficient resources, the absence of independent monitoring actors) and the stages of governance process, particularly in the phase of implementation (e.g., administrative barriers, the lack of coordination and collaboration mechanisms). By measuring implementation gaps, the AdMiGov team brings the analytical perspective on migration governance to the ground of practice and contributes to fill in one of the main gaps of existing indicators that, to date, have only measured policies on paper.

Another crucial challenge regards the lack of an evidence-based approach to migration governance. According to the AdMiGov indicators, the states analysed seem unable to adequately know the efficacy of their actions and the extent to which pre-established objectives are actually achieved. This seems related, on the one hand, to their scarce commitment to data collection (and transparency) and, on the other hand, to the inadequate mechanisms they have in force to monitor and control their actions. The use of data and evidence to support policy development is key to ensuring good migration governance in practice. Improving systems to monitor and evaluate different governance practices can diagnose potential problems and allow remedial action to be taken earlier. Increasing the transparency of information can facilitate the identification of areas where the expected outcomes of policies may have negative implications for the protection of migrants.

The AdMiGov indicators have also highlighted the need for stakeholder consultation. In all the cases examined, migration governance seems to be conceived and issued without considering the perspective of the population that it targets. Broadening stakeholders' participation in the decision-making process, particularly of those more concerned for migrants' rights and protection, appears as another indispensable condition to move towards more secure and sustainable migration governance.

The gaps and limitations identified by the AdMiGov indicators jeopardize the whole functioning of migration governance in the countries analysed, calling into question their actual capacity to ensure migrants' protection, and raising serious concerns in terms effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability. The Netherlands, Spain and Turkey are encouraged to further explore the detailed results of the AdMiGov project and to take remedial action to enhance their migration governance systems in the future.



Introduction

To what extent do current migration governance systems guarantee the protection of migrants? To what extent are current migration governance systems consistent with sustainable development? What are the current strengths and weaknesses of current migration governance systems with respect to migrant protection and sustainable development? To what extent are current migration governance systems able to bring into practice what is committed to on paper? How can we move forward to implement more secure, more sustainable, and more efficient migration governance?

The AdMiGov Indicators of Good Migration Governance offer a tool to answer these questions which is composed of 68 indicators that evaluate national migration governance measures vis-à-vis the standards set by the 2016 New York Declaration (NYD), the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), along with Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The construction of this evaluation tool has paralleled the implementation of the AdMiGov project. The preliminary stage consisted of conceptualizing and operationalizing "good migration governance" according to the rationale and the aims of the project (see Pasetti 2019). The design of the indicators then combined deductive and inductive logics (Figure 1). First, an initial pool of indicators was created by selecting those available in the literature that conformed to our definition of good migration governance (deductive logic). Then ex-novo indicators were inductively created based on the empirical findings gathered across the AdMiGov project. Hereafter, the previously identified and ex-novo indicators were merged into a comprehensive set of indicators and, after a round of consultations and refinements with other WPs' teams, the first set of AdMiGov indicators was compiled (see Pasetti and Lebon-McGregor 2021). This initial version of indicators was then piloted in the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey, a process which led to further revisions (Lebon-McGregor et al. 2022).

The final set of AdMiGov indicators (and related guidelines for application) are presented in this report, accomplishing the final stage of the WP7 research. The report also presents results of the AdMiGov indicators for the three pilot countries, including post-pilot revisions, a process that was carried out by the WP7 team¹ beyond the original scope of the research project, and that provides compelling insights on the potential use and value of AdMiGov indicators.

In the remainder of this report, we provide an overview of the entire process of developing and piloting the AdMiGov indicators. We start by providing a discussion of the conceptual basis upon which the indicators were built (Section 2). Section 3 then provides an overview of what the indicators look like, and how they were developed². In Section 4, we provide details on the application of the indicators to evaluate the goodness of migration governance in the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey.


¹ We gratefully acknowledge Carlota Cumella de Montserrat, Eleni Diker, Oriol Farrés, Niels Ike, Júlia Puigdomènech Vidal, Yağmur Çoğalmış, and Zakaria Al Shmaly for their work and support in the project. We would also like to thank the experts, institutions and organizations that participated in interviews during the pilot of the AdMiGov indicators.

² Sections 2 and 3 summarize previous publications of the project, each of which refers to a specific stage of research: i) literature review and conceptualization (Pasetti 2019), ii) operationalization and creation of the first draft-set of indicators (Pasetti and Lebon-McGregor 2021), iii) piloting and definition of the final set of indicators (Lebon-McGregor et al. 2022).



Section 5 summarises the main findings gathered and provides conclusive remarks on the value and scope of AdMiGov indicators. The list of indicators and related guidelines are provided in the Annexes.

FIGURE 1 – RESEARCH DESIGN UNDERLYING ADMIGOV INDICATORS³



³ Figures and tables presented in the report are based on AdMiGov project's findings and related publications and are created by CIDOB.



Starting Points of AdMiGov Indicators of Good

Migration Governance

The AdMiGov indicators introduce an alternative way of evaluating good migration governance. The novelty of the approach lies both in the normative perspective taken that, complementing traditional criteria of efficiency and effectiveness places the principles of migrant protection and sustainable development at its core, and in the analytical lens applied, which broadens the lens of analysis from policy on paper to assess implementation in practice and beyond the traditional focus on the governance of entry.

Normative perspective

The scope, intensity, and frequency of migratory crises has shed light on the dramatic limits and contradictions inherent to current systems of migration governance, obsessively concerned with border defence and the control of migrant entry. The NYD, the GCM and GCR, along with Agenda 2030 and, especially target 10.7⁴ of the SDGs, recognize that the current global system of migration governance has several shortcomings and the need for an improved approach in which migrant and refugees' protection is the utmost priority as well as a necessary condition for sustainable development. This calls for new and alternative solutions for migration governance, and, from a research perspective, demands new diagnostic tools. The AdMiGov Indicators of Good Migration Governance have been designed to respond to this gap. From the outset, therefore, the principles of migration protection and sustainable development were placed at the centre as the normative standpoint from which to assess migration governance; namely by making protection and sustainable development the criteria against which the "goodness" of migration governance is assessed.

Protection refers to the extent to which a system of migration governance can ensure the protection of migrants, both formally and substantially. From this perspective, protection does not only concern the formal architecture of rights, but an array of formal and informal practices that cover a wide range of issues (e.g., reception, health care, human rights, etc.) as well as different contexts (at origin and destination), levels (supranational, national, and local) and concerns (from ensuring migrants' access to rights, to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers).

In the same line, the principle of Sustainable Development is understood holistically as the reduction of inequalities and, in line with Agenda 2030 and the SDGs' promise to "leave no one behind". It is a multifaceted principle that addresses economic inequality, political instability, and development as root causes of migration, but also the other way around, namely migration and migrants as potential remedies for these root causes (SDG 10.7). Migrants are also clearly identified as a group at risk of being 'left behind' through exclusionary practices on the ground.

⁴ Target 10.7 of the SDGs is to 'facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies' (UN, 2015).

By adopting an approach that focuses first and foremost on migrant protection and sustainable development, AdMiGov place people at the centre of what good governance means and, in doing so, conveys a clear normative message to policymakers.

Analytical perspective

The global system of migration governance is complex and multidimensional, involving different actors, institutions, norms, and practices, operating at different layers of jurisdiction and geopolitical ranges. Central governments are gradually yielding control over processes both upward, to supranational institutions (e.g., EU), and downward to local actors, including to the private sector (both to non- and for-profit actors, including multinational and transnational companies). As the migration governance arena has become more crowded and contested, older, "simpler", statecentred, hierarchical modes of governing are being replaced by more complex ones, characterised by different spatial scales and new types of relationships. In short, migration governance is becoming ever trickier as an object of empirical inquiry.

The array of analytical tools available to measure and evaluate migration governance - commonly known as "indicators" - appears insufficient to account for such complexity. The literature review (see Table 1)⁵ identified two main limitations in existing body of migration related indicators, namely the limited attention paid to governance areas other than entry, on the one hand, and to governance practice, on the other. These gaps are rooted in the tendency among scholars in this field to analyse only one or few "parts" of the migration governance system. Cerna (2014, 2016), for instance, analyses policies for high-skilled labour mobility, while Hutton (2009 and 2016) evaluates migration governance as regards the field of asylum and refugee, to mention another prominent example.

TABLE 1 – ASSESSING MIGRATION GOVERNANCE: A STATE OF THE ART OF AVAILABLE INDICATORS

| Dataset name/acronym | References |
|----------------------------------|--|
| ASYLUM POLICY INDEX | Hutton 2009, 2016 |
| CDI (migration area) | Roodman 2013, Robinson et al. 2018 |
| CERNA | Cerna 2014, 2016 |
| DEMIG | de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016 |
| DETERRENCE INDEX | Thielemann 2004 |
| Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) | Pedrosa and Palop 2017, Pedrosa et al. 2016 |
| GLOBAL MIGRATION BAROMETER (GMB) | EIU 2008 |
| IMPALA | Beine at al. 2016, Geist et al. 2014 |
| IMPIC | Helbling et al. 2015 |
| Immigrants' Climate Index (ICI) | Pham and Hoang Van 2014 |
| Inventory of migration policies | Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti 2009 |
| Klugman and Pereira Index | Klugman and Pereira 2009 |
| NIEM | Tzancos 2016 |
| MIPEX | Huddleston et al. 2015 |
| MGI | EIU 2016 |
| ORTEGA & PERI | Ortega and Peri 2009 |
| PICMD | Hong and Knoll 2016, KNOMAD OECD and UNDP 2020 |
| World Population Policies (WPP) | UN 2016 |

⁵ For the details of the literature review carried out see Pasetti (2021).



The sectorial approach to migration governance often taken by scholars, makes it hard to find any comprehensive evaluation of migration governance and leaves some aspects of migration governance unexamined. Firstly, being mainly focused on entry governance, it fails to account for what occurs in other sites where migration governance operates, such as at the governance of exit (e.g., forced and assisted return programmes), circular mobility (e.g., schemes for seasonal/temporary mobility of migrant workers) and development (e.g. actions in origin countries tackling the root causes of migration). The IOMs' Migration Governance Index (MGI) represents a remarkable exception in this regard, being the only set of indicators that assesses the whole system of migration governance. Unfortunately, its analytical scope is circumscribed to the domain of policy on "paper" – which relates to the other gap of the literature⁶. Being mainly focused on the formal regulatory framework, this literature loses sight of the way in which governance is implemented in practice. Evaluating migration governance "on paper" but not "in practice" turns into an exercise that only analyses what should be happening, as opposed to what is actually happening (Pasetti and Cumella de Montserrat, 2021).

To address a gap in the existing toolbox of indicators, it was decided to focus AdMiGov indicators primarily on moving beyond the governance of entry and focusing on policy implementation (policy in practice) in a national context.

AdMiGov indicators of good migration governance

AdMiGov defines good migration governance (GMG) as the dispersed, diverse, and contested multidimensional system and process of governing international migration, ensuring migrant protection and sustainable development.⁷ The operationalization of this definition led to the identification of five analytical dimensions upon which the AdMiGov indicators could be developed: constitutive elements, policy stages, governance areas, legal categories and underlying principles, each of which is further explained below.

The first dimension captures the complexity of the migration governance system. As system, the disperse, diverse and contested complexity of migration governance can be factorized into four constitutive elements, individually necessary and jointly sufficient to describe it: actions, through which governance is materialized (i); actors, who bring about such actions (ii); relations among the actors involved (iii); and resources, on which governance draws upon (iv) (Figure 2). As detailed in Pasetti and Lebon-McGregor (2021), actors are understood as including both state and non-state; public and private; and individuals and institutions; that are involved in migration governance. Relations capture both formal and informal ties among actors. Resources refer to both the monetary and non-monetary means of enacting migration governance. Actions embrace both the domain of policy and that of practice.

⁶ The MGI is also limited by the impossibility to access both the raw data and the methodology followed to construct indicators

⁷ For the details on the way in which "good migration governance" was conceptualized, see Pasetti (2019).



FIGURE 2 – THE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

ACTORS

Single/collective, state/nonstate and public/private actors involved in the different stages and levels of migration governance.

RELATIONS

Formal and informal links and relationships among actors involved in migration governance.

RESOURCES

Material and immaterial means and assets dedicated to the governance of international migration.


ACTIONS

Policies and practices through which migration governance objectives are carried out.

The second dimension captures the temporality of migration governance. Drawing on the research on the policy cycle (cf. e.g., Jann and Wegrich 2007, Knoepfel et al., 2007), migration governance can be conceived as a process articulated in different stages, from the moment in which a migration-related matter is acknowledged and a related solution is formally defined (i.e. formulation and promulgation) to the moment in which the specific actions are put into practice (i.e. implementation) and, ideally, evaluated (Figure 3).



FIGURE 3 – THE KEY STAGES OF THE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE PROCESS




The third dimension relates to the different moments of the migratory trajectory and captures the correspond areas where migration governance operates, namely: at entry, at exit and for circular (and temporary) movements (Figure 4). Although (re)integration is also part of the migration trajectory, we focus primarily on what occurs around the border of a country: who may enter and who is compelled to leave, and what conditions govern these movements. Each of these areas is then broken down into sub-areas, following the empirical insights gathered during the AdMiGov project's fieldwork and in line with the standard procedure in the creation of indicators (Beine et al., 2016).

⁸ While we recognise that migratory movements, and accordingly their governance, are deeply embedded in political structures, and that governance cannot be discussed without due recognition of the power dynamics that drive it, using



FIGURE 4 – THE MAIN AREAS OF MIGRATION GOVERNANCE




The fourth dimension refers to the variety of legal-administrative categories usually employed by states in governance systems to target migrant population. As pointed out in Lebon-McGregor et al. (2022), it is worth stressing that, despite recognizing the mixed nature of human mobility (e.g., Richmond, 1994; UNGA 2013; UNHCR, 2007; van Hear, 1998) and the risks associated with adopting policy-categories, they represent indispensable heuristic tools to build the indicators' structure. Since the goal of the AdMiGov indicators is to evaluate the functioning of migration governance and, this generally is constructed around said policy categories, discarding them would drastically limit the analytical value of the indicators.

The last dimension refers to the normative criteria against which the "goodness" of migration governance is assessed, namely the principles of "protection" and "sustainable development" (described in Section 2.1). These principles are operationalized into concrete standards, whose main sources are the NYD, the GCM, the GCR along with the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs. These sources build on and complement other international standards regarding migrant protection, asylum and refugee, human rights as well as sustainable development (see Annex 6.1). On the one hand, the capacity of migration governance to abide by such principles — it's goodness — is appraised comprehensively in all its dimensions (elements, stages, area and target-groups); on the other, it is evaluated both "on paper" and "in practice", namely in relation to both its formal regulatory framework and its practical (and also informal) implementation. Furthermore, in recognition of the fact that migration is often coupled with development (e.g., the coupling of development aid with compliance on migration control objectives), a number of indicators are also developed to capture the



dense and problematic relations between international migration and wealth conditions across countries, identified across the AdMiGov project.

FIGURE 5 - ADMIGOV CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GOOD MIGRATION GOVERNANCE





Data Collection and Analysis

Methods and scoring

To ensure a valid and robust evaluation AdMiGov applies a standardized questionnaire in which each indicator is formulated as a question relating to a specific aspect of a country's migration governance⁹. The score attributed (based on the provided answer) captures the extent to which the benchmark has been achieved on a 0-100 scale¹⁰. This benchmark is established on the basis of the aforementioned international standards, complemented with empirical insights (especially from the AdMiGov project's fieldwork). A score of one hundred (100) means the benchmark is fully achieved and zero (0) means they are fully unmet.

Given the unique feature of the AdMiGov indicators in focusing on practice, a specific measurement system has been developed to identify and measure governance gaps. Simply put, this is done by evaluating whether a specific aspect of migration governance recognized on paper (if not this is identified as a normative gap) and, if so, is also brought in practice (if not this is identified as an implementation gap). Implementation gaps are further defined by examining the extent of implementation (i.e., systematically, unsystematically, never) while assessing the scope of implementation temporally, geographically and in relation to the migrant target-groups covered. Temporal implementation assesses how far different practices are institutionalised; geography looks at the consistency of implementation across the territory; and the population coverage looks at for whom specific actions are implemented for, and accordingly allow insights into discriminatory practices and gaps depending on one's migratory status.

Building on the assumption that rights, opportunities, and services count for relatively little for migrants if they only exist on paper and cannot be enjoyed in practice, we developed a scoring scheme that increases the weight of scores relating to practice (compared to those on paper). This is done using a 0-10 scale of scores, whose values are then squared. Squared values bring the scores back to the 0-100 scale and, at the same time, accord greater importance to migration governance practices. Simply spoken, a country with a policy on paper but not in practice receives a score of 5^2 (25) while a country that has a policy on paper and systematically implements it in practice receives 10^2 (100).

More than half of the AdMiGov indicators (n=40) are constructed to identify governance gaps (normative and implementation) by distinguishing between the domain of formal regulation ("on paper") and that of practical implementation ("in practice"). There are slightly different configurations of these indicators to also account, for instance, for the possibility of practices occurring in the absence of policy. However, in general, these indicators are designed to draw attention to the necessity of giving due attention to ensuring that normative frameworks are implemented in practice to ensure migrant protection and promote sustainable development.

⁹ In line with the analytical standpoint outlined in previous WP7 deliverables, the AdMiGov indicators are built at the state-level. While acknowledging the multi-level and multi-actor nature of migration governance, we also recognise that states are generally the central actors in migration governance.

¹⁰ The scoring scale employed follows one of the standard procedures in the literature (Beine et al., 2016).



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The details of the measurement system are illustrated in Lebon McGregor et al. (2022).

Level and scope of analysis

The AdMiGov indicators focus the lens of analysis at the state level. This decision circumscribes the scope of analysis that can be carried out applying them and limits their capacity to adequately capture what occurs upwards (e.g., at the EU level, or related to intergovernmental cooperations) and downwards (at local level, with state and non-state-actors).

For instance, in the case of Turkey, it was often difficult to identify whether some programmes could be considered government-led given that many actions are undertaken in cooperation with intergovernmental organizations such as UN agencies. In addition, for countries that are part of larger supranational organisations like the Netherlands and Spain in the EU (but also, for instance, ECOWAS in West-Africa), it can become more challenging to assess how 'good' governance is, without also taking into consideration these broader relationships that influence migration governance. In the field of asylum and refugee, to provide another relevant example, the focus on the national level obscures practices that are delegated upwards to the EU level in the case of EU Member States.

In the revision of the indicators after the pilot, attention was given to better assessing the relations between different governance actors. While the indicators are still focused on the state level, and this limitation should be kept in mind, revising in this way allows for the better understanding of the types and nature of relationships that exist in different national contexts – such as the outsourcing of border governance to security firms, or the systematic exclusion of civil society actors from the policy process.

Data sources

The AdMiGov indicators rely on an expert-based evaluation, during which a questionnaire is completed by a national expert and double-checked by peer reviewers. Data gathering to complete the questionnaire involves desk-based research and consultations. Data sources to be consulted should include:

- 1) Normative references and other policy documents (national laws and legal provisions, policy documents, official reports, budgets and spending evidence, official data and independent evaluation.
- 2) Academic literature.
- 3) Grey literature (e.g., shadow reports from NGOs).
- 4) Key informant interviews (e.g., with different stakeholders, including governments, local authorities, social partners and NGOs, as well as migrant themselves (via interviews and/or focus groups).
- 5) Other secondary data sources (e.g., research conducted by the expert completing the questionnaire).

To facilitate the work of country-experts in completing the AdMiGov questionnaire coding guidelines are provided, including measurement notes, a glossary and concrete examples for those indicators that might generate divergent interpretations (see Annexes 2 and 3).



Aggregation and compound indicators

Each indicator cuts across the five dimensions defined and explained in Section 2.3. This means that single indicators can be grouped along these dimensions to create compound indicators, allowing a more concrete examination of specific aspects of migration governance (see Table 3). For instance, the combination of indicators referring to entry provides a comprehensive evaluation of the ways in which a country regulates migrants' access to its territory as well as of the way in which such access takes place in practice. The same applies to exit and circular and temporary schemes of cross-border mobility, as well as to the rest of the elements, the stages and the target-groups identified in the analytical frame.

Next to analysing the constituent elements and stages of good migration governance, the AdMiGov indicators can also be used to develop different composite indicators assessing a country's performance in a particular issue area and thus be used to identify specific trends which may require additional attention (see Table 2)¹¹. While a non-exhaustive list, in Section 4.5 we showcase five carefully selected composite indicators – i.e., thematic indicators – to demonstrate the ways in which the AdMiGov indicators can be applied to assess different aspects of good migration governance. Namely these are: 1) international protection; 2) policy coherence for development; 3) governance gaps; 4) irregular migration; and 5) detention.


TABLE 2 - THEMATIC INDICATORS

| Thematic Indicator | Indicators included | Indicator number |
|-------------------------------------|---|---------------------|
| International Protection | 5-7; 28-30; 35-39; 50, 52 plus partials scores from 1-4; 11-15; 22-24 | 25 |
| Policy Coherence for Development | 16-19 (plus 20 as a descriptive indicator) | 4 (5) |
| Governance gaps | Average of all SUMSQ indicators | 40 |
| Irregular Migration | 33, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 plus partial scores from 14 and 31) | 18 |
| Detention | Indicators 40,41,44,45,46,47,48 plus partial scores from 1, 2. 3. 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 | 17 |

¹¹ Apart from enhancing the efficiency of completing the AdMiGov indicators, thematic indicators broaden the scope of the AdMiGov indicators and allow them to be used to capture crucial aspects of migration governance that were not explicitly addressed in the initial analytical framework.



TABLE 3 – ADMIGOV INDICATORS: AGGREGATION AND COMPOUND INDICATORS





Piloting the AdMiGov indicators: main findings

Between February and October 2022, researchers from Maastricht University and CIDOB piloted the AdMiGov indicators in the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey. These countries were selected to reflect expertise housed within the implementing institutions, and the broader AdMiGov consortium¹². The pilot was mainly aimed at testing and reviewing the initial set of indicators and guidelines to develop the final set of indicators. That being said, thanks to the quality of the pilot and to the additional research carried out afterwards to recalibrate the data, it was possible to offer the first preliminary results of the application of AdMiGov indicators, presented here below. The results provide an evaluation of migration governance in the three countries, on the 31st of October, 2022.

The scope and value of the results of the first application of the AdMiGov indicators is, however, inevitably limited by the exploratory nature of the pilot, by the (extremely) small number of cases analysed, as well as by their idiosyncrasies in terms of migration governance dynamics and challenges: Turkey as a non-EU country with different legal categories and hosting a significant number of asylum seekers; Spain as EU-border and top-immigration country; and the Netherlands as a Northern, EU-country. These limits make it hard to offer a robust comparative discussion.

Nevertheless, the findings presented here are primarily presented as a means of illustrating the value of the AdMiGov indicators as diagnostic tool of good migration governance, namely the ability to tell us which aspects of migration governance are more developed and better comply with international standards of protection and sustainable development and, contrariwise, those that do not.

The evaluation presented captures the overall compliance with international standards (as opposed to specific conformity with each standard¹³). The analysis starts from the perspective of "shared challenges", namely those aspects of migration governance in which the application of the indicators in all three countries demonstrated the need for improvement (4.1). The following sections mirror the main analytical dimensions undertaken, on migration governance areas (4.2), elements (4.3) and stages (4.4), and provide further disaggregated results along with reflections on variation observed across countries. Section 4.5 present the five thematic indicators introduced above, drawing special attention to the methodological innovations of the AdMiGov indicators.

¹² While initially it was envisaged that all three pilot countries would be EU Member States, the addition of Turkey was made to reflect the experience of a non-EU destination country, which, as discussed in Lebon-McGregor et al. (2022), also revealed some Eurocentricity in the initial construction of the indicators. While we have taken steps to address this during the pilot, any future broader application of the AdMiGov indicators beyond Europe may require some adaption to reflect regional differences in migration governance (Geddes, 2021).

¹³ After inductively developing the majority of the indicators, each indicator was coded to relevant articles in the New York Declaration, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and the Global Compact on Refugees. For more information of this see Pasetti and Lebon-McGregor (2021). An aggregated assessment of the compliance with each standard (e.g., SDG 10.7 or 17.4) goes beyond the scope of the current analysis, but, the design of the indicators does pave the way for such research to be conducted in the future, ideally with a larger sample of countries.



The key challenges for good migration governance

The AdMiGov indicators identify four key challenges shared across the countries analysed.

The first and more significant one is the gap between governance "on paper" and "in practice." As pertains to the domain of formal regulations and de jure recognition of migrants' rights, the three countries appears relatively consistent with the standards of protection and sustainable development employed. However, as we examine the domain of praxis and the de facto provision of such rights, migration governance appears more deficient and problematic. This gap cuts across all aspects of migration governance. At entry, for instance, despite being legally prohibited, children are often detained. At exit, in returns programmes, migrants' access to rights and services is recognized de jure but often precluded de facto. In the area of temporary and circular migration, the limited and problematic application of labour inspections, turns into practices of exploitation. The AdMiGov indicators detect several factors that help to account for such gaps, concerning both the elements of the governance system (e.g., scarcity of resources, the lack of independent monitoring actors) and the stages of governance process, particularly in the phase of implementation (e.g., administrative barriers), which will be explained in sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.

The second challenge refers to the lack of an evidence-based approach to migration governance. Firstly, this results from the scarcity of mechanisms and tools to assess and track migration governance actions observed in the stage of the evaluation, which in all the three countries represents the weakest phase of the governance process (Section 4.4.3). Secondly, it is related to the lack of data regarding measures carried out (e.g., temporary worker programmes, impact of migration and development programmes) and the practical functioning of core migration governance structures (e.g., reception centres and pre-removal detention centres). The use of data and evidence to support policy development is key to ensuring good migration governance in practice. These flaws seem to suggest that states are unable to know the efficacy of their actions and the extent to which pre-established objectives are achieved. More broadly, such flaws seem to jeopardize the whole functioning of migration governance and to call into question its real capacity to ensure migrants' protection and pursue sustainable development goals. As the following sections illustrate in more detail, the Netherlands performs relatively better than Spain and Turkey in this regard, having accessible data on a wider range of migration governance related areas, as well as processes and procedures in place to feed said data and analysis thereof into the policy development process. Despite this, gaps remain, particularly when it comes to the clear link between the data and the reality of Dutch policies.


The third challenge concerns the need for stakeholder consultation. This is captured by a specific set of indicators evaluating the stage of governance formulation (Section 4.4.1), showing the scarce involvement of civil society actors in the early phase of the decision-making process and, more notably, that of associations and advocacy actors for migrant and refugee rights. This is particularly evident in Spain and Turkey, where such actors tend to be excluded from governance formulation (whereas in the Netherlands they are only occasionally involved). In all the cases examined, to put it simply, migration governance seems to be conceived and issued without considering the perspective of the population that it targets.



The last shared challenged identified by AdMiGov indicators refers to the lack of transparency and points to the difficulty to access official data regarding fundings and material means allocated and executed in different areas of migration governance. The Netherlands represents a remarkable exception in this regard, being the only country that regularly issues reports with clear budget lines related to the different areas of migration governance, although it is still not exhaustive. In Spain and in Turkey, this gap affects the whole migration governance system, but is particularly crucial as regards border management.

Areas of migration governance

FIGURE 6 – AREAS OF MIGRATION GOVERNANCE: COMPOUND SCORES FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022)



According to AdMiGov indicators, the migration governance systems of the three pilot countries present notable gaps when it comes to ensuring migrant protection and sustainable development. The gaps seem particularly critical in Spain (34/100) and Turkey (37/100), while they seem slightly less pronounced in the Netherlands (54/100). Despite wide margins for improvement, Dutch migration governance appears relatively better on the scale of bad to good migration governance.

Governance of entry

In the area of entry, the Netherlands (58/100) performs better than Spain (37/100) and Turkey (37/100). The main problems identified in this area of governance relate to both the normative frame on paper as well as entry practices on the ground.

As for the normative frame regulating entry and rights granted at arrival, the main flaws are observed in the area of health. For example, in the Netherlands (0/100) and Turkey (0/100), people arriving with no official documentation (indicator 33) are de jure excluded from healthcare access and services. Spain, contrariwise, (33/100) formally recognizes the right for migrants in irregular situations to access



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healthcare on the same conditions as nationals, however this is not systematically provided in practice, due to administrative barriers.

Among the positive aspects, it is worth mentioning the favourable legislative rules regulating the length of residence-permit granted at entry (indicator 32) and, in terms of labour market's effectiveness, the measures in force to align labour demand and work-visas (indicator 26). In this regard, the Spanish (100/100) and the Dutch (100/100) systems rely also on a list of occupations of eligible workers, systematically updated according to labour shortages in specific sectors.

As pertains to entry governance on the ground, the praxis of detention of irregular migrants is especially problematic, often clashing with the legal framework in force in the country and, thus, threatening migrants' rights and protection. As further discussed in Section 4.5, in all the cases analysed, the detention of children is prohibited by law, but, in the absence of alternatives, it often occurs in practice (indicator 40).

Another crucial challenge in the domain of practice regards reception facilities. AdMiGov indicators have pointed out how the structures employed, and services provided only occasionally meet migrants' needs in the countries analysed. This problem is particularly crucial for the most vulnerable profiles of asylum seekers, whose necessities remain often unattended (indicator 39).

Governance of exit

Exit represents a problematic area of migration governance in both Spain (16/100) and Turkey (26/100), while the Netherlands performs relatively better (61/100). The Dutch system proves to be relatively more advanced and consistent with the principles of migrant protection and sustainable development, than the Spanish and the Turkish one, both on paper and in practice, however gaps do still exist. This is observed in several aspects concerning exit governance, including: rights and conditions ensured in situation of pre-removal detention (indicators 44), procedures and protocols carried out in forced returns (indicators 50 and 51), as well as rights and services ensured in reintegration programmes (indicator 56) and in assisted returns (indicator 55).

As regard the normative domain, neither Spain (0/100) nor Turkey (0/100) foresee permits for non-deportable persons (indicator 46), leaving these persons formally unprotected against the risk of being (repeatedly) detained and eventually deported. In the Netherlands (44/100) such permits are legally recognized (despite not being systematically provided in practice). As regards the domain of practice, both Spain (36/100) and Turkey (46/100) fail to ensure migrants' systematic access to rights and services in assisted returns, such psychological counselling, legal and medical assistance, logistical and financial support as well as certified translator or interpreter (Indicator 55). In the Netherlands (100/100) these rights seem to be granted both on paper and in practice. However, in contexts of forced returns (Indicator 49) this positive picture no longer holds true, with the Netherlands scoring just 36/100 implying that services are accorded on paper but not systematically realised in practice. In terms of services provided to individuals in the context of forced return, Turkey performs relatively better (57/100), with Spain failing to recognise any such rights (0/100).

Finally, as pertains to returns carried out under readmission agreements, significant problems are observed both at the normative level and in practice. Spain (5/100) shows a critical normative gap: none of the arrangements that the country has signed with countries of origin and transit seem to



provide legal guarantee to migrants, raising crucial concerns in terms of protection. In the Netherlands (36/100) and Turkey (36/100), legal frames regulating readmission agreements are in line with the main normative standards and formally recognize migrants services such as legal assistance and certified translation. However, due to implementation problems these services fail to be systematically ensured in practice.

Temporary and Circular migration

The governance of temporary and circular migration receives low scores in all three countries: Netherlands (37/100), Spain (30/100) and Turkey (35/100). The varying landscape of governance in this area, however, makes direct comparisons challenging. For instance, in the Netherlands, the majority of temporary and circular migrants are from other EU Member States, meaning that they do not full under the same governance system as temporary migrants from non-EU countries. Where temporary migration programmes are very occasionally organised in the Netherlands, they do not form part of the permanent governance architecture. In Turkey, there is a generally unclear landscape with respect to labour migration. Bilateral agreements for temporary mobility exist, but the majority relates to the migration of Turkish labour migrants to other countries. In Spain the situation in progress, due to the substantial changes introduced by the labour reform in December 2021 and by related reforms in the field of migration, whose overall impact on temporary and circular migration is still difficult to establish.


The analysis of the scores available in the three cases confirms the trend observed in the areas of exit and entry: as we move from governance on paper to governance in practice, countries compliance with standards of good migration governance decreases substantially. The main challenges and problems are observed in the execution and functioning of temporary and circular schemes related to migrant workers. In all the case analysed, AdMiGov indicators identify the lack of (stable) coordination mechanisms between organizations involved in the main sectors based on temporary migrant workforce (indicator 58). Labour inspections are foreseen in the three countries, but their application fail to cover the main sectors where migrant work (indicator 68), limiting state's capacity to detect dynamics of exploitation and abuse. In the Netherlands (20/100), temporary recruitment agencies usually meet the main labour standards on paper – e.g., equal pay, contract transparency, paid sick/annual leave, contracts translation -, however these standards are often not granted in practice (indicator 60).

Noteworthy gaps are identified in the normative domain too. In Spain (44/100) and in Turkey (44/100), for instance, the portability of social benefits is granted only to migrants who comes from origin countries with which a specific bilateral agreement is in force, but do not cover the whole mobile population. Both Turkey (0/100) and the Netherlands (0/100), to mention another critical legal gap, do not recognize de jure migrant workers' right to remain in case of unemployment, creating a relationship of dependency between the employer and migrant worker that is not conducive to ensuring migrant protection. In the case of Turkey this is linked to a deeper and wider issue regarding the scarce regulation of the labour market. In the Netherlands it is related to work visas being tied to a specific employer.



Elements of the migration governance system

FIGURE 7 – ELEMENTS OF THE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE SYSTEM: COMPOUND SCORES FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022).



Actors and relations

The core actors in charge of migration governance are found in the central administrative structure and take the shape of different bodies and agencies with different tasks and roles, usually under the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Labour (indicator 1). As a shared strength among the countries analysed, it should be mentioned, the presence of a permanently staffed department to receive and address complaints of discrimination (indicator 8).

The further we move away from institutional boundaries of the central administration toward other layers and sectors of governance, two opposing trends are observed across countries: i) on the one hand, the scarce involvement of and support to local administrations, NGOs and civil society organizations, with respect to which ties with the central government become weaker and more sporadic (indicators 2 and 3); and, on the other hand, the commodification of the implementation of border governance, increasingly outsourced to security firms (indicator 43).

The institutional configurations of actors involved in migration governance also present significant differences. This is evident in the field of asylum, where each country presents a different architecture of multilevel governance (indicator 5). The Netherlands shows a widely articulated governance model that counts on a dense network of state and non-state actors, including different ministries, local and regional authorities, and civil society's partners (CSOs, NGOs). On the other hand, the Spanish asylum system presents a vertical architecture that develops from the central government (in charge of



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
asylum applications and funding the reception system) to civil society entities (in charge of reception facilities and service provision), but that excludes other important actors and stakeholders (e.g., regions, cities, local NGOs). The Turkish asylum system is placed in-between the "multilayer" Dutch model and the "vertical" Spanish one.

In general, in all the countries, the network of actors and relations involved in the migration governance shows weaknesses that negatively affect the governance, with the Dutch system (54/100) performing relatively better than the Spanish (34/100) and the Turkish one (33/100). One of the crucial flaws observed across cases concerns the lack of systematic and comprehensive monitoring of migration governance operations by an independent actor (indicator 12). This is the result of either the lack of formal legal recognition, or due to implementation problems. In Spain (24/100), for instance, the role is taken by the national Ombudsman. However, its action fails to be systematic in terms of scope and effectiveness because of its general character (i.e., not-migration related). In Turkey (16/100), the lack of a clear institutional framework and protocols leave wide room for practices marked by opacity and uncertainty, threatening migrants' rights and protection. Here, bodies, such as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), have sometimes been involved in monitoring, but their actions have remained sporadic and limited in scope.



FIGURE 8 – INDEPENDENT MONITORING OF OPERATIONS

IF THE COUNTRY HAS THE FOLLOWING PRACTICES, ARE THESE MONITORED BY AN INDEPENDENT ACTOR?



- 1 Yes, recognized on paper and systematically executed in practice
- Yes, systematically executed in practice but not recognized on paper
- Yes, recognized on paper but unsystematically executed in practice
- 4 Yes, executed in practice but unsystematically and not recognized on paper
- 5 Yes, recognized on paper but not executed in practice
- 6 Neither recognized on paper nor executed in practice
- 7 Not applicable



Actions

In the three countries, national laws and policies regulating migration prove to be consistent with the main normative standards in several aspects, including: the length of residence-permit (indicator 32), the right of migrant workers (for example to form association as in indicator 65, and to participate in trade unions as in indicator 66), as well as in the field of anti-discrimination (indicator 8). Furthermore, Spain (85/100) and the Netherlands (82/100) have ratified and incorporated in their national legislations the main international rules (and European directives) as regards migrant workers, family-migrants, asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection (indicator 34).

Among the main normative gaps, the AdMiGov indicators highlight the limited access to healthcare for persons in irregular situation (in Turkey and in the Netherlands) and the absence of temporary permits foreseen for non-deportable persons (in Spain and Turkey), aforementioned. Along with these, it should be noted, all countries ack specific laws or policies targeting individuals displaced due to environmental causes (indicator 7).

As already seen, however, the problems and challenges increase as we move from the normative domain to the ground of practice. In terms of actions, this gap is captured by the gap between formal laws and policies and practices on the ground. In the context of education-related mobility, for instance, despite the existence of formal policies promoting the recognition of degree and skills gained by migrants at origin (indicator 67), practical barriers make hard for them to obtain recognition for their diplomas and qualifications.

The Spanish asylum system represents a paradigmatic example of the gap between actions "on paper" and "in practice". Despite the Spanish asylum law according both asylum seekers and BIPs with a wide spectrum of rights, the system is often unable to ensure such rights in practice, including the very access to international protection. What happened in June 2022 in Melilla is only the most striking of innumerable episodes in which the access to the right to asylum is *de facto* denied at the border with Morocco, due to physical barriers and pushbacks.

Another meaningful example regards the governance of "low-skilled" migrant workers in the Netherlands. Despite the Dutch system formally complying with the main standards on migrant workers' rights (e.g. equal pay, minimum wage, leave provisions, contracts available in the language of the worker, the AdMiGov indicators highlight practices of exploitation and abuse (indicator 60). The main problems identified are the limited regulation of temporary agencies (indicator 59), the frequent use of zero-hour contracts (indicator 60),the direct connection between the employer and the residence permit (indicator 62), and, the limited capacity of the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Justice and Security to inspect and supervise labour (and living) conditions of migrant workers (indicator 68).

Resources

Indicators referring to resources evaluate the quantity and kinds of material and immaterial means that a state directly and indirectly (via other actors and/or institutions) dedicates to migration



governance. In this regard, the AdMiGov indicators detect three main weaknesses affecting migration governance systems, concerning the scope, transparency and use of resources¹⁴.

TABLE 4 - COMPOUND INDICATOR ON RESOURCES

| # | Indicator description | NETHERLANDS | SPAIN | TURKEY |
|----|---|-------------|-------|--------|
| 1 | Agency/service dedicated for different aspects of migration governance in the central administrative structure | 86 | 43 | 71 |
| 2 | Support for CSOs/associations carrying out projects in migration governance | 19 | 34 | 9 |
| 3 | Support for local administration carrying out projects in migration governance | 29 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | Budgets dedicated and executed for different aspects of migration governance | 86 | 0 | 0 |
| 5 | Multilevel governance strategy for international protection | 100 | 25 | 50 |
| 20 | Development aid (ODA) allocated to different areas of migration governance | - | - | - |
| 58 | Coordination mechanisms in circular and temporary schemes | 0 | 50 | 0 |

Firstly, resources dedicated to specific sectors of migration governance appear often insufficient to attend to migrants' needs. This is what is observed in the Spanish asylum system, whose limited capacity (in terms of budget, structures and qualified personnel) has often made it impossible for asylum seekers to formalize their demand for international protection and, thus, to enter the reception system (Pasetti et al., 2022). Here the shortage of specialized structures for the most vulnerable individuals should also be noted. In the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, to mention a prominent example, asylum seekers are hosted in the Centre for Temporary Stay of Immigrants (CETI, *Centros de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes*), which are not equipped like the rest of the reception facilities. The absence of protocols and resources to help victims of rape and abuse, for instance, coupled with a usually prolonged stay in these centres, has serious consequences for the mental health of one of the most vulnerable groups of migrants.

The second flaw points to the lack of transparency. Official data regarding fundings and material means allocated and executed for migration governance are scarce and hardly accessible. The Netherlands is the only country that regularly publishes reports with aggregated budget lines related

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¹⁴ In this respect, special attention is paid to the Spanish case because it allows each of these shortcomings to come into focus.




to the different areas of migration governance (indicator 4). The lack of transparency is particularly evident in border management. In Spain this is rooted in specific administrative practices avoiding the obligation to publish acts and proceedings, including: i) the awarding of procurements without a public bidding process; ii) sealing contracts as confidential, basing on national security reasons; and iii) multiple sub-contracting, through which companies receiving public funds externalize their activities to other private agents (El Confidencial and the PorCausa, 2022¹⁵).

The third flaw captured by AdMiGov indicators refers to the misuse of resources. Indicator 20, for instance, gathers evidence of development aid being used for migration control. In Spain, El Confidencial and PorCausa (2022), have pointed out the how the outsourcing of border control (for more than 93 million euros) was mainly carried out through the International and Ibero-American Foundation, an institution dedicated to international cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Aid provided to other countries, among which Morocco is the main recipient, include all-terrain vehicles, trucks, motorcycles, night vision goggles, drones, equipment for intercepting communications, biometric recognition programmes, radars, video cameras, military helmets and bulletproof vests.

Stages of the migration governance process

FIGURE 9 – STAGES OF THE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE PROCESS: COMPOUND SCORES FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022).



 $^{^{15}}$ El Confidencial and the PorCausa (2022) have analysed all the published contracts of the central government related to border management from January 2014 to April 2022.



An overall look at the scores by stages of the migration governance process reveals a consistent pattern across all three countries: promulgation, which captures the network of norms and institutions formally issued to regulate migration governance, is by far the highest scoring areas across all three countries with the remaining areas returning significantly lower scores.

Formulation

High variation is observed across the countries as regards the stage of formulation, with the Netherlands scoring relatively better (61/100) than Turkey (31/100) and Spain (25/100).

This difference is partly attributable to the different functioning of the network of actors involved in migration governance. As regards the formulation of national border policy (indicator 42), for instance, the Netherlands (71/100) relies on a decision-making process that embraces different actors and levels of the public administration (systematically involved), and counts on inputs from non-governmental actors, civil society, the private sector, and academia (despite not systematically). This way of approaching the decision-making process is observed also in the formulation of the strategy for asylum seekers and refugees (indicator 5). In Turkey (43/100) and Spain (21/100), the formulation of the national border policy is limited to a narrower set of actors, usually located with the central administrative structure.

TABLE 5 – ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL BORDER POLICY

| Actors and stakeholders involved in the formulation of national border policy | NETHERLANDS | SPAIN | TURKEY |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Dedicated agency, body or service in charge of border management | Systematically | Systematically | Systematically |
| Other actors, bodies/units or departments (e.g., council members/representatives) | Systematically | Unsystematically | Systematically |
| Other actors, bodies/units or departments (e.g., council members/representatives) | Systematically | Unsystematically | Systematically |
| Competent actors placed at the local level of governance (e.g., regions, municipalities) | Systematically | Never | Never |
| Migrant and refugee advocacy and rights organisations or associations | Unsystematically | Never | Never |
| Other civil society organizations | Unsystematically | Never | Unsystematically |
| Academics | Unsystematically | Never | Unsystematically |
| Employer and employee organizations (e.g. business representatives, trade unions) | Unsystematically | Never | Systematically |



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
In this regard, it is worth stressing the scarce involvement of civil society actors. This is particularly true for migrant and refugee advocacy organizations, which are never involved in Spain and Turkey, and only occasionally in the Netherlands. This relates to a wider and controversial aspect captured by AdMiGov indicators: migration governance tends to be conceived and often developed without considering the perspective of the population that it targets.

Interesting differences are observed also as regard the use of evidence in policymaking (indicator 15), again with the Dutch systems (61/100) scoring comparatively better than the Spanish (8/100) and the Turkish (0/100) one. Despite ample margins for improvement, the Dutch policy-making process is informed by quantitative and/or qualitative data in various migration governance sectors (61/100). Whilst gaps exist, most notably in the area of return, this evidence-based approach to policymaking seems completely absent in Turkey and only barely present in Spain, where the national policymaker counts on data-based assessments only for the management of reception facilities and for migration and development programmes. 16

¹⁶ It should be mentioned that the Spanish government is going through a substantial change of approach in this regard. In 2021 was created the General Sub-direction of Migration Analysis, paralleled by the introduction of new statistical and analytical tools for migration governance. This process is currently at the stage of unifying and streamline data provided by



FIGURE 10 – EVIDENCE BASED POLICYMAKING




- 1 Yes, recognized on paper and systematically executed in practice
- Yes, systematically executed in practice but not recognized on paper
- 3 Yes, recognized on paper but unsystematically executed in practice
- 4 Yes, executed in practice but unsystematically and not recognized on paper
- Yes, recognized on paper but not executed in practice
- 6 Neither recognized on paper nor executed in practice
- 7 No information on the topic available
- 8 Not applicable



Promulgation and Implementation

FIGURE 11 – THE GAP BETWEEN THE STAGES OF PROMULGATION AND IMPLEMENTATION: COMPOUND SCORES FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022).




The gap between policies and practices, formerly discussed with respect to the governance system, is reflected at the level of process between the stages of promulgation and implementation. This implies that, while a country's formal normative and institutional framework may tick many boxes in terms of adherence to normative standards, obstacles and problems existing in the stage of implementation reduce the likelihood that such frameworks will translate into meaningful protection for migrants.

On average, the difference between the two stages in terms of scores is 26 points and the most significant gap is observed in Spain (Δ = 32). The AdMiGov indicators point to several drivers underlying this discrepancy, including insufficient (material and immaterial) resources (indicator 2), the lack of coordination and collaboration mechanisms (indicator 58), and inadequate data (indicators 14 and 15), monitoring and evaluation (indicators 12 and 13).

The role played by administrative barriers should also be recognised as a key reason explaining why migrants fail to enjoy in practice the rights and opportunities that they are entitled to on paper (indicator 9). Administrative barriers include hard to obtain documentation, administrative delays, discretionary procedures, and unaffordable fees. As shown by Figure 12, administrative barriers represent a structural problem that negatively affect the quality of migration governance in all three countries. Unaffordable fees, for instance, hinder the procedure of degree and skills recognition in the Netherlands. In Spain, long waiting times preclude migrants' access to international protection, leaving them in a precarious administrative situation, and denying de facto their right of asylum. In Turkey, significant administrative delays obstruct migrants' visa renewal and extension.



FIGURE 12 – ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS: COMPOUND SCORES FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022). 16



Evaluation

Evaluation represents the weakest stage of the governance process (see Figure 9) in all three countries. Save a few exceptions – such as the Dutch monitoring of the asylum system (indicator 36^{17} : 100/100) and the Turkish reporting of Sustainable Development Goals (indicator 17: 75/100) – most evaluation indicators reveal significant flaws and gaps.

One of the most critical gaps is the overall lack of systematic assessment of migration governance areas and sectors (indicator 13: average = 6/100). More in general, scores gathered in Table 6 suggest that national governments seem unable to know the efficacy of their actions, the extent to which their model of governance achieves the pre-established objectives, as well as about the factors that lead to success or failure.

¹⁷ The Netherlands has a mechanism in place to monitor and evaluate early reception outcomes, which includes coordination with other relevant actors. This does not, however, guarantee that such data is then adequately fed into the policy process.



TABLE 6 – THE STAGE OF EVALUATION: SINGLE AND COMPOUND SCORES FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022).

| # | Indicator description | NETHERLANDS | SPAIN | TURKEY |
|------|--|-------------|-------|--------|
| 12 | Independent monitoring of operations | 44 | 24 | 16 |
| 13 | Systematic evaluation of migration governance areas and sectors | 10 | 8 | 0 |
| 14 | Data collection in migration goverance areas and sectors | 45 | 5 | 0 |
| 15 | Evidence based policymaking | 61 | 8 | 0 |
| 16 | Policy Coherence for Development review | 13 | 38 | N/A |
| 17 | Reporting of Sustainable Development Goals | 13 | 38 | 75 |
| 19 | Research based needs-assessment of development interventions | 25 | 25 | 0 |
| 36 | Monitor and Evaluation of asylum seeker and BIPs reception | 100 | 19 | 0 |
| Avg. | Country average | 38 | 20 | 13 |

Another factor that negatively affects the evaluation stage is the scarcity of reliable data. Indicator 14 captures a state's commitment to data collection, namely its capacity to have trustworthy and systematic empirical knowledge of its governance system, beyond the traditional call for disaggregated data on migration embedded in the SDGs. Without good and transparent data, accountability is much more challenging, which undermines the pursuit of good migration governance. In this regard, the fieldwork has revealed critical gaps in all three countries analysed: the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey lack updated and reliable data regarding actions carried out (e.g., return programmes, temporary worker programmes, impact of migration and development programmes) and the practical functioning of some its core migration governance structures (e.g. reception centres and pre-removal detention centres). This lack of knowledge casts serious doubts on the whole governance system, and calls into question its actual capacity to ensure the protection of migrants.



Thematic Indicators

As described in Section 3.4, the AdMiGov indicators can also be used to develop different composite indicators assessing a country's performance in specific issue areas. While a non-exhaustive list, in this section we showcase five carefully developed composite indicators – hereafter thematic indicators – to demonstrate the ways in which the AdMiGov indicators can be applied to assess different aspects of good migration governance beyond those presented in the analytical framework (Section 2.3).


The first two thematic indicators are inspired by the normative core of the AdMiGov project although they focus in on specific questions related to protection and sustainable development. The first two thematic indicators present the aggregate scores of the three pilot countries in the areas of international protection and policy coherence for sustainable development. The indicator on international protection specifically examines the governance system for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection and highlights the way in which the AdMiGov indicators can be used to aggregate scores for different targets of migration policy which can help to detect potential discrepancies between the different policy categories established by states to govern migration. The indicator on policy coherence for migration and development addresses a specific aspect of the discussion on sustainable development: the use of development policies as a means of achieving migration-related policy goals.

The third thematic indicator highlights the methodological innovation of the AdMiGov indicators in their approach to measuring governance gaps. This includes the identification of normative gaps (not on paper) and implementation gaps (on paper but not systematically in practice).

The final two closely related thematic indicators provide examples of how the AdMiGov indicators can be employed to explore different thematic issues: irregular migration and detention. In this first indicator, we aggregated the scores that were related to the governance of irregular migration. In reviewing the scores, the specific area of migrant detention seemed to be driving the scores, and, accordingly, a new indicator was developed to examine and compare detention systems across countries more closely. These examples highlight the broader utility of the AdMiGov indicators for other interested parties to develop their own thematic indicators to examine various aspects of migration governance in the future. Figure 13 presents the overall scores for each of the five thematic indicators.



FIGURE 13 – SCORING OVERVIEWS OF THE SIX COMPOSITE INDICATORS FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022).



International Protection

The aggregated 'international protection' indicator specifically examines and aggregates scores relating to asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection as a target group of migration governance, and the surrounding governance systems in which policies are formulated, promulgated, implemented, and evaluated. This example therefore also acts as an illustration of how the AdMiGov indicators can be used to conduct a similar analytical exercise for other target groups, such as temporary workers, or those who are compelled to leave a country, either through forced or assisted return programmes.

While Spain scored an average of 30/100 in this dimension, the Netherlands scored 68/100. Turkey finds itself in the middle and scored 39/100. This implies that the Netherlands in general seems to perform better according to the protection principle than Spain or Turkey, although the system is still far from perfect, as the alarming events at the overcrowded centre in Ter Apel in August 2022 demonstrated. Notable gaps emerge from the international protection indicators across all three pilot countries. For instance, as previously mentioned, none of the pilot countries have put any measures in place for the protection or support of persons displaced across international borders in response to environmental causes (indicator 7). Furthermore, apart from some minor support in the Netherlands, we also observe a lack of support for local government actors who are often direct providers of services to individuals in need of international protection (Indicator 3). It is also of note that all three



pilot countries have, albeit different, policies in place that restrict access to their territory for persons seeking international protection (Indicator 52).

However, comparing the indicators on international protection also reveals limitations in the AdMiGov indicators. As noted in Section 4, the three pilot countries represent different experiences in terms of the reception of asylum seekers and refugees: Turkey as a country hosting a sizeable number of individuals requiring international protection and a system with different legal categories; Spain as a country on the borders of the EU; and the Netherlands as a Northern EU state. As previously noted, but worth repeating: the realties in each of these three contexts make it hard to offer a robust comparative discussion using the AdMiGov indicators. Furthermore, when it comes to international protection, the focus on the national level obscures practices that are delegated upwards to the EU level in the case of EU States. Where practices in the border states of the EU may be more readily identified and captured in the AdMiGov indicators, practices relating to intergovernmental cooperation on international protection are far less readily identified. While it is necessary to define the scope of any set of indicators, it is also important to recognise what they are not able to capture. This points to the necessity of complementary indicator sets that address questions relating to multilateral cooperation on migration governance.

Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development

The thematic indicator on policy coherence for sustainable development includes a selection of indicators that points to the use of development policies to achieve migration related policy goals with the intention to address the root causes of migration. In particular, the appropriation of the migration-development narrative to condition development contributions on agreements on areas such as the signing of readmission agreements and border management, has received much criticism. While a narrow definition of policy coherence for development, the indicators that comprise this thematic indicator (indicators 16-19) capture the extent to which the country's policies have been assessed with respect to Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals, and whether the country engages in practices related to the conditioning of development aid on migration related objectives (Table 7). Overall, all three countries received relatively low scores on the aggregated indicator of policy coherence for sustainable development, with Spain scoring just 29/100, followed by the Netherlands with 38/100. In part because one indicator is non-applicable for Turkey¹⁸, overall Turkey scores relatively better than both Spain and the Netherlands, receiving 58/100. Again, idiosyncrasies between the case countries should be acknowledged, with Turkey being both a giver and receiver of ODA.

¹⁸ Turkey does not participate in the OECD DAC Peer Review process.



TABLE 7 – POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS: SINGLE SCORES FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022).

| # | Indicator description | NETHERLANDS | SPAIN | TURKEY |
|------|--|-------------|-------|--------|
| 16 | Have the country's migration policies been assessed in the country's Policy Coherence for (Sustainable) Development peer review and other relevant reviews (e.g., national assessment of policy coherence)? | 13 | 38 | N/A |
| 17 | Has the country reported on relevant migration-related commitments in their voluntary national review of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation? | 13 | 38 | 75 |
| 18 | Does the country's external development (co-operation) plan/strategy outline the strategic use of development co-operation to support migration policy? | 100 | 16 | 100 |
| 19 | Does the country have a systematic way of designing migration-relevant development interventions implemented in other countries that are based on a research-based needs-assessment of the intervention site(s)? | 25 | 25 | 0 |
| Avg. | Country average | 38 | 29 | 58 |

In addition to this, a descriptive indicator (indicator 20) was included to capture the percentage of overseas development aid (ODA) allocated to different areas of migration governance. In particular, we assessed whether the country had allocated ODA towards the support of refugees within the donor country's borders, a practice that distorts the definition of what it means to provide development support (Knoll and Sheriff, 2017). It is much more challenging to assign a score to this indicator, which is why it is purely used to identify whether certain questionable practices are evidence. However, we also acknowledge here that the nation state focus of the indicators may obscure practices that occur at the supranational level (such as through the EU Trust Fund for Africa). Across the three pilot countries we did not find evidence of ODA being used to support refugees within the borders of the donor state. However, we also failed to identify clear and transparent information regarding the use of development funds for different migration governance related objectives.

Despite being a priority of the EU's approach to policy coherence for development (Godin et al, 2021), no references were made to migration in neither Spain (2022) nor the Netherland's (2017) most recent OECD Policy Coherence for (Sustainable) Development Peer Reviews¹⁹. For both countries, some cursory references were, however, found in their own national assessment reports.

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¹⁹ This indicator does not apply to Turkey.

Reviewing the scores for measuring relevant migration-related commitments in their voluntary national review of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation, we see differences across the countries (Table 8). Both the Netherlands and Turkey have made some steps towards measuring indicators related to SDG 8.8, while only Turkey has measurements relevant for SDG 10.7. No countries had reported any information related to SDG 10.c; and only Spain, to an extent, and Turkey offered information related to the disaggregation of data, including by migrant status (SDG 17.18).

TABLE 8 – SDG MONITORING: SINGLE SCORES FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022).

| # | Indicator description | NETHERLANDS | SPAIN | TURKEY |
|------|--|-------------|-------|--------|
| 16 | Have the country's migration policies been assessed in the country's Policy Coherence for (Sustainable) Development peer review and other relevant reviews (e.g., national assessment of policy coherence)? | 13 | 38 | N/A |
| 17 | Has the country reported on relevant migration-related commitments in their voluntary national review of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation? | 13 | 38 | 75 |
| 18 | Does the country's external development (co-operation) plan/strategy outline the strategic use of development co-operation to support migration policy? | 100 | 16 | 100 |
| 19 | Does the country have a systematic way of designing migration-relevant development interventions implemented in other countries that are based on a research-based needs-assessment of the intervention site(s)? | 25 | 25 | 0 |
| Avg. | Country average | 38 | 29 | 58 |


Indicators 17 and 18 both relate to the strategic use of development cooperation to achieve migration related objectives. For the Netherlands and Turkey, we found no evidence of the strategic use of development cooperation to support migration in the country's external development plans (indicator 17) but, as noted, these practices often occur at the supranational level. For Spain, however, this practice was explicitly documented on paper, although evidence of its systematic implementation in practice was not found. For both the Netherlands and Spain we found some evidence of research-based processes to design development interventions on paper, however, in practice these did not systematically take the needs of the beneficiary country into account (indicator 18). In Turkey we found no evidence of such an approach to development practice neither on paper, nor in practice.



Governance Gaps

A review of the aggregate scores of the indicators designed to measure governance gaps reveals comparatively few normative gaps (governance on paper) but significant implementation gaps (governance in practice). The overall scores for the three pilot countries were: the Netherlands (55/100); Spain (29/100); and Turkey (34/100). A closer examination of the distribution of scores for each pilot country reveals different patterns. For instance, in the Netherlands the distribution reveals a relatively strong normative framework, with some areas well integrated in practice alongside a share of indicators in the middle-score range implying implementation gaps when it comes to governance in practice. In the Turkish case we can identify a larger number of normative gaps (indicators scoring 0), while for Spain we see a mixed picture of governance existing on paper but not being systematically implemented (mid-range scores) alongside normative gaps.

FIGURE 14 – IMPLEMENTATION GAPS: SCORES DISTRIBUTIONS FOR THE PILOTED COUNTRIES (2022).



Overall, the indicators reveal a pattern of generally 'good' migration governance on paper, but not in practice. In this regard, it is noteworthy that only one indicator designed to measure implementation gaps scores 100/100 across all three pilot countries. This was indicator 65 on the right of migrant workers to join and form migrant associations. These results imply that, in all three pilot countries, migrants are formally allowed to join and form associations, and that this systematically occurs in practice. All other indicators revealed some kind of gap, be that normatively (not on paper at all) or in practice (either not implemented or unsystematically implemented).

When examining the lowest scoring indicators (which imply neither governance on paper, nor in practice), we find that indicators designed to measure the extent to which global norms are translated into national frameworks related to migrant rights generally score poorly. For instance, across the three pilot countries, indicator 27 (*Does the country have a regulatory framework for the recruitment process abroad?*) scores an average of 4/100 points. Other indicators with low scores across the pilot countries include Indicator 39 (*To what extent do services meet needs of the migrants in reception facilities?*) and Indicator 60 (*To what extent do temporary employment agencies meet fair labour standards?*). There are also certain policies such as access to health care for irregular migrants (indicator 33) and the provision of alternatives to administrative detention (indicator 40) that appear among the lowest scoring indicators. Finally, several indicators relating to multilevel governance also receive low scores across the pilot countries, namely engagement with local government actors (indicator 3) and non-governmental actors (indicator 2); and measures to ensure that data and evidence inform policy development (indicator 15).



When we look at examples of governance on paper, but not in practice, we find several indicators related to ensuring that the rights of migrants are ensured in practice. For instance, all three pilot countries have a normative framework that prescribes labour inspections (Indicator 68), and yet, in practice, the actual functioning of labour inspectorates leaves much to be desired. Similarly, with respect to services provided to beneficiaries of international protection in reception centres, we identify a whole range of services, including psychosocial support, prescribed on paper, but implementation in practice often differs, particularly when we examine temporal, and geographical implementation.

While the sample is too small to make any strong ascertains, it is evident that governance gaps exist in all three pilot countries and strongly drive the overall scores downward.

Irregular Migration and Detention

The AdMiGov indicators can also be used to explore different issues through the creation of additional thematic composite indicators. In this section we examine the aggregated scores for the governance of irregular migration and then focus specifically on indicators related to detention.

Irregular Migration

In total, 18²⁰ indicators are included in the composite indicator on irregular migration. This includes two partial scores extracted from other indicators measuring data collection (indicator 14) and information provision to irregular migrants (indicator 31). The remaining 16 indicators address different indicators of relevance to irregular migration and to irregular migrants. These include indicators across the migration cycle, from the prevention of entry, access to services, to matters relating to detention and return. Compared to the overall scores we find that the irregular composite indicator scores are lower in all three pilot countries, with the Netherlands scoring 51/100, Turkey scoring 27/100, and Spain scoring 19/100. Detention, and specifically the lack of alternatives to detention appear to drive overall scores downward (which led to the development of a further composite indicator discussed below). However, we also see that indicators relating to access to service such as health care are also low across all pilot countries. As previously noted, in Spain, the right to access health care on the same basis as nationals is granted to irregular migrants on paper. Despite this, access to healthcare remains a challenge to many irregular migrants, even if the right to access exists on paper. The right of access is not prescribed in either the Netherlands or Turkey. In terms of 'good practice', the comparatively higher score of the Dutch case with regards to the scope of services provided to detainees in practice, including the use of specifically trained staff could be further examined by other countries to enhance their own practices with respect to detention.

Detention

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Based on the observations from the 'irregular migration' composite indicator, further AdMiGov indicators were identified to create a specific composite indicator measuring detention practices across all target populations²¹. These indicators focused on policies relating to alternatives to detention, compliance with international norms regarding the length of administrative detention, and detention conditions, including both the type of detention facility, as well as staff and services made available to migrants in administrative detention, whether upon arrival, or prior to exit. In addition, partial scores from indicators measuring other aspects of governance (such as data and evidence,

²⁰ Indicators 33, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 (plus partial scores (14, 31).

²¹ Indicators 40,41,44,45,46,47, and 48 (plus partial scores from 1, 2. 3. 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15).



monitoring practices and resources) were also extracted and added to the aggregated detention score to give a fuller picture of the governance of detention across the pilot countries.

The most interesting results across countries point, again, to the discrepancy between what migration governance promises to do on paper and what it actually does in practice. In all three countries, the detention of children is prohibited by law, but, in the absence of alternatives, occurs in practice (indicator 40). The same applies to the duration of pre-removal detentions, which again being limited in line with international law, frequently has a longer duration in practice (Indicator 45).

Overall, the Netherlands scored an average of 60/100 for the aggregated detention indicator while Turkey and Spain scored just 17/100 and 13/100 respectively. The Dutch's higher score is linked to the better quality of its governance system in terms of transparency (e.g., data on detention as well as access to detention centres for monitoring purposes) and in terms of the range of services provided to detained individuals, however significant governance gaps still exist.

Conclusion: What Indicators Tell us about Good Migration Governance

Beyond constructing the AdMiGov indicators – the ultimate goal of WP7 – this report has also presented preliminary results into how they can be applied, by drawing on data concerning the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey. Notwithstanding the limitations that come with the exploratory nature of the study, these results help to better clarify the value, scope, and applicability of AdMiGov indicators.

The AdMiGov indicators can be viewed as the operationalisation of policy recommendations, harmonising migration governance in practice with what the project conceptualises as "good" migration governance. The maximum score (100/100) captures the best-case scenario, the one in which the country's migration governance system – or one specific dimension— is fully consistent with the normative standards on migrant protection and sustainable development employed. Accordingly, any indicator scoring less than 100/100 highlights an area in which a governance gap exists, and improvement can be made.

The AdMiGov indicators represent a tool of diagnosis identifying the strengths and weaknesses of national migration governance systems (gaps and challenges, but also good practices possibly worthy of dissemination). In doing so, the indicators shed light on paths for improvement and policy recommendations.

In general terms, the Dutch migration governance system (54/100) appears relatively more advanced and consistent with the principles of migrant protection and sustainable development, than the Spanish (34/100) and the Turkish one (34/100), which present more critical gaps and limitations, however it is evident that significant governance gaps also exist in the Netherlands.

Despite variation and significant differences across cases, several cross-cutting challenges to achieve better migration governance have emerged from the study. The first and most striking one has been the stark difference between governance on paper and governance in practice (implementation gaps). While some normative gaps have been identified (e.g., limited access to healthcare in the Netherlands



and Turkey), the three countries appear relatively consistent with the standards of protection and sustainable development employed as regards rights and opportunities formally recognized to migrants. However, as we examine the domain of praxis and the de facto provision of such rights, migration governance appears more deficient and problematic. The discrepancy between what governance promises to do on paper and what it actually does in practice cuts across all migration governance's areas: entry, exit, as well as temporary and circular schemes. These gaps are particularly worrying for the most vulnerable profiles of migrants, whose needs are often neglected.

The AdMiGov indicators detect different factors that help to account for the identified governance gaps, concerning both the elements of the governance system (e.g., insufficient resources, the absence of independent monitoring actors) and the stages of governance process, particularly in the phase of implementation (e.g., administrative barriers, the lack of coordination and collaboration mechanisms). By measuring both normative and implementation gaps (collectively referred to as governance gaps), the AdMiGov team brings the analytical perspective on migration governance to the ground of practice and contributes to fill in one of the main gaps of existing indicators that, to date, have only measured policies on paper.

Another crucial challenge regards the lack of an evidence-based approach to migration governance. According to the AdMiGov indicators, the states analysed seem unable to adequately know the efficacy of their actions and the extent to which pre-established objectives are actually achieved. This seems related, on the one hand, to their scarce commitment to data collection (and transparency) and, on the other hand, to the inadequate mechanisms they have in force to monitor and control their actions. The use of data and evidence to support policy development is key to ensuring good migration governance in practice. Improving systems to monitor and evaluate different governance practices can diagnose potential problems and allow remedial action to be taken earlier. Increasing the transparency of information can facilitate the identification of areas where the expected outcomes of policies may have negative implications for the protection of migrants.

The AdMiGov indicators have also highlighted the need for stakeholder consultation. In all the cases examined, migration governance seems to be conceived and issued without considering the perspective of the population that it targets. Broadening stakeholders' participation in the decision-making process, particularly of those more concerned for migrants' rights and protection, appears as another indispensability condition to move towards a more secure and sustainable migration governance.

The governance gaps and limitations identified by the AdMiGov indicators jeopardize the whole functioning of migration governance of the countries analysed, calling into question their actual capacity to ensure migrants' protection, and raising serious concerns in terms effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability. Indicators can be a powerful tool to promote specific normative goals. However, it is also critically important that one does not reduce migration governance — an ultimately social and political phenomenon — to the sum of its constituent parts. Reality is far more complex. Just as a warning light on a car can diagnose where an issue is (engine, breaks, lights etc.), and how serious it is (amber, red), it cannot precisely diagnose the exact nature or cause of the problem. Accordingly, using indicators to diagnose problems in the manifestation of migration governance can only be the first step in systematically identifying the structural issues that are at odds with what we define as the



principles of good migration governance, but that it needs to be followed and complemented by indepth assessment of challenges and dynamics of each migration governance context. The Netherlands, Spain and Turkey are encouraged to further explore the detailed results of the AdMiGov project and to take remedial action to enhance their migration governance systems in the future.



Annexes

Annex 1 Normative standards of ADMIGOV indicators

- Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), 2000
- Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), 1950
- Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Laying Down Standards for The Reception of Applicants for International Protection.
- Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
- Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between person irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 2000/43 of 29 June 2000.
- EC Directive on the right of citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 2004/38 of 29 April 2004
- Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951
- ILO Convention No. 143 of 1979 on Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions)
- ILO Convention No. 97 of 1949 on Migration for Employment
- ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
- Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15 and 16 October 1999
- UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 2018
- UN Global Compact on Refugees, 2018
- UN International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and the Members of Their Families
- UN International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
- UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR)
- UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 2016
- UN the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 2015
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948



Annex 2 Final Indicators and Coding Guidelines

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | | Coding Guidelines | |
|---|--|--|-----------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|------------------------|--|
| # | illulcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Is there an agency or | | | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Central administrative structure |
| | service specifically dedicated to one of the following aspects | GCM Principle (Whole-of Government) GCM: | Actors | Promulgation | Family | Two-dimensional, | | Asylum seekers and BIPS entry and/or early reception |
| 1 | of migration | Detention: 13(g) | Relations | | BIPs | multiple-choice | Grey Literature | Forced returns |
| | governance in the | SDGS: 10.7; 17.14 | Resources | | Asylum seekers Irregular | | Assisted returns | |
| | central administrative structure? | GCR: A.2.1 (para 20) | | | | | | Pre-removal detention |
| | | | | | | | Temporary workers | |
| | | | | | | | | programmes |

| # | Indicator Quest | ion Rationale | | Dimensions of analysi | S | | Coding Guidelines | |
|---|---|--|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------|--|------------------------|--|
| " | mulcator Quest | Nationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which kind of s | 11 0/ | | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Temporary workers programmes |
| 2 | government provide for CSOs/NGOs carrying out project | SDGS: 10.7; 17.14 GCR: A.3.2 (paras 40- | | Promulgation | Family | Three-dimensional, multiple-choice assessing implementation | | Asylum seekers and BIPS entry and/or early reception |
| | in the specified fields | ′′ | Relations | Implementation | BIPs | | Grey Literature | Forced returns |
| | | Immediate and Ongo | Resources | | Asylum seekers | implementation | KI Interviews | Assisted returns |
| | _ | Needs (6b) | ling . | | Irregular | | | Pre-removal detention |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | Coding Guidelines | | |
|---|---|--|-----------|------------------------|-----------------|---|------------------------|--|
| # | mulcator Question | | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which kind of support does the central | | | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Temporary workers programmes |
| 3 | government provide for local government actors carrying out | GCM: 15(i) Whole-of government SDGS: 10.7; 17.14 GCR: A.3.2 (paras 37-38) | Actors | Promulgation | Family | Three-dimensional, multiple-choice, assessing implementation | | Asylum seekers and BIPS entry and/or early reception |
| | projects in the | | Relations | Implementation | BIPs | | Grey Literature | Forced returns |
| | | | Resources | | Asylum seekers | | KI Interviews | Assisted returns |
| | | | | | Irregular | | | Pre-removal detention |



| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | | Coding Guidelines | |
|---|--|---|-----------|------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|--|
| # | mulcator Question | Nationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Does the government | | | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Temporary workers programmes |
| 4 | systematically (i.e., at least every two years) publish a report on the following | GCM: Return: 21(i) SDGS: 10.7; 17.14 GCR: A3.1 (para 32); | | | Family | Two-dimensional, multiple-choice, | | Asylum seekers and BIPS entry and/or early reception |
| | • | B1.2; B1.4; B1.5; B2.1- | | Implementation | BIPs | insert amounts of budget | Grey Literature | Forced returns |
| | migration governance related expenditure? | 2.9; B3.5 | Resources | | Asylum seekers | buaget | | Assisted returns |
| | related expellulture: | | | | Irregular | | | Pre-removal detention |

| | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | | Coding Guidelines | |
|---|---|---|-----------|------------------------|----------------|------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Does the national strategy on asylum | CCNA, Dringinles (M/h ala | | Formulation | | | Normative Reference | |
| | and refuge include | GCM: Principles (Whole of Government; Whole | Actors | Promulgation | | Two-dimensional, | | |
| | specific | of Society) | Relations | Implementation | BIPs | multiple-choice, | Grey Literature | |
| 5 | responsibilities/ | SDG: 17.14; 3.8; 4.1; 4.3; | Resources | | Asylum seekers | measuring | | |
| | commitments (e.g., policy, strategy, or funding) for the specified actors? | 11.1; 16.3 GCR: A3.2 (para 37) | | | | governance gaps | | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Dimensions of analysis | | | | Coding Guidelines | |
|---|--|--------------------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | How does the country | GCM: n/a SDG: 17.14 | Actions | Formulation | | | Normative Reference | Country of transit |
| _ | cooperate with other countries to facilitate | GCR: B3.2 (para 42); | Actors | Promulgation | | Two-dimensional, | Academic Literature | |
| 6 | asylum seekers and | B3.3 (para 95) Extracted | Relations | Implementation | BIPs | multiple-choice | Grey Literature | |
| | , | from the NYD: Durable | | | Asylum seekers | | KI Interviews | |
| | RIPs mobility? | Solutions (14a) | | | | | Other Sources | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|---|--|------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | illulcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Does the government have a policy on the | GCM: 2(i,j,k,l); 5(h) | Actions | | | One-dimensional, | Normative Reference | |
| | protection or support | SDG: 1.5 GCR: D. Prevention and | | Promulgation | | single choice, measuring | Academic Literature | |
| 7 | of displaced people | | | Implementation | BIPs | | Grey Literature | |
| | who move across addressing | addressing root causes | | | Asylum seekers | | KI Interviews | |
| | international borders in response to | (para 8) | | | | governance gaps | Other Sources | |



| causes, such as natural disasters? | environmental | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--|--|--|
| natural disasters? | causes, such as | | | |
| | natural disasters? | | | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | | Coding Guidelines | |
|---|---|---------------------------------------|----------|------------------------|-----------------|--|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | What actions does the government | | Actions | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | |
| | undertake to support | | Actors | Promulgation | Family | | Academic Literature | |
| | victims of | | | Implementation | BIPs | | Grey Literature | |
| | discrimination on | GCM: 17(c,d,e) | | | Asylum seekers | Two-dimensional, | KI Interviews | |
| 8 | grounds of race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national/ethnic origin in the public administration and services? | SDG: 16.3; 5.1 GCR B2.10 (para 84) | | | Irregular | multiple-choice, measuring governance gaps | Other Sources | |

| # | Indicator Occation | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | | Coding Guidelines | |
|---|---|--------------------------------|----------|------------------------|-----------------|---|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | Indicator Question Which barriers do migrants face when trying to obtain a | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | | | Actions | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | |
| | trying to obtain a | | | | Family | Three-dimensional, | Academic Literature | |
| | visa, renew/extend | GCM 12(all); 18(a,b,c,d); | | Implementation | BIPs | multiple-choice, | Grey Literature | |
| 9 | temporary visa/ | 22(b,c) | | | Asylum seekers | insert corresponding | KI Interviews | |
| 9 | residence permit, have skills/degrees recognized and transfer social benefits | SDG: 10.7 GCM B1.6(para 62) | | | Irregular | letter in all boxes that fit your country's situation | Other Sources | |

| | la. | dicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | Coding Guidelines | | |
|---|---|------------------------|--|-------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|--|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | inc | dicator Question | | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Are there confidential mechanisms for migrants and/or staff, to communicate violations of fundamental rights and/or procedures? | | GCM: 3(d); 6(d,j,k); 7(c); 10(e); 15(d); 17 (d,e) | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Three dimensional | Normative Reference | Mechanism |
| | | igrants and/or staff, | | | Promulgation | Family | Three-dimensional, multiple-choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 1 | | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 16.3 | | Relations Implementation RIPs | Grey Literature | | | | |
| | | | | | Asylum seekers | | KI Interviews | | |
| | | U | GCR: A3.2 (para 34) | | | Irregular | governance gaps | Other Sources | |



| | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|---|---|----------|------------------------|-----------------|--|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | mulcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Are there accessible mechanisms for migrants and/or staff for situations of | GCM: 2(c,g); 7(j); 11(d); 14(e,f); 19(f) | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Three-dimensional, multiple-choice, | Normative Reference | Mechanism |
| | | SDGS: 10.7; 17.14 | | Promulgation | Family | | Academic Literature | |
| 11 | | GCR: Extracted from the | | Implementation | BIPs | | Grey Literature | |
| | | NYD: Support for | | | Asylum seekers | measuring | KI Interviews | |
| | emergency? | Immediate and ongoing needs (7c) | | | Irregular | governance gaps | Other Sources | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|---|---|-----------|------------------------|-----------------|--|------------------------|-------------------|--|
| # | indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary | |
| 12 | If the country has the following practices, | GCM: Principle (Whole- of Society); 21 (f) SDGS: 10.7;17.14 | | | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, multiple-choice, measuring governance gaps | Normative Reference | Monitored | |
| | are these monitored | | Actors | Promulgation | Family | | | | |
| | | | Relations | Implementation | BIPs | | Grey Literature | | |
| | by an independent actor? | | | Evaluation | Asylum seekers | | KI Interviews | | |
| | | | | | Irregular | | | | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|--------------------------------------|---|----------|------------------------|--------------------|--|------------------------|-------------------|--|
| # | marcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary | |
| | areas of migration of Government, Wh | GCM Principles (Whole | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, multiple-choice, measuring implementation gaps | Normative Reference | Evaluated | |
| 13 | | of Government, Whole of Society); GCM: 1(all) | | | Family | | | | |
| | | *** | | | BIPs | | Grey Literature | | |
| | evaluated? | GCR:n/a | | Evaluation | Asylum seekers | | KI Interviews | | |
| | evaluated? | | | | Irregular | | | | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysi | s | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|---|-----------|----------|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary | |
| | Is (quantitative and/or qualitative) empirical data systematically collected, under government GCM: 1 | | Actions | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Reception centre | |
| | | | | | Family | | | Academic Literature | Pre-removal detention centre |
| | | GCM: 1 | | | BIPs | | Grey Literature | Forced Return | |
| 14 | | | | Evaluation | Asylum seekers | Two-dimensional, | KI Interviews | Readmission Agreements | |
| 14 | responsibility, regarding | | | | multiple-choice | | AVR(R) | | |
| | the specified areas of | | | | | | | Temporary worker | |
| | migration governance? | | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | Diaspora engagement | |
| | | | | | irregular | | Other Sources | programmes | |
| | | | | | | | | Remittances | |
| | | | | | | | | Circular Migration | |



| | M&D |
|--|---------------------|
| | Irregular Migration |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------|------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Nationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Are there actions in place to | CCNA: 1 | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | Two- | Normative Reference | Actions |
| | ensure that | | | Promulgation | Family | dimensional, multiple-choice, | | |
| 15 | qualitative/quantitative data | GCM: 1 SDGS: 17.18 | | | BIPs | | Grey Literature | |
| 13 | on the specified topic are | 3003. 17.16 | | Evaluation | Asylum seekers | measuring | KI Interviews | |
| | used to inform policy-makers | ed to inform policy-makers | | | turanular | | | |
| | decisions | | | | Irregular | governance gaps | | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysi | S | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|---------------------------------------|--|----------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Have the country's migration policies | | Actions | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Cursory |
| | been assessed in the | GCM: Principle (Whole- of Government; Whole- | | | Family | | | |
| | country's Policy | | | | BIPs | Two dimensional | Grey Literature | |
| | Coherence for of Society); 1 | of Society); 1 | | Evaluation | Asylum seekers | | | |
| 16 | (Sustainable) | (indirectly); 19(b); 23(c) Two-dimensional, multiple-choice | | | | | | |
| | Development peer | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 17.19; | | | | multiple-choice | | |
| | review and other | 10.c | | | luvaquilau | | | |
| | relevant reviews (e.g., | GCR: n/a | | | Irregular | | | |
| | national assessment | | | | | | | |
| | , 5, | | | | | | | |

| | Indicator Occasion | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | S | Coding Guidelines | | | |
|----|--|--|-----------------------------------|------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--|
| # | Indicator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary | |
| | Has the country reported on relevant | reported on relevant GCM: Principle | reported on relevant (Sustainable | Actions | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | |
| | migration-related Development); 1 | | | Family | | | | | |
| | | (indirectly); 2(a,b); 19(a) | | | BIPs | Two-dimensional, multiple-choice | Grey Literature | | |
| 17 | voluntary national | voluntary national SDGS: All (especially | | Evaluation | Asylum seekers | | | | |
| 1, | review of Sustainable Development Goal | 10.7;17.14; 17.19; 10.c) GCR: B2 (para 64-65) | | | Irregular | | | | |



| | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|---|--|--------------|------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Does the country's external development (co-operation) | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | | |
| | | | Promulgation | Family | multiple-choice, | | | |
| 18 | plan/strategy outline | plan/strategy outline the strategic use of GCM: n/a SDGS: 10.7;17.14 GCR: n/a | | Implementation | BIPs | measuring implementation | Grey Literature | |
| 10 | the strategic use of | | | | Asylum seekers | | | |
| | migration policy to support development co-operation? | GCN. II/ a | | | Irregular | gaps | | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | | Coding Guidelines | |
|-------------|---|---|----------|------------------------|-----------------|--|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Nationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Does the country have a systematic | | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | |
| | way of designing | | | Promulgation | Family | | Academic Literature | |
| | migration-relevant | GCM: 1 (indirectly) SDGS: 10.7;17.14 GCR: n/a | | Implementation | BIPs | One-dimensional, single choice, measuring governance gaps | Grey Literature | |
| | development | | | Evaluation | Asylum seekers | | KI Interviews | |
| 19 diriccib | interventions implemented in other countries that are based on a research- based needs- assessment of the intervention site(s)? | | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |

| ., | 1.1.1.1.2.0.0.1.1.1.1 | Rationale | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | Indicator Question | | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | What percentage of overseas | GCM: n/a SDGS: 10.7;17.14 | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | |
| 20 | development aid | | | | Family | One-dimensional, | | |
| 20 | (ODA) has been | | | Implementation | BIPs | insert percentage in all boxes | Grey Literature | |
| | allocated to the | GCR: n/a | Resources | | Asylum seekers | | | |
| | following? | | | Irregular | | | | |

| | Indicator Overtion | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|-----------------------|---|----------|------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which of the | GCM: 3(d); 6(d,j); 7(g,k); | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Three-dimensional, multiple-choice | Normative | |
| | following redress | 10(e,h), 13(d); 15(d); | ACTIONS | | wilgrant workers | | Reference | |
| 21 | mechanisms (either | 17(b,d,e) | | Promulgation | Family | | Academic Literature | |
| | public or publicly | SDGS: 10.7; 16.3 GCR: B2.4 (para 75) | | Implementation | BIPs | | Grey Literature | |
| | funded) are available | | | | Asylum seekers | | | |



| | for all migrants, | | | | | | | |
|----|--|--|--|---|--|---|---|-------------------|
| | regardless of status? | | | | Irregular | | | |
| | regulatess of status. | | | | | | | |
| | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | indicator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which of the following conditions | CCAA F/:) | Actions | | | | Normative Reference | |
| 22 | are taken into | GCM: 5(i) SDGS: 10.7 | | Promulgation | Family | Three-dimensional, | | |
| 22 | account for the family | GCR: B3.3 (para 95) | | | | multiple-choice | | |
| | member requesting | Cent. 25.5 (para 55) | | | | | | |
| | reunification? | | | | | | | |
| | | | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which of the | CCM F(1) | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | |
| 23 | following conditions are compulsory for | GCM 5(i) SDGS: 10.7; 3.8 | | Promulgation | Family | Three-dimensional, | | |
| 23 | the family member | GCR: B3.3 (para 95) | | | | multiple-choice | | |
| | being reunified? | GCN: D3:5 (para 35) | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | | | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | |
| | | GCM 5(i) | | | | | | |
| 24 | What relatives are eligible for family | ` ' | | Promulgation | Family | Three-dimensional. | Academic Literature | |
| | | SDGS: 10.7 | | Promulgation Implementation | Family BIPs | Three-dimensional, multiple-choice | | |
| | eligible for family reunification? | ` ' | | | | | | |
| | , | SDGS: 10.7 | | Implementation | BIPs | | | |
| | , | SDGS: 10.7 | | Implementation | BIPs Asylum seekers | | | |
| # | reunification? | SDGS: 10.7 GCR: B3.3 (para 95) | | Implementation | BIPs Asylum seekers Irregular | | | |
| # | , | SDGS: 10.7 | | Implementation Evaluation | BIPs Asylum seekers Irregular | | Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews Other Sources | Words in Glossary |
| # | reunification? Indicator Question Does the country have a defined list of | SDGS: 10.7 GCR: B3.3 (para 95) | Relations Resources | Dimensions of analysis Stages Formulation | BIPs Asylum seekers Irregular | multiple-choice | Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews Other Sources Coding Guidelines | Words in Glossary |
| # | Indicator Question Does the country have a defined list of occupations (i.e., a | SDGS: 10.7 GCR: B3.3 (para 95) Rationale | Relations Resources Elements Actions Actors | Dimensions of analysis Stages Formulation Promulgation | BIPS Asylum seekers Irregular Target Migrant Workers Family | multiple-choice | Suggested Evidence Words in Glossary Normative Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews Other Sources Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Normative Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews Other Sources Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Words in Glossary Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Normative | |
| | Indicator Question Does the country have a defined list of occupations (i.e., a list of occupations for | SDGS: 10.7 GCR: B3.3 (para 95) | Relations Resources Elements Actions Actors Relations | Dimensions of analysis Stages Formulation Promulgation Implementation | Asylum seekers Irregular Target Migrant Workers Family BIPs | multiple-choice How to Measure | Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews Other Sources Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Normative Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature | Words in Glossary |
| # | Indicator Question Does the country have a defined list of occupations (i.e., a | SDGS: 10.7 GCR: B3.3 (para 95) Rationale | Relations Resources Elements Actions Actors | Dimensions of analysis Stages Formulation Promulgation | BIPS Asylum seekers Irregular Target Migrant Workers Family | multiple-choice How to Measure One-dimensional, | Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews Other Sources Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Normative Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature | Words in Glossary |



| | Indicator Occasion | Deticuele | | Dimensions of analysis | S | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|--|---|----------|------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | What is the relationship between | GCM: 5(c,d,e,f) | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Three-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Quota |
| 26 | the issuance of work | SDGS: 10.7; 8.8 | | Promulgation | | multiple-choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 20 | visas and labour | GCM: n/a | | | | assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | demand? | GCWI. II/ a | | | | implementation | KI Interviews | |
| | demand: | | | | | | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| | | | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | • |
| | Does the country | GCM : 6(all) | Actions | | Migrant Workers | One-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Regulatory framework |
| 27 | have a regulatory framework for the | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8; | | Promulgation | | single choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 21 | recruitment process | 8.7; 12.7 | | Implementation | | measuring | Grey Literature | |
| | abroad? | GCM: n/a | | | | governance gaps | KI Interviews | |
| | abioau: | | | | | | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| | i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i | | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Does the government have a strategy/ | | Actions | | | | Normative Reference | |
| | approach comprised | GCM: 3(c); 5(g) | | Promulgation | | | | |
| | of safe and legal | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.7 | | Implementation | BIPs | Two-dimensional, | Grey Literature | |
| 28 | pathways related to | GCR: Durable Solutions | | | Asylum seekers | multiple-choice, | | |
| | international protection (e.g., | (16) (extracted from the NYD); B3.3 (para 95) | | | | measuring governance gaps | | |
| | asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons)? | (para 95) | | | | | | |
| | stateless personsy. | | | | | | | |
| | to Post of Control | Butter I | | Dimensions of analysis | s | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Are the personal | GCM: Principle (People- Centred); GCM: 12(c) | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | |
| | circumstances of | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 3.8 | | Promulgation | | multiple-choice, | Academic Literature | Words in Glossary Regulatory framework Words in Glossary Words in Glossary |
| 29 | Asylum Seekers | GCR: Extract from NYD | | Implementation | | measuring | Grey Literature | |
| | considered during the | on Reception and | | Evaluation | Asylum seekers | governance gaps | KI Interviews | |
| | entry procedure? | • | | | | governance gaps | | |
| | | Admission (Para 5a-e) | | | | | Other Sources | |



| | | | | Dimensions of analysis | s | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|--|---|----------|------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Regardless of its approach towards | GCM: not addressed | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | One dimensional | Normative Reference | |
| | safe third countries, | SDGS: 10.7;17.14 | | Promulgation | | One-dimensional, single choice, | | |
| 30 | does the country | GCR: Background (para | | Implementation | BIPs | assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | evaluate personal | 2) (indirect) | | | Asylum seekers | implementation, | Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews Other Sources Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Normative Reference Academic Literature KI Interviews Other Sources Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Words in Glossary Normative Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews Other Sources Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Academic Literature KI Interviews Other Sources Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Words in Glossary Normative Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature Grey Literature Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature Grey Literature Grey Literature | |
| | circumstances in asylum application? | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question Rationale | | | Dimensions of analysis | S | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | indicator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Are migrants | GCM: 2(b); 3(c,d); 12(e); 13(e) | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, | | |
| 31 | informed about their | SDGS: 10.7; 8.8 | | Promulgation | Family | multiple-choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 31 | status and related | GCR: Extract from NYD | | Implementation | BIPs | assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | rights? | on Durable Solutions | | | Asylum seekers | implementation | | |
| | | (13b) | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | | |
| | | | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure Two-dimensional, | | Words in Glossary |
| | What is the length of the residence permit | <u> </u> | Actions | | Migrant Workers | | | |
| 32 | for the following | SDGS: 10.7; 8.8; 4.b | | Promulgation | Family | | | |
| | categories of | GCR: B3.5 (para 100) | | | BIPs | multiple choice | | |
| | migrants? | (,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, | | | Asylum seekers | | | |
| | | | | | Irregular | | | |
| | | | | Dimensions of analysis | c | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | | Words in Glossary |
| | What kind of access | | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, | | |
| | to the health system | GCM: 15(a,e) | | Promulgation | | single choice, | | |
| 33 | is given to migrants in | SDGS: 10.7; 3.8 | | Implementation | | measuring | Grey Literature | |
| | irregular situation? | GCR: B1.3 (para 57) | | Evaluation | | implementation | KI Interviews | |
| | | | | | Irregular | gaps | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | i i | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| 34 | Has the government ratified and | GCM: 6(a) SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8; | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | National legal framework |
| | incorporated the | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8; 4.b | | Promulgation | Family | multiple-choice | | |



| | following instruments into their national legal framework? | GCR: Guiding Principles (para 5) | | | BIPs Asylum seekers Irregular | | | |
|----|--|---|---------------------------------------|---|--|--|---|--|
| | | | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| 35 | Do asylum seekers have the following rights? | GCM: n/a SDGS: 10.7; 16.3 GCR: B1.6 (para 62) | Actions Actors Relations Resources | Formulation Promulgation Implementation Evaluation | Migrant Workers Family BIPs Asylum seekers | Two-dimensional, multiple-choice, measuring governance gaps | Normative Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews | |
| | | | | | Irregular | governance gaps | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | Other Jources | |
| | | | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Does the mechanism to monitor and | GCM: Principle (Whole- of Government; Whole- | Actions | | | Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Internal mechanism |
| 36 | evaluate early reception outcomes | of Society); GCM: 8(a) SDGS: 10.7; 17.14 | Actors | Promulgation | | multiple-choice, measuring and | Academic Literature | Monitor |
| 30 | include coordination with other relevant | GCR: Extract from NYD on Reception and | Relations | Implementation | BIPs | assessing implementation | Grey Literature | Evaluate |
| | actors? | Admission (Para 5a; indirect) | | Evaluation | Asylum seekers Irregular | gaps | KI Interviews Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | 1 | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| " | maicator Question | nationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | , |
| | What type of | GCM: 13(a,b,c,g) SDGS: 10.7; 17.14 | Actions | | | | Normative Reference | staff) |
| 37 | reception facilities | GCR: no explicit | Actors | Promulgation | Family | One-dimensional, | Academic Literature | General staff |
| | are used? | reference to who runs | | | BIPs Asylum seekers | multiple choice | Grey Literature KI Interviews | |
| | | reception centres | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | Other Sources | |
| | to Protect Constitution | Buttered | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Do reception facilities | GCM: 13(a,b,c,g) SDGS: 10.7; 17.14 | Actions | | | | Normative Reference | Ad-hoc (trained staff) |
| 38 | employ specifically | GCR: no explicit | Actors | Promulgation | | Two-dimensional, | | General staff |
| 30 | trained staff? | reference to who runs | | | BIPs | multiple choice | Grey Literature | Monitor Evaluate Words in Glossary Ad-hoc (trained staff) General staff Words in Glossary Ad-hoc (trained staff) |
| | | reception centres | | | Asylum seekers | | KI Interviews | |
| | | | | | | | Other Sources | |



| | Indicator Question | Betievele | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|--|---|----------|------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | To subot outside | GCM: 13(d,e,f,h) SDGS: 10.7; 3.8; 4.3; 6.2; | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Service facilities |
| | To what extent do services meet needs | 16.3 | | | | Two-dimensional, | Academic Literature | |
| 39 | of the migrants in | GCR: B3.2 (para 92); | | Implementation | BIPs | multiple-choice, | Grey Literature | · |
| 33 | reception facilities in | B1.2 (para 54); Extract | | | Asylum seekers | assessing | KI Interviews | |
| | the following areas? | from NYD on Reception and Admission (Para 5a-g) | | | | implementation | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| | , i | | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | Is there a policy that provides alternatives | | Actions | | | Two-dimensional, multiple-choice, | Normative Reference | |
| | to administrative | GCM: 13(a,b,h) | | Promulgation | | measuring and | Academic Literature | |
| 40 | detention in case of | SDGS: 10.7; 11.1 | | Implementation | | assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | irregular entry or | GCR: B1.5 (para 60) | | | | implementation | KI Interviews | |
| | stay? | | | | Irregular | gaps | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| " | malcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | If detention occurs, regardless of its | | Actions | | | Two-dimensional, | | Detention |
| | formal recognition, | GCM: 13(f) | | | | multiple-choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 41 | does its duration | SDGS: 10.7;17.14 | | Implementation | | measuring and assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | comply with | GCR: B1.5 (indirectly) | | Evaluation | | implementation | KI Interviews | |
| | international norms and standards? | | | Irregular | gaps | Other Sources | | |

| | Indicator Question | Rationale | Dimensions of analysis | | | | Normative Reference | |
|----|--|---|------------------------|-------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which of the following actors/stakeholders are | GCM: 11 (all - | | Formulation | Migrant Workers | Two dimensional, | | |
| 42 | involved in the | indirectly) | Actors | | Family | multiple-choice, | | |
| 42 | development/formulation | SDGS: 10.7;17.14 GCR: B1.3 (para 57; | Relations | | BIPs | assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | of national border policy | indirect) | | | Asylum seekers | implementation | KI Interviews | |
| | | mairect) | | | Irregular | | | |



| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | | Coding Guidelines | |
|-----|--|------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|-----------------|---|------------------------|-------------------|
| - " | indicator Question | Nationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which of the following actors are | CCM 44 (all indicately) | | | Migrant Workers | Three-dimensional, multiple-choice, assessing implementation | Normative Reference | Responsible |
| | involved the | | Actors | Promulgation | Family | | | Execution |
| 43 | implementation of | GCM: 11 (all - indirectly) | Relations | Implementation | BIPs | | | Monitoring |
| 43 | border governance | SDGS: 10.7;17.14 GCR: n/a | | | Asylum seekers | | | |
| | (i.e. allowing entry/exit) and in what capacity? | | | | Irregular | | | |

| | Indiantas Occasion | Detionals | | Dimensions of analysis | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|--|--|----------|------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which of the | CCM 0(a) 12(a d a) | Actions | | | Two-dimensional, multiple-choice, | Normative Reference | Pre-removal detention |
| 44 | following services are ensured to migrants | GCM: 8(c); 13(c,d,e) SDGS: 10.7; 16.3 | | Promulgation | | measuring and | Academic Literature | |
| 44 | in situations of pre- | GCR: n/a | | Implementation | | assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | removal detention? | GCK. II/a | | | | implementation | KI Interviews | |
| | removal detention? | | | Irregular | gaps | Other Sources | | |

| | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------|------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | illulcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | How is the duration of pre-removal | Actions | | | Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Pre-removal detention | |
| 45 | detention formally | GCM: 13(c,f) SDGS: 10.7;17.14 | | Promulgation | | single choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 45 | regulated by law and | · · | | Implementation | | measuring implementation | Grey Literature | |
| | practically | GCR: n/a | | | | | KI Interviews | |
| | implemented? | | | | Irregular | gaps | Other Sources | |

| 4 | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----|--|------------|----------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Is there a temporary residence permit | CCM: n/a | Actions | | Migrant Workers | One-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Pre-removal detention |
| | • | GCM: n/a | | Promulgation | | single choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 46 | 0 | SDGS: 10.7 | | Implementation | | assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | deportable persons after being released? | GCR: n/a | | | | implementation | KI Interviews | |
| | | | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |



| ., | to Protect Constitution | Bulletin | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|--|---|----------|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|--|
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | What kind of centres | CCM: 12/of a) | Actions | Formulation | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Forced return |
| 47 | are used to host | GCM: 13(c,f,g) SDGS: 10.7;17.14 | Actors | Promulgation | | Two-dimensional, | | |
| 47 | migrants before | GCR: n/a | | | | multiple choice | Grey Literature | |
| | forced returns? | GCK. II/a | | | | | | Words in Glossary Forced return Words in Glossary Forced return Words in Glossary Forced return |
| | | | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| " | malcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Do centers used to host migrants before | GCM: 13(c,f,g) | Actions | | | | Normative Reference | Forced return |
| 48 | forced returns | SDGS: 10.7:17.14 | Actors | Promulgation | | Two-dimensional, | | |
| 40 | employ specifically | GCR: n/a | | | | multiple choice | Grey Literature | |
| | trained staff? | GCN. 11/ u | | | | | | |
| | tranica starri | | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| | | | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which of the following services are | GCM Principle (Person- | Actions | | | Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Forced return |
| | provided to migrants | Centred); 21(e) | | Promulgation | | multiple choice, | Academic Literature | Words in Glossary Forced return Words in Glossary Forced return Words in Glossary Forced return Words in Glossary Forced return |
| 49 | in situations of forced | SDGS: 10.7; 16.3 | | Implementation | | measuring | Grey Literature | |
| | return during the | GCR: n/a | | | | governance gaps | KI Interviews | |
| | process of deportation? | , | | | Irregular | 3 | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | F1 | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | 147 - 1- 1- Ol |
| | | | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Is the situation at origin evaluated and | GCM Principle (Person- Centred); 21(b,d,h) | Actions | | | Two-dimensional, multiple choice, | Normative Reference | Forced return |
| 50 | individualized in | SDGS: 10.7 | | Promulgation | | measuring and | Academic Literature | |
| | forced return | GCR: Not explicitly | | Implementation | | assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | decisions? | addressed | | | | implementation | KI Interviews | |
| | | | | | Irregular | gaps | Other Sources | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | Planest | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
| | A no the one we collect to the | CCNA: 4(i): 2(b): 4(a i:) | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | words in Glossary |
| 51 | Are there regulations that ensure | GCM: 1(i); 3(b); 4(a,b); | Actions | | | One-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Regulations |
| 21 | | 8(d); 11(b); 14(e); 21(c) | | Promulaction | | single choice, | Academic Literature | |
| | protection and | SDGS: 10.7;17.14 | | Promulgation | | measuring and | Academic Literature | |



| privacy of sensitive | GCR: B1.4 (para 48); | Implementation | | assessing | Grey Literature | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------|-----------|----------------|------------------------|--|
| information? | B2.8 (para 82); B3.3 | | | implementation | KI Interviews | |
| | (para 45) | | Irregular | gaps | Other Sources | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|--|---|----------|------------------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Do states correspond | | Actions | | | Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Actions |
| 52 | Do states carry out actions that prevent migrants' access to | GCM: 5 (indirectly) SDGS: 10.7;17.14 | | Promulgation | | multiple choice, | Academic Literature | |
| | | GCR: B3.3 (indirectly) | | Implementation | BIPs | measuring | Grey Literature | |
| | their territory? | | | | Asylum seekers | aovernance aans ' | KI Interviews | |
| | | | | | | | Other Sources | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|--|---|----------|------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Which of the following services GCM: 21(a) are ensured to SDGS: 10.7; 16.3 migrants within GCR: Extract from NYI | GCM: 21(a) | Actions | | | | Normative Reference | Actions |
| 53 | | SDGS: 10.7; 16.3 GCR: Extract from NYD | | Promulgation | | Two-dimensional, multiple choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 33 | readmission | on Reception and | | Implementation | | measuring | Grey Literature | |
| | agreements or | Admission (Para 5i; | | | | governance gaps | KI Interviews | |
| | arrangements? i | indirect) | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |

| - 44 | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | | Coding Guidelines | |
|------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|----------|------------------------|-----------|------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| # | illulcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Is a period of time granted for the | GCM: 21(e) | Actions | | | One-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Voluntary departure |
| 54 | voluntary departure | SDGS: 10.7 | | Promulgation | | single choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 54 | of migrants who are | GCR: B3.1 (para 87; | | | | measuring | Grey Literature | |
| | required to leave the | indirect) | | | | governance gaps | KI Interviews | |
| | country? | | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |



| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|--|-------------------------|----------|------------------------|--------|------------------|---|-------------------|
| " | mulcator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence Words in Glossa Normative Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews | Words in Glossary |
| | Which of the | CCM: 21 /b a) | Actions | | | Two-dimensional, | Reference | Assisted return |
| | following services are | GCM: 21 (b,e) | | Promulgation | | multiple choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 55 | available to migrants in situations of | SDGS: 10.7; 16.3 | | Implementation | | measuring | Grey Literature | |
| | assisted return? | GCR: B3.1 (para 87, 89) | | | | governance gaps | KI Interviews | |
| | assisted returns | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | | |

| | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | ; | | Coding Guidelines | |
|-----|-------------------------|--|----------|------------------------|-----------|------------------|---|-------------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence Word Normative Reference p Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews | Words in Glossary |
| | What are the | GCM: 21(a,b) | Actions | | | One-dimensional, | | Reintegration programme |
| F.C | characteristics of the | SDGS: 10.7 | | Promulgation | | single choice, | Academic Literature | |
| 56 | country's reintegration | GCR: Extract from NYD on Durable Solutions | | Implementation | | measuring | Grey Literature | |
| | J | (Para 11d and 12a-f) | | | | governance gaps | KI Interviews | |
| | programme(s)? | (Para 11u anu 12a-i) | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |

| # Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | | Coding Guidelines | |
|---|----------------------------|-----------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # Indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| Is information regarding rights, | | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Tuo dimensional | Normative Reference | Legal framework |
| duties and legal | GCM: 3(all); 12(e); 13(d); | Actors | | Family | | Academic Literature | |
| framework made | 14(e); 15(c) | Relations | Implementation | BIPs | | Grey Literature | |
| 57 systematically | SDGS: 10.7; 8.8; 16.3; | | | Asylum seekers | Two-dimensional, multiple choice | KI Interviews | |
| available to (potential) migrants in practice and by whom? | 8.7 GCR: n/a | | | Irregular | типеріє споісе | Other Sources | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysi | S | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| # | mulcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Does a functioning coordination | | Actions | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Coordination mechanism |
| | mechanism exist | GCM: Principles (Whole- | Actors | Promulgation | | Two-dimensional, multiple choice | | |
| | between | of Government; Whole- | Relations | Implementation | | | Grey Literature | |
| 58 | organizations | of Society); 5(d) | Resources | | | | KI Interviews | |
| | involved in main | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8 | | | | multiple choice | | |
| | sectors in the country | GCR: n/a | | | | | | |
| | based on temporary | | | | | | | |
| | migrant workforce? | | | | | | | |



| 4 | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysis | 5 | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|--|------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| # | illulcator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | What are the GCM: 6(c) characteristics of SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8; | GCM: 6(c) | | | Migrant Workers | | Normative Reference | Recruitment services |
| 59 | | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8; | Actors | Promulgation | | Two-dimensional, | | |
| 59 | agencies providing | 8.7; 12.7 GCR: n/a | Relations | | | multiple choice | Grey Literature | |
| | recruitment services? | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |

| # | Indicator Questic | n Rationale | | Dimensions of analysi | Dimensions of analysis | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|---|--|------------------------|----------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| # | illulcator Questic | ii Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary | |
| | temporary employment agencies meet the following | GCM: 6(d,i) | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | Temporary employment agencies | |
| 6 | | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8; | Actors | Promulgation | | | multiple choice, Academic Literature | | |
| | | 8.7; 12.7 GCR: n/a | | Implementation | | measuring governance gaps | Grey Literature | | |
| | | rds? | | | | | KI Interviews | | |
| | | | | | | | Other Sources | | |

| # | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysi | S | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|---|-----------------|----------|-----------------------|-----------------|---|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | For how long can a migrant worker leave | | Actions | | Migrant Workers | One-dimensional, single choice, measuring | Normative Reference | |
| | the country during | | | Promulgation | | | Academic Literature | |
| | the validity period of | GCM: 19(h) | | | | | Grey Literature | |
| 61 | their permit without | SDGS: 10.7; 8.8 | | | | | KI Interviews | |
| | their permit without it affecting their pathway to permanent residence? | GCR: n/a | | | | governance gaps | Other Sources | |

| | Indicator Question | Rationale | | Dimensions of analysi | S | | Coding Guidelines | |
|----|--|-----------------------|----------|-----------------------|-----------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| # | indicator Question | Rationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Are work permits free from ties to the | | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | |
| | employer? (i.e., do | | | Promulgation | | | Academic Literature | |
| | migrant workers have | GCM: 6(g) | | Implementation | | multiple-choice, | Grey Literature | |
| 62 | the right to change | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8 | | | | measuring | KI Interviews | |
| | employer without having to make a new work permit application?) | GCR: n/a | | | | implementation gaps | Other Sources | |



| # Indicator Question Rationale Do migrant workers have the right to remain in the territory if they become unemployed in order to seek new employment? CR: n/a Elements Stages Target How to Measure | Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence Normative Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature KI Interviews | Words in Glossary |
|---|--|-------------------|
| have the right to remain in the territory if they become unemployed in order to seek new Actions Formulation Migrant Workers Migrant Workers Two-dimensional, multiple-choice, measuring governance gaps | Reference Academic Literature Grey Literature | |
| remain in the GCM: 6(g); 7(h) Actors Promulgation Family territory if they become unemployed in order to seek new GCR: n/a Resources Evaluation Evaluation Resources Implementation Resources Evaluation Asylum seekers | Grey Literature | |
| become unemployed in order to seek new SDGS: 10.7; 8.8 Relations Implementation BIPS measuring governance gaps | • | |
| in order to seek new | KI Interviews | |
| in order to seek new | | |
| | Other Sources | |
| | | |
| # Indicator Question Rationale Dimensions of analysis | Coding Guidelines | Western Change |
| Elements Stages Target How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| To what extent is the GCM: 22(b,c) Actions Formulation Migrant Workers Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | |
| portability of social SDGS: 10.7:17.14:8.8 Actors Promulgation Family multiple-choice, | Academic Literature | |
| benefits ensured to GCR: n/a Relations Implementation BIPs measuring | Grey Literature | |
| migrants! Resources Evaluation Asylum seekers governance gaps | KI Interviews | |
| Irregular | Other Sources | |
| | 0.110.14.11 | |
| # Indicator Question Rationale Dimensions of analysis Blements Stages Target How to Measure | Coding Guidelines Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| Do migrant workers GCM: Principle (Wholes Actions Formulation Migrant Workers Two-dimensional, | Normative Reference | words in Glossary |
| nave the right to join of Society): 6(i) Actors Promulgation Family | Academic Literature | |
| 65 and form SDGS: 10.7-17.14-8.8 Relations Implementation RIPS | Grey Literature | |
| associations? GCR: n/a Resources Evaluation Asylum seekers implementation | KI Interviews | |
| gaps Irregular | Other Sources | |
| | | |
| # Indicator Question Rationale Dimensions of analysis | Coding Guidelines | |
| Elements Stages Target How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| Do migrant workers Actions Formulation Migrant Workers | Normative Reference | |
| have the right to join trade unions and to SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8 Promulgation Family Two-dimensional, | | |
| be elected as a union GCR: n/a Relations Implementation BIPS multiple-choice, | | |
| representative? Resources Evaluation Asylum seekers | | |
| Irregular | | |
| Dimensions of analysis | Coding Guidelines | |
| # Indicator Question Rationale Dimensions of analysis Blements Stages Target How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | Normative | Mechanisms |
| Does the country have mechanisms SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8 Actions Formulation Migrant Workers Two-dimensional, multiple-choice, | Reference | |



| recognition | Relations | Implementation | BIPs | implementation | Grey Literature | |
|-----------------------|-----------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------------|--|
| agreements) that | | | Asylum seekers | gaps | KI Interviews | |
| promote the | | | | | | |
| recognition of degree | | | Irregular | | Other Sources | |
| and skills for | | | irregular | | Other Sources | |
| migrants? | | | | | | |

| # Indicator Question | | Indicator Question | Rationale | Dimensions of analysis | | | Coding Guidelines | | |
|----------------------|------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|
| # | | indicator Question | Kationale | Elements | Stages | Target | How to Measure | Suggested Evidence | Words in Glossary |
| | | | CCNA: C(E) | Actions | | Migrant Workers | Two-dimensional, | Normative | |
| | | How are labour | | | | | single-choice, | Reference | |
| , | 58 | | GCM: 6(f) | | Promulgation | | measuring and | Academic Literature | |
| | 00 | inspections carried | SDGS: 10.7;17.14; 8.8 | | Implementation | | assessing | Grey Literature | |
| | out? | GCR: n/a | | | | implementation | KI Interviews | | |
| | | | | | | | gaps | Other Sources | |



Annex 3 Glossary

| WORD | DEFINITION |
|--|---|
| Actions | Complex set of things done or performed in relation to the governance of international migration. Actions cover the laws, policies, programmes and practices through which migration governance objectives and actors' goals and preferences are carried out. |
| Actors | Complex set of state/non-state, public/private individuals and institutions involved in different levels and stages of migration governance. |
| Assisted Voluntary Return | "Voluntary return supported by logistical, financial and/or other material assistance" (EMN, 2022). Following Dubow and Kuschminder (2021, p. 8) we use the term assisted voluntary return as a "policy category, rather than an analytical category of voluntariness or a reflection of the degree of voluntariness in the respondent's return decision." |
| Asylum seekers | "A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the person must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds" (UN, 2018). |
| Beneficiary of International Protection (BIP) | "A person who has been granted refugee status or subsidiary protection status" (Art. 2(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU (Recast Qualification Directive) |
| Circular migration | As pointed out by Gomes and Doomernik (2020), there is no agreed definition of circular migration among scholars and official institutions. Here, we rely on the broad definition provided by the IOM (2011), which conceives circular migration as "the fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs of countries of origin and destination." This definition is in line with the EU understanding of the term as "a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries" (EC, 2007, p. 8). |
| Complementary protection | "Various mechanisms used by States to regularize the stay of persons falling outside the scope of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, but who are nevertheless in need of international protection." "At the regional level, the European Union uses the term "subsidiary protection" to refer to complementary protection granted to persons who are not covered by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137) but are in need of international protection.) but are in need of international protection (IOM, 2019, pp. 35-36). |



| Detention (migration) | "The deprivation of liberty for migration-related reasons. Note: Detention of migrants occurs as a consequence of both immigration and emigration and the label of the term reflects the use of detention in both occurrences Within the migration context, detention is ordered by either administrative or judicial authorities, for reasons such as to establish identity, pending the processing of an immigration or asylum claim or for the purpose of enforcing an expulsion order (IOM, 2019, pp. 47-48) <i>Administrative detention</i> is usually less regulated and affords fewer guarantees of legality and due process to those who are detained than criminal detention (IOM, 2019, p. 6). |
|---|--|
| Detention Centre | "A specialized facility used for the detention of migrants with the primary purpose of facilitating administrative measures such as identification, processing of a claim or enforcing a removal order" (IOM, 2019, p. 48). |
| Development | Multidimensional process of capabilities enhancement and improvement of people's quality of life, at individual and systemic level. This understanding follows Kuschminder and Rajabzadeh (2022), who abide by a human development perspective. The original notion of human development focused on (1) leading a long and healthy life, (2) being educated and (3) enjoying a decent standard of living. Other relevant dimensions include democratic participation and security from violence, as reflected, for instance, in the SDGs (UNGA, 2015). |
| Development - Cursory reference | The reference(s) to development are not thorough or detailed. For instance, recognising migration as a relevant factor but not detailing how. |
| Development - Detailed reference | The reference(s) to development are well considered, evidence-based and recognise the complexities of the migration-development relationship in different contexts. |
| Development - Economic approach | An economic approach to development "assumes that economic growth will lead, automatically, to greater wellbeing for all" (UNDP, 2022). |
| Development - Human development approach | A human development approach is about "expanding the richness of human life, rather than simply the richness of the economy in which human beings live. It is an approach that is focused on people and their opportunities and choices" (UNDP, 2022), |
| Diaspora | As pointed out by Unterreiner and Weinar (2014), there is no agreed definition of diaspora among scholars. Here, we rely on the policy-related provided by Kanigel (2019), who conceives diaspora as "a community of people who live outside their shared country of origin or ancestry but maintain active connections with it. A diaspora includes both emigrants and their descendants. While some people lose their attachment to their ancestral homeland, others maintain a strong connection to a place which their ancestors may have left generations ago." |
| Diaspora programme | Programme that engages "emigrants and members of diaspora communities (both organised and individuals) with the countries of origin, building the sense of belonging and strengthening the ties" (Unterreiner and Weinar, 2014, p. 13). |
| Displacement | "The movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters." (IOM, 2019, p. 55). |



| Forced migration | "A migratory movement which, although the drivers can be diverse, involves force, compulsion, or coercion. Note: While not an international legal concept, this term has been used to describe the movements of refugees, displaced persons (including those displaced by disasters or development projects), and, in some instances, victims of trafficking. At the international level the use of this term is debated because of the widespread recognition that a continuum of agency exists rather than a voluntary/forced dichotomy and that it might undermine the existing legal international protection regime." (IOM, 2019, p. 77). |
|---|--|
| Humanitarian (protection) visa | "A visa granting access to and temporary stay in the issuing State to a person on humanitarian grounds for a variable duration as specified in the applicable national or regional law, often aimed at complying with relevant human rights and refugee law" (IOM, 2019, pp. 97-98). |
| Independent monitoring | Observation and supervision of a governance action by an actor (e.g., NGO, CSO) that is not owned or controlled in whole or in part by the government or entity responsible of such action. |
| Irregular migrant / migrant in an irregular situation | "A person who moves or has moved across an international border and is not authorized to enter or to stay in a State pursuant to the law of that State and to international agreements to which that State is a party" (IOM, 2019, p. 133). In the EU context, a migrant in an irregular situation refers to "a third-country national present on the territory of a Schengen State who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions of Entry as set out in the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code) or other conditions for Entry, stay or residence in that EU Member State" (Oomkens and Kalir, 2020, p. 7). |
| Mechanism | Procedural setting and/or institutional architecture that regulates and/or enables the functioning of a specific activity of the governance system. Migration governance can involve a wide and heterogeneous set of mechanisms, such as institutional platforms for coordination among stakeholders, tools for reporting and addressing abuses, or procedures for skills recognition. |
| Migrant Workers | "Person who migrates or has migrated to a country of which he or she is not a national with a view to being employed otherwise than on his or her own account" (ILO, 2019, p.12). |
| Policy | Policy is conceived in the narrow sense of policy-output, which-paraphrasing Knill and Tosun (2014, p. 336), regards "policymaker's statements of what it intends to do or not do in regard to regulation of international migration". |
| Practices | This term refers to the phase of implementation and captures the ways in which policymakers' goals and policy-outputs are brought into practice, including, for instance, the administrative actions conducted at borders by state officials for asylum request formalization. |
| Psychosocial support | "The term "psychosocial" denotes the inter-connection between psychological and social processes and the fact that each continually interacts with and influences the other. The composite term mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) is used to describe any type of local or outside support that aims to protect or promote psychosocial well-being and/or prevent or treat mental disorder" (IOM, 2019, p. 163). |
| Quota | "A quantitative limit on the number of immigrants admitted into a State during a given period of time overall or under certain visa categories" (IOM, 2019, p104). |



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| Readmission agreement | "A bilateral or multilateral agreement between States that establishes, |
| | in a reciprocal manner, the basis and procedures, for one State to |
| | promptly and orderly return non-nationals, who do not or no longer |
| | fulfil the conditions for entry or stay on its territory, to their home State |
| | or a third State, most commonly a State through which they have |
| | transited or a State in which they had permanent residence" (IOM, |
| | 2019, p. 169). |
| Reception facilities | "All forms of premises used for the housing of applicants for |
| | international protection and other categories of migrants, including |
| | refugees, whilst individuals await decisions on applications for |
| | admission or on international protection" (IOM, 2019, p. 169). |
| Recruitment | Process including the "advertising, information dissemination, |
| | selection, transport, placement into employment and – for migrant |
| | workers – return to the country of origin where applicable. This applies |
| | to both jobseekers and those in an employment relationship" (ILO, |
| | 2019, p.12). |
| Recruitment fees / Recruitment | Any fees or costs incurred in the recruitment process in order for |
| related costs | workers to secure employment or placement, regardless of the manner, |
| related costs | |
| Page vitro ant samilas /i | timing or location of their imposition or collection (ILO, 2019, p.12). |
| Recruitment services/agencies | Public employment services, private employment agencies and "all |
| | other intermediaries or subagents that offer labour recruitment and |
| | placement services. Labour recruiters can take many forms, whether for |
| | profit or non-profit, or operating within or outside legal and regulatory |
| | frameworks" (ILO, 2019, p.12). |
| | "Persons recognized as refugees by a State or the United Nations High |
| | Commissioner for Refugees, on the basis of objective criteria related to |
| | the circumstances in their country of origin, which justify a presumption |
| | that they meet the criteria of the applicable refugee definition" (IOM, |
| | 2019, p. 171). This definition is set by Geneva Convention (1951) and the |
| Refugee (prime feets) | following Protocol (1967), which identify, in general term, a refugee as |
| Refugee (prima facie) | "a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons |
| | of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or |
| | political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable |
| | or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of |
| | that country. (Art. 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of |
| | Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). |
| Reintegration programme | Programme provided by a country of destination, providing assistance |
| | either cash, in kind or combined, with the aim of helping a foreign |
| | returnee to lead an independent life after return (Dubow and |
| | Kuschminder, 2021). |
| Relations | Formal and informal links and relationships among actors involved in |
| | migration governance. |
| Resources | Material (i.e. in-cash and in-kin) and immaterial (e.g. know-how) means |
| Nesources | and assets dedicated to the governance of international migration. |
| Ckills dayalanment programms | Programmes dedicated to the development of work-related skills or |
| Skills development programme | competencies through vocational and/or educational training. |
| Stages 1 Formulation | |
| Stages – 1. Formulation | Early stage of the governance process in which a policy-matter is |
| | acknowledged and then, specific options to deal with such issue are |
| | developed and discussed among actors involved in the decision-making |
| | arena (Howlett and Giest, p. 2015). |
| Stages – 2. Promulgation | Stage of formal issuing of the decision undertaken (output) in the |
| | governance process. |
| Stages – 3. Implementation | The stage of the governance process in which actions (e.g., laws, |
| | policies) are executed and put into effect by different actors. |



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| Stages – 4. Evaluation | Stage of the governance process in which an action/output is evaluated, |
| | namely by verifying and assessing whether its implementation and its |
| | effects are aligned with the objectives that were explicitly or implicitly |
| | set out. Different actors, internal and external to the government |
| | apparatus, can conduct the evaluation (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). |
| Temporary employment agencies | "Temporary agency employment is where a worker is employed by the |
| | temporary work agency, and then hired out to perform his/her work at |
| | (and under the supervision of) the user company. There is considered to |
| | be no employment relationship between the temporary agency worker |
| | and the user company, although there could be legal obligations of the |
| | user company towards the temporary agency worker, especially with |
| | respect to health and safety. The relevant labour contract is of limited |
| | or unspecified duration with no guarantee of continuation. The hiring |
| | firm pays fees to the agency, and the agency pays the wages (even if the |
| | hiring company has not yet paid the agency). Flexibility for both worker |
| | and employer is a key feature of agency work" (ILO, 2022). |
| Temporary protection | "Arrangements developed by States to offer protection of a temporary |
| | nature, without prior individual status determination, to persons |
| | arriving in the context of flight from situations of conflict, generalized |
| | violence, disasters or other humanitarian crises, including to persons |
| | who do not have access to protection under 1951 Convention relating |
| | to the Status of Refugees" (IOM, 2019, p. 213). |
| Temporary worker programme | A programme that allows and regulates employers in the hiring of |
| | foreign nationals to fill gaps in their workforces on a temporary basis. |
| | "Temporary labour migration programmes can be set up unilaterally by |
| | migrant destination countries but often they are based on some kind of |
| | agreement (bilateral treaty, MOU, or similar) between an origin and a |
| | destination country. Much of today's temporary migration also occurs |
| | under regional integration schemes and their free movement |
| | provisions" (ILO, 2021, p.1). |
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