6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Human Security

Eduard Soler i Lecha and Laia Carbonell Agustín (eds.)

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COLECCIÓN **MONOGRAFÍAS**

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Narcís Serra and Manuel López Blázquez

Narcís Serra

President of the CIDOB Foundation

Manuel López Blázquez

*Director General of Institutional Relations.
Ministry of Defence of Spain*

This monographic work brings together all the presentations, speeches and reports presented at the 6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean, held in Barcelona on 5-6 November 2007. These seminars, which are jointly organised by the CIDOB Foundation and the Ministry of Defence of Spain, have been held every year since 2002, and have become an important point of reference for all those specialising in issues concerning the Mediterranean and security.

Year after year, these seminars have brought together government representatives from European Union countries, NATO member nations and from the countries of the South and East of the Mediterranean in order to share information and debate the main challenges to security in the region. This annual event also provides an opportunity for renowned academics and actors on the ground – both civil and military – to engage in fruitful dialogue.

The 2007 seminar took place in a context marked by Nicolas Sarkozy's presentation of the proposal for a Mediterranean Union, which would later be modified and renamed "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean". Other issues included in the public debate were the persistence of tension in the Middle East, the re-emergence of the phenomenon of terrorism in the Maghreb region and, finally, the efforts made by the European Union to resolve the constitutional crisis into which it had been plunged following the French and Dutch referenda in 2005. The seminar was also a particularly opportune moment to carry out a joint reflection on both cooperation policies in the Euro-Mediterranean region as well as on how best to tackle the insecurity experienced by many citizens in this region.

In an approach that has become habitual, the seminar carried out a summary of the progress made by different cooperation initiatives (the Barcelona process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, 5+5, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the ESDP). Participants also discussed – from different regional perspectives – the various scenarios of security and insecurity. Within the framework of working groups, one issue of

The seminar carried out a summary of the progress made by different cooperation initiatives the various scenarios of security and insecurity

vital importance was tackled: the challenge of human security. Human security can be understood as a conception that prioritises the security of citizens above all else. The Mediterranean is a region where, all too often, decisions are made using a traditional security approach, as a result of which we decided that it was important to reflect upon this area, which is conceptual in nature but distinctly practical in its application. Using this approach, issues were analysed such as respect for fundamental freedoms in the region, civil-military co-operation and the reform of the security sector.

We, at the CIDOB Foundation and the Ministry of Defence, are delighted to be able to offer readers the opportunity to peruse the presentations and studies included in this volume. We believe that they provide first-hand information and important reflections that can also help to devise new channels of action so as to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of peace, freedom and prosperity.

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Introduction

Spain and Security in the Mediterranean
José Antonio Alonso

José Antonio Alonso

Minister of Defence of Spain

This is the 6th Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean organised by the CIDOB Foundation, and the very continuity of the event represents, I believe, something important in itself. The seminar has become an unmissable event, a point of reference for an issue that is of unquestionable significance not only for the countries along the shores of the Mediterranean, but also for others further afield. We in Spain believe this to be the case, and that is why the Mediterranean is a fundamental part of our foreign policy. This is a point that we have reiterated at many meetings and within the international organisations to which we belong: The Mediterranean is a vital element of our general policy on security. And no-one could accuse me of resorting to rhetoric with these words, given our active commitment and widespread participation in all the security and defence initiatives that concern this part of the world, or which are executed within it.

The Mediterranean is a sea surrounded by different peoples; it represents a border and, at the same time, a connection for many people and many things. And obviously, when I talk about Mediterranean connections, I am not using the same terms as when I refer to the links between other countries and geographical areas. In the case of the Mediterranean region, from the outset, its very proximity urges communication, just as it urges us to resolve the conflicts (whether they be latent or active) related with our everyday coexistence.

An acceptance of diversity is a requirement for moving forward; we have to accept differences, and to acknowledge and tackle inequalities. That is to say, the Mediterranean community needs a permanent construction and a constant appeal to values, especially when we are faced with extremist attitudes bent on promoting the very opposite: identities that exclude, distrust, clashes between different actors and even between different cultures. To combat such situations, Spain has created some major initiatives, such as the Alliance of Civilisations which, by the way, is about to hold an important meeting in Madrid.

Spain is closely involved in a whole range of initiatives concerning security and defence in the Mediterranean. These include the maritime surveillance operations implemented by the Atlantic Alliance in the eastern Mediterranean, to which we are contributing with resources; we are

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also participating in EUROMARFOR, which is considered to be a potential nucleus for maritime security in the European Union, as well as other initiatives of a regional nature such as the 5+5, which is made up (as its name suggests) of 10 countries on both sides of the sea, and the 8+6, which is comprised of eight European countries working in conjunction with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Another security-based initiative is our ongoing cooperation with respect to shared information mechanisms, such as the systems dealing with maritime traffic in areas of national sovereignty through the Virtual Centre in Rome, an initiative that was set up a year ago based on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. These initiatives are specific evidence of our participation, but they also reveal scenarios that have been developing with a particular intensity in recent years bear in mind that I am referring to initiatives from 2002, 2005 and 2006 or rather, very recent ones. They also emphasise the fact that the various Mediterranean actors possess a good understanding of how the new strategic security scenario is evolving.

However, beyond listing our participation in specific initiatives, I would also like to stress that our main task is to provide strong backing and to build using robust processes, by means of regional structures and solid organisations. This is (to give one example) the reason why the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESPD) was developed. But I must also point out that the countries of the European Union and not only the ones around the Mediterranean realise that this policy should not only be consolidated, it should also gravitate increasingly toward the Mediterranean. That is to say, we must accept that current initiatives, while they are vitally important, do not meet all our expectations for an ESDP that should be particularly ambitious with respect to the Mediterranean and Africa. To that end, and with the aim of making progress from within the European Union as a whole, we have supported the initiatives of the Portuguese presidency on the subject during this period.

When it comes to building security through dialogue and cooperation, the Atlantic Alliance is another area of fundamental importance. I should mention that Spain has played an active role in this area, as well as making constant demands and providing support for the Mediterranean Dialogue within the Alliance. Spain has supported the initiative since its inception in the mid-1990s, and more recently we reiterated this support in Riga and at an informal meeting in Seville, as well as on other occasions. Furthermore, we believe that a meeting should be held between the foreign affairs ministers of the countries subscribing to the Mediterranean Dialogue to coincide with the ministerial meeting of the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels in December. Likewise, we consider that this ambitious initiative should be made into a real association, so that its political dimension becomes comparable with NATO's other associations.

In a wider sense, and considering the confluence of the various initiatives, I would also like to express our full support for the Barcelona Process. With respect to the Mediterranean, probably we need something more specific than the European Neighbourhood Policy and, in turn, something that is more open than the Mediterranean Union. Naturally, our backing for the Barcelona Process does not imply a rejection of any other initiative, as they are all useful and should all be taken on board. What I would like to stress is that we should not consider

processes that are open and filled with possibilities to be concluded, let alone completed. This month sees the 12th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, a landmark agreement that championed a process of political collaboration in favour of peace, stability and security; a process that promotes economic and financial collaboration for the purpose of creating an area of shared prosperity, as well as fostering understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. This Euro-Mediterranean sphere is a major framework that must be promoted; it is a context capable of integrating many initiatives, without detriment to what has to be done in other geographical areas of the Union. It goes without saying that with respect to the Mediterranean, we cannot simply ignore what we have already achieved; we are not about to discover the Mediterranean anew, for the very reason that we are not starting from zero, very much to the contrary.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that countries such as Spain should focus their strategic commitment on the Mediterranean, and not only because we are inhabitants of the region, but also because of our strategic understanding of how security is evolving in the world. In short, the Mediterranean is a major priority for Spain's external policy and for security and defence; it should also be an important priority for the European Union.

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Introduction

The Portuguese eu presidency and Mediterranean security
João Mira Gomes

THE PORTUGUESE EU PRESIDENCY AND MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

João Mira Gomes

Secretary of State for National Defence and Maritime Affairs of Portugal

I would like to tackle the important topic of security and defence in the Mediterranean from the perspective of the current Portuguese EU Council Presidency. The Mediterranean represents a region of strategic importance for Europe, not only for its geographic proximity and for the historical and cultural links which bind us together, but also because governments on both sides of the Mediterranean face the same kind of challenges and threats in terms of security and defence.

The emergence of terrorism, organised crime, drugs trafficking and illegal immigration is a cause of great concern to Europe as it is also the case for countries in the southern shore of the Mediterranean. To face those challenges and threats successfully, it will be necessary to continue to deepen co-operation mechanisms, be it within multilateral or regional *fora*, in a number of areas, namely security and defence. In this context, existing partnerships must be reinforced on a structured and operational basis. To serve this purpose, the current Portuguese EU Council Presidency defined co-operation with the Mediterranean as a priority in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

At the occasion of the Informal Meeting of the Defence Ministers, which was held in Évora last September 28 and 29, a working session was set up gathering, for the first time ever in an EU format, the Defence Ministers of the southern partners of the "5+5 Initiative" (including Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia). This pioneer event had two fundamental objectives, which were largely achieved. The first one was to introduce the "5+5 Initiative" to EU Member States, underscoring the importance of existing relations between Europe and the Maghreb region as a possible catalyst for a broader dialogue on security and defence matters; the second objective was to share with the European countries the expectations of the southern partners of the Mediterranean, in light of the results of that successful regional partnership. As an immediate result, the incoming Slovenian and French EU Council Presidencies announced their intention to carry forward this priority.

Portugal attaches significant importance to the "5+5 Initiative", as it is based on an open and sincere dialogue and on full respect for the identity and idiosyncrasies of each partner. Furthermore, it is a genuine commitment to the development of stronger relations in the area of security and defence, as a way to guarantee the adequate stability levels that prompt

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conditions for a sustained development. It was in this spirit that in 2004 the Ministers of Defence of the "5+5 Initiative" (comprising, on the north side of the Mediterranean, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta), defined sea surveillance, participation of the armed forces in the field of civil protection and air security as initial co-operation activity areas.

We consider that a great deal has been achieved by now. The growing number of activities in the scope of the "5+5 Initiative" – four in 2005, 14 in 2006 and around 20 in 2007 – clearly shows the vitality of this framework. It also shows the capacity of materialising the intentions on the basis of its inception; this is to say reinforcing activities through the development and implementation of concrete measures and actions of co-operation in matters of common interest. For all these reasons, Portugal considers that the "5+5 Initiative" should be regarded as an example on the way to more ambitious forms of co-operation in security and defence between Europe and the Mediterranean, maintaining its specifics and complementarities with other multilateral *fora*, such as the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the EU Barcelona Process.

It was in a context of hope and peace, that the Barcelona Process - which was also the result of guidelines approved in Lisbon during the first Portuguese EU Council Presidency in 1992 -, clearly pointed to the need to reinforce the co-operation between the two margins of the Mediterranean. This was an innovative concept at the time which, in the context of the post-Cold War period and successive enlargements of NATO and the EU, was to prove central in consolidating our links and in supporting the major changes that affected our two regions. The Barcelona Declaration was born of this common ambition and of this sense of shared responsibility.

Today, the text has not lost any of its urgency. It still constitutes the reference for co-operative relations and links of solidarity between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries. In more than ten years of partnership, we have succeeded in institutionalising our dialogue, at both bilateral and regional level. A solid and regular framework of ministerial meetings has reinforced dialogue and co-operation in essential areas such as industry, trade or communication and information technologies, to name but a few.

With the launching of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Union reinforced the Euro-Mediterranean process, aiming to give particular and priority attention to its nearest neighbours. This is all the more timely today since there is a shared perception that we need greater and deeper co-operation. We must achieve a more convergent analysis on issues of security and defence; it is only by reflecting together as partners that we will be able to realise our goals. And the European Security and Defence Policy dimension will be further strengthened by the recently adopted "EU Lisbon Reform Treaty".

A concrete example of that future co-operation is the surveillance of the maritime external frontiers and the need to establish a better co-ordination in this area between the Member States of the European Union and the Mediterranean partners. Even if we are aware of how complex it is to advance the political and security basket in the Euro-Mediterranean agenda, given the antagonisms that persist and the lack of a strong

and dynamic South-South integration, we believe it is in our common interest to render the dialogue between the two sides more fruitful, translating common principles into joint initiatives capable of overcoming existing gaps.

All co-operative actions in the Mediterranean basin, like the recent proposal to establish a Mediterranean Union, are both useful and necessary as long as they are mutually reinforcing. The 9th Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers' Meeting of the 5th of November 2007 was an excellent opportunity to discuss the linkage between this initiative and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

After more than a decade of partnership, we must admit that we, in both shores of the Mediterranean, have not yet fulfilled all our expectations. Our regions continue to face many challenges which only together we can tackle with success. Therefore, we must continue to show a strong political will to develop the necessary common responses to establish a zone of peace, security and prosperity in the Mediterranean. And this zone can only steer from a growing sentiment of community, not only based on declarations but also on concrete actions.

Portugal, considering its history and its geography – the most Mediterranean of the Atlantic countries, with a special relationship with Africa and America – understands well the need to contribute to the stability and security of the Mediterranean, a privileged space of intensified relationships between States, peoples, religions, cultures, as well as an area with an enormous potential of economic growth. As stated in the beginning, our common interest in the Mediterranean stems from our culture and our history, our expanding trade links and our desire for stability and prosperity. And this common goal can only be achieved through partnership, involving all countries of the Mediterranean – a vital region that is largely the cradle of our civilisation. I am sure that in this sense the commitment of our Mediterranean partners is just as strong as our own.

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Introduction

The proliferation of fora on the Mediterranean dialogues: The place of NATO
Félix Sanz

THE PROLIFERATION OF FORA ON THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUES: THE PLACE OF NATO

Félix Sanz

Army General, Spanish Defence Chief of Staff

One of the reasons I asked the president of CIDOB to speak seated is, not only because it is more comfortable, but mainly because my speech is three hours long and at this time of the day, three hours can be a really long time. I would like to apologize, because talking about the Mediterranean Dialogue cannot be short. However, I have a shorter version of my speech, which lasts fifteen minutes, and after seeing your faces when I announced that it was three hours long, I think that I will switch to the shorter version.

I would like to start by thanking CIDOB for this initiative. As you probably know, this initiative was launched when we held the Presidency of the European Union in 2002. At that time, it was clear to us that we had to be as transparent as possible with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. We think that this meeting must have something good when every year more and more people are interested in coming and debating the future, the present and the past of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The CIDOB is not only a place where we can discuss everything in a good atmosphere. For the military, it is also a career enhancer institution. I came here as a Colonel in 1998 and here I am, a few years later in the position of Chief of Defence. Probably, with the exception of 2005 and 2006, in all the occasions when we had to talk about the Mediterranean Dialogue, I was here. The good part of it is that I have acquired some experience that I can put forward. From that experience, I can see the process and the progress, if you allow me, that has taken place during these eight years. The bad news is, however, that progress has not been as good as we expected in all forums that were opened for the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The first time that we came to Barcelona to talk about the Mediterranean Dialogue on the 31st October 2000, we finished, after long debates, with four main ideas:

• First, the Mediterranean Dialogue countries want to go to NATO to talk about Security.
• Second, the Mediterranean Dialogue countries want to go to the EU to talk about economic development (Barcelona Process).

• Third, we have too many forums to talk in: at that time when we started, we had NATO, EU, Western European Union, Euro Forces, OSCE, Council of Europe, Eurocorps -even Eurocorps has a small team dedicated to the Mediterranean Dialogue- among others. In some way, we confused the partners when they were put in front of so many of them.
• Fourth is that any type of cooperation in the military-to-military field, has a good chance to make progress.

This is what we agreed on eight years ago, when we talked about the Mediterranean Dialogue.

If you have a look at the situation today, I think that all these four elements are still valid. The role of NATO in security; the role of the EU in economic development; not to confuse our partners offering many different elements for debate, and again, any military-to-military relationship has always good likelihood and opportunities for development.

I should add now a fifth element in the Mediterranean Dialogue. It is what the Americans say: "it takes two to tango".

We have to be convinced that the mutual relationship is good for all of us. Therefore, it is not a matter of trying to convince anybody that it is good to talk. The people at the other side, wherever is the side we are talking about, also need to be convinced that it is good for them to talk to us. And this is something that should be the last element of today's position. Nevertheless, the position is still more or less the same. In NATO, things have changed a lot. It is probably the forum where the Mediterranean Dialogue has changed and evolved the most. But the reality is that this speech, which was valid eight years ago, is still valid today.

I think that it was Scott Fitzgerald who said something like "it is impossible to change things, but at least, we have to try to change them". This is why we are here. It is not only because eight years have passed and we live, more or less, under the same parameters in the evolution of the Mediterranean Dialogue but also because we have to be convinced that it is good. And we have one example, which for me is NATO.

NATO, as you know, was never in a position to have success in the Mediterranean Dialogue. We never got the possibility, until September 11th 2001, to sit all together, at the same time, in Brussels, the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and all the NATO countries. Then, in the aftermath of September the 11th, we found out the way to be seated 19 at time, plus 1, and 19 plus 7.

We launched also, the meetings of the Chiefs of Defence, which today still take place. And not only that, all the NATO forums were opened to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and all of them took advantage of that. One week ago I went to Tromso, in Norway, far beyond the Polar Circle. There I met with a friend from Mauritania to discuss cooperation with NATO. So, if you want to hear about an example illustrating that it is possible to go forward in the relationship, here you have what happened with NATO. First of all, we started at a political level, we continued to make some approaches in military-to-military organisations, and we finished with the most important element which was the Istanbul Summit.

I don't know if you have had time to read about the Istanbul Summit, related to the Mediterranean Dialogue, but it is very important to know that NATO agreed to finish with the Dialogue and to open the partnership. NATO set exactly the same tools as those set for Partnership for Peace. Since then, NATO has doubled the money for the Mediterranean Dialogue, and every interested country can make its own plan to establish a relationship with NATO. The elements to discuss and make progress on, have been of great importance: intelligence, counter-terrorism, interoperability and working together in crisis operations. In Operation Active Endeavour, in the Mediterranean, some partners participated providing ships or support, and it is needless to say that Operation Active Endeavour is an Article 5 operation. Therefore, I can give you a list of many other things we are doing in NATO to show that going deeper in the Mediterranean Dialogue is possible.

The second part is what happened with the EU. Everybody here tonight knows that within the EU we are trying to establish something related to the Barcelona Process; especially to the first basket: security. However, in my opinion, though I may be wrong there has been little fruit regarding this first basket.

This is probably because there are different perceptions of that basket. While the Northern bank is more oriented to security and political dialogue, the Southern one is more oriented to economic development. If this is the case, if we have solved the security relationship within NATO, why not establish, through the Barcelona Process, this specific dialogue related to economic development? Most of the countries represented in the EU are also in NATO. Is it wrong to have a specific forum to talk about security and another one to talk about economic development? Is it better if the interested countries want to follow that pattern?

So, probably, what we can probably put forward is precisely what we decided eight years ago: Talk in Brussels about Security, talk in Barcelona about economic development.

And, what do we do with the rest of the forums? Because every time a specific forum disappears, another one appears. Today we can still count six or seven different places to talk about the Mediterranean Dialogue. Is that wrong? Well, nobody can complain that there is nowhere they can talk about security or whatever other issue in the Mediterranean area. But the reality is that; in my opinion, what we are doing by putting forward more forums, is establishing things that only have a possibility to succeed: if we apply the third element we established eight years ago, which is to continue progressing in the military-to-military relation. And this is the example of 5+5.

What we are doing in 5+5, is setting many relations between Armed Forces. A Spanish frigate and an Italian frigate have been working with Algerian ships and Moroccan ships few months ago. Then, we have to continue, we have to be transparent in all the security matters. This is one of the reasons why we are here tonight: to be transparent in security matters, to continue military-to-military relationships and, if we want, to progress in security; to follow, in my opinion, the path that has been marked by NATO.

Nobody can complain that there is nowhere they can talk about security or whatever other issue in the Mediterranean area

NATO, do not forget it, is the only organisation where, not only in the NATO Military Committee, but also in the NAC at the Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers formats and in many other formations, the Mediterranean Dialogue is always present.

To sum up, because I promised you 15 minutes, and it is now 16, what we said eight years ago is still valid. Our efforts should go into obtaining some kind of parallel action; that they do not interfere each other. Our tool should be the dialogue in the military-to-military cooperation and then to make sure, as much as possible, that both sides are ready to talk and discuss elements.

This is what I can say. The relationship that has been established in this Seminar and in other meetings, is also very important, because these meetings are crucial to build up confidence and, as much as you rely on your allies, less rules you have to establish to continue the progress.

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Balance of the cooperation initiatives

The CFSP and the ESDP in the Mediterranean in 2007
Martín Ortega Carcelén

Martín Ortega Carcelén

*Lecturer in International Law and International Relations
at the Complutense University of Madrid*

In this article I will begin by reviewing the work of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) during the past year; secondly, I will examine the recent actions of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Mediterranean area, and thirdly, I will be assessing the latest proposals for renewing the cooperation structures in the Mediterranean, including the project proposed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy for a Mediterranean Union. Finally, I will sketch out a few conclusions.

The European Security and Defence Policy was not affected by the constitutional crisis between 2005 and 2007

The European Security and Defence Policy and the Mediterranean

Following the difficulties encountered in ratifying the project for the European Constitution, owing to the referendums that rejected the measure in France and the Netherlands in 2005, 2007 has been a year of recovery. During the first half of 2007, the German presidency of the EU worked hard to overcome the crisis, and as a consequence, an agreement was signed at the European Council in June specifying the broad outline for a new treaty. But in comparison with this general sensation of uncertainty experienced by the major structures, the ESDP has continued to function in a very satisfactory manner. The European Security and Defence Policy was not affected by the constitutional crisis between 2005 and 2007, as it followed a pragmatic approach. In fact, if the ESDP's evolution is viewed in perspective, from its inception at the European Council of Cologne in 1999, then we can describe it as a success story. Bear in mind the fact that prior to the Cologne Council, such a policy was completely unprecedented within the process of integration and that, even though 10 years have not yet passed since its creation, it already possesses institutions and an operating capacity that has enabled the European Union to contribute to its own security and to the maintaining of world peace in an effective manner.

The ESDP's actions are approved every six months in a public document titled "Presidency Report on the ESDP". This six-monthly report is an amazing summary of the EU's activities in the fields of security and defence, and is recommended reading. The fact that the report is openly

available to the public, both to European citizens and EU partners (and especially for Mediterranean inhabitants and even the rest of the world), demonstrates that the EU is in the process of constructing a transparent defence policy. At the same time, these documents and the Union's actions also go to show that the EU's philosophy is to collaborate with all the different international peacekeeping and security authorities, starting with the United Nations.

The latest ESDP report approved in June 2007, titled "Presidency Report on ESDP, 10910/07", explains the steps that have been taken to improve the European Union's military and civil capacities for crisis management. The report also lists the cooperation and dialogue relations that exist between the ESDP and other organisations (mainly NATO and the EU neighbours and partners). One particularly important aspect in this sense is that the European Union sends out regular reports on its security and defence policy to the Mediterranean partners belonging to the Barcelona Process.

Another important point that becomes clear from the successive reports is that the ESDP includes operations of very different types. The European Union is able to launch and execute classic peacekeeping operations (for which the acronym EUFOR is used), military and civil crisis management, policing (EUPOL), law and order operations (EUJUST), border control (referred to as "Border Assistance Missions", or BAM), Security Sector Reform operations (commonly referred to as SSR, though the EU has now dubbed it EUSEC) as well as funding mechanisms that provide funds for operations carried out by other regional structures, as in the case of the aid for the African Union operation in Darfur.

Over the past year, the ESDP has been active in many different regions throughout the world. In autumn 2007, the following EU operations were in progress: EUFOR Althea in the Balkans, the policing operation EUPOL EUPM in Bosnia, as well as a planning team for a possible operation in Kosovo; in Asia there was EUPOL Afghanistan; in Africa, there were EUFOR CHAD/RCA, EUPOL RD Congo, EUSEC DR Congo and the support operation for the African Union's AMIS II mission in Darfur; meanwhile, in the Middle East, there were EUPOL COPPS as support for the Palestinian police force, EU BAM Rafah to safeguard the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt and EUJUST Lex, a mission responsible for training people to work in the justice system in Iraq. Furthermore, eight EU operations have already been completed, all of which makes for an impressive list, bearing in mind the fact that ESDP is a relatively new initiative.

In addition to these operations, I must also mention Europe's participation in the United Nations mission in southern Lebanon FINUL 2 (or UNIFIL 2). Following the brief conflict in the summer of 2006, Europe's contribution made it possible to rapidly implement crisis management, and after the cease-fire, the small United Nations operation that was already in place in the area was strengthened. Even though the European Union decided not to involve itself as an institution at that time (and thus no new ESDP mission was implemented), the participation of the European states was crucial in finding a way out of the crisis and in the subsequent stabilisation. Since then, and during the course

of 2007, Europe has been making great efforts in this area. According to figures supplied by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in September 2007, the peacekeeping force consisted of 13,264 troops, of which 2,379 were Italian, 1,587 were French, 1,121 were Spanish and 905 were German. When evaluating the situation of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area, it is important to remember the contribution that Europe is making to stability; it is a contribution that benefits the countries involved, the region itself and also the rest of the world, which has no desire to see any more conflicts break out in this area.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Mediterranean

It is very difficult to assess the achievements of the CFSP in the Mediterranean during the past year, given that it has produced a mixture of positive aspects and others that have not been so positive, and thus the overall judgement is rather cloudy. Following the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process in November 2005, the new Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Tampere in November 2006 and the Lisbon Conference in November 2007 have set the pace for the process. The European Neighbourhood Policy has also been in operation, existing as a com-plement to the Barcelona Process. Another area of the EU's activities concerning the Mediterranean region is the enlargement of Europe to include two new members, Bulgaria and Romania, which took place on 1 January 2007, and which, in time, will inevitably give the Union greater influence towards the Black Sea. At the same time, the European Union's continuing involvement in the stability of the Balkans is another positive aspect of the CFSP.

Also on the positive side of the balance for the past year, mention must be made of the agreement reached at the informal European Council in Lisbon on 19 October 2007 on the Reform Treaty. This agreement con-firms that the EU's High Representative will also be the Vice President of the Commission and the head of external relations; thus, when the Treaty is finally ratified, the CFSP will be in possession of a more effective instrument.

Nevertheless, Europe's foreign policy on the Mediterranean has also produced some less positive results. The thorniest and most controver-sial point over the past year was without any doubt Europe's reaction to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and the events that took place on the Palestinian side. Following the Palestinian elections in January 2006, in which Hamas obtained a majority, a Hamas govern-ment was formed, led by Ismail Haniya, with shared power with Fatah, headed by President Mahmoud Abbas. Though this cohabitation was by no means easy, the Palestinian sides reached an agreement in Mecca on 8 February 2007 to form a government of national unity. However, this moment of consensus soon began to fade.The humanitarian situation became increasingly serious and the Palestinian factions began prepar-ing for conflict, which broke out in June 2007, with the result that the armed forces of Hamas gained control of Gaza, and a political split took place among the Palestinians.

The thorniest and most controversial point over the past year was Europe's reaction to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and the events that took place on the Palestinian side

Despite the creation of a government of national unity, the European Union (which had outlawed Hamas as a terrorist organisation) refused the government any direct support or political contact. However, though it did not maintain relations with the Hamas government, the EU continued to ensure humanitarian aid, channelled through an emergency procedure. Nevertheless, many experts and observers claim that in the period of time that elapsed between the Mecca agreement in February 2007 and the outbreak of violence in June 2007, Europe missed its chance to try and establish a new type of relations with the coalition government. For example, Muriel Asseburg from Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politik has pointed out that as there were different tendencies existing within Hamas, the EU could have offered assistance to those who were more prepared to acknowledge a *modus vivendi* with the Israeli state, and to respect the previous commitments gained by the Palestinians. Following the fragmentation that took place between the Palestinians in Gaza and those on the West Bank in summer 2007, a new phase of activity has commenced, the results of which will be hard to forecast, given that the Gaza Strip is caught in a spiral of economical and political decline.

New initiatives for the Mediterranean

During the electoral campaign for the presidency of the Republic of France in May 2007, the candidate Nicolas Sarkozy proposed the introduction of a new, rather vague project for a Mediterranean Union for the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. Once he was elected president, Sarkozy went into greater detail with this idea, particularly in a speech he gave in Tangiers on 23 October 2007. But even though President Sarkozy's proposal has the indisputable merit of encouraging reflection on relations in the Mediterranean, unfortunately it is hampered by a series of weaknesses that are typical of political ideas that have been removed from the oven when only half-cooked.

Firstly, Sarkozy's speech at Tangiers makes mention of the fathers of European integration; however, these precursors were from different countries, while he chose not to share his project with others before he formulated it. Secondly, Sarkozy envisages an association that only includes the states that ring the Mediterranean Sea; the other European states, meanwhile, are invited to join in as observers, while an association will be created between the Commission and the Mediterranean Union to ensure the relationship "between the two unions". The question that must be asked is whether this formula is compatible with the existence of a common EU security and external policy. Sarkozy has also declared that just as the integration of Europe began with coal and steel, the Union of the Mediterranean should begin with sustainable development, energy, transport and water, as well as culture, education and human capital. All of these aspects are currently dealt with in other forums, and in fact, the new initiative's added value is something that has yet to be ascertained.

Sarkozy's plan requires further development through debate with the European and Mediterranean partners. Even so, what currently seems to be the best way of developing the project would be to merge it with the Barcelona Process, thereby fully associating it with the EU, with the aim of strengthening the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

In 1995, the countries of Europe and those on the shores of the Mediterranean had a great idea: they would give the region's geographical reality a political content by means of a far-reaching association with the nascent European Union, the indisputable central economic hub of the area. Thus, the Barcelona Process was created, featuring multilateral activities (in which all the countries participated) as well as bilateral agreements for each of the EU neighbour countries. It was a flexible solution for a heterogeneous collection of states dotted with conflicts that could not aspire to become part of the Union.

As is commonly known, the process has had an eventful life so far, without achieving any spectacular results. However, any such evaluation should bear in mind that it takes time to overcome so much leaden historical inertia, and that the controversies currently existing in the region have the effect of permanent slowing down the process. Even so, among the virtues of the Barcelona Process is the fact that it is a forum for dialogue and cooperation in which the countries of Europe and the European Union, a new international actor, can meet together with the countries of the Mediterranean. The declaration from the recent Euro-Mediterranean Conference at Lisbon, held on 5 and 6 November under the presidency of Portugal, reveals a considerable range of activities ,from the fight against terrorism and desertification to aid programmes for filmmakers, all made possible thanks to funding totalling over 3 billion for the period 2007-2010.

This is why the new French initiative should be used to strengthen the Barcelona Process, a move that could be brought to fruition during France's EU presidency in the second half of 2008.

A few conclusions with respect to the future

In retrospect, 2007 appears to have been a year of transition, and no less so for the Mediterranean. The area's perennial problems, starting with the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, remain unresolved. The United States, which entered into war in Iraq in 2003, has failed to exert any clear leadership in order to resolve these conflicts, nor has it offered a coherent view of the Middle East. The European Union is also in transition (as it always seems to be), though it is slowly starting to gain in importance as an international actor. In all probability, the Treaty of Lisbon (which will reform the Union and give it greater capacity for external action) will help the EU to play a more decisive role in international relations.

Within the Mediterranean, the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy continue to be important instruments for ensuring good cooperation relations between the European Union and its neighbours. In 2007, the CFSP and the ESDP –the Union's external and security policies– have made a significant contribution to peacekeeping and stability. Further positive aspects include the cooperation measures within the Barcelona Process and the participation of a number of European states in Operation FINUL 2 in southern Lebanon. Though this is a United Nations mission, and was not organised by the European Union's ESDP, the presence of European troops has clearly strength-

ened the operation. Meanwhile, a more negative aspect is the lack of decision-making among European countries with respect to seeking a negotiated solution to the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, as it stands today, we cannot say we are completely satisfied with the Barcelona Process. The project presented by President Sarkozy in 2007 has served as a salutary lesson, reminding us that the European area needs to be rethought and reconstructed. Admittedly, Sarkozy's project needs to be revised and, in the end, it should be used to strengthen the Barcelona Process, at the same time as fully integrating the French measure into the European Union. But the very fact of presenting alternatives is useful, since it shows that this is not a time of continuity but rather a time of architects, and we should be busy making daring plans for the future. This ambition should be present throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area because, after 2008 (which, just like 2007, seems to be shaping up as a year of transition) a new stage will inevitably commence in which new regional structures will have to be established in the Middle East, in addition to reforming the global institutions for tackling the numerous common problems, from conflict resolution to environmental protection.

The project presented by President Sarkozy in 2007 has served as a salutary lesson, reminding us that the European area needs to be rethought and reconstructed

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Balance of the cooperation initiatives

The Barcelona process and the european neighbourhood policy: From Tampere to Lisbon
Eduard Soler i Lecha

Eduard Soler i Lecha

Coordinator of the Mediterranean Programme, CIDOB Foundation

At international seminars on security and defence in the Mediterranean, it is customary to carry out an evaluation of the main cooperation initiatives in the region. Such an evaluation must, by definition, include the Barcelona Process, the cornerstone of Euro-Mediterranean relations, and the European Neighbourhood Policy. What follows is a summary of the progress made by these two cooperation frameworks from the Euro-Mediterranean conference in Tampere (27-28 November 2006) to the Euro-Mediterranean conference in Lisbon (5-6 December 2007).

In spite of the differences, some claim that the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy overlap at too many points

Two cooperation frameworks in one single region

Before I embark on the actual summary, I should sketch out the main differences between the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). One difference is their very nature: as its name suggests, the ENP is a policy; that is to say, it has been designed by its subject (the European Union) and is aimed at an object (the partner country). In contrast, the spirit of the Barcelona Process places all the members on an equal footing (at least with regard to principles), be they European or Mediterranean.

Another difference is their geographical range. The ENP covers a much larger area given that, in addition to the countries of the Mediterranean basin, it also includes those of East Europe and the Caucasus. Likewise, while Turkey is a member of the Barcelona Process, it is not subject to the ENP, owing to the fact that it is currently a candidate for EU membership.

Finally, there is a structural difference: while the Barcelona Process combines a multilateral dimension with a bilateral one, the ENP (for the present, at least) is based on a strictly bilateral logic. This bilateral approach, which is expressed in the form of action plans and country reports, means that actions can be designed that are adapted to the needs, specific situations and desire for reform of each of the Mediterranean partners.

In spite of these differences, some claim that the two frameworks overlap at too many points. Even though the European Commission and the Member States insist on the existence of a complementarity

between these cooperation frameworks, many experts and analysts have warned of the danger of the Barcelona Process becoming replaced by the ENP, or at the very least, of marginalising the former through this policy.

Such arguments, while they are not the subject of this analysis, do highlight the importance of analysing the Barcelona Process and the ENP within the context of one single article . The main reason for this is that they are closely interrelated, and allusions are made between one framework and the other, and vice versa.

A difficult year

In this summary of the progress of the two cooperation frameworks between Tampere and Lisbon, I will be looking exclusively at political and security aspects; that is to say, the aspects that represent the first basket of the Barcelona Process. This is a subject area that is also covered by ENP Action Plans.

The Euro-Mediterranean conference at the city of Tampere, Finland, was held on 27 and 28 November 2006. During this meeting, the Euro-Mediterranean partners approved a work plan for the following year, a plan that was modest but specific. The fact that it was adopted represented a significant success if one bears in mind the problems that had accumulated in the months prior to the conference (the war in Lebanon, growing tension in the Palestine territories).

In early November 2007, the Euro-Mediterranean partners met up again, this time in Lisbon. During this conference, several common conclusions were agreed and the activities for 2008 were planned . However, the Lisbon meeting was also marked by a sharp shock, in the form of France's announcement that it planned to establish a Mediterranean Union which, in its initial form, was presented as a mechanism that would remedy the supposed failure of the Barcelona Process.

Thus for very different reasons, in both 2006 and 2007, the Euro-Mediterranean partners were forced to define their position more clearly than is habitual in terms of their commitment to the Euro-Mediterranean project. Though the commitment expressed at the two meetings was not necessarily accompanied by any tangible progress.

Continuing negative trends

There are five areas in which, unfortunately, no significant advances have been made in the past year. The first is the fact that progress on security issues within the context of the Barcelona Process is still hampered by major obstacles. Stalled projects such as the Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean still appear impossible in the present context. That is why the decision was made to act bilaterally and to support states such as Morocco, which wants to cooperate in the area of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The second is the fact that the framework of political dialogue of the Barcelona Process has not succeeded in reducing tension between the members of the Euro-Mediterranean space, and particularly between three members of the Process: Israel, Lebanon and the Palestine National Authority. The EuroMeSCo annual report called 2006 a year of "wars and tensions in the Mediterranean". In autumn 2007, the situation in the Gaza Strip continues to raise concern, while an additional worrying factor is that another member of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Turkey, is carrying out an aggressive, nationalist policy in its fight against PKK terrorism, and which is threatening to bring new elements of instability to the Middle East.

Thirdly, a sense of unease persists over the results of the Barcelona Process, with some commentators speaking of the limitations of the Process. Effectively, this represents a return to a debate that has been going on since the early years of the Process, and can be summarised thus: is it a problem of the design of the Partnership, or is it a problem of the international and regional political context?

Fourthly, the ENP does not offer adequate incentives, or it only offers them to those countries that are particularly predisposed to increasing their cooperation with the EU. This factor, which is one of the main problems with the policy, becomes more marked if we focus on the political sphere, and even more so in that of security and defence. And the point is: why does the ENP offer to help countries progress in the area of economic integration, but not with political integration? The ENP does not have much to offer in the field of security and defence given that, for the moment, it does not offer any attractive incentives in areas such as the resolution of conflicts or the modernisation and democratisation of the armed forces.

Finally, it must be said that the ENP still does not represent an attractive prospect for one country that is of key importance in the Euro-Mediterranean space: Algeria. This country views the ENP with suspicion, as it considers that the Policy has too much of a tendency to influence and control the speed of reform, and that it tends to interfere excessively in issues of Algeria's national sovereignty. Furthermore, because Algeria signed the association agreement relatively late, in 2002, the country would rather examine all the ramifications of the agreement before entering into any new association frameworks with the EU.

Innovations and progress

Aside from this stagnation, a series of innovations have taken place between the Tampere and the Lisbon conferences, some of which do suggest that progress is being made in the Euro-Mediterranean framework or in the ENP, while others represent new challenges that these frameworks will have to tackle.

One of these new features is the adoption of what the German presidency of the EU has called the "strengthened European Neighbourhood Policy", and which consists of a series of documents revising the Policy, the most well-known being the Communication from the Commission

The ENP still does not represent an attractive prospect for one country that is of key importance in the Euro-Mediterranean space: Algeria

of December 2006 . Among the most notable recommendations of this revised version of the ENP are: the need to rethink the incentives that the EU can offer, making greater efforts to identify the agencies or European programmes that could prove attractive and, very specifically, revising visa policy. Another new feature was the acceptance of the fact that a purely bilateral policy is unable to cope with certain challenges, such as environment and energy. Both the European Commission and the experts have stressed that these issues require multilateral frameworks. Nevertheless, they do not advise creating any new institutions, preferring to make use of existing regional cooperation frameworks such as the Barcelona Process and the Black Sea cooperation initiatives.

Despite claims that the ENP is to continue as a bilateral policy, steps have been taken in recent months that might suggest otherwise. The most significant of these was the conference in Brussels in September which brought together government representatives from all the beneficiary countries of the ENP, an initiative which appears set to continue.

On the subject of the ENP, it is worth pointing out that, unlike the aforementioned situation as regards Algeria, Egypt has decided to take part in the policy. Though the Cairo government gave few signs of enthusiasm when the new policy was first introduced, in 2007 Egypt decided to participate fully, and since March of that same year, it has possessed its own Action Plan.

Situated halfway between the ENP and the Barcelona Process, one of the most significant innovations of this year is what is known as Morocco's "Advanced Statute". With the support of Spain, Portugal, France, Italy and the European Commission, the Moroccan government has decided to align itself as much as possible with Romano Prodi's idea of "everything except the institutions". In this respect, the Advanced Statute should help to specify how a country can become a little more than a partner without actually joining the EU. The steps taken in relations with Morocco could end up having repercussions with the country's Mediterranean neighbours, and even with Eastern countries, as they will all be closely monitoring the development of the Advanced Statute, and will probably attempt to copy it. In the field of security and defence, the Advanced Statute will probably lead to Morocco becoming more closely integrated into ESDP mechanisms and missions. Morocco has already taken steps in this direction (participation in ALTHEA and designation of a link in the Political and Security Committee). With the Advanced Statute, this cooperation will be increased and intensified.

Also halfway between the ENP and the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was introduced in 2007. This instrument resulted from the merging of the MEDA and the TACIS funds, and features several changes designed to improve the execution of projects and strengthen areas such as cross-border cooperation. Nonetheless, it is too soon to carry out an assessment of the results of this instrument.

Meanwhile, within the context of the Barcelona Process, one point worthy of mention is the steps that have been taken toward the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean system of civil protection. The Mediterranean is a

particularly vulnerable region as regards natural disasters, and in 2005, the Action Plan approved in Barcelona determined that this area should become a priority. Thus it was that, on 24 October 2007, a meeting was held in Porto between all the director generals for civil protection of the Euromed programme and their European counterparts to discuss how to develop such a fully-integrated Euro-Mediterranean system. The Euro-Mediterranean conference in Lisbon made further progress in this direction.

With respect to the area of security and defence, the countries of Europe have clearly made greater efforts to encourage some of their Mediterranean partners to enter into debate on these issues. An example of this took place in Évora in September 2007, when an informal work session was held between the Defence Ministers of the 27 Member States and the five countries of the Maghreb region.

However, one of the main new features in the Euro-Mediterranean area has been France's proposed creation of a Mediterranean Union. The proposal was first mooted in Toulon in February, and explained in more detail in a recent speech by the French President in Tangiers. Nicolas Sarzoky claims that the Barcelona Process and the ENP suffer from limitations that this new project could overcome. Sarzoky calls for what he defines as "specific solidarities" and "pragmatic projects within a framework of variable geometries". The French President asserts that just as Europe was built on cooperation involving coal and steel, the Mediterranean should be constructed by focusing on sustainable development, energy, transport and water. As we can see, the classic issues of security and defence are absent from the list.

Meanwhile, Sarzoky is calling for a strengthening of political dialogue by holding a meeting of the heads of state and government of the countries located along the edge of the Mediterranean. This meeting would be called the G-Med (an allusion to the G-8). Strengthening political dialogue is one of France's main priorities in the Euro-Mediterranean context, though it remains to be seen whether a framework that only includes the countries on the shores of the Mediterranean will really be more effective (or less problematical) than one that includes the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. In the light of the ongoing regional conflicts in the Near East, it does not seem likely to be the case.

There seems to be a general agreement that the French project will generate a great deal of uncertainty. Among those showing the greatest scepticism are the countries and institutions (such as the Commission) that are most strongly committed to the Barcelona Process. Other sceptics include countries from non-Mediterranean Europe such as Finland and Germany, who feel excluded from a cooperation initiative into which they have invested enormous effort. Meanwhile, countries to the south are also expressing doubts and reticence. Many Arab nations want relations with the entire EU, and not just with the EU's Mediterranean countries. Turkey, moreover, views this initiative with suspicion, as it believes that the Mediterranean Union is being presented as an alternative to Turkey's full admission into the EU.

One of the main new features in the Euro-Mediterranean area has been France's proposed creation of a Mediterranean Union

Concluding remarks

> The year 2007 has brought innovations to the Mediterranean region, though they have been particularly limited in the area of cooperation and defence

This year, once again, the Mediterranean has proved to be an important area for the EU's external relations, though that does not mean that any significant advances and progress have taken place. Not only have existing cooperation frameworks been maintained, it has also been proposed that new spaces (specifically, the Mediterranean Union) be added to a situation that is already complex enough in itself. One of the great challenges continues to be how to create a coherent European policy that will optimise resources and efforts and can move toward the ambitious objectives set down in the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, and which remain equally valid today.

As we have seen, the year 2007 has brought innovations to the Mediterranean region, though they have been particularly limited in the area of cooperation and defence. Even so, we cannot describe the situation as having succumbed to stagnation or lethargy. This annual assessment could be summed up by paraphrasing Galileo: '*Eppur si muove*'. Nevertheless, this movement has not reached the cruise speed required by the challenges facing the region.

Notes

1. For these arguments, see (among others) EMERSON, Michael and NOUTCHEVA, Gergana. "From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues". *CEPS Working Paper,* No 220 (2005); MAHJOUB, Azzam. "La politique européenne de voisinage: un dépassement du partenariat euro-méditerranéen". *Politique Étrangère,* No. 3. (2005). P. 535-544; SCHUMACHER, Tobias and DEL SARTO, Raffaella, "From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?", *The European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 10 No 1 (2005) 17-38; and SOLER i LECHA, "Las perspectivas de la Política Europea de Vecindad para el Mediterráneo" in BARBÉ, Esther & HERRANZ, Anna (eds), *Política Exterior y Parlamento Europeo: hacia el equilibrio entre eficacia y democracia.* Barcelona: IUEE/ Office of the European Parliament in Barcelona, (2007) pp. 89-101.
2. Tampere conclusions, 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Tampere, 27-28 November 2006.
3. Agreed Conclusions of the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 5-6 November 2007.
4. EuroMeSCo *Regaining Impetus, annual report,* Lisbon, 2007, pp. 14-15.
5. See ZERARKA, Youssef, "Política de vecindad: por ahora no es una prioridad para Argel" in *AFKAR-IDEAS*, No. 14 (2007).
6. *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy*, Brussels, 4 December 2006, COM(2006)726 final.
7. JAIDI, Larbi, "Estatuto avanzado entre la UE y Marruecos: ¿un nuevo partenariado?", AFKAR-IDEAS, No. 14 (2007).
8. SARKOZY, Nicolas, *Discours à Toulon* (07/02/07) and SARKOZY, Nicolas, *Discours du Président de la République sur l'Union méditerranéenne* - Tangiers, 23 October 2007.

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Balance of the cooperation initiatives

Cooperation in western Mediterranean: The 5+5 defence initiative
Mario Rino Me

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Admiral, Chairman 5+5, Italian Ministry of Defence

There is a general recognition of the growing relevance represented by this old crossroads as a result of the implied geopolitical dynamics on the international scene, at a moment when it appears increasingly necessary to give the geography its strategic importance and relevance to the present times, and pertinence to sub-regional issues.

In reality, the strategic dimension of the Mediterranean has highlighted the difficulties of reaching common platforms in order to lay out an architecture of shared security, due to the complexity and variety of sub-regional dynamics. As a result, the Mediterranean as a whole appears at the moment far from free of the old divisions and tensions and their up-to-date variants.

The proposal for the adoption of the format 5+5 within the defence arena was presented in the autumn of 2004, in a climate of effective collective collaboration and equally strong political support. The challenge was then represented by the need to set up an undertaking starting with "a clean slate", all agreeing to give the "initiative-in-being" the connotation of an operational dialogue in the framework of a yet existing format. That is to say, the 5+5 Dialogue, re-launched in the original Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Interior dimensions after 10 years of standstill.

Within an informal context, the shorter format, in fact, favours a fast and effective dialogue, avoiding the risks of long and complicated decision making processes. It is acknowledged that the Dialogue does represent the indispensable basis to begin any kind of productive co-operation. In fact, the necessary climate of trust, confidence and mutual respect, allowing differences to be metabolized, is built through dialogue. Another advantage for the quick start and progress of the Initiative has been offered by the combination of above features with the limited geographical scope, which have decoupled the Dialogue from the fluctuations and frustrations of the various political crises in the neighbourhood.

In November 2004, the Italian Defence Ministry hosted the first informal meeting of a self-proclaimed Steering Committee (SC), to set the basis for an agreement. The existence of a convergence in the perception of future uncertainties and the willingness to go forward together within

> The strategic dimension of the Mediterranean has highlighted the difficulties of reaching common platforms in order to lay out an architecture of shared security

a shared and incremental common project was confirmed in Rome. On the 21st of the following December, in Paris, the Ministers of Defence of the 10 Member Countries ratified the official birth of the 5+5 Defence Initiative formalising the Declaration of Intent. This far-reaching document established the institutional figure of the Presidency, which rotates annually following the English alphabet order, the constitution of the SC, responsible to the Ministers for the direction and supervision of the actions agreed on, yearly, within a suitable Action Plan (approved at Ministers of Defence level). The real trump card was represented by the fast-track conceptual definition and ministerial approval of the frame of reference (the above mentioned Declaration of Intent), and the first 2005 Action Plan which contained, besides the list of activities, the principles (first of all, the voluntary basis, the unanimous consensus), the methodology to follow and the operational schemes.

The 5+5 Defence Initiative is based on the co-operation in practical activities responding to common needs of the two sides, whose solution involves a minimum of interoperability problems, which can be resolved *in situ*, with working methodologies proposed and verified within the context itself. Another important aspect is the spirit of its *sui generis* co-operation, based on the principles of transparency, of a non- prescriptive, rather egalitarian character. That is, amongst equals and two-way street cooperation.

Three areas of initial co-operation are agreed and shaped in terms of defence contribution .

First, there is the maritime surveillance. As we witness in the media front pages, what the Romans used to call simply *Mare Nostrum* is affected by a variety of illegal activities. The maritime dimension is covered by several laws and international agreements. This legal framework calls to the sharing of this common space and therefore, the Mediterranean should be viewed from a perspective of co-operation. The areas connected with Search and Rescue, the contribution of the Defence to countering illicit trafficking of either merchandise and human beings and illegal immigration are of particular interest to both sides. It is important to know that some issues are dealt at level of Chiefs of Navies Staff.

Secondly, there is the Defence contribution to Civil Protection. In the context of ever growing demands for human security, the Ministry of Defence can provide, within its area of competence and according to its means and capabilities, a swift contribution to populations, property, goods and services that have been damaged or endangered. Assistance in a situation of crisis -be it environmental, natural or man-made-, mine clearing, support of military medicine, monitoring of locust clouds are some of the areas where the Defence contribution may be value added.

Finally, we also have air security. Since terrorist trans-national organisations seem to represent a strategic challenge to the international community, the exchange of information on the air picture, in addition to what happens within the usual networks of the civilian air traffic control system, can contribute to the timely predisposition of defensive measures in the case of an improper use of air space for terrorist activities. A significant boost to this dimension was given by the first meeting of the Air-Force Chiefs of Staff, which took place in Algiers last June.

The 5+5 Defence Initiative has, from the beginning, emphasised the advantage of streamlined undertaking and it has taken on a dynamism that has given it the connotation of front runner of cooperation and a test-bed of experiences to be exported to other and wider *fora* of discussion.

From the operational phase of *souplesse,* in 2006, during the following French Presidency, the number of activities raised from the four accomplished in 2005 to 14, four of which are offered by the partners of the southern area giving rise to the desired two-way street cooperation. Hence, igniting a process of spiralling growth of virtuous circles, substantiated in the networking of the interested parties in all the activities. In the meantime, the activities menu has widened with the inclusion of a proposal for mine clearing, training structures and the initial discussions on the personnel education dimension. In 2007, the number of activities reached the figure of 20; eight of which offered by the southern Mediterranean partners. In 2007 we have therefore a further confirmation that this unique deed of joint venture, its project-like concept and implementation, resulting from a firm collective commitment, has given positive results enacting the so-called cross-fertilisation of ideas. On the whole, the activity has marked the achievement of a triple, collective strategic objective.

The first strategic objective coincides with the consolidation of the Initiative, three years after its launch, towards an operational dimension. The validity of the methodology applied for the setting up of an effective and suitable cooperation, has been confirmed in the numerous offers of activities, a clear evidence of common interest in the areas of practical development. The Canale Exercise, a bilateral Italo-Maltese exercise with invitations to other Mediterranean nations, able and willing, and now customized at ten and the similar Forefinger Exercise, proposed by France, indicate the entry into the practical dimension.

The operational vehicle represented by an Italian pilot project, labelled Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (V-RMTC), 5+5 tailored, is complementary to the Canale Exercise and similar activities. It is a *de facto* contribution to situation awareness along the principles of plug and play, and a specific measure of confidence building. The ratification by eights navies of the V-RMTC 5+5 NET Operational Arrangement took place during the meeting of the Navy Chiefs of Staff of the member Countries of the 5+5 Initiative in Naples, last May. In the mean while, the tailored network is processing nine navies' inputs and we are confident that it will incorporate the whole format next year. Moreover all the achievements are underpinned by a useful cycle of expert's recommendations, turning into a kind of customized lesson-learned implemented system.

The second strategic objective is represented by the emergence of concrete forms of two-way street and cooperation amongst equals. The third strategic objective is represented by an important flow of cross dialogue. After all, thanks to the favourable climate of interpersonal relationships, and in particular, to the opportunity presented by a context of win-win situation, it can be stated that the Initiative has entered its youth stage.

The 5+5 Defence Initiative has, from the beginning, emphasised the advantage of streamlined undertaking

The education dimension constitutes, at present, the 4th area of cooperation. In this dimension France and Tunisia have submitted their proposals for the implementation of, respectively, a 5+5 School and an Institute for Strategic Research. Both projects deserve the greatest interest and consideration, in view of their possible complementarities and their decisive contribution to what we can define as the inter-operability of minds. The so called '*College tournant des 5+5*' has reached its final stage and is going to be launched next year. Thanks to the generous involvement of the whole community it will be something more than an exchange of universities.

With regard to the think-tank, we assess that any form of practical cooperation must be necessarily sustained by the breath of a future strategic vision, in the sound assumption that a common baseline can be beneficial to both sides and as a prerequisite to be prepared to face future challenges. In other words, the practical thrust was instrumental to start; yet if we look at our future, we have to go beyond daily needs.

As a result of the above mentioned the Initiative will be corroborated by the concurrence of the practical activities and soon by the already mentioned education dimension; at a later stage we are confident to set in place also a training sub-dimension, which gives rise to a strong self-sustaining function.

It is necessary to link-up with the processes activated by those regional organisations becoming increasingly assertive in the area –the European Union, the Arab Maghreb Union and the African Union- in view of possible synergies. The ministerial event at Évora is a first response to this need. Slovenia and France commitments for a follow-up characterised by continuity bodes well for the future .We feel also the need to establish liaisons within the 5+5 framework, since some activities are in the border-line with the Ministry of Interior purview.

The practical and balanced nature of cooperation makes it possible for the Initiative to present itself as an EU-Africa cooperation model and test-bed for experiences.

All in all, the project of the 5+5 Defence Initiative is a building blocks development that allows us to see the Mediterranean, at this time limited to its western dimension, under a perspective of a collective cooperation. The governance of this sea is a shared responsibility. The success of the Initiative stems from its very nature, described previously, and its adherence to some known principles such as: "think globally, start practically, act locally" and, after Évora's meeting, "coordinate regionally". It is of vital importance to network in order to harmonize themes and make synergies.

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Balance of the cooperation initiatives

NATO's role in the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East
Alberto Bin

Alberto Bin

Head of the Mediterranean Dialogue,
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Contact Countries Section,
Political Affairs and Security Policy Division NATO International Staff

Over the past few years, I have been closely involved in the development of NATO's cooperation with countries across the Mediterranean region and into the Middle East and so I would like to underline here the rationale for that cooperation and its enormous potential. Our world today is very much characterised by the effects of globalisation, positive but also negative and in that increasingly complex, fast-paced, volatile international environment, cooperation is the only sensible way for all our nations to safeguard our security.

From the very beginning, NATO has understood the importance of cooperation. It was established almost 60 years ago, in circumstances that were very different from today's'. It was created to bring North America and Europe together to address the specific security challenges of a divided Europe. Thankfully, the Cold War has long disappeared. And so has the old, Cold War, NATO Alliance.

As before, today's NATO still has two unique features that give it the strength and cohesion to adapt and respond to changing circumstances. First, NATO brings together North America and Europe – two continents that not only enjoy a unique level of cooperation with one another, but which also feel a strong obligation to contribute to global stability. And second, NATO continues to feature both an exceptional political consultation mechanism and a multinational military structure to implement the decisions taken by its members.

At the same time, security cooperation in NATO has assumed a totally different nature. We no longer have to defend Western Europe against the threat of a massive invasion from the East. Instead, cooperation in NATO today is all about addressing new security challenges, including terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and instability due to failed or failing states. So what are the key differences between the new, 21st century NATO, and the old NATO? As far as I am concerned, three points stand out.

First and foremost, I would point to the way we look at security. Essentially, all 26 NATO Allies agree that a geographical, territorial understanding of security is simply too narrow to cope with risks and threats that know no borders. We can no longer afford to wait for these challenges to come to

> In an increasingly complex, fast-paced, volatile international environment, cooperation is the only sensible way for all our nations to safeguard our security

us - instead, we must be prepared to meet them where they emerge, even if that may mean deploying far away from our traditional European borders.

That is why, today, NATO has over 50,000 troops deployed in a number of demanding missions on three continents. In Europe, NATO continues to keep the peace in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo. In the Mediterranean, the Alliance's maritime operation, Active Endeavour, conducts naval anti-terrorist patrols. In Afghanistan, NATO is leading the International Security Assistance Force, our most extensive engagement which includes peacekeeping and combat tasks. In Iraq, NATO has established a training mission to assist with the training of Iraqi security forces. And in Africa, NATO is supporting the African Union with its peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Moreover, on a number of occasions, we have demonstrated our ability to support international humanitarian relief operations, most recently in the wake of the terrible earthquake that struck Pakistan in 2005 and in the context of the rescue operations following the volcano eruption that struck an island off the Yemeni coast not long ago. In both cases, NATO intervened upon a specific demand by the local authorities.

I should like to point out that none of these missions is about territorial defence or about achieving military success in the traditional sense. And I should also like to emphasise that NATO does not wish to play the role of a global policeman, standing ready to solve problems all over the world. But we do understand that, in an age of globalisation, NATO must take a much more active role in order to promote stability and security. This does not mean that NATO imposes itself. Instead, we work closely together with other nations and international organisations.

This leads directly to the second key characteristic of today's NATO that I wish to highlight: our closer relationship with other institutions and Afghanistan is the perfect example of this. We all know that success in Afghanistan does not depend on NATO alone. It requires both security and development, and the two must go hand in hand. Reconstruction and development have almost had to start from scratch; a whole new political process has to be created; fighting and nation building have to be carried out in parallel; and regional neighbours need to be engaged.

That is why, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, NATO today is not acting alone. We obviously work in close partnership with the governments concerned. But more and more, we are also cooperating closely with other major institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the World Bank (WB) – as well as with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO). As I mentioned earlier, this broad international cooperative effort is the only feasible approach to safeguard our security in a globalised world.

Let me move onto the third, important characteristic of NATO today: partnership. Promoting security is a considerable task and NATO's 26 member states need the support of other countries – countries that realise that they too, that are not immune from the new global risks and threats; countries which are willing to work with us in addressing those common challenges.

And there are many of those countries. As I stand here today, 18 partner countries have forces under NATO command, standing shoulder to shoulder with our troops in some of our most demanding operations. And NATO is at the heart of a wide network of security partnerships that stretches across Europe, Central Asia, Northern Africa, the Middle East, and even beyond.

In the mid-1990s, NATO took the first step in reaching out to its neighbours to the south when we launched our Mediterranean Dialogue. The aim was to establish a new relationship between NATO and the countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East. And three years ago, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) extended our offer of partnership to interested Gulf States.

Essentially, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI have the same objective: to enhance mutual understanding, build transparency, and engage in concrete cooperation on issues of mutual interest. The basic approach underpinning the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI can be summarised quite easily as well: NATO is not imposing anything on any of its partners, but offering to work together in areas in which it has experience and expertise, and where our partners are prepared to define their specific requirements and demonstrate genuine ownership. Moreover, NATO wants to complement ongoing cooperation by our partners in, and with, other international *fora*. We certainly do not seek to duplicate or complicate this cooperation. Rather, we want to focus on those areas where NATO can bring a clear added value, which is in practical cooperation.

A lot has already been achieved. So far, seven countries of the southern rim of the Mediterranean have joined our Mediterranean Dialogue: Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Four Gulf countries have joined the ICI: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Our political contacts have increased significantly. Mediterranean Dialogue Ministerial meetings have been held in Brussels (2004), Taormina (2006) and Seville (2007), and the next Ministerial meeting is scheduled to take place in Brussels on the 7th December 2007. The entire NATO Council – the Alliance's senior political body – visited Morocco and Kuwait. Chief-of-Staffs from NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries meet regularly at NATO Headquarters. We have also seen a significant increase in our practical cooperation, which now ranges from intelligence sharing, through military interoperability and participation in military exercises, to security sector reform. In addition, we were able to strike a balance between non-discrimination – an essential principle of all our initiatives in the region – and the need for self-differentiation through the development of Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP). Israel was the first country to develop such an ICP, followed by Egypt which finalised its ICP recently.

So now, the challenge is to build upon this progress, and to reinforce it. I firmly believe that the opportunities to do so are better than ever. Less than a year ago, at their Summit in Riga, NATO Heads of State and Government decided to enhance all of NATO's partnership mechanisms. This is a most important step that will open up new opportunities for our cooperation in three key areas.

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In less than two years' time, NATO will turn 60 thanks to its tremendous ability to adapt to a changing strategic landscape

First, there will be new opportunities for political dialogue and consultation between the NATO Allies and one or more Mediterranean Dialogue or ICI partners who support NATO operations. This will give more political substance to both frameworks, and make them more responsive to unfolding events.

Second, our Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI partners will now be able to benefit from many of the partnership tools that, until now, were only available to members of our more elaborate Partnership for Peace framework. This will further increase the depth of our cooperation.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, we launched the so-called NATO Training Cooperation Initiative. Through almost six decades of military cooperation among Allies, NATO has acquired a wealth of experience in education and training. By sharing this experience with our partners from the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, we will make another step towards the human interoperability that is so crucially important for the success of future joint missions, as well as for our day to day cooperation. We are currently working on the implementation of this new initiative including through the establishment of a dedicated Faculty at the NATO Defence College in Rome.

In implementing the new opportunities for cooperation, we will continue to work very closely with our partners here in the region. We believe that joint ownership among equal partners remains a key principle of our cooperation. We also believe that cooperation is a two-way street; that we should not duplicate the efforts of others; and that nothing should be imposed on anyone. All these principles have served us well and they will continue to guide us in our efforts to enhance our cooperation with our partners in the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East.

In less than two years' time, NATO will turn 60. This is a very old age for an Alliance of sovereign states. But when we look at NATO's evolving agenda, it becomes clear why the Alliance has remained in business for so long: it has a tremendous ability to adapt to a changing strategic landscape. The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative are both perfect illustrations of this unique ability to adapt, an ability that we must preserve.

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Scenarios of security and insecurity in the Mediterranean

Another way of understanding security: A way out of the impasse affecting the Barcelona process
Álvaro de Vasconcelos

ANOTHER WAY OF UNDERSTANDING SECURITY: A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE AFFECTING THE BARCELONA PROCESS

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

*Director of the European Union Institute
for Security Studies (ISS-EU), Paris*

I t seems to be an increasingly accepted idea that the Barcelona process has failed. This is a view that is shared by many of the European capitals and particularly (though not solely) by the countries of southern Europe, and it is now turning into a central issue in the Euro-Mediterranean debate. As a consequence, it is important to examine the relationship that exists between the view that the Barcelona Process has failed and the analyses that have been made of the problem of security in the Mediterranean.

From the point of view of security, a dysfunction exists between the values that were established (and which were announced when the Barcelona Process was launched) and the current analysis of the problem of security in the Mediterranean and of the challenges that the southern Mediterranean represents for the European Union. This imbalance is one of the central reasons behind the argument that the Process has failed. It was 12 years ago that we announced in Barcelona that our objective was to create an integrated Euro-Mediterranean area based on democracy and human rights, and that this would be achieved through a long-term process of economic, political and social integration. But at the same time, back in 1995 (and this, in its essence, has not changed) an analysis was made of the challenges to be addressed which did not – as far as I am concerned - correspond to the reality. I would go so far as to say that it went against the possibility of successfully achieving those objectives.

After 1995, the great challenge for the European Union and the Mediterranean was deemed to be political Islamism. Facing a political change as they were, the countries of the South were considered to be countries in crisis (from a social and economic point of view), while the alternative to the existing regimes were political forces that the EU viewed as a real danger: Europe did not understand them, did not like them and feared they would achieve power. As a consequence, Europe developed a policy during those years aimed at neutralising them or, at the very least, of preventing them from actively participating in political life.

The basic reason for the current view that the Process has failed (even if it is not the only one) has to do with the fact that, 12 years on, none of these political forces have been neutralised or eliminated. Instead they are still very clearly present, and, furthermore, they have developed into

> From the point of view of security, a dysfunction exists between the values that were established and the current analysis of the problem of security in the Mediterranean

real political alternatives to the governments that have been ruling these countries during the past few years. It is this analysis that is responsible for much of the view that the Process has failed; it is, therefore, of the utmost importance to our discussion on the challenges to security in the Mediterranean that we succeed in carrying out a more precise analysis, more in line with the reality, and more able to comprehend the political change going on in the region to finally understand what is called the "Islamist phenomenon".

To achieve this objective, we have to give up any Euro-Mediterranean approach to the problem which is based on an analysis that we could call (for the purposes of simplification) culturalist. Any sensible person would agree that there is no point in predicting a clash of civilisations. But that does not mean that we do not accept the main supposition of this view, which is ultimately based on the convictions of Samuel Huntington and, one could say, of the culturalists. This essential presupposition would, on one hand, conceive civilisations as political actors, so that when they connect, we may find ourselves involved in a dialogue, or in a clash (the dialogue is a positive view, but it still represents a positive "huntingtonianism" of the clash of civilisations). On the other hand, the Islamists would be the clearest and most advanced representatives of this civilisational perspective, of this clash of civilisations - through their clear references to religion, to culture and to civilisation, but also because many of them believe that civilisations are political actors and that they are the representatives of a particular civilisation, and because of their distrust of the cultural influence of the West and since the most extremist of them also share the "clash of civilisations" perspective.

On this point, I believe it is of enormous importance to understand that people possess multiple identities. Amartya Sen's book[1] (2006) on the problem of identities expresses this idea clearly and brilliantly. The basic argument in his criticism of culturalism is, precisely, the fact that many people are unable to accept the multiplicity of identity. We are never one single thing, enslaved to our culture, religion or civilisation: there are some people who are, at the same time, democrats and Islamists, or democrats but not Islamists. Among the Islamists, we can also find democrats and Islamists who may possess these two identities, in the same way that someone can be a democrat, an Islamist and in favour of European integration and, simultaneously, believe in the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean Union - which would represent a fourth identity. The result of Sen's book is that we cannot carry on perceiving the Mediterranean situation in the same way; it changes our understanding of the Islamist phenomenon, of its enormous diversity, and of the fact that not all Islamists are terrorists. There are some Islamist political forces - such as the AKP in Turkey (even if the AKP does not like to be reminded that its identity derives from political Islamism) and the PJD in Morocco - whose political cultures contain references to religion and yet they are, at the same time, actors of democratic change.

The importance of this analysis for Euro-Mediterranean relations and for security in the Mediterranean becomes very clear if we consider the issue of Palestine. At present, the EU's security strategy (and this is a widely-shared view) deems the Israel-Palestine conflict to be the central issue in the Mediterranean. Thus it considers that solving the Israel-Palestine problem would not only help to advance Euro-Mediterranean relations, it

would also help to significantly reduce radicalism and identity extremism. It would, therefore, represent a major contribution to stability and security in the Mediterranean. However, the inability to understand the Islamist phenomenon - the tendency to view Islamism in general as a deadly enemy of Western values - has meant that the EU (and not only the EU, which of course was not the only origin of this stance) was unable to accept the results of the Palestine elections, which gave victory to the Islamist party Hamas. On one hand, this event reveals the inevitable nature of this party, and on the other, our inability to accept its role in political life. The consequence of all this is a considerably worsened situation, with profound divisions between Palestinian political forces, and a weakening of the aim of building a Palestinian state, and everything that this would represent. There is no need to stress this point because we all realise that without an agreement with Hamas, the Palestine situation is stuck in a cul-de-sac. On 27 November a peace conference will be held in Annapolis to discuss the Israel-Palestine question, which we hope will be a great success. But this is not likely to be the case if not all the Palestinian forces are involved in the process. Perhaps it will represent the start of a process, but if he is deprived of power, the Palestinian leader will obviously be severely weakened, and will be unable to put into practice anything that is agreed at this conference.

On a more positive note, if we look at the Moroccan elections we can see how the process of political transformation is possible thanks to the fact that the Moroccan government - the king - has accepted the PJD as an actor of political change. Obviously, we could ask what sort of state Morocco would be in today and its hopes of Euro-Mediterranean integration if the Moroccan government had not accepted the PJD as a political actor, if it had neutralised it or prevented it from participating politically. What would Morocco's internal political situation be like? Undoubtedly, the political party would have become radicalised, and would have turned into a huge factor for instability.

And so, what sort of future can we expect? On one hand, we are reaching the end of a period in which analyses of the problem of security in the Mediterranean have been dominated by the perspective of the global war on terrorism. This perspective has made it very difficult to forge links with the Islamist parties because it is true that part of the Islamist tendency - the most radical, extremist part (albeit a minority, but it does exist) - has turned terrorism into a weapon of political action. It is equally true that the fact that this phenomenon has become globalised, and the view that terrorism is a threat comparable to that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, prevents us from seeing the differences and distinctions, and from contextualising the problem of terrorism and differentiating between the different political forces.

It is interesting to note that nowadays, in the United States, and particularly in the Democrat sector (which will, in all probability, be the next party to come to power), but also in some Republican sectors, this view is increasingly seen as one which has failed. There is growing belief that political conceptions in the area of security must be changed, and that the question of terrorism should not be turned into one, single absolute issue. The parties are returning to other problems such as social and political issues, issues of democracy, human rights, poverty, etc. which, in many cases, are more important and significant than terrorism is with

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respect to stability and security. Clearly, this change in the United States will also lead to a change in the world, and it will definitely have a great impact on Europe.

Finally, we must ask ourselves what we should do as Europeans, Euro-Mediterraneans and southern Europeans. While I mentioned at the beginning that a view exists that the Barcelona Process has failed, I should also point out that despite this view, daring proposals have been made, such as the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Union. Behind the launching of this proposal lies the idea of the failure of the Process and the perception that there is a need to do more, to move beyond this failure. But what should be done? Should more be done with respect to Mediterranean matters (which, obviously, should play a particular role)? Or alternatively, in the area of Euro-Mediterranean issues? Will the questions that I have formulated be better resolved by strong commitment from the EU? Should we be speaking about a Mediterranean Union or a Euro-Mediterranean Union? In my view, the answer lies in this Euro-Mediterranean perspective, and for one simple reason: if we focus our efforts solely on the Mediterranean, the accent is placed on an intergovernmental approach, on cooperation between states - something that is clearly an essential component, though it means that we lose the community dimension, the dimension of political commitment, the social dimension, the dimension of support for civil society, for democratisation, etc. which in my opinion is the most interesting part of the Euro-Mediterranean process. It is precisely this part in which the Barcelona Process has been successful, and therefore we should not give up on the Process but instead develop it by benefiting from the added value that it possesses, thanks to this Euro-Mediterranean component. It is important to bear in mind that during the difficult years it has undergone, the Barcelona Process has made a commitment not only to civil society but also to the area of the economy, and progress has been made by using EU community instruments. As a result, we must unite all these commitments. If we possess a perspective, a challenge, that is not purely security-based, but instead focuses on security in the widest sense, we will come to realise that the EU's great achievement lies in this combination of community and political elements. Thus we should continue to work on this coherence between political and intergovernmental cooperation (something that 5+5 is already implementing in the area of security) and EU efforts aimed at achieving economic integration, support for democracy and human rights. In conclusion, let us hope that this debate on the Mediterranean Union helps to build a stronger Euro-Mediterranean perspective, and not just a Mediterranean one.

Note

1. SEN, Amartya. *Identity and violence: the illusion of destiny*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. cop., 2006

ANOTHER WAY OF UNDERSTANDING SECURITY: A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE AFFECTING THE BARCELONA PROCESS

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
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Scenarios of security and insecurity in the Mediterranean

Challenges to security in the Maghreb region
Khadija Mohsen-Finan

Khadija Mohsen-Finan

*Head Researcher at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI)
and Lecturer at the Institut d'Études Politiques (IEP), Paris*

I n the countries of the Maghreb region, threats to security now take many different forms, combining elements that are traditionally rooted in the region. These elements include the tension between Algiers and Rabat and its flashpoint the conflict in the Western Sahara as well as factors that represent a new international order, such as the alliance struck between Al-Qaeda and two Islamist groups in the region: the Algerian GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

There are also points of convergence between factors considered to be old, and new ones that could meet up in that famous strip of land, the Sahel, which is beyond the authority of all states.

In fact, with respect to challenges to security, what has fundamentally changed is that radical Islam has been incorporated into the international order. This has of course been accompanied by the importing of new methods from the Middle East by people from the Maghreb who have been to Afghanistan, or simply taken from Internet websites.

In the past, whether it was the bread revolts in the 1980s or the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s, such phenomena were limited to a national sphere. Nowadays, it has become much harder to identify the enemy and the objectives of terrorist actions are not precise. The methods used render the traditional ways of fighting terrorism inoperative, and give the sensation that the existing powers have less and less control over the security of their countries.

Furthermore, this threat is not localised. On the contrary, it is diffuse. Every place and every country is now exposed to violence. By joining Al-Qaeda, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) has gained a very useful legitimacy for the movement when it comes to rebuilding networks of young men who want to fight in Iraq, or to recruiting potential suicide bombers. The ease with which such networks can be rebuilt points to the existence of a generation of young people who, no matter how much of a minority they may be, are utterly devoid of dreams or projects, and who are not truly integrated, socially or politically, into the society in which they live. These young people do not negotiate with the State, which they consider to be corrupt, impious and allied to the West; their form of expression is radically different: they choose to beat the enemy at the expense of their own destruction.

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A new type of terrorism

The year 2007 saw the advent of a new kind of bomb attacks. Whether Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for them or not, it cannot be denied that they bore all the hallmarks of the organisation: car bombs, simultaneous bombings, synchronised suicide bombings and the symbolic choice of dates and objectives. Their way of acting has become increasingly sophisticated, such as the use of mobile telephones to detonate bombs remotely. From now on, these bombings will take place within the international Islamist sphere of influence, and no country in the region is spared. In Ben Ali's Tunisia, with a powerful security apparatus, a Salafist group that was preparing to carry out bomb attacks was dismantled in December 2006. In Morocco in April 2007, the kamikaze operations in Casablanca dramatically rekindled memories of May 2003, when simultaneous suicide bombings in different symbolic locations in the country's financial capital resulted in 43 deaths.

In Algeria, the old GSPC (after being renamed Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), has shown that it has strengthened its operating capacity, and has recovered its dissuasive force, which had been reduced for some time by the Algerian army. Its ability, though imperfect, to attack symbols of power and of the West suggests that, contrary to the declarations made by the Algerian authorities, radical violence is not residual.

The ex-GSPC also possesses a capacity (which has no doubt been strengthened since their alliance with Bin Laden) to rebuild the networks of jihadists prepared to kill themselves in bombings or to go and fight in Iraq. These young men are often Algerian, but networks dismantling operations have revealed that they could also be coming from neighbouring countries.

The objective of the new jihadists is to declare war on the political leaders of the countries in their region, whom they consider impious, corrupt and servants of the United States and the West. In this sense, they differ from the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), whose aim was to carry out their actions within an Algerian framework in order to found an Islamic state. The new jihadists' project is a global one: it goes beyond the borders of their country and possibly of the region.

It is precisely this project that has meant that, ever since the aforementioned groups joined the nebulous international organisation headed by Bin Laden, the Maghreb States fear a wave of fundamentalism. Even so, at present (and independently of the simultaneous nature of the 11 April bombings or the presence of Tunisians and Mauritanians in the ex-GSPC's training camps), it cannot be claimed that a unified command exists.

Conceived by Ayman El Zawahiri, the Federation of Islamist movements of the Maghreb (which offers a number of advantages, including the chance to build a front beside Europe) has not yet become a reality. In Morocco, for example, while the suicide bombings of 11 March and 10 April 2007 employed similar methods to those of Al-Qaeda, their leadership was completely autonomous; it was the work of radical Islamist cells with different objectives. While the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) continues to be the main organisation, there are others that have been created to attack different objectives, such as symbols of power,

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Westerners or tourists. In 2006, the Moroccan security services disman-
tled 11 networks of agents recruiting combatants for Iraq. The GICM was
behind the networks, one of which had sent almost 40 Moroccans to fight
in Iraq, after having trained them in northern Mali[1].

The regular dismantling of cells planning to carry out terrorist attacks indi-
cates that, in effect, the threat of 16 May 2003 still persists. As in the case
of the Algerian GSPC, these Moroccan groups boast of a real capacity to
regenerate their networks, in spite of close monitoring by the forces of
order. A collection of violent factions with no political ideology exists, who
take their inspiration from international Salafism, and feed off the petty
criminals with whom they coexist.

In the absence of any unified command, it can be observed that nowa-
days there are in the Maghreb region Salafist practices that are deployed
in different ways, given that Islamism is carried out by means of interac-
tivity with its environment.

The Sahel strip

In fact, we have few tangible elements available in this Sahel strip, which
is several thousand kilometres long, stretching from the Atlantic as far
as Chad. Left for many years solely in the hands of the Tuaregs and of all
types of dealers, this territory has now become a grey area that is rebelling
against the authority of the states in the region.

There are several factors that explain the suspicion felt by the US,
Europeans and Maghreb states toward this little-controlled area.

On one hand, the porousness of the borders encourages the circulation
of people and of all manner of products, including weapons and con-
traband cigarettes, merchandise of a semi-legal nature. The circulation
of people and products is facilitated by the fact that the Sahel area is
surrounded by countries whose security apparatus is particularly weak
when it comes to controlling their territories as far as their borders.

The weakness of these Sahel states, which are heavily in debt and poorly
structured in political terms, is even more worrying when one considers that
they adjoin countries considered to be active or potential focal points for
radical Islamism, such as Sudan, the north of Nigeria and Algeria[2].

This uncontrolled expanse of land could be used as a training site for
candidates arriving from adjoining countries, from Europe or other, as
well as the Islamic jihadist groups who had found it difficult to carry
out their actions in Algeria. Whether potential or real, this refuge for
Islamists a place where they can join forces, train and, possibly, plan ter-
rorist operations has become a veritable fixation for the United States.
In 2002, the US established a concerted anti-terrorist fight among the
different states in the region, and which was named the *Pan-Sahel
Initiative*, to be renamed in 2005 as the *Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Initiative* (TSCTI). With funding totalling 100 million dollars annually for
a period of five years, the programme was devised to assist the seven
countries that border the Sahara Desert in their fight against terrorism.

In practice, this "ground coordination" took the form of relatively rudimentary actions such as teaching armies in the region to use military equipment, coordinate between themselves and to make use of the information provided by Washington and Paris.

Furthermore, the seven states that participated in this coordination seem to have different views regarding the fight against terrorism. While for the United States, this fight would necessarily involve training local forces, who would need to be equipped with the necessary resources to combat the Islamists, for Mali, meanwhile, the priority was not to fight the Islamists but to fight smuggling, which results from the lack of state control in the north of the country. In the opinion of the government in Bamako, the main threat is the fragility of the states and the porousness of borders.

In parallel with these diverging ideas over the threat and the necessary means to combat it, Algiers made use of a number of Tuareg groups for some time by enlisting them onto special security units to fight the Islamists. But it was not a lasting strategy, as the Tuareg ex-rebels soon became reconciled with the members of GSPC.

This lack of unity in terms of evaluating the threat and defining the adversary to be combated has led to a weakening of the methods that have been adopted. So how can we fight the terrorist networks in this region today, and what is the true nature of the threat that reigns over this famous strip of land, the Sahel? Each of the states involved in this programme for fighting terrorism might be tempted to use the prevailing opacity, the porousness of the borders and the absence of compartmentalisation between dealers, traders and, most recently, Salafists, as an opportunity to wipe out their enemies, an enemy that will vary according to each state; for Algiers it could be the GSPC Islamists, while for Rabat it might be the Saharauis of the Polisario Front.

These accusations are based, perhaps, on observations that highlight existing links between these groups. The study carried out by Altadis on cigarette smuggling in the Maghreb region reveals that some Saharauis are involved in a widespread smuggling network that receives cigarettes in Casablanca, before going on to redistribute them elsewhere. This trade, which takes different routes, also passes through the Western Sahara and, specifically, through the city of Laayoune, before entering Algeria at Tifariti and Bir Lahlu, the latter two being watering points controlled by the Polisario Front[3].

While the nature of these contacts does not, at present, appear to represent an immediate, definite threat to the bordering countries, the activities of these groups are made possible by an absence of state control. These are groups that are resistant to the states in the region, and who could combine their rejection of the established systems to turn the Sahel strip into a refuge, an area to which operations aimed at destabilising the existing powers can withdraw. Hence the need to bring peace to the region, starting with bringing the Sahara conflict to an end, even though it is a low-intensity conflict.

Bringing an end to the Sahara conflict

However, while the US, Europe and Morocco all agree that the resolution of this conflict is a prerequisite for bringing peace to the region, the difficulty in finding a solution persists.

While Rabat continues to present the autonomy of the Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty as the inevitable solution to this conflict, which has lasted for over 30 years, it is also true that this option can only be adopted if it is accepted by all the parties involved. But it has been rejected by both the Polisario Front and Algeria, who continue to champion the principle of self-determination to resolve the dispute.

The current situation's complexity is particularly a result of the fact that the protagonists have become locked into a reductive semantic that for some consists of assimilating self-determination with Saharaui independence (and, therefore, a defeat for Morocco), and for others, of associating Sahara's autonomy with a Moroccan victory, the option that has been mooted by Rabat since the beginning of the new millennium.

To untangle this dilemma, one of the two parties needs to be named the victor of this conflict, so that they can then announce how they have decided to resolve the situation. However, this is not the case. Rabat and Algiers continue to promote their plan to dominate the region by weakening their neighbour. This underlying ambition has not disappeared, and the Polisario Front continues to exist, thanks to Algeria, and also because the latter country has not given up its plan to dominate the region. Nevertheless, as Clausewitz points out, the final aim of war is not to physically destroy one's adversary, but to break their political will. In the case of the Sahara, both political wills, no matter how antagonistic they might be, continue to be very much in existence.

Because the protagonists in this case are making the mistake of thinking that victory or defeat are "all or nothing" situations, and that the application of their own judgment would inevitably guarantee their victory and the defeat of their adversary.

Bearing in mind the fragility of these strategic approaches (and which necessarily lead to the stagnation of the search for a way out of the crisis), the abandoning of the Sahara conflict by the actors involved is necessarily determined by a learning and a political maturity that consists of ceasing to think on a national basis, as well as the existence of a regional leadership.

Meanwhile, though the establishing of autonomy in the Sahara seems to be the most likely way out of the crisis, and provided that it is approved by the United States, France and the United Nations, it will inevitably raise a series of questions for Morocco's power, on one hand, and on the other, for the other countries in the region. For Morocco, it would involve a new institutional architecture and the revision of its Constitution. It would also involve moving from a centralised system to a decentralised one, with all that this would imply for a monarchy that "has assumed the role of the guardian of national unity and Moroccan Islam, while at the same time centralising its power"[4].

It is necessary to bring peace to the region, starting with bringing the Sahara conflict to an end, even though it is a low-intensity conflict

In fact, political symbols are still present in the spirit of the Moroccans, and Mohammed V "the Liberator" has been succeeded by Hassan II "the Unifier" who, on behalf of territorial integrity, planned to absorb the Sahara into Morocco.

It will also involve reaching a new agreement with the Saharauis, who will have regional prerogatives, as they will be represented by an Assembly. But this raises the question of how such a body should be composed. How can one ensure the coexistence of displaced peoples from Tarfaya and Gulimina with those who have arrived from Moroccan cities and with members of the Polisario Front? It is a question of legitimacy and scope of representation, two concepts closely linked with the possibility of negotiating the limits of local power with Rabat.

With respect to education, for example, would they have school curricula that differed from those of the other regions? And looking at it from the other way round: if the curricula were similar, what would remain of Saharaui identity and of the history of the Sahara, which necessarily would have to be written? How can one write an official history and re-found a national pact while bearing in mind plural identities that have been at war with each other for over three decades?

The autonomy that might be granted to the Sahara implies, from Morocco's point of view, a transformation that will affect its territorial foundations and its internal regime, and which could have an impact on its political identity. Meanwhile, this autonomy could have a knock-on effect, and lead to other calls for autonomy in regions where the population could be tempted to champion their identity or their differences. If this were to take place, there would be a fragmentation of central power, to the benefit of local identities and freedoms.

If this idea of regionalisation did come into existence in Morocco, it could also inspire peoples originating from neighbouring countries, particularly those of Cabilia province, who might call for their independence from Algiers.

If we are talking, therefore, about a fragmentation of the central powers and a re-evaluation of the current political configuration, it is not necessarily a question of potential risks and dangers, but of another form of political thought that could even represent the prelude to a Maghreb made up of regions which could replace the Maghreb made up of nation states.

Political development and stability

These challenges to security, as well as the persistence of a latent conflict that the actors involved cannot manage to solve, all goes to highlight the existence of new sources of tension close by Europe. This proximity means that Maghreb has gained a new centrality in international relations.

This region, which is an economic and cultural bridge between Europe, Africa and the Middle East, is becoming a site of exportable tensions, as well as being a repository for immigrants originating from Maghreb or in transit through these countries.

However, this new assessment of the Maghreb region may also encourage Europe and America to contribute to the pacification and development of the region, given that its perverse effects cannot be kept confined to just one side of the Mediterranean.

This connection between economic, political and security development is, therefore, a reality. And even more so: Since 11 September 2001, the United States has gone even further by establishing a link between the promotion of democracy in the world (and particularly in the Arab world) and its own domestic security.

In contrast, in the countries of the Maghreb, elections are regularly held and take place in a climate of change that is desired in all countries, supposedly translating into political openness and expressing the renewed link between electors and political leaders[5]. Ever since the 1990s, governments have made considerable efforts to respect the framework of constitutional legality and the electoral calendar. This preoccupation with formal legality settles the questions that might arise as to the actual meaning of these referenda. In all these countries, power employs a multi-party framework and regularly holds elections, scrupulously respecting the electoral calendar. It also multiplies the mechanisms of political control, showing off their transparency as a way of breaking with past periods. All these precautions are an attempt to give power a symbolic coherence, at the same time as they demonstrate a concern for constitutional legality.

Nevertheless, and in spite of these changes, the elections that have been held indicate a desire for change from above. In spite of a concern for transparency and openness, they are controlled by those in power, who cannot decide whether to include or contain the Islamists.

The two legislative elections that have been held in Algeria (May 2007) and Morocco (September 2007) highlight the fact that, in contrast to the Turkish model, the power elites in the Maghreb and, generally speaking, in the Arab world, are not willing to share the management of political issues with Islamist parties, no matter how large their grassroots support might be.

In fact, the transparency of the political game and the plurality of the parties in competition are creating hopes for participation in the political game, even though these hopes are subsequently contradicted by the reality of the regimes, which continue to be essentially authoritarian[6]. In Morocco, for example, fears of a victory by the Islamist-tending Justice and Development Party (PJD) led the government to divide up electoral constituencies, in order to weaken the Islamist group. In spite of this, the PJD has made significant gains in the political sphere over the past decade, and finished second in the elections, behind Istiqlal, though without gaining representatives in the government.

These regimes, which combine the maintaining of authoritarianism with electoral transparency, are currently creating political stability, as well as an image of openness. This situation is very convenient for European and US allies, who are full of praise for the results of elec-

In spite of these changes, the elections indicate a desire for change from above. They are controlled by those in power, who cannot decide whether to include or contain the Islamists

tions that have been deemed free and transparent. However, over the long-term, the frustration of these parties' supporters and sympathisers might lead to citizens becoming distanced from the political classes, thereby creating the danger of destabilisation. In fact, bad governance and the "hybrid" nature of regimes could also involve challenges to the security of political balance.

Notes

1. Khadija Mohsen-Finan, "Le Jihadisme s'invite au Maghreb" Ramsès, 2007 p. 192

2. Alain Antil, *L'Afrique et la guerre contre la terreur,* Politique étrangère, Ifri no. 3. 2006.

3. Ignacio Cembrero, *La contrebande du tabac malmenée par Altadis,* Le Journal hebdomadaire, 2-8 June 2007.

4. Malika Zeghal, *Islam, islamistes et ouvertures politiques dans le monde arabe, quelques jalons pour une approche non culturaliste,* in La démocratie est-elle soluble dans l'Islam? ss dir Hammoudi, Bauchard and Leveau, IFRI/CNRS éditions, 2007.

5. Khadija Mohsen-Finan, "Au Maghreb, ce que voter veut dire", in *Marchés Tropicaux et méditerranéens*, May 2003.

6. Khadija Mohsen-Finan and Malika Zeghal, "*Maroc, régime hybride"* in *Libération*, 27 September 2007.

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Scenarios of security and insecurity in the Mediterranean

Arab-Israeli peace and collective security in the Middle East
Shlomo Ben Ami

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ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Shlomo Ben Ami

Vice-President of Toledo International Center for Peace (CIT pax).
Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel

T he establishment in the Middle East of a system of collective security is a venture difficult to imagine in the foreseeable future due to the concern for domestic stability among the regimes in the area, the absence of shared values among its components and, notwithstanding, the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a major common threat to the incumbent regimes in the region. There is nonetheless a multiplicity of threats that make global security for the Middle East a highly problematic concept.

Unless the Arab-Israeli conflict is solved, a number of inter-Arab disputes are settled, and the national aspirations of oppressed minorities – it is not only Palestine; think of the Turkish/Kurdish conflict, of invertebrate Lebanon, of the Sunni/Shiite divide, of the emergence of powerful non-state agents like Hamas and Hezbollah who have excelled in the art of asymmetric warfare, of revolutionary powers like Syria and Iran seeking to acquire nuclear military technology, and of the rise of an Iran-led regional axis of evil that acts as the spoiler of any peace process in the region – are satisfied, a selective sale of arms to the region, especially to countries with a defensive strategy, may still be a major instrument for maintaining the stability and security of the region.

It is only after the satisfaction of nationalist aspirations and the solution of political conflicts that quasi-federal systems like the European Union, for example, can be created. Even wider and more amorphous global enterprises like the Helsinki conference was made possible only after the major European conflicts had been solved.

A system of regional security in the Middle East will for years be stymied by the Arab perception of Israel. So long as the Jewish state does not have internationally recognized fixed borders it will continue to be perceived by the Arabs as possessing an irresistible propensity to expand. For years, Israel has been for the Arabs the measure of their failure, a "high-tech crusader state" ruled by a technological elite committed to hindering Arab development.

The Arabs do not feel secure with their quantitative edge; they fear Israel's qualitative advantage, always guaranteed by America's unqualified support for the Jewish state. Inevitably, the perception of Israel's nuclear capabilities assumes a central role in the Arab's view of the

> A system of regional security in the Middle East will for years be stymied by the Arab perception of Israel

Israeli qualitative threat. It is therefore highly improbable that the Arabs will agree to the creation of a regional security system so long as Israel refuses to address the nuclear issue.

An additional difficulty facing the prospects of arms control in the Middle East lies in the multiple sources of the threats to security in the region. That the security equation is Israel versus the Arab world is one of the major misconceptions of the Middle East. Syria is a rival not only of Israel, but also of any effort to stabilize Lebanon, and now also of the all-Arab anti-Iran consensus. The Gulf War in the 1990s, and now the emergence of Iran as a new regional hegemony in the wake of the Iraq War, have clearly brought home to the dynasties of the Gulf an unequivocal message: their stability has very little to do with the threat from the Israeli enemy. Iraq then and Iran now are more imminent sources of threat. It is this puzzle of conflicts and tension that renders the task of designing a new regional equilibrium in the Middle East through arms control or any other means so very difficult. Nor should we underestimate the fact that the West is anyway not especially keen on reducing its arms sale to the region.

Peace and stability in the Middle East depend to a large extent on the uncertain outcome of America's policies in the region and on the chances of the transatlantic alliance to serve as a more reliable platform for conflict resolution in the region.

George W. Bush was the first president to argue that stability is in itself an obstacle to the promotion of US interests in the region, and that such interest, including an Arab-Israeli peace, could best be served by a fundamental restructuring of the Middle East that would bring about a change in the international behaviour of the regional powers. If the first Gulf War was launched in favour of the *status quo* and the principle of stability, the current Iraq war was conducted in favour of a radical change of the status quo.

This American policy of "constructive instability" is clearly approaching a critical juncture. A major question is whether America can really win the war, or rather the peace, in Iraq? The answer must be ambiguous. Washington has definitely lost the confidence of the Iraqi people, and is unlikely to win it back. If at all, the war can only be won by moderate Iraqis, and only to the degree that they are not seen as dependent on the American occupying power.

Another dilemma is whether a grand bargain can be struck between America, Europe and Iran that can, in its turn, help towards peace in Israel-Palestine too. If Euro-American cooperation in stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation in the region is successful, this will serve as a major boost to an Arab-Israeli peace. For, more than an enemy of Israel as such, Iran is the enemy of an Arab-Israeli reconciliation. An Israeli-Arab peace is a major tool for undermining Iran's capacity to continue rallying the Moslem masses against Israel, American power and the Arab incumbent regimes.

Democratization, one should recall, was not the rationale for the Iraq war, but it gained prominence once the fallacy of the claim about weap-

That the security equation is Israel versus the Arab world is one of the major misconceptions of the Middle East

ons of mass destruction (WMD) was exposed. But, does democracy and popular participation necessarily mean more moderate and peace policies? If Arab autocrats have been hesitant in backing their American patron's Mideast policies, that is only because their own societies are implacably hostile to the same policies. Mubarak's greatest challenge, if Egypt were a genuine democracy, would not come from the liberal democrats but from the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. The same is probably true in Syria. It is not out of a desire to follow the US example, but because of the desire to repudiate it and the self-serving elites it has long sustained, that much of the Arab world is now demanding its democratic rights.

Another question is also whether Israel will not have a harder time adjusting to a democratic Arab world, in which public opinion rather than centralized rulers determine policy. Will democracy, an Islamic democracy that is, in Egypt and Jordan really strengthen peace with Israel?

Hence, the question of whether or not Islamist parties -Hamas, the Muslim Brothers and many others- can be transformed into full-fledged political organizations has a vital meaning not only for the prospects of an Israeli-Arab peace, but also for the future of political Islam throughout the Arab world, and indeed for the future of Arab democracy. This is a question of such far reaching consequences that both Israel and the West need to address it without falling back on ready made clichés, and always with a central objective in mind: to strengthen political Islam's commitment to peace and draw it away from an Iran-led regional axis of evil.

Categorical perspectives are not good advisers for the understanding of the complex fabric of Islamic movements throughout the Arab world. They mostly respond to profound social and political realities. Not unlike Hamas, they are essentially social movements with a wide community network that has never been indifferent to political calculations. It would be therefore wrong to fall back on the old conventional wisdom that democracy is not for the Arabs. The stability of those Arab regimes that is not sustained by a democratic consensus is bound to be fragile and misleading. Extinguishing Arab democracy will not bring either stability or peace to the region. It will only deepen and exacerbate the rage of the masses at the all too well-known duplicity and double-dealing of the West, now expressed in its democratic charlatanry.

The spoilers will have then to be engaged if an inclusive Middle East peace is to be reached. Such a peace will have to go beyond the Palestinian problem. The solution of the Palestinian problem will not herald an era of celestial peace for the Middle East, for the maladies of the region are indeed colossal; they stretch far beyond the boundaries of the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, an Israeli-Palestinian peace, besides being a response to an authentic clamour of generations of Arabs and Israelis, and a profound moral imperative as well, would certainly be of significant consequences for the prospects of regional stability. For it would eliminate one of the most sensitive triggers for mass hysteria throughout the region, a frequent pretext for the Bin-Ladens of the Muslim world in their global war of terror, and the ultimate alibi of Arab rulers in their drive to stifle social and political liberties.

It would be wrong to fall back on the old conventional wisdom that democracy is not for the Arabs

If and when a political settlement is reached in the region, Israel will have to address the question of whether it is ready to endorse the European way of collective security. Traditionally, Israel's concept of security relied on the centrality of "self-help" and cumulative deterrence rather than on collective or cooperative security. The long-term challenge of peace is for Israel to explore to what extent, if at all, can it allow itself the luxury of transforming its military doctrine from offensive defence to defensive defence. Such a European style transformation of Israel's strategic philosophy requires a dramatic and radical change of the political environment in the Arab Middle East.

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Scenarios of security and insecurity in the Mediterranean

Security and insecurity in the Middle East
Fred Halliday

Fred Halliday

Research Professor ICREA at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI)

Introduction

Although I come from a country far away from the Mediterranean, the Republic of Ireland, I have, over the last 40 years, been a student of the Middle East. I have not been to Mauritania, but I think I can say I that have been to every single other country in the Middle East, including Afghanistan. I had the pleasure of lecturing in most of the universities of the region, from the universities of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to the Saddam Hussein College of Law and Politics in Baghdad, where in the spring of 1980, the main question in their minds was whether the Soviet Union would invade Iraq from their bases in the Caucasus as they had just invaded Afghanistan from the bases of Central Asia using the very similar treaties of Friendship and Cooperation, which then existed by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the country called from 1978 to 1992, with Iraq.

I would like to make two or three experimential observations from my recent conversations and visits to the region. After that, I would like to make one or two academic points, which may be pertinent to this discussion. Finally I shall address the question of security.

Iran

First of all Iran[1]. I have known Iran for more than 40 years and I have maintained some contact even with officials of the Ahmadinejad regime. Much speculation has centred recently on whether Iran will abandon its militant policies, and cease to be 'irrational': there is, however, a distinction between being irrational and being radical, and Iran may pursue rational goals while remaining a radical state. At the same time there is some danger in the calculations of the Tehran authorities for two particular reasons. One is that, beyond being a formal imperial power, with its own idea of *grandeur* - the Iranians are pleased to be a Mediterranean power again after 2000 years - and beyond being a Shiite power with its own view asserting Shiite identity in the Middle East, Iran is a revolutionary country, and this is a very important part of the Iranian politics. If we look to revolutions in comparative perspective in the last hundred years we see that they tend to pursue what the historian E.H. Carr termed a 'dual policy', at once diplomatic and revolutionary. It takes many dec-

There is some danger in the calculations of the Tehran authorities

ades for revolutionary states, be it Russia, China, Cuba or Korea, to come to terms with the international system. And if we think that Cuba, a small country of 10 million, which is in dreadful economic shape is still pursuing revolutionary alliances in Latin America, then we may understand how Iran, with the resources it has, less than 30 years from its revolution, retains many illusions.

The conflict between Iran and its allies and the United States and its allies - Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia - is, even more than the war in Iraq itself or the Arab-Israeli disputed - the fundamental axis of conflict in the Middle East and may well remain so for many years to come. On some issues the Islamic Republic of Iran does make rational and conventionally diplomatic calculations. An anomaly of Iranian foreign policy is that one of their closest allies is the Christian country of Armenia, which whom they ally against the Shiite Muslim State of Azerbaijan. In the same realist vein, the Iranians say nothing about Kashmir, they say nothing about Xinjiang and they say nothing about Chechnya. But the Iranians, even before the 1979 revolution, have a tendency to miscalculate: in 1941 Iran was invaded by Russia and Britain because the then Shah did not see that the invasion was coming and thought that he could maintain his links to Nazi Germany. When the nationalist Prime Minister Mosadegh nationalised oil in 1951, he could have got a deal with the western oil companies but he overplayed his hand and the result was the coup of August 1953, in which he was ousted and the Shah restored to autocratic power. Most importantly, in 1982 Iran had the upper hand in the war with Iraq. The Iraqis were on their knees, Saddam was begging for peace and Khomeini at first agreed. However he was later persuaded by the Revolutionary Guards to continue on the grounds, it was argued, that the Iranian forces could first march on the holy Shiite cities of Najaf and Kerbala, in Central Iraq, and from there go on to Jerusalem. Six more years of war followed, in which hundreds of thousands of Iranians died, some of them gassed by Iraq. In the end, when the Iranians took the bitter decision to sign a compromise peace brokered by the UN, they got a much worse peace than they would have gotten in 1982. The Iranian regime knows this, as they know that they did a complete mess of things with the American hostages' crisis, which absolutely did them no good at all.

Ahmadinejad's regime is more nationalistic than it is religious, but is, on both ideological bases, capable of miscalculation again. It's very interesting to look at Ahmadinejad rhetoric because the word that he uses most is izzat, the Persian word for honour. It is the same word that Egyptian President Nasser used in 1956 when he nationalised the Suez Canal, in Arabic sharaf. This is the key issue. This nationalism, this sense of being objects of international 'disrespect', is driving Iranian rhetoric and feeling within Iran itself and is giving the regime not majority support perhaps, but sufficient support within the people and within the state apparatus itself to continue. Here I think it is very important to recognise, and I would want to underline this, that the Iranian regime is very unlikely to fall soon: all of what has been said about regime change and opposition groups supporting the minorities is very dangerous and irresponsible. This regime has the guns, it has the legitimacy, it has the support and, let's not forget, it is prepared to kill. For its part, the opposition in Iran is not prepared to die because they had enough fights.

The implications for the Middle East are evident: this regime, or some post-Ahmadinejad variant of it, is going to remain in power for some time and will continue to act as a revolutionary state. Iran wants to be an indispensable regional power. They are not a world power, but nor is China. China is an indispensable regional power and Iran, wrongly of course, imagines itself to be the equivalent in West Asia of the Chinese in East Asia. The Iranians are also optimistic because they think that the Americans are on the run on Iraq. I suspect that the Iranians could, when they think the time is right, do something very dramatic in Iraq. There could be a mutiny in the Iraqi army and police, where the Iranians have a lot of influence, and a lot of Americans could get killed. I hope I am wrong but this seems to be a real possibility. The Iranians are certainly not going to give up in Lebanon, on Palestine and on Syria. So I think that we have to be realistic about Iran.

The forty years that followed from June 1967 are over and we are dealing with groups with very different ideology

The Arab-Israeli Dispute: a new mood

As somebody who came into contact with the Arab world in 1967 and at the time of that Arab-Israeli war -I took my first undergraduate exams on the 5th of June 1967- I think that the whole period that followed from that, the period of the negotiations, of Arab socialism, of divisions within Israel, and so forth has really come to an end. We are, more or less since 2000, in a more difficult situation. The forty years that followed from June 1967 are over and we are dealing with groups with very different ideology.

Here permit me to make a personal observation. I have in my research mainly concentrated on Iran and the Arabian Peninsula - I did my PhD on Yemen - but I was recently in Lebanon and in Jerusalem. In Beirut I met with a senior representative of Hezbollah Sheikh Naim Qasim, the chief political spokesman of Hezbollah and I also recently met a gentleman in Jerusalem who gave me a sense of the thinking of Hamas. Both of these people had very different characters from that of the secular, Western-orientated, intellectuals and politicians that we have been used to. They are clear sighted, calmly spoken and very determined: they are not looking for UN mediation, or semi-official conferences in European hotels. One of the military commanders of Hezbollah took me down to the Israeli frontier to overlook the town of Metulla. He was very clear and said: "Listen, it took us 23 years to drive them out of here and maybe it will take us forty years to take them out of there". I believe that this is indeed what they think. They may not succeed, but this is what they intend.

In Jerusalem, a man with ties to Hamas came to see me. He said he was an expert on *hudna*, the Koranic word for 'truce': this is a way of saying that they will stop fighting at least temporarily but that they will not recognise Israel. So the offer of *hudna* does not solve the problem because this is not a strategic or long-term solution. But he was clear and determined: 'we have the guns, we have the money, we have the people and we have the Muslim world behind us, so we are not going to yield'. Again I believe him. This, plus the broader spread of quite conservative but popular Islamic movements in the Arab world and elsewhere, is a serious factor and creates a new regional reality.

A New Regional Configuration: the Greater West Asian Crisis

To turn now to the broader situation in the Middle East, or, as I have come to term it in my academic work, 'the Greater West Asian Crisis'[2]. On the one side, I do not think that the issue of the former Soviet republics is that important. In fact it is very striking that both Transcaucasia (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan) and Central Asia have remained largely separate from the Middle East since 1991. On the other hand, what is a complete change from the world I knew for twenty or thirty years from the 1960s is the growing integration of Afghanistan and Pakistan into the Middle Eastern equation. Where did the Iranians and Libyans get their nuclear technology from? Well, we know it was from the Pakistanis. The Gulf areas today, awash with money and anxious about Iran, may well turn to the same source.

There is, in a way, a greater integration of the politics in the Middle East than any time in the past. People would talk about the region in a framework where everything was interrelated. Sometimes people exaggerated how far, in particular, the Arab-Israeli question affected the Gulf or other conflicts in the region. What was the role of the Arab-Israeli question in the Iranian revolution, or in the Iran-Iraq war, or in the war that was in Algeria or in the wars in Sudan? Very little. How does Palestine relate to the Kurdish question? It does not. But now, since the late 1980s, the integration of Afghanistan with Iran and the Arab world, with all the Al-Qaeda and other young militants that come from there, or that they say they come from there, being active in Arab states and the emergence of Pakistan as a regional actor, represent a serious change in the region. All of this means that both at the level of nuclear weapons and strategic rivalry on the one hand, and at the level of popular sentiment on the other, the region is more integrated.

Analytic Themes

In the context of these three trends in the region, there is something else which I want to emphasise, more in the academic vein. In recent years, there has been quite a lot of research done on the foreign relations of Middle Eastern States – the Arab world, Israel, Turkey and Iran - some by historians, some by foreign relations specialists, some in Israel or Arab countries and some in the West[3]. What is very striking is that all, despite the variations of theoretical, political and national perspective, have roughly come to the same conclusion: that, while in the past we looked at relations between Middle Eastern States and in terms of the outside powers –the colonial powers, the Cold War- if you go back over the records since the 1950's, regional states have had a very high degree of autonomy. They have in large measure done what they wanted to do. You can take the most obvious test of all, launching wars: When Israel attacked the Arabs in 1967, as they did in Lebanon in 1982, of course they new the United States would not oppose that much, but they did it for their own reasons. When the Arabs attacked Israel in 1948 or again in 1973, it was not because the Soviets or the British told them to do so. When Saddam attacked Iran or attacked Kuwait, it was not told

<div style="margin-left:2em;">There is a greater integration of the politics in the Middle East than any time in the past.</div>

to do it by anybody. Morocco and Algeria are not acting in anyone's orders. Whoever is giving Libya orders should be found. This means that the ability of outside powers to control, or impose is very, very limited. I would love to think that Bush or Clinton could impose an Arab-Israeli settlement, but I do not think either the Palestinians or the Israelis would accept it or that is going to work.

The Role of Europe

This brings me to the question of Europe. I think in Europe we have one job above all to do: to behave ourselves. This is, to maintain our democratic systems, our prosperity and the rule of law, to set a good example and not just to the Middle East, but to the all the parts of the world as well, including East Asia and, if I may say so, also to the United States. I spent last Wednesday outside the Audiencia Nacional in Madrid for sixteen hours with CNN as the verdicts were read on the Madrid bombings. What impressed me was the dignity, the seriousness, of the Spanish courts and of the way that this matter was conducted. Here, Europe in general and Spain in particular, should be proud and resolute: there is no Spanish Guantanamo[4], no one in Spain talks about 'Islamo-Fasciscm', there has not been a single significant attack on Moroccans in this country since the 11th of March. If we compare this to what is happening in the United States, what is happening in America is an absolute disgrace. The level of discussion, the *chauvinism* of politicians and the way these things happened out. I think Spain should be very proud of what happened on that day and I think it is a model of how European countries should proceed. So, in response to terrorism and wars thereto related, the first thing we should do is set an example.

There is, however, a limit to what Europe can do in the Middle East. I say this not to deny the colonial past, in which Spain too played its bloody and hypocritical role, along with France, Italy and Britain, nor to deprecate European intentions, but to be realistic about the way the people in the region think today. The record of recent years speaks for itself: we told the Israelis not to build the 'separation wall' and they built the wall; we told the Palestinians not to vote for Hamas and they voted for Hamas; we told the Syrians to go out of Lebanon and the Syrians did not go entirely out of Lebanon[5]. Then we told the Iranians to stop the nuclear programme and they are going ahead. We told the Gulf States to democratise, there is absolute no notice. We told the Moroccans and the Algerians to sort out the Sahara, they have not done so and they are not going to. So I think that Europe has to lower its expectations and be realistic. But there are things that we could do and should do. I repeat, the most important thing we can do is to set the good example. Here I would cite, with all the differences, the famous telegram of George Kennan sent from the embassy in Moscow to Washington in 1946, which ends with a very important sentence. It says: "we must contain communism, but we will prevail if we live out to our best traditions, that is how we will survive". In the end, the Cold War ended because Western Europe succeeded in building a democratic and prosperous system, which was what the Eastern Europeans wanted, and as a result of it is that Europe is in peace for the first time in a thousand years.

There is a limit to what Europe can do in the Middle East

It is necessary to talk to Hamas because talking is not the same as negotiating, and not the same as recognising, let alone agreeing

However, there are things we can do in the Middle East, and should do. Number one, I would very much endorse the policies of the EU with regard with Darfur. There are no angels in Darfur. The mistake is to think that the Sudaneese government are the mass murderers and that the rebels are angels. And the only way forward is to reach agreement between them and to give whatever military and diplomatic support which we can and which we are doing.

Secondly, I am pessimistic about the Afghan involvement. Above all because the Pakistanis have decided in 2004-2005 to go on the offensive once they saw the Americans were on the run in Iraq. But given that and given the deeper problems, it may well be that this NATO-EU commitment to Afghanistan fails. However, we should do our best to prevent this and, as in Iraq and as elsewhere, to involve regional powers in bringing about a solution.

On the Arab-Israeli question, we should be insistent, engaged, indignant, outspoken, but modest. That there is very little that Europe could do, other than to remain talking to both sides. I think they should talk to Hamas, I think talking is not the same as negotiating, and not the same as recognising, let alone agreeing. The job of governments is to talk and also maintain minimum humanitarian standards. But we should also maintain a critical distance and we should say what we think. I would say this in regard to Human Rights, but in particular in regard to the most basic of all issues in Human Rights, which is the conduct of parties in armed conflicts. Here I commend those who have criticised both the IDF conduct in Lebanon, the West Bank, but also denounced in the strongest terms the launching of missiles by Hezbollah against civilian targets in Israel, the launching of missiles from Gaza and elsewhere against cities and towns in Israel, suicide bombings and the rest of it. The voice of Europe should prevail. However we know that neither the United States nor the Europeans can seriously affect this outcome

Final Remarks

The final point I want to make is a more professional one, arising out of my academic work. After about 40 years of experience of teaching on, and in more than a dozen countries in, the Middle East, I am struck by the paucity of informed and independent opinion, a lack of expertise in my generation and the subsequent generations in this region. How many people are coming out from all these universities from central Europe are competent in Arabic, in Persian, or in Turkish, in Hebrew, let alone Kurdish? How many people can make sensible judgements about, for example, how far is this new Sunni-Shiite conflict in Iraq going to go? To what degree are Hezbollah able to act independently to Syrians and Iranians. How far can we engage in dialogue with Islamist parties? Few people could make this kind of essential quality judgements. In the whole of the world that I know, from San Francisco, cross Europe to the Middle East universities in Israel, in the Arab world, there are less than two hundred people whose judgement are academic understanding of these issues I would regard as sufficient. This is a very serious problem and is one of the reasons why the public debate is so symbolic. Thus part of our European responsibility is to train and promote such people, be it in journalism, in diplomacy or in intelligence.

Notes

1. For a fuller elaboration of these ideas, see *Irán, Potencia Emergente en Oriente Medio. Implicaciones en la Estabilidad del Mediterráneo*, special issue of *Cuadernos de Estrategia*, no.137 Ministry of Defence, Madrid, July 2007 Chapter 1, Fred Halliday 'Contexto Político: La Política Interna Iraní y Efectos en su Política Exterior' pp. 21-56.
2. *The Middle East in International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, Chapter 5.
3. By, among others, Anouhsiravan Ehteshami, Gerd Nonnemann, Michael Barnett. Frew Lawson, Gregory Gause, Shibli Telhami, Katarina Dalacoura, Ray Hinnebusch, Efaim Karsh, Yezid Sayigh, Avi Shlaim, David Styan, Mariam Panah, Jubin Goodarzi, Rory Miller, Amnon Aran, Karen Dawisha.
4. There *was* a 'Spanish Guantanamo', namely the Barcelona hilltop prison and military base Montjuïc where, in the nineteenth century, Filipino and Cuban nationalist leaders, as well as Catalan anarchists, were detained in an extrajudicial manner, interrogated, tortured and , in some cases, shot. See interview with Professor Benedict Anderson, *La Vanguardia* 'Montjuïc XIX, Guantánamo XXI', 10 December 2007.
5. A Syrian diplomat said to me recently: 'we still have some cards in Lebanon'. Shooting friends of mine is one of the things they have, and they have other cards.

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Scenarios of security and insecurity in the Mediterranean

Security and insecurity in the Mediterranean: An American perspective
Ian O. Lesser

SECURITY AND INSECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Ian O. Lesser

Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington

Over the next decade, the Mediterranean is set to become more central to security concerns on both sides of the Atlantic, and more prominent in north-south relations. The American presence in the Mediterranean, diplomatic, economic and military, is longstanding. But despite two hundred years of engagement in the region, the American perspective on the Mediterranean remains distinctive and underdeveloped. The EU and key European partners have articulated explicit Mediterranean strategies, and states on both sides of the Mediterranean have a well-developed notion of the sea as a strategic space. By contrast, Washington continues to divide the region, intellectually and bureaucratically along rigid regional lines - Europe, including southern Europe on the one hand, the Middle East and North Africa on the other. Key sub regions and issues, including the Balkans and Arab-Israeli disputes are rarely, if ever, treated in a Mediterranean context.

Functional issues, above all counter-terrorism and energy security, are more central to the emerging American debate over Mediterranean strategy. Yet, the perspective from Washington is still driven largely by bilateral relationships and specific flashpoints around the Mediterranean basin, rather than a global approach to the region as a whole. Could this change? Quite possibly, it could. The determinants will be the evolution of the internal security scene along the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and new approaches to Mediterranean strategy emanating from Europe. Looking ahead, the security environment in the Mediterranean will be shaped by trends and perceptions already visible, but also by a series of potential shocks or "wildcards" capable of recasting the outlook for security and insecurity across the region.

> Washington continues to divide the region, intellectually and bureaucratically along rigid regional lines - Europe, on the one hand, the Middle East and North Africa on the other

The Primacy of Internal Security

Traditionally, security around the southern shores of the Mediterranean has been about internal security, first and foremost. Governments from the Maghreb to the Levant continue to face a series of domestic challenges to legitimacy and stability. Leaving aside normal political challenges, regimes must contend with a range of internal security problems, from political violence and terrorism, to separatist movements

The economic liberalization programs may prove destabilizing in political and security terms in the absence of radical new approaches to education and investment

and organized crime. The post September 11th environment has actually brought about a degree of convergence in north-south perspectives. In past decades, the southern Mediterranean preoccupation with internal security contrasted strongly with prevailing views in Europe and across the Atlantic, where security debates focused largely on state-to-state dynamics and regional crises. Today, internal security is a shared preoccupation for north and south.

Some specific aspects of the internal security scene are worth mentioning. First, demographic trends fuel many of the leading concerns across the southern Mediterranean, and also strongly affect security perceptions in Europe. Societies in North Africa and the Levant face, to a greater or lesser degree, a common conundrum regarding the "youth bulge" and inadequate economic growth. In sharp contrast to Europe (but not the US), Southern Mediterranean populations are young and growing, even if the pace of population growth has slowed in recent years. With the notable exceptions of Israel – arguably not a part of the less developed "south" of the Mediterranean at all – and Turkey, the region suffers from a growing gap between the education and employment needs of young populations, and what societies can offer. Even states such as Morocco and Tunisia, that have made notable progress in economic modernization and reform, continue to face a growing challenge of youth unemployment, alongside rising expectations – a potentially explosive combination. Under these conditions, the economic liberalization programs pressed by Europe and the US, may actually prove destabilizing in political and security terms, at least in the absence of radical new approaches to education and investment across the region.

Second, demographic trends in the south and the north of the Mediterranean are also fueling illegal migration and a host of associated public policy problems, from human security to cultural anxiety. The developmental divide between north and south in the Mediterranean is among the most dramatic on a global basis, second only to the gap between north and south on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, migration dynamics across the Mediterranean are increasingly driven by pressures from a more distant south, including sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. As northern societies have adopted tougher border controls and immigration policies, the traditional circulation of migrants has been constrained. As the risks of migration have increased, those migrants already in Europe now tend to remain in the north, even as overall pressures for economic migration remain high. Tougher policy approaches have thus had the unintended consequence of increasing the number of "illegal" migrants in the north, a phenomenon visible in North America as well. These trends have tangible security implications in terms of loss of life in failed attempts to cross the Mediterranean, and the expansion of criminal and terrorist networks accompanying uncontrolled migration. In a broader sense, migration of this kind fuels cultural anxieties – fears regarding security of identity – in north and south, and xenophobic politics, complicating the longer-term outlook for north-south relations.

Third, political Islam remains the leading threat to existing regimes across the Southern Mediterranean. From Morocco to Lebanon,

Islamist movements contend for power at the level of electoral politics, with varying success. From a northern perspective it is unclear that movements such as the Justice and Development Party in Morocco or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt represent a security challenge *per se*, but for hard- pressed governments in the south, the challenge is clear enough. More troubling has been the revival and reconfiguration of violent Islamist networks across North Africa, with echoes in Europe. Algeria may not be on the verge of collapse under the pressure of Islamist violence as many thought in the mid 1990s. But Islamist movements are hardly a spent force as a factor in Mediterranean stability, as the actions of Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb in Algeria, the reality of Hamas rule in Gaza, and the power of Hezbollah in Lebanon make clear. The relatively easy movement of people across the Mediterranean, and the existence of large Southern Mediterranean communities in Europe, makes the problem of radical Islamism and jihadist terrorism a shared problem for north and south.

Iraq will be a factor in this equation, as a *cause celebre* for Islamists around the Mediterranean, but also as a training ground for a new generation of extremists. Significant numbers of the foreign fighters in Iraq have come from North Africa, including Egypt. Over time, these expatriate jihadists will return home, or find their way to Europe, where they may focus their attention on the "near" enemies, the established regimes, and western targets close to home. A similar trend was seen after the return of the Arab Afghans from the struggle against the Soviet Union. Observers in North Africa credit these Afghan veterans with fomenting much of the violent unrest in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The scale and significance of the Afghan factor in North Africa can be debated. But it would be unwise to assume that veterans of the Iraq insurgency will not play a role in the security environment around the Mediterranean over the next decade.

Nationalism and State-to-State Dynamics

By some measures, the Mediterranean is arguably "more" secure today than a decade ago. In the Western Mediterranean, Spanish-Moroccan frictions over the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla remain unresolved, but the risk of an outright clash is probably lower than it has been for some time. Western *détente* with Libya and the progressive reintegration of Tripoli into international economic and political life has removed a significant source of tension in the Central Mediterranean, even if the longer-term future of Libya and its external relations remains uncertain. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the *détente* between Athens and Ankara has been nothing short of transformative in terms of regional stability and crisis management. The new pattern of relations, bolstered by growing economic ties and bilateral diplomacy, has also removed a leading policy challenge for Washington. Aegean stability no longer places the same demands on American policymakers. The Cyprus problem remains unresolved, further complicating Turkey's already troubled EU candidacy. But few in Europe or the US now fear a Greek-Turkish clash over Cyprus. In key respects, Cyprus is now a political rather than a security problem from an American perspective, and the center of gravity for Cyprus diplomacy is now Brussels rather than Washington.

The Middle East peace process continues to shape Mediterranean security and the failure to reach a comprehensive settlement limits multilateral security dialogue and cooperation

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the Middle East peace process as a whole, continues to shape Mediterranean security in significant ways, not least because of its influence on public opinion across the Southern Mediterranean. Indirectly, the failure to reach a comprehensive settlement limits multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in European, NATO and regional frames. The conflict clearly has a Mediterranean dimension, especially with regard to Lebanon and Syria. But it is arguable that here, too, the center of gravity has shifted eastward in political and security terms. Iran is an increasingly important element in the Israeli security calculus, and Tehran is, by virtue of its growing strategic reach and support for irregular forces, a significant player in the Middle East conflict. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf States have acquired a larger stake in the future of the peace process, and their participation matters, as the recent Annapolis conference demonstrated. The unresolved conflict between Israel and its neighbors now reaches eastward from the Mediterranean to the Gulf, and even Pakistan.

The outlook for Mediterranean security at the level of states and regional flashpoints will be heavily influenced by the strength of nationalism as a political force in north and south. Rising nationalist sentiment could easily spur a reversal of the progress in Greek-Turkish relations. It could seriously worsen already strained relations between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara and other issues. Nationalism is the leading force for insecurity in the Balkans and around the Adriatic, and this, too, is part of the Mediterranean equation. Over the next decade, the prospects for stability in the Mediterranean will be heavily influenced by the tension between nationalism, and the attachment to traditional notions of national sovereignty, and more positive pressures for integration in a wider European space and along south-south lines, with the exception of energy trade. This last dimension remains strikingly underdeveloped in the Mediterranean, with the persistence of serious structural and political impediments to trade, investment and regional cooperation at many levels.

New Actors, New Strategies

For all the heated debate over unipolarity and its alternatives, it is noteworthy that key regions on the periphery of Eurasia are already highly multipolar. This is certainly true of the Black Sea, the Caspian and Central Asia. It is also true of the Mediterranean, where a variety of old and new actors are present and playing a direct or indirect security role.

At the Euro-Atlantic level, the Mediterranean is an area where American and European roles are relatively well balanced. In contrast to the Gulf, European states can project military power around the Mediterranean very effectively. In political and economic terms, the EU is the predominant player in the region. Powers such as France, with a long history of involvement, continue to reinvent themselves as economic, political and defense partners for North Africa. American economic involvement in North Africa is growing, mainly as a result of energy trade with Algeria, the reopening of relations with Libya, and a free trade agreement with Morocco. But Europe remains the critical trade and investment partner for the southern Mediterranean. The US 6th Fleet will remain in

the Mediterranean, even as the American military presence in Europe declines or is oriented elsewhere. But a sustained American security engagement can no longer be taken for granted at all times, and under all conditions. In the Balkans and North Africa, in particular, the coming years might well see "too little" American presence for European comfort. Already, the US no longer regularly deploys a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean, a practice that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

At the same time, new external actors are appearing on the Mediterranean scene. Russia – actually an old actor – has returned to the region after almost 20 years absence. Russia is increasingly present as an investor, primarily in the energy sector, as a trading partner, and as a supplier of defense goods and services to Algeria, Syria and others. Russians are now a part of the Mediterranean landscape as tourists and residents. In the fall of 2007, the Russian navy returned to the Mediterranean to exercise in strength for the first time since the break-up of the Soviet Union. This renewed Russian involvement in the diplomatic, commercial and security life of the Mediterranean could acquire very different meaning if relations between Russia and the West continue to deteriorate. A return to Cold War style competition, even if at far lower levels, might have a center of gravity in the south, in the Black Sea, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, areas at the margins of the first Cold War.

China is emerging as an economic actor of some importance around the Mediterranean, and a potentially significant security player. The rapid expansion of Chinese investment in sub-Saharan Africa has obscured the smaller but still remarkable growth in Chinese investment in North Africa. These investments extend beyond the energy sector and include large-scale stakes in the textile industry in Tunisia, and port facilities around the Mediterranean. Historically, China has had a leading role as a defense partner for Albania, as a partner in Algeria's nuclear program, and (with North Korea) as a supplier of ballistic missile technology to Syria and Libya. Looking ahead, India, already a defense partner via its cooperation with Israel, could acquire a larger interest in Mediterranean commerce and security.

Over a decade after the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process) partners on both sides of the Mediterranean are reconsidering the tenets of a process widely seen as troubled and dysfunctional. Among Southern Mediterranean states, there is a desire for a more balanced partnership, with a greater voice for the south in political, economic and security agendas. The lack of an integrated partner in the south, and the persistence of a "hub and spoke" relationship with Europe, is widely seen as part of the problem. Barcelona was launched at a time of relative optimism on the bilateral and multilateral tracks of the Middle East peace process. Over the years, the persistence of conflict with Israel has proved a central impediment to multilateral cooperation with Southern Mediterranean partners on political and security matters. Moreover, European aid and investment in the Southern Mediterranean has become more conditional over time, tied to political and economic reform and the development of suitable projects for EU funding – an ongoing challenge for Southern Mediterranean states.

China is emerging as an economic actor of some importance around the Mediterranean, and India could acquire a larger interest in Mediterranean commerce and security

For Europe, the Barcelona experience has been equally frustrating. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) suffers from an enduring lack of consensus among EU members as requirements on Europe's southern periphery compete with enlargement and cohesion priorities in the east. The elaboration of the European Neighborhood Policy has further complicated this picture as EU members consider the place of Mediterranean initiatives in the overall approach to wider Europe, east and south. Can the Barcelona Process continue as a stand-alone initiative, or will it be subsumed within a broader neigh-borhood strategy? Southern European states will likely see continued merit in a distinctive and well-funded European strategy toward the Mediterranean, built around the notion of Mediterranean identity. Yet this approach may not be sustainable. The absence of a transatlantic dimension also imposes certain limitations on the EMP, especially in the security context.

The US has been active through NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, launched in 1994 and subsequently expanded and enhanced. But even here, the US has never been in the vanguard of an initiative promoted largely by southern European members of the Alliance. To the extent that the Mediterranean Dialogue continues to evolve in the direction of tangible, practical defense cooperation with the seven Mediterranean partners – Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Jordan – American interest will be sustained, and could grow. Already, there is informal talk of bringing Libya into the Dialogue, a step Washington could well support.

Some of the most important new thinking related to Mediterranean security and cooperation is now coming from France, with important transatlantic implications. President Sarkozy's 2007 proposal for a Mediterranean Union was greeted with some skepticism in Europe, partly from fear that it might undermine already troubled EU initiatives toward the region. In some quarters, the proposal was also seen as a way of sidelining Turkey's EU candidacy. Over time, the concept has gathered way, including tentative Spanish and Italian support. Clearly, security will be only one dimension of the proposed Union, the thrust of which will be a series of specific functional projects in such areas as energy security and migration. Notably, the Mediterranean Union idea has attracted considerable and largely positive attention in the US. The "Sarkozy factor" is undoubtedly part of the explanation. The possible opening for cooperation with Washington is another. If France does indeed return to NATO's integrated military command as the Sarkozy administration has hinted, transatlantic security cooperation in the Mediterranean will be most directly affected. For all of these reasons, Franco-American policy dialogue on the Mediterranean is likely to loom large in the strategic future of the region over the next few years.

Apart from questions of internal stability, development and counter-terrorism, energy and maritime security issues are likely to be at the top of the agenda in new approaches to the Mediterranean. The development of an increasingly dense network of oil and gas pipe-lines in the Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean, and across the Adriatic, is linking the Mediterranean ever more closely to distant energy sources and markets. A Mediterranean energy market is already

emerging, and energy transit issues are occupying much foreign policy energy for Turkey, Greece, Italy and others around the region. A proposed pipeline from West Africa to Algeria would add a new southern dimension to this network. Energy concerns are also driving renewed attention to maritime security in the Mediterranean, broadly defined, to include the security of sea lanes, ports, key choke points such as Suez, Gibraltar and the Bosphorus, and diverse environmental risks. The trend here may be toward greater transparency in maritime affairs, even at the expense of national sovereignty.

Potential "Shocks" and Transforming Events

Beyond the discussion of longer-term trends, the prudent strategist will also consider the possibility of unexpected transforming events – shocks or wildcards – capable of producing sudden shifts in the security environment. With multiple regional influences and multiple actors, the Mediterranean is especially exposed to shocks, positive as well as negative. An illustrative list of potential shocks relevant to the Mediterranean could include the following:

- The emergence of one or more new nuclear-armed powers in the Middle East would be transforming for the strategic environment. A nuclear or near-nuclear Iran, and new programs elsewhere, could set in motion a series of cascading effects on military balances and strategic perceptions across a wide region, from the Caspian to the Aegean, Europe and the Maghreb. The continued proliferation of ballistic missiles of trans-Mediterranean range underscores the exposure of north and south to proliferation dynamics around and beyond the Mediterranean Sea.
- A collapse in Pakistan might seem a distant event when seen from the Mediterranean. But the ensuing political chaos, effects on terrorist networks, and even the possible loss of control over the country's nuclear arsenal, could have dramatic implications for Europe and the Southern Mediterranean.
- A further deterioration in relations between an increasingly nationalistic and assertive Russia and an increasingly insecure "West" would raise the specter of more dramatic competition over energy and security issues, some of which would be played out within the larger Mediterranean space. Under these conditions, states in the Maghreb and the Levant, including Turkey, could be forced into uncomfortable choices in their defense and economic relations between east and west.
- The current global financial instability makes clear that the potential for a severe economic crisis is all too real. The possible consequences of a prolonged crisis for the Mediterranean environment are wide-ranging. High-growth but fragile economies – Turkey is the leading case, but there are others – could face new economic crises of their own. Developing economies in the Maghreb might find aid and investment dramatically curtailed. Leading energy exporters such as Libya and Algeria could see an end to high demand and high prices for oil and gas, with serious implications for domestic cohesion and stability. Xenophobic and nationalistic political movements in Europe might benefit from these conditions, and could be expected to press

The possible consequences of a prolonged crisis for the Mediterranean environment are wide-ranging

a tougher stance on migration and north-south relations generally. Economic stringency might also severely complicate transatlantic relations, limiting the prospects for a more concerted policy in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Finally, a prolonged recession – or worse – could spur a far more parsimonious approach to American power and presence, leaving Europe to cover more of the security burden on the periphery of the continent. In the worst case, a deterioration of security relations between states could follow a deterioration of economic relations, with a heightened propensity for regional conflict – the interwar model.

- New acts of super-terrorism on the pattern of September 11th, or a campaign of dramatic, if less lethal, attacks on the pattern of Madrid, Istanbul or Casablanca, could prove highly destabilizing in the Mediterranean context. The "next attack" could well be in Europe, and as the Madrid bombings and more recent foiled plots in Italy and Spain demonstrate, southern Europe is not immune. There is a significant chance that North African networks will be involved in future attacks of this kind. The result could be a further "securitization" of north-south relations in the Mediterranean, and a redoubling of internal security concerns.

- A break-up of Iraq and the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in the north would pose enormous problems for Turkey and its international partners. Ankara already faces serious security challenges as a result of the renewed PKK insurgency and urban terrorism. The nature of the Turkish reaction would have significant long-term implications for Turkey's strategic orientation, and Ankara's ability to act in other spheres, including the Eastern Mediterranean.

To this catalogue of highly undesirable contingencies, we should add some potential events of a positive and equally transforming nature:

- Unquestionably, a comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli settlement and a durable two-state solution would have a transforming effect on the Mediterranean security environment. Other regional rivalries would remain, of course, and internal challenges would persist. But a leading flashpoint would be removed, even if extremists continued to challenge the agreement. A major new commitment to stability and development in a Palestinian state might well be imbedded in a wider strategy of aid and investment for the Southern Mediterranean. Consolidating and securing a comprehensive settlement would, by its nature, require closer transatlantic coordination in the eastern Mediterranean.

- *Détente* between Tehran and Washington may be a remote prospect from the perspective of 2008. Over the next decade, however, the potential for a revolutionary break in the pattern of relations between Iran and the West is quite real. Unlike the recent *détente* with Libya, the reintegration of Iran would go beyond the merely stabilizing, and would be transformative for nonproliferation, energy security and "end of conflict" in relations between Israel and its neighbors. These effects would be felt in the Mediterranean as well as the Gulf.

Overall Observations and Conclusions

The Mediterranean security environment is evolving rapidly, driven by internal pressures on both sides of the sea, changing regional dynamics – positive as well as negative – and the emergence of new actors and new strategies. Questions of religion and identity, traditionally important elements in Mediterranean affairs, are once again central. Strategic shocks, many emanating from beyond the Mediterranean, are likely to play a critical role in the evolution of the region at many levels. Again, not all of these transforming contingencies are negative, but many could have strongly destabilizing consequences.

Looking ahead, this analysis suggests that partners on both sides of the Mediterranean and both sides of the Atlantic will face several open questions. First, Mediterranean states, and above all the Mediterranean states of Europe, will need to consider the merits of ever wider strategies toward the European periphery, the extended neighborhood, versus a reinvigorated strategy toward the Mediterranean, Europe's near abroad. Does the Mediterranean identity matter as an organizing principle for strategy and policy, or is it an anachronism? The French proposal for a Mediterranean Union and the notable revival of the 5+5 Dialogue suggest that the notion of a unifying Mediterranean identity is hardly a spent force. It could even be a necessary corollary to Germany's drive for a new *ostpolitik* if Europe is to be a more assertive and effective security actor on the periphery.

Second, what role can the US play in emerging Mediterranean strategies? Much will depend on competing priorities in American policy and planning. If the next decade is defined by more intense strategic competition between the US and China, it is unlikely that American security engagement in the Mediterranean will expand. If stability along Europe's southern periphery is increasingly seen as critical to transatlantic security in an era of shared risks, greater American engagement if not necessarily greater presence, will be a priority. Under any conditions, the primacy of internal conditions for security in the region argues for much closer coordination in European and American approaches to aid, investment and reform across the Southern Mediterranean.

Finally, partners on both sides of the Mediterranean will be affected by the globalization of regional security, in particular, the burgeoning links between security in Africa and Eurasia and the strategic environment in the Mediterranean. New transit routes and wider migration patterns are part of this equation, alongside the growing reach of weapons systems, and the increasing capacity of non-Mediterranean actors to project power, both hard and soft, into the sea and its hinterlands. The long-standing question of the interdependence of the Mediterranean and Atlantic (and Pacific) worlds remains relevant for today's strategists and policymakers.

The primacy of internal conditions for security in the region argues for much closer coordination in European and American approaches

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Scenarios of security and insecurity in the Mediterranean

Security challenges in the southeastern Mediterranean region:
implications for the EU
Meliha Benli Altunisik

Meliha Benli Altunisik

*Professor, Department of International Relations.
Middle East Technical University, Ankara*

S ecurity issues in the Mediterranean have been evolving since the end of the Cold War. Some of these challenges are new; some are old with new twists. As a geographic area this paper will focus on the south-eastern Mediterranean region, including the Mashreq and the Gulf. Although some of the issues discussed here are also relevant to the Maghreb, the western Mediterranean has its own dynamics as well. The discussion will also focus on the implications of these challenges for the EU. Clearly the EU and the southern Mediterranean region are interlinked in terms of security concerns. Yet it is also important to identify these challenges from a regional framework without prioritizing the concerns of the EU. Within this context I will identify seven current challenges in the Mediterranean region that I think will continue to have an influence in the near future.

Increasing interconnectedness between different conflicts in the region

The Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been the main conflict in this region for a long time, has recently become more interconnected with the other two issues in the Middle East, namely the Iraqi and Iranian crises. The link between these conflicts works in both ways. The Iraq war of 2003 further radicalizad the region and popularized the more radical groups in the Arab-Israeli front. On the other hand, the US presence in Iraq and its aim to transform the region after September 11 decreased the possibility of US pressure on Israel to make peace. The Bush Administration, which was not much interested in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict to begin with, became preoccupied with Iraq. The Iran crisis, on the other hand, also greatly influences what happens in the Arab-Israeli front. Iran has clearly become a Mediterranean power as well in recent years. These conflicts have increasingly become arenas for regional and extra-regional actors, mainly the US, to continue their fight to establish their visions of a regional order. Lebanon has become a battleground for this struggle. The Lebanese War of Summer 2006 was a clear case. The continuation of the Palestinian conflict also allows Iranian President Ahmedinejad to have a platform in the Arab public space. The well-known secret of Israel's nuclear arsenal helps Iran to justify its nuclear ambitions. Such obvious linkages between the various conflicts clearly led to the extension of the boundaries of the Mediterranean region beyond its geographic

Iran has clearly become a Mediterranean power as well in recent years

reference. This situation further complicates security problems and thus makes them less manageable. The settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict has become all the more complicated as long as the other conflicts continue to linger. This development presents particular problems for the EU as it has constructed a separate Mediterranean region through its policies since the end of the Cold War. The EU, on the other hand, has been slow to develop policies towards the Gulf region. Therefore, increasing interconnectedness between different conflicts in the region presents further limitations to EU's Mediterranean policies.

Lack of regional security frameworks in the south

This region is a difficult case for region building. There are several reasons for this and they are related to regional political dynamics as well as the policies of external powers. The Arab-Israeli conflict and other polarizations, consolidation of national sovereignty norm at the expense of regional cooperation and policies of exclusion by the external powers particularly have acted as obstacles to the building of a regional security regime. As a result, the zero-sum mentality in security matters prevailed. The Middle East in general has operated on realist principles, especially the balance of power principle. Reliance on balance of power in dealing with regional security issues has sustained chronic instability with full and low intensity warfare frequently used. The security dilemma has characterized the relations in the Middle East and prevented a truly regional approach to security. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership stresses the promotion of regionalism to address issues of common interest. However, ultimately this has to be initiated from within the region. One such opportunity has been Iraq's Neighbors Forum, which was started before the war in 2003 by Turkey's initiative. After the establishment of an Iraqi government, Iraq also has become part of these meetings that are convening at both foreign and interior ministers' level. Iraq has been going through a significant transformation and faces huge challenges in the process. The fate of this transformation will have tremendous repercussions not only for Iraq but for the region as a whole. The states in the region are quite apprehensive as to what all this will mean for them and for their region. They are trying to develop means to secure their influence to safeguard their own interests. On the other hand, Iraq itself needs time and freedom from intervention to sort its problems out in the process of state building. The security concerns of all these actors cannot be taken individually, as they are interconnected. In other words, these actors constitute a security complex, defined by Barry Buzan as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from another'[1]. Thus the new strategic setting that emerged after the Iraq War of 2003 created a new sub-regional security sphere with Iraq as its center. The main actors in this new setting are no longer just the countries of the Gulf; they now include Turkey, Syria and Jordan. The Neighbors Forum tries to reach agreements on a collective set of basic principles, such as respect for territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, minimal confidence building measures, and mechanisms for dialogue. For a long time its effectiveness was hampered by both Turkey's sensitivities about the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq and the US' polices of exclusion of Iran and Syria. However, the last meeting in Istanbul last year convened in an extended form with the inclusion of external actors, including the US and the EU. Such an evolution, if sustained, can be significant

for the establishment of a limited security regime in the region. The most important achievement of such a regime would be the recognition of the legitimate security rights of all and the unacceptability of the use of military force. As such it may act as a building block for a more comprehensive and institutionalized common security framework in a region facing daunting challenges to security and political stability.

The US policies of exclusion and unilateralism

The policies of the US, the main extra-regional power in the region since the end of World War II, have been based on the principle of exclusion of some countries. During the Cold War, years bipolarity justified such policies and at times the US wrongly interpreted regional dynamics in the context of its struggle with the USSR. Thus the US policies alienated Arab nationalism and tried to exclude such regimes and movements from regional politics. In the post-Cold War era the US aimed to create a new Middle Eastern order. An important element of that order was the exclusion of two major Gulf States, Iran and Iraq from regional politics. The Clinton Administration implemented its 'Dual Containment policy' through the use of several tools, including embargoes, military build up, use of force, and diplomatic efforts to get the support of other actors. The policies of exclusion continued and in fact expanded after September 11. While the Bush Administration launched a more robust policy of creating a 'new Middle East' it also paid less attention to the principle of multilateralism. The new US policies have created new insecurities in the region. When the Bush administration openly targeted regimes in Iran and Syria, these regimes sought to upset US policies in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. The exclusion of some of the main regional actors prevented progress in achieving stability. On the other hand, the fact of US power and its unilateralism became a force to be reckoned with even for the US' traditional allies in the region. Thus, one of the new challenges for both regional and extra-regional actors today is how to manage the US power.

Increasing fault lines in the region between different group of states and non-state actors

Recently regional politics have come to be characterized by polarization between different actors. The divisions get to a point where some analysts began to talk about a new Cold War in the region. On the one hand, there is increasing polarization between states that are more pro-Western and those who resist the US power and its project of molding the region according to its own design. There are non-state actors, like Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and several Kurdish organizations that have become actors in this polarization. These groups operate beyond state control and ultimately challenge the basic tenets of the state system such as monopoly on control and use of force and territoriality. Finally, there is the emergence of a fault line between the Sunnis and the Shiites which further complicates the situation. The increasing power of Shias in Iraq after the fall of Saddam's regime as well as rise of Iran in regional politics has led to some concerns among Sunni states. For some states that have sizable Shia minorities, the situation presents an internal challenge. However, there is also a regional politics dimension to the issue as some of these states do only have a very small

Shia population to be threatened. Thus, as it has been the case, historically the Sunni-Shia divide has a lot to do with power politics. The casting of this struggle in sectarian terms adds to the instability in the region and internally in several states.

The question of political Islam

The question of political Islam and how to approach it still remains a fundamental challenge for both regional and external actors. Political Islam continues to be the most important political force in the region. However, in recent years there have been important evolutions in political Islam. On the one hand, there has been the emergence of global radical Islam, which transcends the state level and acts on the bases of an Islamic *ummah*. With its ideology and methods it presents a challenge not only to the West, but also the Shias, secular Muslims and the regional states. It also presents new challenges to the EU because of its potential to make inroads into the Muslim communities living in Europe. Despite the limited numbers of such recruits considering the size of the Muslim communities, the phenomenon exposes the problems of integration in these countries. Political Islam has seemed to have evolved also into a more moderate strand. In recent years several Islamist parties emerged in different Middle Eastern countries that aim to 'marry Islam with individual choice and freedom with democracy and modernity'[2]. There are Islamist parties in the region, such as Justice and Development Party in Morocco, Hizb al-Wasat in Egypt, and Islamic Action Front in Jordan that renounced violence and agreed to work within the current system[3]. The development of the so-called phenomenon of post-Islamism is very important for the evolution of politics in the Middle East. However, we still do not know much about why and how some Islamist movements are evolving in this way or to what extent this represents a genuine evolution. Nevertheless, the developments in political Islam relate closely with the security challenges in the region. The continuing popularity of political Islamist movements and the evolution of post-Islamism forcefully raise the issue for external powers like the EU of whether and how to engage with non-violent Islamist groups.

The dilemma between stability and democracy

The lack of accountable, transparent, participatory governments in the region poses threats to their citizens as well as each other.

The promotion of democracy as a way to cope with security challenges has also become part of the policies of the external power in recent years. The EU was the first to decide to deal with the root causes of the instability in the region and its exportation to the north by launching the Barcelona Process in 1995. The Bush Administration after September 11 also promoted democratization as a panacea for terrorism, albeit adopting different instruments than the EU. However, both the EU and US policies soon faced with the so-called stability-democracy dilemma. Even those who argue that democracy is a prerequisite for stability in the long run, fear from uncontrolled transition periods in a short and medium term. After long years of authoritarian rules, political openings may

unleash instability which would in turn create obstacles for democratiza-
tion. This dilemma seems to have locked the issue of political reform in
a vicious circle. The stability-democracy dilemma has also affected the
positions of the external powers as they ultimately opted for stability.
This, in turn, has led reservations over the sincerity, depth of commit-
ment and consistency over their motives in the region.

The civilizations as units of analysis

The danger of casting region's relations with the outside world in terms of
notions such as 'clash of civilizations' is another security challenge that the
region faces. The idea that cultural and religious identities are the primary
source of conflict in the post-Cold War has become a self-fulfilling prophecy
especially after September 11. There are advocates of this view on both sides.
In such an environment it becomes particularly important that Mediterranean
policies of the Western institutions should not be seen as anti-Muslim. One
way to deal with this challenge has been to promote concepts of dialogue
among civilizations instead of a clash. For instance, the prime ministers of
Spain and Turkey, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
launched the initiative Alliance of Civilisations in November 2005 with the
aim of fostering respect and dialogue between Islamic and Western societies.
Such notions, however, can be just considered as the other side of the same
coin as they still operate at the same level of analysis, i.e. civilizational level.
Therefore, whether one emphasizes clash or alliance, they both assume that
there are monolithic, self-contained civilizations out there that are engaging
with each other. Such an approach should be problematized and discussed
as a relevant way of understanding historical and current problems that we
have been facing.

Even those who argue that democracy is a prerequisite for stability in the long run, fear from uncontrolled transition periods in a short and medium term

Notes

1. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, New York – London: Longman, 1991, pp. 186-229. http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/conclusi.htm - 3#3
2. Asef Bayat, 'What is Post-Islamism?' *ISIM Review*, No. 16, 2005, available at http://www.isim.nl/files/Review_16/Review_16-5.pdf
3. For more on these parties and global radical Islamism see Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, NY: Routledge, 2007.

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Fundamental freedoms

Fundamental freedoms and security in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: Thinking long term and in country specific approaches
Isabelle Werenfels

FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND SECURITY IN EURO-MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION: THINKING LONG TERM AND IN COUNTRY SPECIFIC APPROACHES

Isabelle Werenfels

Research fellow at the Middle East and Africa Unit
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin

The issue of fundamental freedoms is a key aspect of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation – at least in theory and on paper[1]. The "Mediterranean citizens'" right to fundamental freedoms is enshrined in the two major frameworks for cooperation in the Mediterranean basin: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona Process) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 explicitly refers to the necessity of strengthening human rights and democracy in the region, and Article 2 in all Association Agreements postulates that the respect for fundamental rights and for democratic principles are an essential element of the agreement. Moreover, the Action Plans within the ENP framework feature, albeit to varying extent, specific provisions for expanding fundamental freedoms among the southern partner states.

One of the main underlying assumptions for including the demand of making political reform a main pillar of both the Barcelona Process and the ENP was the European credo that a belt of prospering and democratic countries around the Mediterranean would be the best guarantee for lasting stability in the region and thus for European security. This goes back to the argument of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant that – to put it somewhat simplified – democracies do not fight each other. Also, the collapse of the Soviet Empire, only half a decade before the founding of the Barcelona Process, came as a proof that coercion and deprivation of political freedoms could not guarantee lasting security and stability. Since the early 2000s, moreover, the European Union's call for enhancing fundamental rights in the partner countries has been increasingly driven by the assumption that a better human rights situation and more political freedoms would curb the desire of young Arabs to migrate to Europe and reduce the breeding ground for radical Islam. This line of thinking is not least related to the "human security" paradigm which departs from the assumption that national, regional and global security and stability are strongly linked to individuals' security and rights.

When it comes to political practice, however, there appears to be a deep rooted belief among many European policy makers that there is a trade-off between human rights and democratization on the one hand and stability and security on the other hand. This results in an obvious contradiction between the spirit and goals of Barcelona and the *status*

Regional and global security and stability are strongly linked to individuals' security and rights

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Evidence from processes of political openings shows that there is no one simple causal relationship between fundamental freedoms and security

quo maintaining day-to-day policies of the European Union and most of its Member States toward the region. This becomes evident, for instance, in European policies vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Most European policy makers prefer to support the stable Mubarak regime than promote political freedoms which they fear could lead to an Islamist takeover. Policy makers – rightly or wrongly – assume that such a takeover would harm European security interests. France's President Sarkozy used precisely this line of argument in his new year's speech in January 2008.

The following article hence concentrates in a first part on questions regarding the relationship between security and fundamental freedoms. In a second part, it discusses policy options for enhancing these freedoms in the southern partner states while at the same time promoting long term European security interests. The reason for the focus on the partner states only is that the relationship between security and fundamental freedoms is more problematic in these states than in Europe. This does not go to say that there is no tension between the two in European states: The heated debates over new legislation in the context of the fight against terrorism and its implications for fundamental freedoms in countries such as England, France or Germany testify to this. However, these tensions between security and freedoms are dealt with in institutional frameworks of rule of law and independence of the judiciary. This generally warrants that politically freedoms and civil rights are not being (severely) curbed. In the southern partner states by contrast, open debate, both on security issues and legislation as well as on fundamental freedoms, is strongly restricted – if to varying extent. Moreover, there are few checks and balances regarding executive action.

Multiple relationships between freedoms and security

Empirical evidence from processes of political openings shows that there is no one simple causal relationship between fundamental freedoms and security, at least in the short term. Whether extending fundamental freedoms leads to instability and insecurity or whether it tends to enhance stability depends strongly on the following three factors: Context, timing and time frame, and sequencing of reforms. To be more specific, it is crucial in what social, economic and international context a country extends and expands fundamental freedoms. This becomes evident in the following three examples:

In Algeria in 1989 far-reaching political freedoms were granted at a time of deep socio-economic crisis, which was the result of the oil price shock and the post-colonial elites' failed industrialization and development project. At the same time, the Algerian society was strongly divided over questions of national identity, with berberophone, francophone and arabophone identities in conflict and with secular visions of the state colliding with Islamist visions. Moreover, the political freedoms were granted overnight, without a stable institutional framework, that is a functioning and, in a Weberian sense, insulated state apparatus in place to support it. Under these very particular circumstances it was not surprising that a radical protest party became so strong.

The example of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq (to use an example that is not from the Mediterranean region) demonstrates particularly well that a certain level of security and state stability is a prerequisite to render the extension of fundamental freedoms meaningful not only in theory but in practice. In Iraq broad civil and political rights and freedoms were granted in a situation in which the state apparatus was in shambles and the state thus too weak and instable to guarantee their implementation. In this case, the sudden enhancement of freedoms contributed to destabilization and insecurity.

A third example is the case of so called late democratizers in Southern Europe. The Spanish, Greek and Portuguese trajectories have demonstrated that in a context of relative security and institutional stability the extension of fundamental freedoms and democratization will not destabilize a state but is bound to have a positive effect on its stability and security in the long term. Not to be blended out, however, is that these states had an important incentive for reform: the perspective of European integration. A similar development, the prevention of destabilization in the context of expanding freedoms, could be expected in the case of Turkey.

One obvious lesson to be drawn from these examples, as well as many others in the literature on political transition processes toward democracy in other world regions, is that there is a difference between the short and the long term effect of enhancing political freedoms. In the short term, enhancing these freedoms can produce unpredictable results and may lead to instability. In the long term, however, it appears to be an important factor for achieving stability and security. The tricky question that poses itself is how to further these freedoms without affecting negatively stability in the southern partner states in the short term.

How can Europe strengthen fundamental freedoms and security at the same time?

The deficits and limits of European democracy promotion and promotion of human rights in the Southern Mediterranean have been amply analyzed in the scholarly literature, particularly in the context of assessing the Barcelona Process and its achievements. Among the factors that limited the effectiveness of EU policies, are those rooted in the Barcelona framework itself: for instance, the partnership with governments that for obvious reasons have little interest in implementing reforms which undermine the existing authoritarian systems. In addition, the implementation of Barcelona has suffered from inconsistencies and contradictory signals and policies of individual EU Member States and of the EU Commission. These problematic aspects affect the relationship between the EU and its Member States on the one hand, and the Arab partner states on the other hand.

Yet, it would be erroneous to, in turn, search for a "one size fits all"-approach to the promotion of freedoms in the partner states, and to assume that policies and instruments valid for one country could work in all other countries. For one, the political, economic and socio-cultural situations differ substantially across the region. The same holds true for political freedoms and the security situation: A state like Libya is highly

The tricky question that poses itself is how to further these freedoms without affecting negatively stability in the southern partner states in the short term

stable but lacks even the most basic fundamental freedoms. Moreover, power is highly centralized in the hands of a few people. In Lebanon, by contrast, civic rights and political freedoms are high by regional comparison but state stability is low, and power spread between different elite groups hostile to each other and relying on external backing. It is obvious that European policies vis-à-vis these two states call for different approaches.

Despite the need for "hand tailored", that is, country-specific approaches, there are a number of general guidelines for European policies in the region that are likely to boost the European credibility in the region. Moreover, they will also have a positive effect in the long term for regional stability and security while at the same time furthering fundamental freedoms.

European policy makers are well advised to take the populations in the partner states more serious by conveying the message to these populations that their rights, demands and hopes are being heard and respected and not only those of their governments. This implies, for instance, that European politicians advocate that all non violent oppositional actors participate in the political process in the partner countries. This means accepting the inclusion of political actors, such as Islamist parties, that may not share European values and visions of society but that represent a substantial part of their societies – of course only under the condition that they submit themselves to the democratic rules of the game. It also implies that European governments form their own opinion about these movements and parties rather than buying into discourses of partner governments that have an interest in discrediting their opposition, particularly if it is Islamist. One such example would be the forbidden Tunisian Nahda movement. This Islamist movement is branded a terrorist organization by the Tunisian government even though its agenda and discourse are along the lines of legal Islamist parties which in neighbouring countries sit in parliament or even government such as the Moroccan PJD (Parti de la Justice et du Développement) or the Algerian MSP (Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix).

European credibility suffers if fundamental freedoms are merely advanced to further other causes. Several EU Member States are, for instance, at least rhetorically much tougher on Syria when it comes to issues of fundamental freedoms or democratization than when dealing with Algeria, Libya, or Tunisia. The reasons for this lie not primarily in the situation of fundamental freedoms (Libya's record is rather worse than Syria's) but in the larger geo-strategic situation: Syria is considered a spoiler in the region, while Libya and Algeria are key to European energy security and to control of irregular migration. In other words, fundamental freedoms are merely used as a pretext or, as is also the case, simply mentioned to relieve policy makers of pressure by international human rights groups. EU credibility, moreover, suffers from its Member States giving messages contrary to overall EU policy. This has repeatedly been the case with the French stance with regard to human rights abuses in the Maghreb. Finally, the EU has done its credibility a great disservice in the aftermath of the Palestinian elections of 2006. After preaching democracy, pushing for elections, observing them and commending their freedom, the EU refused to deal with Hamas. In view

of such inconsistencies and contradictions in its policies it comes as no surprise that civil society actors in the partner countries distrust not only the US but also the Europeans.

Close cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean countries in the "war on terrorism" risks having the (undesired) effect of furthering radicalisation and thus being counterproductive. If European states, for instance, assent to human rights abuses by extraditing alleged or real terrorists to countries in which these suspects are likely to be tortured they are giving Arab populations precisely the message these popula-tions are getting from their governments, namely that their rights do not count. Similarly, European states send problematic messages to Arab populations if they deliver weapons to a state like Libya, in which the human rights situation is problematic to put it mildly, or ask such states to fight migration without assuring that migrants are treated accord-ing to international human rights standards. Such messages do not serve Europe's image amongst the disenchanted Arab youths and could encourage their religious radicalisation and hostility toward the West.

Finally, arguments of partner governments which use the terrorist threat as an excuse for not initiating political reforms or for curbing existing freedoms should be questioned. The Moroccan example goes to show that the fight against terrorism can go alongside with a fairly high degree of press freedom, a fairly pluralist and competitive political proc-ess, and – by regional comparison – a fairly decent human rights record.

The purely bilateral track and the multi-bilateral track of the ENP or NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue are more promising frameworks for advancing fundamental freedoms and security in parallel than the multilateral and regional Barcelona framework. There are a number of reasons for this: First, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is so emotionally loaded that it overshadows and dominates any discussion on security and human rights and prevents conclusions and policies within the mul-tilateral Barcelona framework. Second, as mentioned earlier, countries such as Morocco or Syria have very different problems. As a result mul-tilateral ways of addressing these issues generate no more than general and watered down statements – if anything at all. The conflict over the definition of terrorism at the "Barcelona Plus 10" summit in November 2005 was a point in case.

Finally, security is traditionally a highly secretive and fundamental freedoms a highly sensitive issue. Hence, political and military elites from the Southern Mediterranean countries hesitate to speak about them in large forums: the smaller the circle, the better the chances of confidence building. Confidence building is also important because of an under-standable anti-colonial reflex in some partner countries when it comes to external pressure for extending fundamental freedoms. Sub-regional and semi-institutionalized and semi-formal formats like the 5+5 have produced more tangible results regarding security cooperation than the Barcelona framework. It is thus more promising to resort to numerically reduced and flexible multilateral formats in order to build confidence among a small group of actors with common concerns. A further advan-tage of small multilateral formats is also that mechanisms such as peer pressure or competition set in and can help produce tangible results.

The purely bilateral track and the multi-bilateral track are more promising frameworks for advancing fundamental freedoms and security parallel than the multilateral and regional

Last, but not least, European foreign policy makers need patience and a long term vision in addition to certain modesty with regard to the European capability of influencing domestic situations in the partner countries. It is important to bear in mind that substantial reform processes require transformation of systems of domination, of societies' political culture and of economies at the same time. Generally this cannot happen overnight: the best prove for this lies in European history and the centuries it took to expand fundamental freedoms and arrive at consolidated democratic systems.

What policy instruments?

In the Barcelona framework there are few instruments for furthering fundamental freedoms, apart from two rather unspecific ones: political dialogue in the first (the political) basket of the EMP and support of civil society actors in the third (the cultural) basket. Neither of these instruments has produced tangible results. Even in cases in which the political situation has developed positively over the past decade, as in Morocco, where the political system has been liberalized and civil society has become stronger since the beginning of Barcelona, it is extremely difficult to establish a correlation between these developments and EU-funding and policies. It seems realistic to assume that they played a very minor role at best compared to domestic and regional developments, such as the civil war in Algeria and related strategic considerations of then King Hassan II, or the reform boost linked to the young and socially modernist Kind Mohammed VI coming to power in 1999.

The ENP for its part works with potentially more powerful instruments, namely benchmarks and *ex-post* conditionality. The European Neighbourhood Policy's Action Plans with the southern partner states, for instance, all include a provision that human rights need to be respected in the fight against terrorism. However, no specific benchmarks or indicators to measure progress in this respect are given, such as, for instance, how the rights of the detained are strengthened etc. Finally, no specific carrots are tied to specific steps taken.

The ENP action plans should directly tie "carrots" to progress in specific domains. Political elites in partner states are most likely to engage in reform, if they have a clear incentive. Only if Southern Mediterranean elites see that they too profit – even if only on the symbolic level – from extending fundamental freedoms will demands by the EU for extending freedoms find a local resonance. The fact that Morocco has been given the possible perspective of a *Statut avancé* by the EU in 2007 is symbolically important also for other Arab elites, because it honours compliance with agreements as well as the fact that the Moroccan king has also taken reform initiatives at his own, for instance, with the impressive truth and reconciliation process. Also, in order to assess developments the EU should insists with their partners that more benchmarks/specific indicators to measure progress be defined and included in future action plans.

Only if Southern Mediterranean elites see that they too profit from extending fundamental freedoms will demands by the EU for extending freedoms find a local resonance

Particularly with regard to improving the human rights situation and enhancing political freedoms in the southern partner countries it makes sense to address those involved directly in maintaining security, that is, members of the security apparatus and the police.

Awareness about fundamental freedoms should be raised through bilateral or multi-bilateral (EU plus one partner country) dialogue and exchange programmes between members of security apparatuses. When European military or police officers share their experiences with dilemmas regarding security and human rights with their counterparts from the Southern Mediterranean countries, the latter are more likely to listen than when European politicians make normative speeches. Topics to be focused on in such discussions could include: 1) How fundamental freedoms and security are guaranteed in democracies, and what institutions and mechanisms are employed for solving conflicts between the two; 2) What the code of conduct (the guidelines) in European countries for dealing with opponents/demonstrators etc. look like, and how these guidelines are being elaborated; 3) What the characteristics of the relationship and cooperation between military and political institutions are in European countries.

Possibly, the most effective instrument for raising awareness and changing attitudes of military as well as political elites regarding fundamental freedoms may be engaging these elites on the operative level in a third country.

An instrument to be explored is election observation missions. The US' National Democratic Institute (NDI), for instance, has trained and involved Algerians (including Islamist members of parliament and the government coalition) and other Arabs in election observation in countries undergoing transition processes toward democracy. The resulting comparative perspective on elections can be an eye-opener for the participants and allow them to more specifically identify problems with their own election processes and give them an incentive to raise new demands for more democratic election procedures and legislation in their own countries. The EU would be well advised to install a Euro-Mediterranean programme for election observation in third countries.

Multilateral missions in a third country can change perspectives on issues such as human rights and political liberties also among military personnel. A good example for this has been the Turkish military's involvement in the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH), a civil-military peace-keeping mission established in the framework of the Oslo process under the leadership of Norway. Working against human rights abuses in Hebron and discussing these issues with Israeli and Palestinian human rights activists made a number of Turkish officers have strong second thoughts about the policies employed against political opponents and ethnic minorities in Turkey[1].

These examples go to show that it may be a promising path for European foreign policy makers to think of ways to introduce the issue of fundamental freedoms also through the backdoor and in a more applied sense than has generally been done in the past.

The issue of fundamental freedoms should be introduced through the backdoor and in a more applied sense than has generally been done in the past

Notes

1. Fundamental freedoms are defined here according to the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 which includes political liberties and (democratic) rights such as freedom of association (Article 20) and freedom to take part in the government of ones country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives (Article 21).
2. The author of this article was head of the Swiss Delegation to the TIPH in 1999 and hence could witness such processes first-hand.

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Fundamental freedoms

For the introduction of a code and an ethical charter for the media in the Mediterranean: Aguarantee for an effective fight against terrorism
Nadir Benseba

FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A CODE AND AN ETHICAL CHARTER FOR THE MEDIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A GUARANTEE FOR AN EFFECTIVE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

Nadir Benseba

International Federation of Journalists, Algiers

Ever since 11 September 2001, the date when terrorist acts became officially globalised, attention has shifted to focus specifically on the role of the media in the fight against this phenomenon. When the media are not being generally criticised, they are being directly accused of being apologists for the supporters of terrorist unrest.

Before I turn to the problem of the role of the press in the fight against terrorism, I would like to present a few figures that are already well-known to many people.

In 2001, before the attack on the Twin Towers, 346 attacks and bombings took place, causing a total of 3,547 deaths, while in 1998, such attacks left 741 dead and 5,952 injured. Meanwhile, the INSI (International News Safety Institute), set up by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), reports that 100 journalists were killed during the first half of 2007. To be exact, 85 journalists and 17 associated professionals were killed between 1 January and 26 June 2007. In comparison with last year – and if we take the same six-monthly period – 68 journalists have been killed so far this year. Nevertheless, 2006 still remains the blackest year for the media; 168 press professionals lost their lives during that period. And finally, 214 journalists have been killed since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

The International Federation of Journalists, which is present and active in more than 114 countries and has some 800,000 members, continues to remind us of this terrible situation for several reasons. In fact, the killing of journalists is not always the work of a terrorist group; it is sometimes the result of "errors" by soldiers involved in peace-keeping operations.

By highlighting this fact, the IFJ aims to raise public awareness and to encourage the community of States to reach an agreement on the conditions necessary to guarantee journalists' safety, and particularly to enable them to carry out their task of providing objective information. I believe that in this area of the struggle to safeguard human lives, we must join forces.

The Algerian press, which came out in favour of the fight against Islamist terrorism, and which was at one point accused of playing into the hands of the armed forces, has become an example to follow in

The IFJ aims to raise public awareness and to encourage the community of States to reach an agreement to enable journalists to carry out their task of providing objective information

this sense. Between 1993 and 1996, 116 Algerian journalists were murdered. By quoting this figure, I am not attempting to "sell" the Algerian example – nothing could be further from my intentions, especially bearing in mind that, on a structural level, a great deal remains to be done to improve Algeria's media.

> We need to establish a journalists' code of practice and a common ethical charter for media professionals working on both sides of the Mediterranean

But at present, and within the context of the problem in question (that is to say, building a stable, secure Euro-Mediterranean space), I believe that we need to establish a journalists' code of practice and a common ethical charter for media professionals working on both sides of the Mediterranean. The aim is that they should be able to do objective work, in better conditions, but without compromising the actions of the other actors involved in the fight against terrorism.

Once endorsed, this initiative will achieve a dual objective:

Firstly, it will serve to establish journalists' rights and responsibilities in the context of missions assigned by the organ employing them. In this respect, some journalists come up against obstacles or they are simply not allowed to work because they are not aware of the regulatory requirements of the country in which they are planning to work.

Secondly, the initiative will include the drafting of an ethical charter to prevent mistakes such as the ones that took place in Algeria, for example, in the early 1990s. At that time, the press on the north side of the Mediterranean placed itself on the side of the armed Islamists in order to attack the Algerian military officers who the northern media believed were responsible for the civilian massacres.

On a strictly national level, this initiative will undoubtedly produce results in terms of consolidating the democratisation processes currently underway in the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. And this because this charter or mechanism, which initially will only affect journalists, will foster a legislative harmonisation aimed at guaranteeing the rights and responsibilities of media professionals.

I am not saying anything new when I state that in some countries, which do not possess a journalists' statute, it is not possible to create a national journalists' register or, in fact, to distinguish a media professional as such. Because a journalists' statute – instituted on a national scale, as a universal text – envisages the creation of a national journalist's identity card; a document that lays down the conditions and criteria of journalistic practice.

This idea was widely discussed at the first meeting of the Mediterranean trades unions affiliated to the IFJ, held in Almería in 2005. The initiative was strongly echoed once again very recently, at a second meeting held in Malta in late September 2007.

At the latter meeting, the delegates stated plainly that the imbalances between the countries of the north and those of the South are not getting any smaller, and that this fact is clearly highlighted by the migration and adoption policies of some European countries: restrictive policies that view political refugees and immigrants as a danger and a source of unrest.

Too many European media organs assume the role of complacent broadcasters of policy, and turn their backs on the most elementary humanitarian principles. The introduction of the aforementioned regulatory device will unquestionably put an end to this kind of practice. Because the role of the journalist consists of presenting information with sufficient distance so as not to stir up hatred, but on the contrary, to promote a decent image of immigration, without ignoring its cultural, economic and political dimensions. In this sense, governments should show more solidarity with countries that are facing migration problems.

The participants also observed deterioration in the quality of information in many countries, an increase in repression, the return of censorship, death threats and murders of journalists. Likewise, the media continue to group themselves together and to fall into the hands of industrial and financial bodies for which information is no more than a source of profit, just like any other, and a way of consolidating their ideological domination.

Too many European media organs assume the role of complacent broadcasters of policy, and turn their backs on the most elementary humanitarian principles

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Human Security

Fundamental freedoms

The war against terrorism: do solutions exist to safeguard fundamental freedoms?
Salam Kawakibi

Salam Kawakibi

*Political scientist, researcher with the CIDOB Foundation and
representative in Europe of the Centre Kawakibi pour les transitions
démocratiques. Coordinator for the Arab world of the Security Services
Reform project under the supervision of the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)*

Dilemmas and contradictions

Currently, there do not seem to be any successful policies in the Euro-Mediterranean region capable of promoting democracy, good governance and human rights, on one hand, and of consolidating security and stability, on the other. At best, they only exist in the speeches that are broadcast. It is very hard to try to promote the principles of the rule of law and democracy when leaders are using the war against terrorism as the reason behind all the evils of their societies, their economies and their policies on this interminable conflict. In most cases, they have the support of democratic politicians from the North, via a number of different routes: declarations, gestures and bilateral agreements on security.

As a consequence, from a purely theoretical point of view, there should be no dilemma between, on the one hand, the promotion of democratic principles and practices, respect for human rights and the application of the rules of good governance, and on the other, the safeguarding of security and stability. However, these are no more than hopes, given that in practice, the reality is very different. This paradox is not exclusive to Southern countries; it also represents (and above all) an element of contradiction within the actual countries of the North, purportedly the promoters of the universal values of democracy and human rights.

It is possible that some of those who are responsible for making the decisions in Europe are torn between respecting human rights and the "needs" regarding the security for which they are responsible. When it is a question of a "serious" threat, they manage to overcome this "humanist" feeling without much difficulty. Though limited, this attitude is damaging from a social and ethical point of view. But these countries have the advantage of possessing democratic institutions that exercise a function of control and surveillance. Parliaments, the press and non-governmental organisations all play an essential role when it comes to imposing respect for the principles of human rights, at the same time as acting with total freedom in a world that is subjected to the pressures of market interests and the oil-military industry. These same institutions can exert significant and effective pressure on their political systems when dealing with issues that concern their own population, but it is worth

From a theoretical point of view, there should be no dilemma between respect for human rights and the safeguarding of security and stability

asking whether they are as efficient with respect to their countries' stances (or lack of stances) toward the actions of governments of the South. That is the big question.

Side effects or fundamental effects?

On both sides of the Mediterranean, the fight against terrorism is producing terrible consequences in terms of respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights. However, the leaders of both northern and southern countries seem to be prepared to join forces with this initiative. There have been many meetings between these leaders, without them managing to solve this dangerous phenomenon of violence that can put an end to peace in society. For the countries of the South, this fight represents an extremely valuable pretext, as when they carry out repressive acts against peaceful protests by their civil societies, or as a consequence of this repression, the political regimes of these countries (whose democracy is conspicuous by its absence) take refuge in the existence of a universal fight against terrorism in all its forms, both real and invented.

By adopting this not particularly credible strategy, the political powers and those responsible for security in these countries believe that they are persuading the "demanding" North in terms of respect for individual and collective political rights. Sadly, in most cases, they achieve their objectives, and any criticisms that may exist simply vanish.

In addition to this approach, which ignores citizens' rights, there is another "soft" reaction which could in a certain way be called complicit: the actions of the governments of some Northern countries, which maintain privileged relationships with these regimes. Some leaders of these democratic countries go so far as to claim that their southern counterparts represent a specific "culture" that must be respected, and that they are "admired" by millions of citizens in their countries and throughout the region, or that they represent the last "barrier" against the tsunami of political Islamism. A wide range of such explanations and legitimisations exist, which are even updated as political relations (but especially economic relations) are developed between the democratic countries of the North and the authoritarian regimes of the South.

In these cases, the victims are the citizens of the South, who end up trapped in a repression that has been "legitimised" by their Northern neighbours. They are not naïve and are well-informed, in spite of what might seem to be the case: their regimes are avid students and have learnt fast of the many different types of cooperation carried out with Northern countries.

Organising cooperation: its impact on the promotion of democracy

Cooperation is a necessary element for security and defence and, in theory, it can be conceived using different approaches that are not mutually exclusive. Even so, the regional context involves distinctions and preferences. Most of the countries of the South have difficult relations with their adjoining countries. A regional agreement reawakens their differ-

ences, and their mutual respect has yet to be demonstrated. Experience has shown this to clearly be the case, several agreements in different fields between Southern countries have not been implemented. The same applies to regional organisations, which function in slow motion.

In this situation, these countries tend toward bilateral relations, owing to political rivalries or to a lack of agreement with their neighbours. Thus, the leaders of these countries believe that they will obtain greater advantage, on all levels, if they limit their negotiations only to a northern country or organisation, without signing an agreement that involves their "enemy-brothers". This is a view that is unquestionably limited but, unfortunately, it is a common one. The most deplorable aspect is the approval of this "dangerous game" whether explicit or implicit, by Northern countries, at least for the future of stability and understanding between the countries of the South.

With this formula, there is a danger of giving priority to the reciprocal interests of the countries in question and not, as a consequence, paying sufficient attention to the preservation of fundamental rights in the Euro-Mediterranean area, and particularly in its southern region. Political leaders in both the North and the South employ many different arguments to evade the monitored application of the universal principles of human rights, good governance and democracy.

The United States and the European Union: which model of democracy?

In the West, there are different ways of perceiving the promotion of the fundamental principles of freedom in the region. The convergence of these different views continues to be the object of debate and uncertainty, as they have different priorities and make use of different (even contradictory) methods. In the eyes of civil society in Southern countries, the image of US-style democracy has been almost completely tarnished by America's bloody escapades and its use of force in Iraq, as well as its unconditional support for Israel and its well-known backing for totalitarian regimes that block even the most tentative attempts at political liberalisation in their societies.

Nowadays, and more than in the past, the civil societies of the South view American democracy with suspicion, to say the least. Given America's recent record in the region, few intellectuals would still dare to stress the importance of the "principles" on which the United States was built.

In this respect, a comparison between the American and European versions of democracy is advantageous to the latter. However, European democracy is not without its critics. For example, the fact that "Old Europe's" policy on such sensitive issues as the fight against terrorism or the right to national resistance is deemed to follow that of the United States continues to arouse sharp criticism in Arab countries.

Some conservatives, and even some of the "democrats" of the South, harbour a stereotyped idea that links Western democracy and a loss of moral values. In the opinion of the extremists, Western democracy

Some conservatives harbour a stereotyped idea that links Western democracy and a loss of moral values

has one single aim: "The dismantling of the societies and peoples that adopt it". Thus, it is not viewed as a system of pluralism, alternation and separation of powers. This is the image that has been promoted in these spheres, and great efforts will be required to change it. Authoritarian regimes take advantage of these "doubts" and support them, either directly or indirectly, by promoting the consolidation of this idea (which is false in spirit) to protect themselves against any demand for democracy.

The civil societies of the South view Europe's foreign policy in the Mediterranean in varying ways. Some have even criticised any initiative as the expression of a "neo-colonialism" that is attempting to "deprive our country of its experts and its wealth and to prevent the development of the Muslim religion in the region". Others express this distrust in accordance with their own categories, using the term "crusades". But this does not prevent some "liberals" from believing that Europe does possess a desire to promote democracy in their region.

On one point there is unanimity: in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Process, it is necessary to "demand" that Southern countries carry out fundamental reforms of their power mechanisms, to ensure the rule of lea and good governance.

It is important to point out that for the public opinion, in all its variations, the orientations of European policy in the Mediterranean basin represent an approach that is capable of achieving a balance that has been unfairly knocked out of equilibrium, owing to the USA's partial policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Europe's role in the "resolution" of this conflict in particular and of the problems of the region in general is eagerly expected. One idea that is commonly shared by certain observers is that this will have repercussions even within Europe. The "despotic and corrupt" regimes that are backed by the West, and the support given to Israel by certain areas of West will, over the long term, lead to reactions within Europe's Muslim community.

The challenge of promoting human rights and cooperation within security and defence

Given the fact that Europe's current policy is greatly conditioned by the issue of security and, particularly, by everything concerning bilateral and multilateral measures for fighting terrorism, defining this challenge can be a confusing task.

It seems that the priority is the fight against terrorism. As a result, the issue of human rights is relegated to second place or is completely absent on the scale of real priorities. According to the discourse, the situation is different, but it does not manage to conceal the reality, which is very often a long way away from good intentions.

However, it should be mentioned that the exchanges that take place in the area of security and defence involve groups and organisations of all kinds. This means that these organisations are not only involved in meeting "technical" needs, they also have to help resolve problems of an "ethical" nature in terms of the behaviour of their security services.

In contrast, the susceptibility of the receivers of the mentioned organisations is rooted in the culture of Southern countries, which makes the task much more difficult. Using organisations set up by local actors seems to be a good way out of the problem. This would involve, therefore, local civil societies and their organisations specialised in the defence of human rights and the protection of people under arrest, and would encourage decent conduct in interrogation scenarios.

In this respect, the role of civil society is very important and European authorities should take more notice of its impact without trying to influence its work or to orientate it. It is also important to be able to distinguish between the real active civil society on the ground and the "false" active civil society that can be seen at Embassy receptions, the type that speaks our language, drinks alcohol and whose wives do not wear veils. Such criteria do not help to establish a relationship of trust with the actors involved on the ground. The panoply should be widened, though the situation should be avoided whereby a highly governmental civil society develops at a dizzying speed in Southern countries for the purpose of absorbing European subsidies.

Political Islam: a new challenge or an imaginary problem?

It is worth asking whether the fear that is felt toward political Islam is sufficient to encourage Northern countries to accept "crimes" against human rights in the South. Does a "real Islamist danger" exist? Will a sustained democratic transition necessarily tend toward a fundamentalist Islamic system, thereby closing the door on real democracy? There is nothing to suggest that fundamentalist movements will dominate political systems when the latter become democratic. Even so, it cannot be denied that there has been a "clear upturn" in the demonstrative practice of the Islamic faith, as well as a "violent" increase in religious expression in social and cultural practices. This could explain the anxiety of Europeans who fear that the development of this concealed phenomenon could reach the northern shores of the Mediterranean. It is obvious that several Southern leaders, seeking legitimacy, are currently playing down the idea of the omnipresence of religion in everyday life, though without lowering their guard in the area of security, with respect to political protests by both Islamists and other groups.

Unfortunately, a growing number of inhabitants of the South, including the Islamists, consider that Europe's image has been altered by certain behaviour, such as the reluctance to accept certain populations into their societies, under different pretexts, but with the real reason being that they are not Christians (see the example of Turkey). There is also the refusal to acknowledge and support an "Islamist" government despite the fact that it has been democratically elected (see the example of Hamas in Palestine) or the lack of energy that is expended in defence of the ideals (which are nevertheless widely proclaimed) of democracy and human rights. This has caused a leading intellectual from the democratic left to claim: "It is not only the despotic regimes that encourage the Islamist threat to protect their power, but also Western forces, who do not want to exert effective pressure to impose or inspire democracy. In their opinion, the danger is to allow radical movements from political Islam to make progress".

> It is worth asking whether the fear that is felt toward political Islam is sufficient to encourage Northern countries to accept "crimes" against human rights in the South

Terrorism is not innate in the young; it is not the result of just any kind of culture or religion

Promoting human rights in Arab countries is a very complex task, as it faces not only tight control by the authorities over any civil society initiative, but also opposition from local society to the universal culture of these rights. Traditions, customs and conservative groups which are deeply rooted in the society represent a resistance to universal values. Knowledge of the universal values of human rights, their mechanisms, concepts and definitions is virtually nonexistent here, apart from among the members of the elite. Thus, the religious factor represents, correctly or not, an alibi that allows some to reject certain values and concepts. In addition to this, as I have already mentioned previously, there is also the role played by the authorities in the demonising of terms such as "civil society" and "human rights". Therefore, all work done in this area should be meticulous, sensitive to local cultures and should take great pains to avoid upsetting the sensibilities of others.

Regional conflicts and their impact

It is impossible to speak about security, stability, human rights and democracy in the region without paying due attention to the conflicts that exist within it.

Even if there is a tendency to limit it (through its title, at least) to a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to be the main conflict in the region. It has many different repercussions which include the occupation of the territories, colonisation, the incarceration of the entire population behind separating walls (something that rekindles bad memories), impoverishment, the systematic destruction of the habitat, the uprooting of olive trees, the demolition of an identity and a society, and terrorism. I have chosen to end this piece with the subject of terrorism in order to try to be explicit about its roots. Terrorism (a term that has yet to be defined) is not innate in the young; it is not the result of just any kind of culture or religion, even if the deformation of a culture or religion contributes, directly or indirectly to its development.

Therefore, if we simply beat about the bush and seek partial and unfair solutions to this conflict, we will only succeed in accentuating the crisis, deepening disappointment and encouraging terrorism. Humanitarian initiatives by European civil societies clash with the almost cynical approach of the occupying authorities. The international meetings that give the impression that they are approaching a solution to this conflict have consistently failed since Madrid in 1991, in the full knowledge, furthermore, that other territories in Syria and the Lebanon continue to be occupied by the Israeli army. Moreover, there are still millions of Palestinian refugees scattered across the world, without the "negotiators" being really concerned about their fates.

Iraqi youth continues to represent a useful pool to draw on for developing all kinds of violence, starting with the violence of occupation, of humiliation, shows of bravado and collateral damage, and resulting in a national resistance and a blind terrorism whose partnerships take on an enigmatic form. With more than four million Iraqi refugees in the neighbouring countries and two million or more displaced persons within the country, the enormous humanitarian crisis that seems to escape the

attention of well-meaning observers may facilitate the development of the machinery of violence and terrorism. Regional instability is now assured, and so this is not something that can simply be blamed on others: it concerns all the countries of the Mediterranean. Speaking about the issue of Iraqi refugees in Syria, a leading European politician said that it was a problem that only concerned Syria. Others have even insinuated that Syria should pay for its support to Iraqi rebels. Thus, we find ourselves in the midst of two arguments that are highly dangerous and lacking in vision. The refugee crisis should be a concern of all countries and, in particular, those on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. If we choose not to deal with the problem, then security instability and danger are guaranteed.

For an Arab population that places great importance on symbols, this conflict could affect the entire region and not only the countries directly concerned. Frustration, bitterness, feelings of rebellion, the feeling of having been betrayed by the international community, feelings of injustice, etc., these are all factors that will hamper the work of the decision-makers on both sides of the Mediterranean in their "fight" against terrorism. In this climate, there are, unfortunately, many candidates for committing violent acts against symbols or human beings. A force-based solution cannot be useful in any way. Thus, it is very important to fight against the state terrorism from which populations suffer, both in certain Arab countries and in the occupied Palestinian territories. In order to promote democracy in tandem with security, one must, above all, avoid taking on the role of a pyromaniac fire-fighter who goes around provoking imaginary conflicts with the aim of subsequently imposing a slanted calendar for the process of change in the region. In this way, opting for opposition in exile does not seem to bear fruit, as we have seen from the case of Iraq. It is the living forces within the countries, with all their defects, that are capable of bringing about the change. And creating new monsters in the region will only serve to open new breaches in the wall of security and to create areas of tension and conflict that will never lead to the establishing of that much-desired stability.

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6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Civilian_Military cooperation in humanitarian missions

Civil-Military cooperation in humanitarian operations
Benito Raggio

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Benito Raggio

Mayor General, Director General of Defence Policy.
Ministry of Defence of Spain

T he issue of civil-military cooperation in humanitarian operations derives from another, more general subject, which is the object of permanent debate: the participation of the Armed Forces in humanitarian aid actions and reconstruction tasks.

In fact, certain actors in the field of humanitarian aid have often expressed opinions against the idea of military humanitarian missions or, more commonly, against military participation in humanitarian aid operations; such opinions are presented in newspaper articles, seminars and workshops and even in formal documents on cooperation.

It is true that the number of humanitarian operations has increased spectacularly, together with the number of actors involved in them. This is because today's conflicts are marked by a spectacular civil presence and by an enormous increase in actors and their participation in the conflict in many different ways. Among these actors are the Armed Forces, carrying out interventions that range from logistical support to the direct provision of assistance. That is to say, they intervene using a flexible, *ad hoc* support approach, adapted at all times to the existing needs.

In order to ensure that this increase in the number of actors helps humanitarian action, it is vitally important that all their actions should be coordinated. And this is precisely where the application of civil-military cooperation comes in. All military operations, no matter what kind, involve or are associated with a civil component. While this component may be a minority element when it comes to combat missions, it acquires greater importance in the area of peace missions and is markedly predominant in humanitarian missions. Naturally, when speaking of military components, I am also referring to policing and judicial elements, among others.

Viewing this problem in terms of my responsibilities as Director General of Defence Policy, in charge of coordination with civil authorities, I can confirm that cooperation for development – an area of the Spanish administration that embraces humanitarian action – is undergoing significant growth within the State's external action, especially in terms of humanitarian action and peace-building operations. In this sphere, the Ministry of Defence collaborates fully with the Spanish cooperation for

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development, so as to prevent overlapping of responsibilities and to join forces to achieve an objective that should be common, given that both organisations are part of the State which they serve.

And this is inevitable, given that one of the guidelines of the Defence Policy, established in the National Defence Directive (DDN) 01/2004, is to "achieve effective coordination between the civil and military elements participating overseas in humanitarian aid operations and peacekeeping or crisis-management operations".

As a logical consequence of this, the participation of the Armed Forces in humanitarian aid and reconstruction missions is expressly included in Spain's Organic Law on National Defence. Thus, this legal document effectively acknowledges the role of the armed forces, in Spain and its surrounding regions, within the field of humanitarian aid. Consequently, the Armed Forces have become an important, legitimate component of Spain's external action in the area of humanitarian aid and peace-building operations.

This participation takes into particular consideration the principle of complementarity, which means preventing any overlapping of skills and resources with those provided by other components – and is mainly based on the added value that the Armed Forces can provide when it comes to mitigating human suffering.

No organisation, body or group is exclusively allocated – through any law or treaty – the task of mitigating all this suffering. It is a joint task for all those skilled in this field, whether they are official bodies or private organisations, each working in the way that they can best provide their contributions, without exclusions of any kind. Unfortunately, there is enough suffering in the world to absorb – hundreds of times over – the assistance provided by the actors involved in humanitarian aid: governmental and non-governmental organisations, Armed Forces, etc. No actors should be excluded from these efforts because they are all necessary. Exclusion would only result in causing harm to the population that they are trying to help.

The characteristics of the military forces, their functioning and organisation in accordance with the principles of unity, discipline and hierarchy, their capacity for rapid, organised deployment on the ground, to concentrate major resources over a short space of time or to carry out mass transport operations, all goes to make them ideal for carrying out this kind of mission. This added value that the Armed Forces can provide is what has led to the recent creation of the *Unidad Militar de Emergencias* (Military Unit for Emergencies, or UME).

Thus, in general terms, Spain's external action is strengthening its response capacity to conflicts and humanitarian disasters. This is reflected in the following:

- A great increase has taken place in the number of peace operations by the Armed Forces and their humanitarian component. There are currently 54 peacekeeping operations in progress (without counting the mooted mission in Chad).

- At the same time, there has been a progressive increase in Spanish actions and projects in the area of cooperation for development.
- As a result, an increasing interaction and close collaboration exists between the two elements of Security and Cooperation for Development.

Thus we are working on the basis of a "marriage" between the concepts of security and development, as a result of which it is logical to bear in mind that, within the new geostrategic environment in which we are working, it is very hard to separate security from development, among other factors, in the struggle to achieve peace. In fact, the Security Strategy that the EU approved in December 2003 highlights the interdependence between security and development as one of the key factors for promoting stability.

More recently, the final declaration of the NATO summit in Riga also envisaged this idea, which was included in the text with the following reflection on the situation in Afghanistan: "Without security there can be no development, and without development there can be no security".

Of course, to ensure an effective complementarity between the two, apparently unrelated and even opposing fields of security and development, areas for collaboration need to be found. However, this is not a process that can be set in motion from one day to the next. Collaboration between defence and cooperation for development should be constructed little by little, step by step, using an approach that will unquestionably improve the efficiency of Spain's external action in the areas of humanitarian action and peace-building operations.

To this end, as I have mentioned, the Ministry of Defence acts in permanent collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and particularly with the State Department for International Cooperation and the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development, as regards everything concerning cooperation for development.

As a result, new spaces for collaboration between the two departments have appeared, providing greater synergy and enabling us to improve Spain's institutional response to humanitarian crises and conflict prevention. Below are some of the options for collaboration:

- Joint drafting of documents concerning cooperation in humanitarian aid and military participation in this field (sectorial strategy on conflict prevention and peace-building).
- Collaboration (transport – basically air transport, logistical support, security) with the emergency humanitarian aid operations carried out by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development (AECID) (air transport, etc.). The Air Force has temporarily offered the use of a hangar at its Torrejón airbase for storage for humanitarian aid purposes, in order to streamline urgent deliveries.
- Organising courses on clearing areas of personnel mines at the International Demining Centre, especially for countries designated for Spanish cooperation for development, among others.
- Coordination and collaboration on the ground, even if this might involve extra efforts for the forces' tasks and missions.

Collaboration between defence and cooperation for development should be constructed little by little using an approach that will unquestionably improve the efficiency of Spain's external action in the areas of humanitarian action and peace-building operations

One of the most outstanding examples of this effective coordination is the Spanish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) that is carrying out tasks of security and rebuilding in Qala i Naw (Afghanistan), and which includes a civil component of the AECID and another military element, both working in permanent coordination.

The application of the term "humanitarian" to certain military interventions is not to everyone's liking, even though it was the UN that used the term for the first time

Spain's approach is that the aim of our presence in Afghanistan is to help this country escape from the critical situation in which it currently finds itself, and to support its development. In contrast to the intentions that previous visitors to this country seem to have had, Spain does not plan to extend its presence permanently, and only began working in the country following a request from the Afghan authorities. Finally, this scenario means that reconstruction cannot be disassociated from security – proved by the fact that several attacks have been made on personnel attached to humanitarian organisations. This eventuality was envisaged by the United Nations in resolutions that authorise the use of force.

Logically, this collaborative approach, which includes compliance with the Oslo and Stockholm Guidelines (the latter on the principles of good humanitarian provision), has been constructed in coordination with the multinational forums in which Spain participates, and in which the focus on civil-military cooperation varies in accordance with each organisation and with each specific mission to be carried out.

There are two examples that are representative of this variety of approaches – the United Nations mission in Lebanon and the humanitarian aid operation launched by NATO in Pakistan in 2006 following the earthquake that devastated Kashmir.

Before I deal with the United Nations mission in Lebanon, I would like to briefly recapitulate on the antecedents to the current situation:

The first peace operations carried out by the UN took place in 1945. Since then, and until the end of the Cold War, these military missions did not include considerations of humanitarian action in their mandates, and had almost no contact with humanitarian deployment. Since the end of the Cold War, with the new international context arising from the disappearance of the blocks, civilians have become targets and are now the victims of many conflicts.

This new scenario included new threats (terrorism, organised crime, failed states) which now receive from the states a response based on an approach that integrates more their different capacities and places greater emphasis on civil-military aspects and on the use of humanitarian aid as a tool for managing crises and conflicts. Once again, we are faced with a need for close coordination between the two fields.

The UN has tackled this increasing importance of the humanitarian aspect, and the advent of military components with humanitarian aspects, through different initiatives. This began with the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA, 1991), which later became the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 1997), in an attempt to ensure coordination between humanitarian and military components.

In this sense, it must be remembered that the application of the term "humanitarian" to certain military interventions is not to everyone's liking, even though it was the UN that used the term for the first time, on considering that it eliminated the indispensable differentiation that has to exist between military and humanitarian aspects on the ground. This coexistence and coordination is more difficult the more violent a situation is, and requires an approach whereby the two components act in a separate though complementary manner.

As is commonly known, following the creation of the OCHA and the first operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, the Brahimi report of 2000, the Oslo Guidelines and the associated documents from 2003 to the present have all determined in greater detail the way in which this type of operation should be carried out. Thus, the most important recommendations in the Brahimi report are based on:

• The need to create integrated missions of a multifunctional nature (ranging from the protection of civilians and humanitarian aid to disarmament/demobilisation/reintegration) to deal with the new threats, and achieving greater involvement by the UN
• A stronger military mandate
• Ensuring the division of tasks and mandates between the different actors, some of which (EU, NGOs, NATO, etc.) may be external to the UN.

These recommendations have been enlarged to cover the following aspects:
• More authority has been requested for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), so that it can supervise the different actors.
• Respect must always be shown for the principle of impartiality, though not necessarily for that of neutrality, especially if violence is taking place (even though this may be a problem with humanitarian aid).
• Greater backing should be given to the mandates with commitment to the use of force if necessary.
• Integrated planning should be carried out: political, military, civil police, electoral attendance, refugees, etc. as well as preparing rapid deployment, on call, for military forces and police, etc.
• All resources should be placed under one single mandate, and there should be a strengthening of the link between humanitarian operations and peace operations with the appointment of a resident coordinator or a humanitarian aid coordinator to second the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG); this was a point that came in for particular criticism from NGOs.

These recommendations have since been applied in Kosovo, Haiti and Afghanistan, as well as other countries.

With respect to the degree of participation by military forces in humanitarian tasks, in general terms the OCHA considers that this should be determined by the intensity of the existing violence. Thus, in times of peace, military forces may be called on to provide direct aid, something that would be difficult in a mission to impose peace, and impossible in a combat situation, in which the military could only provide support for infrastructures.

The following box from the OCHA reflects these considerations, in relation with the visibility of forces and their level of impartiality.

Decreasing task visibility				
Missions for military forces	Peace	Peacekeeping	Imposition of peace	Combat
Direct aid	Possible	Possible	No	No
Indirect aid	Yes	Possible	Possible	No
Infrastructure support	Yes	Yes	Possible	Possible
Decrease in impartiality of forces ------>				

As we have seen, in addition to the Brahimi report's recommendations, the Oslo Guidelines have recently added considerations on the use of military resources and civil defence (MCDA) when providing aid for disasters, as well as the Stockholm Guidelines in 2003, on the principles of good humanitarian provision, and which focus on the following points:

- The OCHA coordinates all international aid, including military aid
- The use of military resources should be a last recourse, limited in time, and should be replaced by civil aid as soon as possible
- Operations should always maintain their civil nature
- Participating military personnel should go unarmed if possible, and should not participate in direct distribution of aid
- The paramount role and leadership of civil organisations should be strengthened in humanitarian aid, and particularly in conflicts

These principles are valid in general terms. Their application should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and in accordance with the specific characteristics of each emergency. This is the spirit of the Guidelines, as presented by the director of OCHA in a speech made to present one of them.

It is within this framework that the mission in Lebanon is being carried out. One of the tasks established by Resolution 1701, which approved the strengthening of the UNIFIL mission, was to widen its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to the civil population and the voluntary return of displaced persons in conditions of security. It is, therefore, a mission that includes a component of humanitarian aid. Thus, one of UNIFIL's operational tasks is to "provide the civil population with protection and humanitarian aid".

Spain is deploying 1,100 troops out of the 11,500 involved in the mission, included in the brigade that we are leading.

The structure of civil-military cooperation is organised within two different bodies:

- On one hand, the director of civil and political matters, the Chief of Staff (COS), supervises the structure of civil matters
- On the other hand, there is the J9 CIMIC, who reports to the COS.

Curiously, in the UN, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) only refers to coordination between civil and military elements to fulfil their respective objectives, while in NATO, this also includes cooperation.

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Our humanitarian aid, and the aid we are providing to help rebuild Lebanon is organised into two different channels. On one hand, and just like the rest of UNIFIL's military structure, we have funds of approximately 700,000 available for QIP (Quick Impact Projects) to be carried out in our area, and which cover different fields (access to basic services – education, health, civil education, human rights, gender policies, etc.). The aim of these projects is to foster trust in the mission among the civil population and to help create a good image for UNIFIL. These QIPs are coordinated and approved by the Project Review Committee, which is made up of the Chief of Civil Affairs (civil), the chief of J9 CIMIC (military), together with other representatives such as the Chief of Administrative Services (civil), the head of Finance and the Chief Engineer (civil). In this way, coordination and unity of efforts is ensured.

It should be pointed out that this system of QIPs is also employed by the UN, which allocates an annual budget of around $500,000 to UNIFIL to carry out the project of infrastructure rehabilitation (roads, water and electricity).

Other support activities directly aimed at the civil population include awareness-raising activities regarding mines and medical and veterinary aid tasks, employing the surplus skills of the health units, the main mission of which is to support the force.

Meanwhile, Spanish cooperation for Lebanon, which has been organised for the period 2006-2008 through AECID, stands at €41 million. This is dispensed through a fiduciary fund by which Spain is represented by personnel from our embassy in Beirut. The fund is presided over by the Ministries of Finance and Economy of the Lebanon. The administrative organisation is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Below are the most noteworthy points:

• A comparison of the above-mentioned annual figures (€700,000 employed by the Armed Forces against the €41 million by civil agencies) shows that the aid that is channelled through civil bodies is 58 times greater than the amount channelled through military organs. €41 million compared to €700,000. This clearly shows where the emphasis falls in terms of humanitarian aid.
• Furthermore, the two types of aid complement each other. Civil aid is invested in large, medium/long-term projects, while military aid is focused on immediate projects.

Finally, in addition to all of the above, we must add the funds contributed by the Ministry for the purposes of stabilising southern Lebanon:

• Military cooperation grants (Training courses for promotion to Commander and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, offered to Officers of the LAF, as well as six grants for a Spanish course, in the Language School of the Spanish Armed Forces),
• Special projects such as teaching Spanish (in Lebanon) and mine-clearing courses offered to the troops of the Lebanese Armed Forces (course ran from 19 February to 16 March, for 25 students).

The EU is the only organisation that effectively has this civil component available, and which is indispensable to achieve a comprehensive approach to crises

Now that we have looked at the case of the United Nations, let us turn to the case of NATO. For this organisation, Kosovo represented a turning point in its on-the-ground strategy for humanitarian aid. As a consequence of its conceptual evolution, in the 2006 General Planning Guide, NATO is acknowledged as an actor in the areas of humanitarian and disaster aid, as well as in the areas of cooperation in the field of security.

NATO's intervention in Pakistan is an example of the use of predominantly military resources to rapidly solve a humanitarian crisis. It also stresses the fact that we came when they needed us. In this case, both the government of Pakistan and the United Nations requested direct aid from NATO so that their forces and military resources could alleviate the humanitarian crisis brought about by the earthquake that devastated Kashmir in October 2005.

On the one hand, the United Nations requested publicly and fervently that NATO should coordinate the humanitarian aid operation. To this end, NATO organised an airlift to bring military transport resources to Islamabad and to coordinate the flow of humanitarian aid. Thanks to this, most of the humanitarian and field material provided by donor countries and by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was transported to Pakistan before the harsh Himalayan winter set in.

Meanwhile, following a direct request from the government of Pakistan to NATO, the NATO Response Force was sent in, which included engineers, transport helicopters and field hospitals. Some bilateral aid sources chose to join the NATO multilateral aid operation owing to the enormous difficulties resulting from the harsh weather and the steep, uneven terrain. This was the case of the Canadian "Disaster Aid and Response Team".

In response to this request, the permanent ambassadors to NATO of the Alliance member nations (that is to say, all the NATO countries, without exception) agreed to carry out a humanitarian aid operation through the activation and deployment of part of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force which was led by Spain at that time.

The operation lasted for little over 90 days. During that time, direct aid was provided to the population in the form of works and repairs that were expressly requested by the Pakistan authorities, and which were deemed to be the most urgent and necessary. Thus, and by way of example, the engineers carried out the following tasks:

• Rebuilding two schools in the Bagh area
• Setting up 13 tent-schools as provisional installations
• Rebuilding the health centre at Arja
• Rebuilding 55 km of roads and forest tracks
• Setting up a water purification system to supply 8,000 people a day.
• In addition to treating the Spanish troops, the doctors also treated Pakistani and NATO personnel, supplied medicines and food for children and collaborated in the reopening of the health centre at Arja.

All of these actions helped significantly to alleviate the suffering of a population that was experiencing extreme difficulties to even survive.

This was the way they saw it, and it was clearly manifested during the Spanish troops' stay in this area of devastation.

It should also be stressed that there was constant coordination with the NGOs deployed in the area, as well as the fact that the military forces carried out the tasks that these organisations could not have carried out on their own, owing to the lack of technical resources and heavy materials.

From a financial point of view, the final cost of the operation totalled 20.3 million, 2.6 million of which was funded by NATO.

Though I will not be analysing the third actor – the EU – suffice to say that its philosophy is the same as Spain's, given that it is based on the integration of civil and military components in one single mission. The EU is the only organisation that effectively has this civil component available, and which is indispensable to achieve a comprehensive approach to crises by deploying all the actors required for same – police, judicial, military, etc.

Spain is continuing on the above-mentioned path on the international scene. With respect to legal aspects, the National Defence Directive and the Organic Law 5/2005 include participation in humanitarian missions among the possible actions of its armed forces. In terms of experiences, Spain has been a pioneer in missions such as those in Pakistan, and has represented the military component of EU missions such as the one to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, Spain has taken a great step forward in terms of participation of military forces in disasters with the creation of the UME, a tool with wide-ranging capacities to act both internally and externally.

It is clear that in the context of crises and humanitarian aid, civil and military capacities are in many cases complementary. The key lies in the political will to act in the interest of the victims. It is also clear that wide-ranging coordination is something that is absolutely necessary.

It is indispensable that, in the collaboration between civil and military bodies, neither should attempt to assume the exclusive role of managing humanitarian crises, or that the military should be excluded. What remains to be done in this field (and which unfortunately is a great deal) far outweighs current capacities and possibly future ones, as a result of which we will have to carry on working for everyone.

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Civilian_Military cooperation in humanitarian missions

Civilian_Military coordination in EU crisis management
Radek Khol

Radek Khol

*General Secretariat of the Council of the EU,
DGE External and Politico - Military Affairs,
Directorate IX (Civilian Crisis Management)*

Introduction

This paper focuses primarily on internal challenges of consolidating EU civilian crisis management. One of the important aspects of these challenges is to ensure coherence between civil and military capabilities, which often lies at the heart of effective EU external action. New dynamic security environment requires use of wide spectrum of instruments available to the EU and their use in the best coordinated way. Civil-military interactions are increasingly a crucial element of EU operations. Two concepts, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), apply to this area and it is important to clarify the difference between them. CIMIC, primarily related to cooperation between different actors in the field at operational-tactical level, is beyond the scope of this study. CMCO is still a work in process and its dimension of intra-pillar coordination is perhaps the most important, although also the inter-pillar coordination dimension can apply to certain priority areas like civil protection or disaster response. Since the EU has not deployed any truly mixed civil-military operation yet -(with limited exception of the Support Mission to the African Union's African Mission in Sudan (AMIS)-, this paper addresses mostly the coordination between civil and military capabilities at the strategic and planning level.

Importance of CMCO was accepted and underlined in several EU key strategic documents. The European Security Strategy, in definition of threats, states that "none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments" and then calls for a more coherent response bringing together the different instruments and capabilities following the same agenda[1]. In a similar fashion, also the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 calls for "ensuring close cooperation and coordination with the military efforts throughout all phases of the operation. When necessary, civilian crisis management missions must be able to draw on military enabling capabilities"[2]. At the same time, we must bear in mind that there is still no EU strategic concept providing detailed guideline on how to balance military and civilian assets within the EU or which role the EU wishes to play in crisis management.

Distinction between Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)

There is a clear need to distinguish between two concepts – Civil-Military Cooperation and Civil-Military Coordination, although they both exist within the framework of EU activities in crisis management operations, whether the EU is in a lead or support role.

The military is increasingly engaged in multifaceted missions, where it is tasked with not exactly 'military' activities. CIMIC derives from the military perspective that focuses primarily on force protection, and on the need to cooperate with local authorities and civilians to reach that aim, as a part of a complex military operation. There are two types of such interaction. Firstly, there is the crisis management operation, partially dependent on civilian institutions and population for resources, information and even security. And secondly, there is also cooperation of the military force with other international or non-governmental organizations. It is therefore an externally oriented military support function. CIMIC is thus also an important feature of the EU-led crisis management operations aiming at enhancing effectiveness of those operations. CIMIC is based in broadly defined civil-military relations that cover also other areas such as civil emergence planning, military assistance in humanitarian emergencies and host nation support. In the field, CIMIC aims at mutual support and common goals based on transparency and communication.

EU adopted its own concept on CIMIC for EU-led crisis management operations through the EU Military Committee (EUMC) on 18 March 2002[3]. It envisaged establishing permanent CIMIC structures and the incorporation of CIMIC structures into specific EU-led operations, while stressing EU comprehensive approach towards crisis management building upon uniquely wide array of both civilian and military instruments.

The EU, unlike international and regional organisations such as NATO or OSCE, has however declared a clear ambition to develop both civilian and military crisis management capabilities. Apart from the concept of CIMIC, defining cooperation with external actors in EU-led operations, the EU had to develop a concept to designate internal coordination as well, the CMCO.

"CMCO, in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), addresses the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU's response to the crisis"[4]. As such it has a different scope from CIMIC, and it is the political decision-making bodies of the EU, notably the Political and Security Committee and the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) which are driving it. CMCO serves thus primarily an internal function to the EU facilitating successful planning and implementation of EU´s response to crisis. Its aim is to encourage and ensure coordination in the actions of relevant EU actors in all phases of the operation. CMCO thus looks beyond the issues dealt at the operational-tactical level of the CIMIC and takes into account unique features of the EU at political-

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The military is increasingly engaged in multifaceted missions, where it is tasked with not exactly 'military' activities

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strategic level. CMCO should be employed as both an intra and inter-pillar tool within a single EU institutional framework. Such approach could alleviate the weaknesses of traditional EU pillar structure divisions as all three pillars governed by different principles are now involved in EU crisis management activities. The overall approach is both to establish a coherent EU response to a specific crisis situation and to build a culture of routine coordination at every phase of EU crisis management.

CMCO as a culture of coordination

CMCO, in the context of CFSP/ESDP as defined in November 2003[5] by the Council, stresses that at the top of the list of fundamentals lies the need for a culture of coordination, rather than seeking to put too much emphasis on detailed structures and procedures. The aim must be to encourage and ensure coordination in the actions of relevant EU actors in all phases of the operation. This culture of coordination is based on continued cooperation and shared political objectives and relies to a very large extent on detailed preparation at working level involving relevant Secretariat of the Council/ Commission services. Working closely together is an essential element also during 'routine' phase of EU crisis management"[6]. Culture of CMCO should thus be built into the EU's activities and respond to a crisis at the earliest possible stage. It should also cover all phases of considering, planning and implementing EU operation, rather than being „bolted on" at a later stage[7].

Different national conceptions of civil-military relations of EU member states (British, French, German or Nordic) further complicate the creation of a common model for civil-military coordination at the EU level.

Collocation of the military -DGE Directorate VIII and EU Military Staff (EUMS)- and civilian -DGE Directorate IX and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)[8]- staff at the Council Secretariat Directorate-General E at Kortenbergh Building helps to foster individual working contacts, but institutional cultures still differ. EU Military Staff was somewhat isolated, creating first of all common EU military culture and building upon familiar world of military structures. There is also certain degree of imbalance between military and civilian components in the Council Secretariat, where the civilian side has been understaffed, although the number of civilian missions and their scope has been continually expanding. The framework for EU crisis management efforts was created by the military, while civilian input came later on and did not change fundamentally strategic planning approach.

Formal guidelines for internal coordination are less effective than informal meetings on lower level focusing on finding practical solutions and drafting documents. Procedures and rules should allow for this practice to continue, while ensuring sufficient flow of information upstream in the appropriate EU bodies. These staff-to-staff contacts could be also helped by designating formal points of contact.

The command and control issue touches upon sensitive arrangements as military chain of command in EU operations is distinct and separate from the civilian side. EU Special Representatives are leading political

This culture of coordination is based on continued cooperation and shared political objectives

representatives of the EU on the ground, but they do not have a supreme coordination authority over EU Force Commanders, who report to EUMC and receive political instructions directly from the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The military is understandably very anxious to keep this chain of command intact and separate from civilian side.

Fundamental differences in proximity of military and civilian personnel to local population remain a reality. The military is trained for minimal contact and resides at military bases, while EU civilian personnel interacts continuously with the local authorities and will, as a rule, be mixing more with the local population.

Complexity is further enhanced when different type of personnel recruitment is taken into account. In the military domain foreign deployments are perceived as the core task for soldiers in most EU states. Professional soldiers are easy to deploy and career incentives for serving in international operations facilitate the process. However, in the civilian area, voluntary basis remains the rule. Hence, there are only limited incentives to release these experts from domestic structures, (they will be typically civil servants employed by state or local authorities), and little specialization of civilian experts is often needed[9].

Crisis Management Procedures (CMP)

EU developed its CMP as elaborated in the document on "Procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management" from July 2003[10]. This is considered to be a living document that provides a CMP flowchart to be revised in light of developments in areas such as civil-military coordination. Although need for civil-military coordination is repeated at several points of the document, as well as coordinated planning between the Council Secretariat and the Commission with the possible establishment of joint teams, the resulting process is far from being coherent. It can still be perhaps best described as a separate process with several contact points rather than a fully coordinated approach, especially during routine phase and crisis build-up, including elaboration of the Crisis Management Concept. The crucial role of the PSC remains the case also in ensuring coordinated EU action as it receives advice from the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and EUMC during decision-taking on launching EU operation and then serves as main point of reporting to by EU actors in a field.

Procedural innovation in CMCO area rests with the creation of a Crisis Response Coordinating Team (CRCT) as an *ad-hoc* arrangement without decision-making powers and composed of senior officials from the Council Secretariat and the Commission. The CRCT should act during the preparation of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC). At staff level, the CRCT should ensure full coherence between military strategic options, police strategic options and other civilian strategic options, the different Concepts of Operation (CONOPSes) and Operation Plans (OPLANS). CRCT should further assist in ensuring full coherence between the civilian and military aspects of the EU action in the implementation phase. But role of CRCT was in reality confined mainly to formal coordination between the Council and the Commission at a senior level. Its activity during planning of

ESDP operations was rather limited, although it was more active during the Crisis Management Exercise (CME) 02. It usually consisted of representatives from the Commission, Cabinet, Council Secretariat - DG E, Policy Unit, EUMS, Legal Service and SITCEN. Regular working relations between the Council Secretariat and the Commission were kept on the level of Desk Officers within task force setting.

In the field, a crucial role in the CMCO area is reserved for particular EU Special Representative (EUSR), who maintains an overview of the whole range of activities within an area of operations. Moreover, the EUSR closely coordinates with the EU Force Commander, the Police Head of Mission and Heads of Mission for other EU civilian operations.

The latest innovation of ESDP crisis management procedures directly impacting also CMCO area was brought about by the document "Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning" from November 2005.[11] It is based on the principle that EU CMCO, including Comprehensive Planning, implies unity of effort while respecting each actor's integrity, specific expertise and contribution to EU crisis management.

CMCO in the field was also addressed recently in a new document "Civil-Military Coordination: Framework paper of possible solutions for the management of EU Crisis Management Operations" from May 2006[12]. It suggests a list of practical measures that could help foster CMCO in the field, covering issues such as a clear strategy and well defined tasks for EU actors in theatre, cross-support and synchronisation of activities in theatre, the EU focal point in theatre supported by dedicated staff, media and information strategy, training aspects and coordinated reporting.

Role of the Civil-Military Cell

Civilian/Military Cell (Civ/Mil Cell) was brought about as a part of compromise package in 2003 controversy, where the most contentious issue was the establishment of autonomous operational headquarters.[13] In December 2003 the European Council decided to establish a civil-military planning cell in the EU. It was proposed to enhance the capacity of the EUMS to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning through the establishment within the EUMS of a cell with civil-military components. The Council envisaged five main functions of the cell[14]:

- To link the work across the EU states on anticipating crises, including opportunities for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation;
- To assist in planning and coordinating civilian operations;
- To develop expertise in managing the civilian/military interface;
- To conduct strategic advance planning for joint civil-military operations;
- To reinforce the national headquarters designated for an EU autonomous operation.

Negotiations over composition and modalities of Operations Centre took another year and resulted in a final conceptual document specifying Civ/Mil Cell terms of reference to be adopted only in December 2004 and delayed gradual creation of Civ/Mil Cell during year 2005[15].

Institutional position of Civ/Mil Cell is firmly in the Council structures under auspices of SG/HR and as a part of the EUMS it is on the military side of ESDP, possibly limiting its potential role as a strong inter-pillar coordination tool. It should improve coherence of the civilian and military structures of ESDP taking into account all available ESDP tools and reporting both to CIVCOM and EUMC. In CMCO area, it can perform several vital tasks as it is now a natural CMCO interlocutor. The Civ/Mil Cell is now completely staffed and has already its second Military Director (Gen. Manione took over as of autumn 2007 when General Brauss completed his term) as well as its second Civilian Deputy Director. The Cell consists of Strategic Planning Branch and permanent key nucleus of Operations Centre.   Strategic Planning Branch is especially relevant for CMCO issues. It has 17 staff members, including seven military planners and seven civilian planners. Among civilian planners there are two Commission officials acting as liaison officers and having expertise in humanitarian aid and disaster response and the management of reconstruction assistance respectively. This permanent link to the Commission, its experience and expertise in humanitarian operations, is an important institutional innovation. Civ/Mil Cell is entrusted with strategic contingency planning bringing together views from different EU actors from both pillars, Member States, but also from both civil and military dimensions. Within crisis response strategic planning Civ/Mil Cell provides assistance to political-military strategic planning regarding also the civilian/military interface and possible civilian or military support[16].

Even more importantly, Civ/Mil Cell should contribute to crisis response strategic planning for joint civil-military operations through developing joint strategic options including civilian and military dimensions. This is especially acute, as there has not been a truly joint EU civil-military operation carried out yet, although there is a need for such operations. Second, may Civ/Mil Cell achieve significant improvement in the area of development of doctrines and concepts, that would enhance civil-military interface in areas such as Security Sector Reform or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration where civilian and military expertise are naturally intertwined, as well as to assist civilian crisis management operations with expertise in areas such as logistics, communications and information systems and planning expertise. Civ/Mil Cell has also an institutional position to integrate reports on lessons learned from separate civilian and military operations conducted side by side in one territory as is now the case in Bosnia. The same joint lessons learned could be drawn also from EU exercises.

In general Civ/Mil Cell has to rely on its ability to convince and to bring people together, thus establishing the habit of working together and strengthening feedback between the Commission and the Council Secretariat structures. Civ/Mil Cell will be also in a position to increase awareness of CMCO issues through presenting briefings in various training programmes. Advantage of Civ/Mil Cell may be seen in the fact that it is neither managing funds, nor running operations (although it may assist in running operations). It is free of direct interests, in concrete EU operations, and can therefore better focus on the overall picture of civilian and military instruments available for a joint mission or a better interlinkage of existing separate missions in one territory. Civ/Mil Cell is now designated as a strategic planning branch and staffed by personnel with solid planning background and good awareness of EU institutional environment.

Joint civil-military training

Two training programmes deal with CMCO issues – one run by the Commission in 2001-2007 and one run by the Council since 2004. They target as their main audiences key personnel (diplomatic, civilian and military) of the EU Member States taking up senior posts in national delegations in Brussels and policy posts in capitals, officials from all EU institutions and personnel for EU-led missions. Joint civil-military training is clearly needed as it does not exist in any systematic manner within national training programmes.

EC Training Project for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management has been running for several years (2001-2007), run by the EU Group on Training (EGT). Special courses on CMCO were conducted during the project lifetime.

The EU Training Concept in ESDP was approved by PSC in December 2004 with a perspective of the rolling multiannual EU Training Programme in ESDP bringing together various training actors (Member States and their training institutions, European Security and Defence College, European Police College, European Diplomatic Programme, Commission). The civil-military area is considered an important aspect for training at all levels – strategic, operational; for national diplomatic, civilian and military personnel from Member States, Acceding States and Candidate Countries; officials from EU Institutions-. It is usually perceived as an important part of General ESDP training bloc and as a necessary specialisation training in a preparation for a specific function, but not necessarily related to a specific mission. It is focused on knowledge and skills to participate in civil-military ESDP operation, covering both civilian and military instruments, with particular attention to CMCO. Civil-military and inter-pillar coordination were seen as a special EU training requirement based on experience from operation Althea[17].

CMCO issues were of course included in the curriculum of the ESDP pilot course of 2004-2005, organised within the framework of the European Security and Defence College. The pilot Course on CMCO, organised by Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden) as a part of EU Group on Training activities, took place in 19-27 September 2005. It was able to build upon ESDP CMCO Course carried out there within framework of EC Training Project for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management in September 2004[18].

EU Crisis Management Exercises using both civil and military instruments and including their coordination

The EU conducted four CME in 2002-2007, two of which were relevant for CMCO (held in 2002 and 2004 respectively). These exercises served for development and testing of crisis management procedures in a situation where none or only limited EU operations were launched. They help, nevertheless in understanding of options, constraints and distinctive procedures for civilian and military missions.

The first EU Crisis Management Exercise (CME 02), held from 22 to 28 May 2002, focused on testing and evaluation of EU crisis management procedures and structures[19]. Its scenario involved fictitious

Civ/Mil Cell should contribute to crisis response strategic planning for joint civil-military operations through developing joint strategic options including civilian and military dimensions

island 'Atlantia' and was limited to politico-military strategic level, primarily PSC and bodies designed to support it. Evaluation of CME 02 brought rather positive feedback on general EU crisis management procedures, concepts and structures, but identified a major weakness in the area of internal EU coordination, concerning both the clarification of competencies of bodies in the first and second pillar as well as the integration of civilian and military instruments[20]. Experience of CME 02, therefore, significantly influenced further development of CMCO mechanism that needed to be strengthened as declared the Spanish Presidency's Report on ESDP presented at Seville European Council.

CME 04 held from 18 to 27 May 2004 marked a further point in testing EU crisis management and improving CMCO procedures, this time with a scenario of autonomous EU-led operation, without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. CME 04 exercise scenario was the most ambitious so far, requiring the deployment of the full range of EU's civilian and military instruments, both from level of Community and Member States, including military force, police component, a rule of law component and civil administration. Such a demanding scenario included also several issues for civil-military coordination.

CME 06 was based on a scenario combining military and civilian instruments to be used and need for rapid reaction. As a novel feature Civ/Mil Cell was going to be responsible for integrated planning. Unfortunately, due to external political circumstances, CME 06 was eventually cancelled and replaced by much more limited EST 06 (Exercise Study), focusing on rapid response theme. The same had already happened to CME 05, which was also replaced by EST 05, focusing on a handover of EU crisis management operation to and from the UN.

Real-life operations are now more important for the evolution of CMCO than exercises as they challenge the EU structures and rules with concrete issues and press for *ad hoc* solutions or flexible changes to crisis management procedures.

CMCO in practice: EU involvement in crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Aceh, Congo, and Guinea-Bissau

The EU presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been rather robust with several parallel operations, using different EU instruments – European Union Police Mission (EUPM), European Union Force (EUFOR), European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and European Union Special Representative among others. The EU involvement has been a huge one, and has lasted for more than a decade.

They were planned and conducted not as a joint EU operation, but as separate operations with separate mandates, chains of command and different reporting authorities. Practice on the ground saw only limited application of CMCO. Instead of full coordination, it rested only on an exchange of information and regular meetings of heads of field missions. Some lessons were initially included from EUPM for operation Althea and its Integrated Police Unit, but they were of mainly sectoral

nature. CMCO was therefore very limited both in planning and initial operational phase. Some lessons from the Bosnia experience, where now coordination occurs both in Brussels and to a limited extent in the field, were identified in late 2006. They focused on triangular (EUSR, EUPM, EUFOR) coordination practices, including mission reviews, situational awareness and exchange of information, media monitoring as well as a need for a strong coordination role for the EUSR.

However, process of identifying and learning lessons is itself so far not carried out in a truly joint fashion, but as a series of separate processes for all respective missions. Planning for a follow-up mission in Bosnia could better draw on military and police commanders as advisors to the EUSR.

Better outcome in CMCO practice materialised in the successful EU civilian operations in Aceh, although scope for improvement still exists in ESDP activities in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or during EU support for African Union in Darfur. Lot of expectations in this area were connected with EU mission in Aceh, where civilian monitoring mission drew on military logistical assets and military expertise in overseeing disarmament and decommissioning of rebels as well as withdrawal of non-local Indonesian military and police units. EU Aceh Monitoring Mission was formally a civilian operation, but in practice it could be seen as a mixed mission that engaged in planning phase Civ/Mil Cell, its resources and unique capabilities combining Council and Commission officials. Civ/Mil Cell was thus fully involved already in a fact-finding mission.

In DRC, Security Sector Reform is a main task of the EU advisory and assistance mission "European Union's Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo" (EUSEC RD Congo), authorized in May 2005. It is carried out as a civilian mission and is financed through CFSP budget line, but relies on military expertise and has a retired French general acting as the Head of Mission, reporting through EUSR to HR/SG as is the case with police mission EUPOL KINSHASA, already in place since spring 2005. EU presence was also complemented by the military operation EUFOR Congo, deployed during elections in DRC during the period of July-November 2006.

Prospects for further strengthening of CMCO in EU crisis management

CMCO considerations affect also the area of civilian and military capabilities development. Interlinkage between Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) and Headline Goal 2010 (HG 2010) process exist at informal level and through inspiration from some approaches. Institutional coherence should be ensured at the level of PSC, although there are intensive efforts for coherence also at lower levels. These two processes are, however, not formally linked, have different timeframe, level of detail and are managed by different committees. While HG 2010 is the continuation of European Headline Goal (EHG), CHG 2008 is a new process inspired by the military Headline Goal model, even if major differences persist in types of capabilities needed in military and

civilian dimension as well as their status of readiness. While the military side usually works with units and technical capabilities, both available on reserve, the civilian side deals with human capabilities such as highly qualified individuals (civilian experts) or small units (police), usually not available on a reserve status. CHG 2008 envisages civilian crisis management missions deployed either jointly or in close cooperation with military operations, thus drawing on military enabling capabilities and ensuring close cooperation and coordination with the military efforts throughout all phases of the operation[21].

Looking into synergies between both processes of CHG and HG 2010 was identified as an important part of the newly agreed Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010) in November 2007. A common stock-taking event on civilian and military ESDP capabilities, as well as capabilities available to the EC, should be organized towards the end of CHG 2010 cycle. CHG 2010 explicitly identifies areas to be investigated, such as field security, training, logistics and procurement, and relevant synergies identified there[22].

Real situation of multiple EU missions in Western Balkans offers a good opportunity to prepare a bridging model for Bosnia, based on the comprehensive approach advocated by three EU presidencies in 2005-2006 and embodied in the subsequent Comprehensive Planning document. There is clearly a good case to be made for post-EUPM and post-EUFOR planning towards truly EU joint mission.

CMCO issues are therefore taken seriously, even more so as reality will push the EU increasingly towards complex crisis management activities and draw upon a wide range of civilian and military instruments at its disposal. This impetus is likely to be sustained through deployment of new parallel (civilian and military) EU operations in Africa, the Balkans and elsewhere. The next stage would be certainly planning for a truly joint EU operation, overcoming institutional separation of different civilian and military tools available for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation. It is easy to see an added value of using a mixture of these tools at disposal of a unified EU presence in a given territory. A clear candidate for such a novel approach would be EU mission in Bosnia.

The second angle on CMCO improvements is connected with new institutional developments represented for example by the Civ/Mil Cell that may become a natural CMCO interlocutor within the EU structures. Also overall drive for improving EU capabilities is now likely to be more intertwined through linking Civilian Headline Goal 2008/2010 and Headline Goal 2010 processes.

The third area of CMCO progress rests with further development of contacts and information exchange among the EU (both in Brussels and in the field) and various external actors of much less complex nature - such as NGOs, Third States, Media, etc.- This task may significantly improve functioning of ESDP missions in theatre, yet it might be very difficult to set basic rules of those interactions without any central authority. Not only is it true that everybody preaches notion of coordination, but does not want to be coordinated, but some actors

such as NGOs are strongly suspicious of any coordination efforts carried out by international bodies such as the EU. Information exchange may thus constitute the first step on a long journey.

Last, and perhaps the most crucial part of building a well-established civil-military coordination within complex institutional framework of the EU, lies in a continuous process itself. Culture of CMCO will have to be carefully nurtured in both intra- and inter-pillar sense, through continuous training both for officials in Brussels, EU capitals and personnel earmarked for field missions. Especially EU institutions will have to sustain this culture of CMCO even without powerful external forces that would be created by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and unified European External Action Service as envisaged in the EU Lisbon Treaty (EU Reform Treaty). The impact of the new EU Reform Treaty may be, however, much more limited given the degree of separation of the military dimension of the ESDP, contained now in the protocols agreed in last-minute negotiations.

Overall drive for improving EU capabilities is now likely to be more intertwined through linking Civilian Headline Goal 2008/2010 and Headline Goal 2010 processes

Notes

1. A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, adopted by the Heads of States and Government on 12 December 2003, p.12 and pp.18-19.
2. Civilian Headline Goal 2008, Council Doc.15863/04, 7 December 2004, para.6.
3. CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations, Council Doc. 7106/02, 18 March 2002.
4. Civil-Military CooCoordination (CMCO), Council Doc. 14457/03, 7 November 2003, para.1.
5. Civil-Military CooCoordination (CMCO), Council Doc. 14457/03, 7 November 2003.
6. Council Doc. 14457/03, para. 2-5.
7. For extensive elaboration see Renata Dwan, *Civilian Tasks and Capabilities in EU Operations*, paper presented at Berlin Expert Seminar on Tasks and Capabilities, 18-19 May 2004, esp.pp.15-18.
8. Created in summer 2007.
9. Renata Dwan, op.cit., pp.9-12.
10. Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, Council. Doc.11127/03, 3 July 2003.
11. See Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning, Council doc. 13983/05, 3 November 2005.
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Civilian_Military cooperation in humanitarian missions

The experience of Afghanistan in civil-Military cooperation: An example for the Mediterranean?
Francisco José Gan Pampols

THE EXPERIENCE OF AFGHANISTAN IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION: AN EXAMPLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN?

Francisco José Gan Pampols

Colonel in the Spanish Armed Forces

Presentation

Ever since the days of our first national interventions in operations abroad, a lot has changed, both in terms of procedures and of the resources employed. Nevertheless, it is clear that the greatest change that has taken place is in our way of thinking, when we consider the reasons why these peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations are carried out, how they are developed, what interlocutors are available and how the success or failure of these initiatives can be evaluated. We have experienced conflict situations in which the entire peacekeeping operation has been focused on the warring adversaries, and all our efforts were aimed at separating, containing, disarming and redeploying them. However, was this enough?

The experience has taught us that in order to achieve success, from the outset of each operation we have to act simultaneously and systematically upon a diversity of objectives that go far beyond a purely military analysis of the problem. Thus, we have to locate and make contact with the unofficial leaders, the networks that form public opinion beyond the official sources, the autochthonous experts in development in short, anyone who can instil in a society in crisis the value of security, which is an indispensable condition in terms of development, reconstruction and quality of life.

War often causes citizens to lose hope in the possibility of a better future, and thus we, the "peacemakers" have to bear in mind that our first task is to restore their hope for a better future, even at the cost of enormous sacrifice in the present. Security only becomes an important value when it is viewed as a precursor of other elements that have real or symbolically high value for the population.

Our experience in different geographical settings can help us to improve our actions in other environments. Thus, when setting up civil-military cooperation initiatives on humanitarian missions in the Mediterranean, a great deal can be learnt from what has already been carried out in countries such as Afghanistan.

> In order to achieve success we have to act simultaneously and systematically upon a diversity of objectives that go far beyond a purely military analysis of the problem

The origin of the experience to be transmitted

Afghanistan today

The international community decided to promote a wide-ranging agreement on Afghanistan that would make its democratic future viable and sustainable

Rather than embark upon a long historical analysis, I will instead focus on the past 30 years, a period of generalised violence which goes from the Soviet invasion in 1979 to the subsequent civil war, the war of the Talibans and their bid for power and the situation that arose following the defeat of the Taliban regime by the Coalition forces in late 2001. For the purpose of this article, I will be focusing on the real situation of a State that has for a long time been trapped in a spiral of dismemberment and destruction, and has often been forgotten by those who could have intervened at critical moments, but did not want to.

This Afghanistan that I have experienced is in the grip of chronic underdevelopment and has almost no formal power structure beyond the capital, Kabul. Furthermore, it has a population that is ethnically very diverse, networks of power and influence of tribal origin (and even of different clans) which are beyond political control, and an almost nonexistent national industry or agriculture. Though it might seem a pessimistic view, it is on the point of becoming a failed state, and the only reason it has not failed before now is because of the widespread backing given by the international community to the legally constituted power that currently governs the country. Corruption, illiteracy, inefficiency, lack of training and violence are just some of the worst evils that are obstructing the development of an efficient administration.

Even though in certain departments (though not all of them) it is possible to find a certain ability for planning and programming actions, the problem occurs when the actions have to be put into practice in an uncontrolled area. The necessary decentralisation does not take place because there is no certainty that the projects can become implemented beyond the areas under the control of international forces. The result is a *de facto* paralysis that is only alleviated when troop movements are deployed on the ground on a more consistent, permanent basis than mere shows of force. Meanwhile, efforts are being made to create, and as quickly as possible, an army and a police force that will be able to take over the responsibility of security and internal order on an autonomous basis. In short, there is too much work to be done in too short a time, with a lack of resources and without a long-term programme for creating and validating State structures.

The international community and its agreements

Once the Coalition's military campaign had successfully defeated Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that supported it, the international community decided to promote a wide-ranging agreement on Afghanistan that would make its democratic future viable and sustainable. First there was the conference in Bonn, followed by a second in London, where the architecture of international aid, its objectives and its control systems were all decided. In a parallel manner, in late 2001 and early 2002, the International Security and Aid Force (ISAF) was created, after which, and backed by the United Nations Security Council mandate, it was estab-

lished in Kabul, to be later deployed under the umbrella of NATO forces throughout Afghan territory in late 2005. The Multinational Force that ISAF comprised was deployed in four locations at a regional level (Mazar i Shariff, Herat, Kandahar and Bagram) as well as in the capital, Kabul; ISAF numbers totalled some 35,000 troops, in addition to the troops of the Coalition, which numbered approximately 15,000.

A new conception of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid

In terms of ensuring that Afghanistan has a future, it is clear that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) will continue to represent the main vehicle for the expansion of ISAF. The concept of the PRT is still a fairly recent one, and though it came in for criticism during the first stages of international military deployment in Afghanistan, with the passing of time, it has become recognised as a highly beneficial instrument for helping the Afghan government increase its effective presence and influence in the different provinces. PRTs are made up of joint civil-military teams of different sizes and compositions, each one directly under the orders of the country that has provided the team members, and which are deployed in most of the provincial capitals. PRTs provide a real and credible alternative to an international peacekeeping presence (imposition), something that cannot be applied in Afghanistan, nor is it included in the ISAF mandate. The current PRTs are controlled by Germany, Spain, the United States, Holland, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, the United Kingdom and Turkey, respectively. Meanwhile, other Allied and Partner countries are contributing significant numbers of civil and military personnel.

The ISAF-managed PRTs have contributed to countless reconstruction projects, they have mediated between groups in confrontation situations, collaborated in the process of the disarming of the various Afghan militias and supported the development of a national Afghan police force and army. In general, they helped to improve security through their contacts with the local authorities and the population of the area.

PRTs have also proved to be an innovative way of bringing together civil and military actors in the complex task of supplying external aid for national reconstruction. Their composition is based on the approach that stabilisation and reconstruction represent two sides of the same coin. As stressed in the Afghanistan Compact: "Security remains a fundamental prerequisite for achieving stability and development in Afghanistan but security cannot be provided by military means alone". Even though the PRTs continue to be under the responsibility of different nations and are adapted to the peculiarities of each region, the idea is spreading that it would be better to have more coordination, and not only in the military sphere, in order to share our common efforts and to reconcile the respective activities with the regional and national priorities of the Afghan government. It would also be a good idea to draft more detailed common guidelines for all the PRTs.

In any case, the concept of the PRT has shown itself to be an effective, opportune, feasible and sustainable tool. Using a carefully-measured amount of force, PRTs are able to penetrate areas where the work of other organisations cannot be guaranteed, as well as interacting with

PRTs have also proved to be an innovative way of bringing together civil and military actors in the complex task of supplying external aid for national reconstruction

civil society and local administrations, echoing the real problems of the population they are supporting, and guiding the government's actions by monitoring the Provincial Development Plans (PDP) and the various sectorial plans created by departments at a provincial level.

The reality of the Spanish PRT model in Afghanistan

At present, the impetus that lies behind the capacity of the Spanish PRTs in Qala and Naw to transform society and the population undeniably derives from national initiatives. Particularly, it derives from the continued spending by the Spanish government and the political will to maintain military forces on the ground until the desired levels of effective government (governability) and economic sufficiency (development and reconstruction) have been achieved. But it is also true that this capacity for transformation is often obstructed, in different ways, by the reality of the society in which the PRT is working. Particularly by local administrations that are incapable of understanding the short-, medium- and long-term objectives of the efforts being made, or by administrations that are technically unskilled and highly corrupt. Such a situation considerably widens the range of action that must be addressed if one aims to leave a functional country with its survival assured: this range of action covers the tasks of training, control and verification, supervising spending and many others.

In short, it involves creating a country in accordance with the will of its legitimately-elected governors, educating its population so that they will adopt the standards of coexistence that correspond to a model of "limited" democracy compatible with their *modus vivendi*, and attempting to legitimise these innovations among the people. In all, it is an enormous task that can at times overwhelm the international community's limited capacities on the ground.

In effect, the reality experienced by the PRT is one of a national initiative operating on its own, because there are still no international organisations or NGOs to speak of in the province of Badghis. The signing of bilateral agreements only partly alleviates the fact that something vital is still missing, an integral plan for Afghanistan as a whole, with goals to be reached over a specific timeframe. Though it would be a praiseworthy act to create an oasis of progress, it would represent no more than a grain of sand in a desert of urgent needs. Meanwhile, the fight against illiteracy, corruption and apathy must be continued and intensified. Skilled workers must be trained at all levels and the departments in Kabul and the provinces must be monitored, and all of this must be carried out in such a way as to avoid colonial attitudes, imposition or arrogance. We have to listen and discuss, create synergies and combine our efforts, pushing from behind and from below, and subtly persuading all the while.

Towards a possible evolution

Afghanistan's present is mired in terrible problems, the solutions to which cannot always be found within the country itself. Its long, complex border with Pakistan, its ethnic diversity and the fanaticism of the Talibans, not to mention the widespread grinding poverty, are the

most significant features in an equation that will not be easy to solve. Meanwhile, Afghan society, tribal, fragmented and without any real public opinion, is beginning to oppose the presence of international forces, both those of the Coalition and the ISAF. It is worth mentioning that sometimes it is the Afghan government itself, through its inability to connect with its population, that is most responsible for the Afghan people's erroneous perception of the mission of the international forces. Having said that, the international forces must also accept responsibility for actions which, though they might be justifiable in terms of the legitimate use of force, have proved costly with respect to the image of justice and impartiality that govern the actions of the ISAF and the Coalition forces.

To draft an accurate summary of development, one has to consider the essential elements of the problem: the population, security, the economic situation and international presence.

In the first place, there is a clear, urgent need to win over the trust of the population. Afghanistan cannot have a decent future without the consent of its complex social system. In the same way, stability and peace cannot be achieved in the country without the elimination of the Taliban threat, an objective that cannot be achieved only through the use of force. But even though such elements might jar with a democratic conception of coexistence, we have to be realistic and achieve the objective, through reiterated actions, that the society itself succeeds in bringing about a change in the mentality and attitudes of those that support the rebels. The Taliban world must be integrated into the Afghan State structure to ensure that past colonial experiences are not repeated, as we know all too well what the results would be. But that does not mean that the Afghan government and the international community should not back the legitimate use of necessary force to contain, isolate and eliminate the threats that affect the essential form of survival of the fragile model currently being introduced.

Secondly, we need to carry on funding action to bring about the development and reconstruction of the country. The Afghan people must come to understand that their general living conditions will improve the more they involve themselves directly and actively in the creation and maintaining of a climate of security, which is indispensable for development and reconstruction.

Thirdly and lastly, the Afghan society needs to begin the natural creation of elites capable of taking on the political and governmental responsibilities required by a State in order for it to function normally. At the same time, the Afghan people must realise that the international presence has a defined, finite life cycle, and that the development of economic, political and administrative sufficiency will result in the withdrawal of the international forces.

Sometimes it is the Afghan government itself that is most responsible for the Afghan people's erroneous perception of the mission of the international forces

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Security sector reform

Risking trust: Security sector reform assistance in the Arab region
Arnold Luethold

Arnold Luethold

*Head of the Africa and Middle East Division,
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*

S ecurity sector reform is a complex political and social process rather than a technical endeavour. Reorganising and restructuring security forces alone would not produce capable security and justice providers for the Arab region. Nor would training and equipment be able to achieve it. Legitimate, effective security and justice organisations emerge from a broad range of inter-related and mutually reinforcing efforts. Security and justice organisations would be unable to perform well without technical skills or proper equipment, but their real strength stems from public trust and support. This, in turn, requires proper political process, which helps develop and nurture the legitimacy of these organizations.

Thus, 'security sector reform', in OECD donor-language, implies the establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability, so that the security forces and the political authorities, which control and oversee them, operate in a manner consistent with democratic norms, and within the rule of law[1]. By doing so, the security sector enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. This carries some practical implications for international assistance of which perhaps the most important is that security sector reform cannot be dissociated from democratization.

It goes almost without saying that the bulk of international assistance directed into so-called security sector reform in the Arab region does not constitute security sector reform as defined by the development ministers of the OECD. It describes more a cluster of activities, which provide equipment and training to selected forces. Such assistance is too often aligned more on external security interests, usually the security interests of donors, than interests of societies in the recipient countries. Typical external security would include obtaining support for and participation in the Western-led war on terror, protecting the extraction and transport of natural resources, promoting or protecting commercial interests, fighting illegal migration and drug-trafficking, or keeping certain groups or individuals in power while preventing undesired actors from exerting influence. At the military level, interoperability between forces and systems also act as important drivers of technical reforms.

In the Arab region, most activities labeled as 'security sector reform assistance' target the defense and security *forces* (armed forces, police, intelligence etc.) as beneficiaries, and only seldom the security *sector* as a whole,

Legitimate, effective security and justice organisations emerge from a broad range of inter-related and mutually reinforcing efforts

A more sustainable reform effort, from which all parties could benefit, would have to give much higher priority to the security needs of citizens

which would also include the executive, the legislative, the judiciary and the more informal actors of oversight (as for instance civil society organizations and media). International assistance is usually delivered through force-to-force relations, involving military, police and intelligence officials. This results in a limited concern for the wider institutional and legal framework and a tendency "to securitize" the civil aspects. While such an approach may lead to transformations of the security apparatus, it usually fails to deliver on the normative expectations of security sector reform, which would typically include enhanced transparency and accountability of security and justice organizations and democratic legitimacy.

The chances for such reforms being sustainable, in a society which stands to receive little direct benefit from them, are small and in some cases, like for instance in the Palestinian territories, practically non-existent. A more sustainable reform effort, from which all parties could benefit, would have to give much higher priority to the security needs of citizens, including their wish that professional and efficient security forces be properly controlled by the Executive and held accountable by Parliament and the Judiciary and that civil society organizations and the media are allowed to exert informal oversight. Most citizens in the Arab region see the primary objective of reform in the reduction of corruption and nepotism and enhanced respect for human rights, particularly within the security apparatus.

To understand ownership of security sector reform is critical and is related to the question of political and societal inclusiveness in policy formulation and decision-making in societies: what is the vision of reform, and does this vision address the security needs of all citizens or just those of a few? Does the public approve of the vision, objectives and strategies and does it have a possibility to influence decisions? Who defines which problem reform needs to address? Does decision-making follow proper institutional process or are there shortcuts, which give certain groups more power to influence outcomes? Do external actors impose their vision of reform or do they assist a genuine reform process that reflects the will of citizens?

For example, the Western initiative to train and equip the *Presidential Guard* and the *National Security Forces* in the Palestinian territories to counter the elected Hamas government has had four important drawbacks: (1) It established a new security organisation outside governmental and parliamentary control; this runs counter to what security sector reform seeks to achieve, namely a democratically-accountable and legitimate security sector. (2) It exacerbated tensions between Hamas and Fatah; many see the bloody clashes of 2007, which ended in Hamas' seizure of control in the Gaza Strip, as a direct consequence of this policy. (3) The disregard for proper institutional process, mainly in terms of resource allocation, strategic and operational control, and accountability procedures, resulted in the progressive dissolution of institutions. This, in turn, accelerated the breakdown of central control and fragmentation of political power. (4) Ultimately it also undermined the credibility of donor involvement. In a poll conducted in 2007, 84 per cent of Palestinians distrusted the advice and assistance given by the US and Canada in security sector governance; and 69 per cent distrusted European advice and assistance in this regard[2].

From a development perspective, security sector reform built on a hardcore security notion that neglects the importance of political development for achieving long-term stability is part of the problem, not of the solution. Different groups within a society may disagree with each other about the orientation of their policies, but such differences need to be admitted and subject to discussion, as part of a political negotiation process, which helps prepare the consensus and compromise required for sustainable solutions.

Several Western countries have, for example, offered their support to those Lebanese political parties who called for disarming Hizbullah, supposedly as a means of strengthening the state. Hizbollah, on its side, has insisted that state institutions, to which Lebanese armed groups were expected to hand over their weapons, were insufficiently developed and lacked legitimacy. There were also doubts whether disarmament would affect only some or all of the Lebanese armed groups. Subsequently, Hizbollah defended the viewpoint that institutional development needed to be given priority over disarmament. This illustrates that various Lebanese actors hold differing threat perceptions and differing views on sequencing of reform. Unless these are being properly acknowledged and addressed, security sector reform is unlikely to succeed.

Because of the uncertainty involved in terms of outcomes, democratic process is often assigned a low priority in practice. More assertive parliaments, as for the example the National Assembly of Kuwait, can delay or refuse the ratification of international agreements. Thus, for greater expediency and for the sake of preserving their own interests, some donor countries prefer to see security sector reform in the Arab region rather in the hands of the executive and pay lip-service to oversight and control mechanisms.

Security sector reform, however, stands and falls with its acceptance in the wider society. As societal values, interests and power are involved, procedural aspects, such as the representation and participation of stakeholders, do matter, and it would be erroneous to believe that reform can be removed from politics.

In the longer term, not only recipient countries, but also donors would benefit more from a greater emphasis on governance development, since higher responsiveness to citizens' needs promises higher sustainability. In the Arab region, such an assistance policy would need to pay attention to the following:

- Promoting political and social inclusiveness throughout the Arab region, without exception, by encouraging broad stakeholder participation in the discussion of legal and normative frameworks and in policy debates;
- Supporting and assisting the development of a national security policy dialogue with a view of facilitating consensus on a society-owned vision of security;
- Encouraging security sector reform decision-making through normal institutional process;
- Promoting and assisting the development of effective control and oversight institutions with the objective to deliver security and justice to the people;

> In the longer term, not only recipient countries, but also donors would benefit more from a greater emphasis on governance development

- Strengthening transparency and accountability in security sector governance and reform by assisting the development of a culture of openness and human rights compliance that enhances the legitimacy of national actors;
- Encouraging and assisting the development of informal oversight capabilities, which enable civil society organizations and the media to play their role in national security debates;

While some donor agencies have embraced a policy along these lines, implementation remains piece-meal, slow, under-funded and often inconsistent with policies and practices of other government agencies within the same donor country. For security sector reform in the Arab region to progress, donors may need to revisit their attitude to risk and place higher trust in Arab citizens.

Notes

1. See OECD DAC *Handbook on Security System Reform, Supporting Security and Justice* (OECD, 2007), p. 23f.
2. Roland Friedrich, Arnold Luethold, Luigi de Martino, *Government Change and Security Sector Governance: Palestinian Public Perceptions*, Summary Report, 3 August 2007, (Geneva: DCAF-IUED), pp. 25-26. Available at: http://www.dcaf.ch/mena/Palestine_Sec_Perceptions.pdf

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Security sector reform

Thick silence and flourishing voices: Democratic oversight of the security sector and the role of the civil society in Turkey
Volkan Aytar

THICK SILENCE AND FLOURISHING VOICES: DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY SECTOR AND THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

Volkan Aytar

Program Officer. Democratization Program.
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Istambul

As the heir of a dismantling world Empire, the Republic of Turkey was established amidst a chaotic intermingling of new hopes and longitudinal fears. Facing the double impact of the rise of ethnic nationalisms, and changing dynamics, norms and applications of the world diplomacy, the reformist state elites of the late Ottoman period had tried to walk on a thin line of having to balance the requirements of an emerging and increasingly consolidating world order, with that of keeping what is left of an once glorious empire.

The 'Baggage' of History: Bargain between the State and Society on Security and Rights

Constant population movements, most chiefly of Muslim groups away from the newly established Christian nation-states towards the heart of the shrinking Empire may be said to have contributed to the development of a new type of 'bargain' between the state and the imperial subjects. This bargain was based on an allegiance to a protective state apparatus and passive subjection to its rules, thus an exchange of rights and liberties with defense and security.

Established on this very bargain, and faced with new threats of unfriendly intrusion, the new republic tried to sustain the territorial congruity and social homogeneity of the country through a mixture of administrative/coercive fiat and mass political socialization. Sensing the need to construct allegiance in a country populated by migrants and belligerent groups, the new republican elite took the previous bargain at a different and higher level by instituting republican citizenship as a concrete implementation of the exchange of rights and liberties with defense and security.

Addressing this bargain from a different yet related angle, Aydın argues, the 'fact that Ottoman Empire/Republic of Turkey is demographically shaped by complex, interwoven and successive waves of migration and their associated traumas is one of the main shaping factors of the state-citizen asymmetry'[1]. Aydın also claims that 'the relationship between the citizen and the state is one determined by the dual expectations/ requirements of 'fear' and 'security' whereby the state is perceived and conceptualized as a body mimicking the role of the patriarch'[2]. The sheer

value of citizenship rights has not yet been ingrained in Turkish popular mentality as well as prolonged bureaucratic perceptions. Longitudinal attitudes still lend support to an asymmetrical model of an all-powerful state and passive citizen[3]. Thus, the particular loci for the citizenry were strictly defined according to the needs and expectations of the state, and citizenship rights were 'granted' in a top-down manner.

Securitization of the State and Society

The unbalanced relationship between the state and the citizen was also superimposed on geopolitical as well as internal political developments that further exacerbated the erosion of citizens' rights, and that created conditions for an asymmetrical type of relation between the civilians and the military by placing extreme emphasis on a discourse of the security of the state, thus effectively 'securitizing' the state and the society as a whole. Helped by a permissive international atmosphere marked most chiefly by the Cold War -whereby pro-Western 'authoritarianism' was preferable than pro-Soviet 'totalitarianism,' and citizens' rights could easily be abandoned and/or abridged for the sake of state's and its allies' security-; Turkey became a NATO member with a strong and socially popular army. In this particular regard, the bearing and prolonged impact of the Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* – TSK) has been critical.

In its self-defined role as the 'protector of the republic,' TSK wielded significant power to define the strict contours of the security and defense requirements of the state, that were seen as being 'naturally' above politics, thus as 'higher' issues that could not be discussed or altered by the elected governments, let alone by individual citizens. Reminding Aydın's notion of the separation between the *state* and *government*, the former sphere was the domain of the military and bureaucratic elites deciding on the security and defense agenda, while the latter sphere was seen to be peopled by 'unreliable' (and mostly 'corrupt') civilian politicians that need to be directed to rubber stamp pre-made decisions.

In this context, the experience with multiparty democracy was marred by four military interventions (those overt or nearly overt military *coup d'états* in 1960, 1971 and 1980; and the "post-modern" coup in 1997), as well as the constant mobilization of an overbearing political discourse of security and defense. The discourse of security and defense, which was to a great extent adopted by majority of the masses, and left rather unquestioned in the world system of states, provided little room for the development of genuine citizenship consciousness, let alone constitutional guarantees for the defense of citizenship rights.

Shifting Ground: A Changing Environment of Rights and Security

With the end of the Cold War since the mid-to-late-1980s, and through Turkey's latest experience with pluralistic democracy since 1980, the security and defense environment, as well as the discourse and implementations of citizens' rights, have changed considerably. Firstly, Turkey lost its former position of a bulwark against the communist pact, and

Turkey became a NATO member with a strong and socially popular army

found itself in an increasingly complex and chaotic world and in a regional environment that was further underlined because of the flaring up of the social unrest and violent conflict in the South-Eastern and Eastern Anatolia.

Secondly, again at the international plane, the classic separation between defense and security or between external security and internal security quickly faded. Third, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, international terrorism gained a new and more threatening face, which, coupled with the Allied invasion of Iraq, added even more complex and chaotic dimensions to the conceptions, perceptions of and solutions to the security problems.

Fourth, in Turkey, the double impacts of increasing social demands towards more democratization and the country's European Union membership bid paved way to numerous democratic reforms and changes, including important changes in legislation and administrative practices, as well as the widening of the discourse of democratic citizenship. Turkey's European Union membership bid has been greatly helped by a sustained political will, as well as increasing social demands towards democratization.

The Development of Civil Society since 1980

One could argue that Turkey's state-centred polity has significantly weakened the development of civil society. In this sense, the role of the military coups deserves notice. Ünlü argues that, "(a)long with the 27 May 1960 military *coup d'état* and the 12 March 1971 military 'Memorandum' (*muhtıra*), the coup of 12 September 1980—which rendered organisations, foundations and civil society formations, as well as the more institutional and organised structures of democracy, such as the media and the parliament dysfunctional—continued to make itself felt through its traumatic effect on the civil society consciousness and the 1982 Constitution"[4]. With the coup of 12 September all NGOs as well as political parties were shut down and their property seized. A total of 23,667 organisations were shut down[5].

With the coup, the social and organisational dynamism dating back to 1960s was harshly halted. One could claim that the primary aim of the *junta* was to atomize society by conducting a politics of "anti-politics," whereby social debates and discussions as well as the diverse voices in society were muted. All in all, the coup of 12 September was among the highest points in securitization of state and society.

Notwithstanding its heavy toll, the coup of 12 September gave way to a social dynamism of a different type. Since the early 1980s, organisations bringing together the victims of the coup were established. Ünlü lists the Families of Prisoners Assistance Association (*Tutuklu Hükümlü Aileleri Yardımlaşma Derneği* TAYAD), founded in 1984, as well as the Federation of Families of Prisoners Assistance Associations (*Tutuklu Aileleri Dayanışma Dernekleri Federasyonu*, TUHAD-FED) and the Support to Families of Prisoners Association (*Tutuklu Aileleriyle Yardımlaşma Derneği,* TAYDER) among such organisations[6].

Turkey's state-centred polity has significantly weakened the development of civil society

Among other significant additions was the Human Rights Association (*İnsan Hakları Derneği*, İHD) which has shown significant visibility, continuity and impact when compared with previous, less influential organisations except for the Saturday Mothers (*Cumartesi Anneleri*), an informal group of activists bringing together the victims of the coup as well as those relatives of the disappeared persons, political prisoners and others. The Saturday Mothers became emblematic with their nearly regular demonstrations on Saturdays in front of the Galatasaray High School in Beyoğlu, İstanbul.

While their protests were frequently and violently dispersed by the police, their creative and colorful style of activism sometimes likened to the Mothers of Plaza del Mayo in Buenos Aires, Argentina, became a model to be followed by similar groups and even at times by groups that are opposed to their agenda. Not only Islamic women with headscarves, feminist, gay and lesbian, left-wing and Kurdish activists, but also nationalist groups espoused Saturday Mothers-type of activism to attract attention to their plight. Indeed a group calling themselves the Friday Mothers (*Cuma Anneleri*) bringing together nationalist relatives of the members of the Turkish security forces killed or wounded fighting the separatism of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan*, PKK) briefly took to the streets in a similar fashion.

Later, the establishment of the Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (*nsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği*, Mazlum-Der) signalled the introduction of a healthy diversity into the human rights advocacy scene, whereby HD was positioned to the left of the spectrum, while the Mazlum-Der was known to be closer to 'religious' sensibilities. Notwithstanding their differences, HD and Mazlum-Der managed to cooperate on a number of issues to resist encroachments over citizens' rights. Considering that such a tradition of cooperation is significantly lacking in Turkey, İHD and Mazlum-Der's work emerge as path-breaking. Indeed, the state and mainstream media discourse branded both organizations as 'dangerous,' even as legal fronts for separatism and insidious activities.

The Susurluk 'Parenthesis': A Challenge to Shadowy 'Security' Apparatus

A car crash near Susurluk district of Balıkesir on 3 November 1996 signaled the beginning of a civil societal dynamism unparalleled in the history of the republic. In the accident, police chief Hüseyin Kocadağ, a convicted right-wing criminal on the run, Abdullah Çatlı and his girlfriend were killed, while the then ruling coalition partner, center right True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP) deputy Sedat Bucak was wounded. In this 'strange' accident, it was discovered that Çatlı -who was convicted of the murders of eleven left-wing Turkish Labor Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP) activists before the military coup- was carrying a Turkish diplomatic passport issued under a fake name and was traveling with an active duty police chief and an ethnic Kurd deputy (from the ruling coalition) known to be involved in anti-terrorism activities in the South-Eastern Anatolia against the PKK as a pro-state tribal chieftain (*ağa*) and village guard (*köy korucusu*, a paramilitary security force established by the state in early 1980s[7]) leader.

The accident started to unravel the networks and connections dubbed as the 'deep state,' (*derin devlet*) namely those groups and individuals involved in shadowy activities partially supported by factions within the state bureaucracy and security apparatus. Those networks were allegedly involved in conducting an 'informal war' -llustrated by extra-judicial killings and series of assassinations- against the militants of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) that was particularly active in the late 1970s and early 1980s -whereby they killed and wounded numerous Turkish diplomats in Europe, US and elsewhere to force Turkey accept the 'Armenian Genocide' of 1915-.

The 'deep state' and its various operatives were also reportedly involved in conducting 'informal' fight against suspected PKK militants and sympathizers, and ethnic Kurdish drug lords, anti-state tribal chieftains and mafia leaders suspected of financially supporting the PKK. Some 'deep state' formations were also allegedly working in tandem with the shadowy Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Organization (*Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele Teşkilatı*, JİTEM), whose existence was vehemently denied by the government and the army[8]. JİTEM was suspected of conducting 'dirty' methods to fight the PKK and its militants and sympathizers.

The Susurluk accident unleashed a civil societal dynamism aimed at completely unraveling the shadowy networks within the state and security apparatus while protesting the passivity and silence of the then ruling coalition that was trying to belittle the significance of the accident. The post-Susurluk activism emerged as an important beginning of the civil societal challenge of the unchecked powers of the security sector in Turkey, and signaled the beginning of an advocacy wave underlining the need for civilian and democratic oversight and control mechanisms over the security sector. A "One Minute of Darkness to Bring Constant Daylight" campaign was supported by impressive numbers of citizens joining various and colorful protests.

However, post-Susurluk dynamism was soon to be diverted solely against the *Refahyol* cabinet[9] suspected of conducting an 'insidious' campaign to undermine the secular roots of the regime. Indeed, *Refahyol* was forced out of power with what some call the "postmodern" military coup on 28 February 1997. By managing to divert attentions away from the shadowy networks within the state and security apparatus, the military and civilian bureaucracy successfully muted alternative voices and gathered popular support for the protection of the regime against a harshly criticized yet an elected government. While Islam-friendly NGOs were targeted and scrutinized heavily, secular and left-wing NGOs were either divided or enlisted against these former associations.

An Emerging New Path? Civil Societal Contributions since 2000

The Susurluk event had nevertheless injected a healthy dose of 'suspicion' among the citizens whereby state and security forces lost their previously untainted image, and their hitherto unchallenged hegemonic status. While some took this suspicion to the extreme by producing and disseminating numerous 'conspiracy theories', -that usually scrutinize, demonize and criminalize certain individuals and groups rather than supporting

> The Susurluk accident unleashed a civil societal dynamism aimed at completely unraveling the shadowy networks within the state and security apparatus

a consistent politics of transparency and democratic oversight- many citizens came to believe that shadowy and dirty cliques indeed exist within the state and security forces. While post-Susurluk dynamism was muted and diverted to support the regime against 'Islamist infiltration', its impact was still important in shaping developments since 2000, especially in the context of impressive legal, administrative and social changes coupled with Turkey's European Union membership bid.

In the formal front, following the constitutional amendment of October 2001, eight "EU Harmonization Packages" were adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* – TBMM) between February 2002 and May 2004. All eight packages included impressive changes in legislation that enlarged the domain of citizens' rights *vis-à-vis* the previous security-oriented state structures. Although there exist serious deficiencies in implementation mainly because of the longitudinal impact of institutional, bureaucratic and ideological behavioral modes that squarely remain within a state-oriented and authoritarian mindset, all eight packages imply a deep sea change in Turkish legal system, politics and societal dynamics, real promises, potential limitations, as well as substantive and temporal durability of which will be tested in decades to come. However, the true significance of the reform packages also need to be evaluated in relation to the new civil societal dynamism since 2000.

'Rights Discourse' on the Rise: A New Civil Societal Dispute and Divergences

If we examine all eight packages, we see a very significant and impressive transformation towards democratization, an increase in the domain of citizens' rights over the highly securitized administrative structures of the state, and better harmonization of the Turkish Civil-Military Relations (CMR) with the universal democratic standards. As a whole, the packages and other related legislative and implementation-oriented steps imply a move towards better balancing human rights protection and security provision.

We could also claim that all these formal-legislative changes, as well as the process of EU accession, stroke a chord with the widespread societal demand towards democratization that had an important past in Turkey. The formal changes in legislation also initiated a more substantive transformation in the 'rights discourse', whereby the citizens increasingly question the state-centered assumptions, regulations and practices, and start to reclaim their inalienable rights. This rights discourse was strengthened to such an extent that, even those anti-EU and anti-democratization forces increasingly mobilize 'civil societal' methods -along with methods of intimidation, including physical and verbal attacks, calling the 'old guard' to duty, and others- to further their agenda, by filing charges, initiate petition campaigns and public relations tactics, among others. Although their perspective and most methods are highly anti-democratic and authoritarian, they nevertheless seem to rely on the opportunities of the new atmosphere of pluralism and permissiveness by trying to fight for the cultural hegemony of the country in perhaps a Gramscian sense.

In this new atmosphere, more programmatic efforts were shaped by NGOs to help discuss the agenda of civilian and democratic oversight

of security sector. While some pro-state NGOs such as the Centre for Eurasian Strategic Studies (*Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*, ASAM) seem to conduct 'think tank' activities to help the regime 'manage' the coming and increasingly strengthening discourse of civilianization (*siville me*), and EU demands for further alignment of the Turkish CMR with those of the European standards with the least 'damage,' some liberal NGOs such as the TESEV put forth a more civil societal and critical stance to help transform not only CMR but also to positively contribute to the agenda of civilian and democratic oversight of security sector.

In late 2004, ASAM teamed up with the Istanbul Policy Center (*İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi*, İPM) and the Gröningen, Netherlands-based Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) to conduct a project on Governance and the Military. ASAM withdrew from the project in April 2005 by claiming that the final report was unjustly criticizing the Turkish state and that its suggestions were not in line with Turkey's best national interests[10]. While the three organizations continue to cooperate, their differences seem to have overshadowed the agenda of civilian and democratic oversight of security sector.

We could claim that the main aim of the Governance and the Military project of the CESS and İPM was centered on an understanding that through the course of Turkey's EU membership bid, further alignment with the EU standards in CMR would prove to be increasingly more inevitable and that the Turkish Armed Forces should be 'convinced' that it is to its best interest to join this process rather than isolate itself by resisting it. In this sense, ASAM's inclusion to, as well as withdrawal from the project is highly symbolic considering this think tank's close links with the security establishment in general and with the TSK in particular.

Compared with CESS-İPM-[ASAM] project's exclusive emphasis on the CMR, TESEV's Democratic Horizons in Security Sector project conducted in partnership with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is a more multi-faceted effort that takes as its starting point the notion of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) as whole, and the agenda of civilian and democratic oversight of security sector. TESEV and DCAF do to put the sole critical emphasis on Turkey's problematic CMR, and instead concentrate on helping reform all security sector institutions ranging from the TSK to the police force, from the gendarmerie to the village guards, from private security to the intelligence organizations. Also different from the CESS-İPM-[ASAM] project, TESEV and DCAF take as their target audience the members of parliament, the media and the civil society at large[11]. In this sense, their project aims to help initiate and support civilian capacity building efforts.

Conclusion

In Turkey, discussing security issues and advancing the agenda of civilian and democratic oversight of the security sector have always been difficult. Especially considering the above discussions on the 'sanctity' of the state and the 'bargain' between the state and society on security-rights balance, even raising the issue was viewed as akin to "national treason". Historically, human rights associations faced tremendous pressures and difficulties, and even social stigma, and had to fight against claims that

More programmatic efforts were shaped by NGOs to help discuss the agenda of civilian and democratic oversight of security sector

they have "hidden agendas" to demoralize the Turkish security forces and undermine the secular and republican roots of the regime.

Notwithstanding positive developments in civil societal dynamism since 1996 and more specifically since 2000, NGOs continue to face administrative measures, court cases, nationalist attacks and others. While since 2000 the discourse of democratization gained considerable strength, developments in 2005, such as the Şemdinli scandal (which exposed the continuity of the 'deep state' formations and networks especially in the eastern and southeastern Anatolia), the 're-securitizing' amendment to the Anti-Terror Law, and the nationalist backlash are alarming enough to underline the fact that both democratization wave and the agenda of civilian and democratic oversight of the security sector are far from being secure and complete. More civil societal contributions are needed to help transform not only legislation and administrative practices, but also social mentalities still viewing the state as 'sacred' and the bargain between security and rights as necessary and inevitable.

Notes

1. See, S. Aydın, *"Amacımız Devletin Bekası": Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Devlet ve Yurttaşlar*, TESEV Publications: Istanbul, 2005, p.8. For an English-language summary, see: http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/events/ndemoc_axis_state.php.
2. Aydın, ibid, p. 8.
3. However, it should be noted that this powerful mental model greatly overshadows the richness of social realities in Turkey. Aydın, for example, argues against such "simplified assumptions pitting powerless citizens against an oppressive state" by showing that "in a far complex reality, administratively constructed mentalities are highly internalized, functionalized and operationalized by individuals". Aydın, ibid, p. 8.
4. F. Ünlü, "Non Governmental Organisations", in Ü. Cizre (ed.) *Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight*, DCAF-TESEV Series in Security Sector Studies, TESEV Publications : Istanbul, 2006, p. 190.
5. Ünlü provides below information to illustrate the social impact of the 12 September 1980 military coup:
   "Number of people 'tagged': 1.683.000. Number of trials and people tried: 230.000 people in 210.000 trials. Number of death sentences and executions: 517 people were sentenced to death, 50 were executed. Number of people whose citizenship was revoked: 14.000. Number of recorded deaths through torture: 171 people." Moreover, newspapers were not able to be published for 300 days, and many cases of torture and suspicious death were witnessed. F. Ünlü, "Non Governmental Organisations", in Ü. Cizre (ed.) *Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight*, DCAF-TESEV Series in Security Sector Studies, TESEV Publications : Istanbul, 2006, p. 190.
   See <http://www.memursen.org.tr/haberioku.asp?kategori=1&id=173>.
6. Ünlü, ibid, p. 191.
7. For a documentation and discussion of the village guard system, see, E. Bee, "Temporary Village Guards," in Ü. Cizre (ed.) *Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight*, DCAF-TESEV Series in Security Sector Studies, TESEV Publications : Istanbul, 2006, pp. 138-147.
8. For a discussion, see, E. Be e, "Intelligence Activities of the Gendarmerie Corps (JTEM-JT)," in Ü. Cizre (ed.) *Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight*, DCAF-TESEV Series in Security Sector Studies, TESEV Publications : Istanbul, 2006, pp. 172-189.
9. A compound title used to refer to the ruling coalition between the Islam-friendly Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) and the centre right *True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP).
10. See URL: http://www.cess.org/publications/harmoniepapers/pdfs/HarmoniePaper19.pdf.
11. For details of the TESEV-DCAF project, see URL: http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/events/democ_hor.php. For a comparison of the two projects, see, F. Ünlü, "Non Governmental Organisations," in Ü. Cizre (ed.) *Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight*, DCAF-TESEV Series in Security Sector Studies, TESEV Publications: Istanbul, 2006, pp. 193-198.

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Human Security

Security sector reform

The EU and its policy towards security sector reform: A new example of the 'conceptual-contextual' divide?
Gemma Collantes Celador

THE EU AND ITS POLICY TOWARDS SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: A NEW EXAMPLE OF THE 'CONCEPTUAL-CONTEXTUAL' DIVIDE?

Gemma Collantes Celador

*Post-Doctoral Research Fellow,
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI)*

First introduced into the public domain by the UK Labour government following its electoral victory in 1997, Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a relatively recent concept.[1] The often cited 1998 speech by former UK Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, at the Royal College of Defence Studies (London) has become a symbol of the key role that the UK played in developing this concept, but also a clear indication of how new this concept is. Short called for "a partnership between the development community and the military" to address the "inter-related issues of security, development and conflict prevention".[2] Her statement effectively parted from the type of military assistance and defence cooperation – often referred to as "old defence diplomacy" – that characterised the eras of European colonialism and the Cold War. That is, technical assistance aimed at strengthening the armed and security forces of allied countries without consideration for the governance aspect, including the democratic accountability of those forces.[3]

As a field of study and practice, the development of SSR has been influenced by a number of trends. These include the re-thinking process of Cold War-related security concepts in favour of people-centred definitions that went on since the late 1980s in Africa, Asia and Latin America; the "new wars" of the 1990s, to use Mary Kaldor's terminology; and, more recently, the aftermath of 11 September 2001.[4] Consequently, at present, SSR has links to a multitude of pressing problems, from poverty alleviation to sustainable development, good governance and conflict mitigation/resolution.[5] SSR has widened its scope from an initial narrow focus on the defence sector to include other security agents as well as issues related to justice; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Due to the changes in the nature and scope of SSR, the concept occupies an important role within the policy agenda of key international actors, from individual states (like the UK and the Netherlands) that have developed specific SSR policies or comprehensive governmental approaches, to international institutions such as the OECD, the UN and the EU. The latter two have in recent years moved a step further by producing policy concepts that institutionalise their efforts in this field in search for more coherence, comprehensiveness and coordination. Even the World Bank has succumbed, albeit more timidly than other institutions, to the need to incorporate security-related policies.

> SSR has links to a multitude of pressing problems, from poverty alleviation to sustainable development

The present chapter is located within the study of institutional responses to the multidimensional nature of SSR. It will provide an analysis of the EU's efforts to improve its performance in this field by focusing on its two recent policy concept papers. It will highlight the main traits and synergies of the documents, using the example of police assistance as an illustration of the Union's readiness to engage actively in the field of SSR. In doing so this article engages with those scholars who point out that "a 'conceptual-contextual divide' exists between SSR's stated goals and its actual implementation".[6]

EU Concepts on SSR: What, Where, When?

There are two EU documents on SSR, the 2005 *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform* (henceforth 'Council SSR Concept') and the 2006 *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform* (henceforth 'Commission SSR Concept'). As explained later in the chapter, these documents were brought together under a common policy framework in 2006. These two SSR concepts build on various EU reference documents, including the *European Security Strategy* that advocates a Union ready to engage in a larger variety of missions. Moreover, security sector reform, within a broader institution-building approach, is mentioned in the strategy document as one of the possible approaches to fulfil EU objectives, including preventing and/or resolving violent conflict, combating terrorism and address-ing state fragility. A similar message can be found in the *Civilian Headline Goal 2008* document, endorsed at the December 2004 European Council. It calls for going beyond Petersberg-type missions to include, among other things, support to SSR and DDR.[7]

The Council and Commission SSR concepts also build on their previous efforts in this field. For example, at a strategic level, in 2004 both the European Commission and a number of EU Member States were heavily engaged in the development of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) *Security System Reform and Governance* guidelines (due at least in part to their membership of this committee). At an operational level, the Union through both its Council and Commission mechanisms has already been engaged for a number of years in the implementation of various aspects of SSR. For example, the Commission has provided SSR-related support in over 70 countries, through both its geographical and thematic programmes, from Eastern Europe to North and South Caucasus and Central Asia, Western Balkans, Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific, South Mediterranean and the Middle East, Latin America and Asia. The support provided so far has fallen in the areas of reform of law enforcement, justice, and state institutions deal-ing with the management and oversight of security agents. Other activities have been directly linked to the respect for human rights which, in the words of the Commission, "also encompass the security sector and thus indirectly contribute to security sector reform".[8] Furthermore, some of the Commission activities have in the past sought to strengthen regional approaches to secu-rity, which "also has a positive impact on SSR efforts at the national level".[9]

The Council has focused more on deploying civilian and military missions within the framework of its ESDP, beginning in January 2003 with the European Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, until 2005

none of these missions were meant to address SSR as a whole, but rather specific aspects of the security sector, such as purely military issues, civil-military relations, police reform, rule of law and border management.[10] The EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has broken with this pattern. This mission has engaged in army reintegration and reform, advice to security authorities on good governance and, at times, in aspects related to police and customs reform, leading to some overlap with the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (April 2005-June 2007).[11] A new SSR mission is being planned in Guinea Bissau, expected to be deployed in spring 2008.

The existing evidence of Council and Commission involvement in SSR-related activities seems to illustrate that the EU is not entirely new to this field. However, there are some critics who argue that the operational activities listed by the Council and Commission documents as evidence of their experience require a more critical assessment as many have been re-labelled to fall under SSR.[12] Leaving this issue aside, what makes the two EU concept papers on SSR different is their emphasis on providing the Union with a coherent and holistic/integrated approach that did not exist before. According to a Council official, "the SSR concept is not 'new' in itself […] many Member States have done bits of SSR before […] the only thing that is new is the idea that SSR-related work has to be holistic".[13] In order to achieve this comprehensiveness, the two SSR concepts have sought to provide the basis for successful coordination between the EU Pillars while also ensuring "one common understanding on SSR among the 27 Member States".[14]

The Council and Commission SSR concepts adopt by and large the OECD DAC guidelines as the starting point, which define the security sector as:[15]

A system which includes:

- The core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; custom authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).
- Security management and oversight bodies: the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committee; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units) and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
- Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.
- Non-statutory security forces, with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguards units; private security companies; political party militias.[16]

Both documents highlight the importance of ensuring and/or strengthening the accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector

Evidence of Council and Commission involvement in SSR-related activities seems to illustrate that the EU is not entirely new to this field

DDR can constitute a significant pillar of SSR and is regarded as central to conflict resolution However, SSR goes well beyond DDR and should be considered as the primary concept

when dealing with external and internal security needs, the civilian control of security actors, the protection of democratic norms and principles of good governance, human rights, transparency and the rule of law. They also acknowledge the importance of local ownership and tailored approaches that can ensure that the EU's support to SSR is the most adequate to the needs of the local population, the country and region.

Africa seems to have been in the mind of the Council and Commission officials involved in the drafting process of the two SSR documents for a variety of reasons: (1) historical factors, particularly for countries like the UK and France; (2) existing strong links between Africa and the EU and its close proximity to the Union; (3) the pressing conflict-related problems this continent is going through and the effects these have within the EU in the form of human and drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. However, this does not mean that the two concepts were created for implementation in Africa alone. On the contrary, the intention was to create a general tool that the EU could use in a variety of contexts worldwide. In fact, when put together, the two documents identify a number of possible scenarios for EU action on behalf of SSR, ranging from an immediate post-conflict situation to a context where countries are undergoing long-term democratisation processes in relatively stable environments. The two SSR documents acknowledge that each scenario comes with its own set of needs and combination of Council and Commission action. Within this framework the southern Mediterranean countries and the Western Balkans are two other regions well-suited to receive EU assistance in the field of SSR.[17] These two regions are appealing to the EU for they fall within the Union's enlargement and neighbourhood policies and consequently, the state of their security sectors arguably has a bearing on the EU's internal security needs.

EU Concepts on SSR: How and by Whom?

The two SSR concepts endorse the OECD's call for a holistic, multi-sectoral approach that seeks to find linkages between existing local security actors when carrying out reform activities, rather than concentrating on one or a very limited number of actors, often independent of each other, as previous donor actions have tended to do. This search for comprehensiveness goes further in the EU case considering that the Council document calls for the integration of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) activities within a SSR approach.

It has been noted that DDR can constitute a significant pillar of SSR and is regarded as central to conflict resolution and internal stability. In such cases, SSR will call for DDR-type activities. However, SSR goes well beyond DDR and should be considered as the primary concept; DDR should be addressed separately, but consistently with this SSR concept, noting that the Commission is particularly active in the field of Reintegration.[18]

The importance of this relationship was similarly underlined in the 2006 *EU Concept on DDR*, where it was underlined that any DDR process "should be considered an aspect of Security Sector Reform and take its point of departure from an assessment of future needs and structures

of the overall security system, recognising at the same time that parts of DDR go outside SSR".[19] The EU has been involved in DDR activities for a long time, mainly through Commission actions and Member States' bilateral programmes. This track record was reinforced in 2005 by the ESDP Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia, deployed to monitor the disarmament of members of the former resistance movement (GAM) and the phased withdrawal of Indonesian government troops.

The Council and Commission SSR documents also specify the kind of support the EU could offer in particular areas, including military reform, police reform, justice and rule of law, border and custom sector, financial and budgetary reform of the security sector, and government functioning and division of responsibilities. Let's take the example of police reform. The Council document specifies that, The EU could, inter alia, provide assistance in the following domains:

- assessment of policing needs;
- defining the objectives of a comprehensive policing policy and strategy, fully integrated with the objectives of the Justice/Rule of Law sector;
- developing a methodology for achieving such objectives, including critical and success factors and their measurement;
- organising the police sector, including oversight/budget control;
- administration, transparency and accountability, as well as political control;
- educating the police sector on the principles of modern policing and police management, including respect for human rights, international law, and gender issues;
- guiding and accompanying the police force in their daily tasks during a transitional period;
- co-locating experts to the national ministry of home affairs to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities in issues related to home affairs and SSR;
- launching public awareness campaigns in order to secure the trust and co-operation of the community.[20]

In order to realise this police assistance the Council has at its disposal a variety of mechanisms developed since the late 1990s. At the 2000 Santa Maria da Feira meeting, EU Member States approved police action as a priority area, in addition to the rule of law, civilian administration, and civilian protection. Furthermore, it was concluded that by 2003 EU Member States should voluntarily contribute up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations, up to 1,000 of them deployable within 30 days if necessary. Since then, these police targets have been met and increased. Moreover, the *Civilian Headline Goal 2008* document has provided the EU with guidelines for the enhancement of civilian crisis management capabilities, both in terms of capabilities and possible scenarios for their deployment.[21] This has allowed for progress in Member States' contribution, for example, of specialists in the fields of border police, sexual and violent crime, human trafficking, organised crime and human rights as well as in the development of Civilian Response Teams, Integrated Police Units and Formed Police Units. These developments are now complemented with a new *Civilian Headline Goal 2010*, adopted during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU (July-December 2007). Based

The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 document has provided the EU with guidelines for the enhancement of civilian crisis management capabilities

on the assumption that the commitments made in the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 have been met, this new document gives more weight to questions of quality over quantity of the capabilities.[22] The building of the EU's civilian crisis management capabilities has so far taken place concurrently with a similar exercise – commenced earlier – to build a military crisis management capability.

The process of fleshing out the EU's role in police assistance has also been accompanied by the creation of a number of structures and plans, including the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, the Police Unit in the Council Secretariat, and the Police Action Plan to foster consistency within the EU and with other external actors.[23] More recently, the EU Council of Ministers agreed on a reorganisation of the Council Secretariat to better serve the needs of civilian ESDP operations, including those of a police nature. The end result – the establishment of a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) – will complement the "new" civilian crisis management directorate (DGE IX) in the Council Secretariat. The latter, following its restructuring, will deal with the political-civilian (pol-civ) side of crisis management, such as the preparation of the crisis management concept.[24] It will nevertheless continue to manage horizontal issues related to civilian ESDP, including concepts, capabilities and training.[25] Note that none of these capabilities and structures was created to serve SSR activities, but rather for crisis management more generally. However, with the consent of Member States they could also be applied to missions of this kind.

Turning now to the Commission, it can contribute directly to the promotion of the governance aspects of police reform/assistance, including democratic control and civilian oversight, police-judicial relations, independence from politicisation, civil society assistance, efficient use of public resources, respect for human rights and capacity-building of regional and/or sub-regional organisations to deal efficiently with the regional dimensions of SSR (including police aspects). There are in fact various well-established Community policies and financial instruments that have been used and could be used in the future. These include Short-Term instruments (such as the Stability instrument administered by the DG External Relations) and those that fall under Development and Economic Cooperation, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Policy, the Pre-Accession Assistance instrument, the Enlargement process (including twinning programmes), and the Democracy and Human Rights, and Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management policies.[26] Moreover, there is also the external dimension of policies related to the area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

However, as outlined by the Commission document, the tools at its disposal could be better employed. For example, SSR (including police reform/assistance) should be prioritised under the aforesaid policies and financial instruments, as well as clearly integrated in Country and Regional Strategy Papers, and action plans programming tools. For the latter proposal to take place it would depend, at least partly, on good coordination with Member States bilateral country strategy papers. Other proposals under consideration include working towards effective and holistic policy and programming dialogue with stakeholders in partner countries by introducing international standards on SSR, ensuring coordi-

nated planning (as has begun to take place through Council-Commission fact-finding missions), expanding and improving the range of expertise and pool of experts, designing SSR-specific training, and improving cooperation with international partners.[27] For its part, the Council SSR document suggests that since SSR has to be locally owned, national development plans in areas such as poverty reduction should also be taken into account.[28]

The authors of the Council SSR document realise that reforming the security sector is a horizontal process that encompasses elements that cannot be tackled using crisis management instruments alone. Consequently, the document calls for complementarity with other areas of EU external action:

In any situation, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission will need to work in close cooperation both to ensure a clear, functional division of responsibilities and to ensure maximum coherence and effectiveness of overall EU effort. It is foreseen that the paper on a Community concept on SSR will build on the same premise.[29]

And indeed it does. The Commission SSR document calls for coherence not only with ESDP missions but also with the bilateral activities of certain EU Member States. It also mentions the need for better cooperation at a multilateral level in order to ensure greater levels of synergy and the avoidance of unnecessary duplication, not only within the UN framework, but also with third states, other international organisations, and NGOs. An example of this search for coordination is the work that the Commission has carried out within the OECD DAC framework to develop, together with some EU Member States and other bilateral and multilateral donors, the 2007 joint donor handbook for SSR implementation.[30] This document provides donors with a set of common guidelines in areas such as SSR assessment methodology, programme design, management and evaluation, and development of integrated approaches, that allow for a better management and linkages between development, security and justice policies and practices. The end goal of this donor handbook is to achieve greater levels of efficiency, coherence, sustainability and adequacy to people's needs in the implementation of the 2004 OECD DAC *Security System Reform and Governance* guidelines.[31]

EU Concepts on SSR: Problems

There is some scepticism as to the viability of the EU's search for holism and coherence in its SSR activities. This arises from a number of problems that appeared during the policy formulation phase, and that cast a shadow on its implementation. The EU did not proceed to merge the Council and Commission documents into one overall SSR concept, as originally intended. As stated in the Council document, "due consideration should be given to joining these two strands within the framework of an overarching EU concept for SSR".[32] This was initially thought to be of as necessary since, as the titles specify, both the Council and Commission documents on SSR were drafted to show what each institution could contribute to an SSR process, with the Commission document presented as a "Communication".[33] Nevertheless, it was decided to discard this original idea and instead bring the two concepts

There is some scepticism as to the viability of the EU's search for holism and coherence in its SSR activities

under a common framework in June 2006. This common policy framework highlights the need to take a comprehensive, cross-pillar approach to SSR that subsequent Presidencies and the Commission would gradually turn into operational actions for Community and ESDP action.

There are various explanations for this change of plans. As elucidated by a senior Council official, "For outsiders one common concept would have been better but too time-consuming and Austria wanted to complete this job before the end of its Presidency".[34] The drafting of the two SSR concepts took a total of eight months, with the Commission document taking the longest due to the fact that all country and thematic desks had to be consulted. Therefore, according to this Council official, developing a common document on the basis of these two would have taken too long at a time when the Austrian Presidency was determined to finish the process began by the UK. A Commission official, however, provided a different view on this change of events:

Given the range of policy instruments used to support SSR and the different nature of community programmes and ESDP activities we have not seen the need to try to revise these and come up with a single document. Instead, we are focusing on implementation and how to achieve better coherence in situations like DRC, Kosovo and Afghanistan, etc.[35]

Regardless of how reasonable this point of view sounds, the fact is that the absence of a single document on SSR reinforces the view held by many scholars and practitioners that coordination and collaboration between the Council and Commission is still sub-optimal.

Concerning internal EU cooperation, one should also add to the aforesaid institutional equation the need to cooperate with the national policies of those Member States active in the SSR field, and to ensure better civil-military relations, which remain two areas with too many open questions. Some of the challenges confronting the EU with regards to its relations with Member States are eloquently summed up by a Council official, who remarked that,

'SSR is still very young. It has the possibility of becoming something 'nice' if we are able to manage it all in a coherent way, if Member States are keen to cooperate, if they are willing to give the necessary capabilities to the EU […] for the time being it is not so evident […] so far there is no transparency of Member States with the EU on what each of them is doing in terms of SSR programmes in different countries'.[36]

The drafting of the 2006 DDR Concept provides the opposite picture. The various EU-related stakeholders involved (including Member States) were ready, in the words of a Commission official, to "break the existing institutional set up to acknowledge the security-development nexus" leading to the Commission and Council working together in the drafting of one single concept.[37] This 'success' story could nevertheless be explained by the narrower field of action, the smaller number of EU actors involved, and the fewer locations of EU action.

The problems of internal cooperation and coordination could somehow be offset by a successful implementation of the SSR documents. In this respect,

THE EU AND ITS POLICY TOWARDS SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: A NEW EXAMPLE OF THE 'CONCEPTUAL-CONTEXTUAL' DIVIDE?

one can already point at some positive initiatives. For example, the development of joint Commission-Council-Member States fact-finding missions, the awareness-raising campaign by EuropeAid among other Directorate Generals and EC Delegations to speed the information-sharing process on best practices, and the Commission's participation in the drafting of the OECD DAC 2007 Handbook on SSR. However, these moves are timid steps if the EU is to confront those sceptics that continue to view the SSR documents as another "paper tiger" that will be lost and forgotten in the maze of documents produced by the EU.[38] Indeed, there is an array of potential challenges that the EU needs to tackle. These include further work on the development of regional approaches to SSR (as called for by the two SSR concepts) and benchmarks to measure the implementation of SSR activities, the dependence of successful SSR on effective cooperation arrangements with the multitude of external actors that can be found in the field (from bilateral donors to international organisations and NGOs), and the costly political, economic and human capital implications of integrated approaches. Finding solutions to these challenges is of utmost importance if we take into account that the successful implementation of a coherent SSR policy requires a careful consideration of issues such as planning, budgeting, financial and human resources, and cooperation and competition among relevant actors.

The Council and Commission SSR documents represent a major step forward in the development of the EU's external identity

Conclusion

Writing in 2006, Damien Helly (from Saferworld) argued that SSR would become in the foreseeable future a crucial component in the implementation of the EU's defence, security, development, and crisis management and conflict prevention policies since it represented a "formidable tool to engage in groundbreaking initiatives worldwide" and in a variety of scenarios.[39] He also delved into the reasons that made the EU an ideal candidate as a SSR advocate, including its donor status, its flexible and enduring presence in many countries, and the variety of tools (political, developmental, security) at its disposal.[40]

Despite all existing criticisms, the Council and Commission SSR documents represent a major step forward in the development of the EU's external identity. The approach described in these documents, underlined by the principles of adherence to democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law, respect for nationally/regionally owned participatory reform processes, and coordination with other areas of EU action on the basis of gender-sensitive and multi-sectoral reform processes, will allow the Union to respond more effectively to a variety of challenges, including violent conflict, poverty, state fragility and terrorism, to name a few.

However, in order to turn these pledges into tangible results and take advantage of its strengths, the EU needs to deal with a variety of outstanding issues, such as improving internal coordination among members of the EU family, and externally with a variety of actors, and the costly nature of the endeavour. The process did not start well, as illustrated by the drafting of a common policy framework instead of a single SSR concept. However, given that this new EU policy is still in its early implementation stages, it is too early to predict where it will go.

Notes

1. Different actors use variations of the term interchangeably. Whereas the development community tends to opt for "security sector reform", the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) prefers the term "security system reform", and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) supports the phrase "justice and security sector reform". Security Sector Governance and Security Sector Transformation (often equated with African discourses) are other possible alternatives. This chapter has opted for the term "Security Sector Reform" as it is the most commonly used among scholars and practitioners. For a more detailed explanation of the existing terminology see Michael Brzoska, *Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform*, Occasional Paper no. 4, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2003.
2. Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, *Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR): Policy, Practice and Research*, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 2006, p. 10.
3. Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster (2004), as quoted in Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner, "Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU's Neighbourhood", *Chaillot Paper* no. 80, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, July 2005, p. 20.
4. For a detailed account of the evolution and key elements in the SSR field, see Jane Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects,* Adelphi Paper no. 344, Oxford: Oxford University Press & International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2002.
5. Ball and Hendrickson, *Trends in SSR,* op. cit., p. 3.
6. Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake, "To Arrest Insecurity: Time for a Revised Security Sector Reform Agenda", *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 5, no. 3, December 2005, p. 295.
7. Council of the EU, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 12; Council of the EU, *Civilian Headline Goal 2008,* Document no. 15863/04, Brussels, 7 December 2004, p. 2.
8. For more information see European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: a Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform,* Document no. COM(2006)253final, Brussels, 25 May 2006, p. 6.
9. Ibid.
10. For a list of all the ongoing and completed ESDP missions, consult the Council of the EU website, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en.
11. Interviews with Council and Commission officials, Brussels, April 2007; International Crisis Group, *Security Sector Reform in the Congo,* Africa Report no. 104, 13 February 2007.
12. See, for example, Andrew Sherriff, "Security Sector Reform and EU Norm Implementation" in David M. Law (ed.), *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform,* Münster: Lit Verlag and DCAF, 2007, p. 94.
13. Interview with Council official, Brussels, April 2007. One of the examples used to illustrate this holistic or integrated approach is the fact that, although civilians in the Council were involved in the drafting of the Council document on SSR, the process was led by the Civilian-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff. In the words of another Council official, "SSR is another tool to bring all existing mechanisms and elements to work together. The same function is achieved by other initia-tives, including the Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Cooperation developed by the EU". Interview, Brussels, April 2007.
14. Interview with Council official, Brussels, April 2007.
15. For a discussion of the differences between the EU's SSR definition and that of the OECD DAC see Willem van Eekelen's contribution in David Spence and Philipp Fluri (eds.), *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*, London: John Harper Publishing, 2008.
16. Underlined in the original. Council of the EU, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, Document no. 12566/4/05 REV 4, Brussels, 13 October 2005, pp. 5, 7-8.
17. Interviews with Council and Commission officials, Brussels, April 2007. The Western Balkans has been receiving aid of an SSR-related nature for over a decade but not in a holistic, integrated manner.
18. Council of the EU, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR*, op. cit., p. 7.
19. Council of the EU and European Commission, *EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR),* Document no. 16387/06, Brussels, Approved by the Council of the EU on 11 December 2006 and by the European Commission on 14 December 2006, p. 12.
20. Council of the EU, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR*, op. cit., p. 14. It would be interesting to compare and contrast this list of police assistance roles with the two generic concepts, prepared by the Police Unit in the Council Secretariat a few years ago, on (police) substitution missions and strengthening missions. These two generic concepts dealt with general issues (administration, organisation, etc.). Police substitution missions are composed of armed police officers with executive police powers (i.e. filling the enforcement gap). Police strengthening missions consist of unarmed police officers with roles that range from educating to training, assisting, advising and monitoring the local police (i.e. capacity-building). At the time of writing the author of this paper did not have access to these two generic concept documents. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, "ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges", *European Foreign Affairs Review,* vol.10, no. 2, Summer 2005, p. 222.
21. Council of the EU, *Civilian Headline Goal 2008*, op. cit.; Gustav Lindstrom, *The Headline Goal,* Section on ESDP, Paris: Institute for Security Studies 2007, pp. 5-6; Council of the EU, *Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference – Ministerial Declaration*, Document no. 14713/05 (Presse 306), Brussels, 21 November 2005, p. 2.

22. Council of the EU, *Civilian Headline Goal 2010,* Document no. 14823/07, Brussels, 9 November 2007.

23. Annika Hansen, "Security and Defence: The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina", in Walter Carlsnaes et al. (eds.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy,* London & Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishers, 2004, pp. 173-185; European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Document no. SN200/00, Santa Maria da Feira, 19-20 June 2000.

24. For example, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability will contribute to the realisation of effective civilian-military (civ-mil) cooperation during the planning phase of missions through its participation in the joint civ-mil planning capability in the Civ-Mil Cell within the EU Military Staff.

25. Interview with Council official, Brussels, April 2007; "EU Continues to Improve its ESDP Structures in Order to Reinforce its Role as a Global Player", *ESDP Newsletter*, Issue 4, July 2007, p. 6.

26. Interviews with Commission officials, Brussels, April 2007; European Commission, *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform,* op. cit., pp. 6-7, 9. For example, beneficiary countries from Commission assistance under the pre-accession instruments are supported in their efforts to carry out reforms in their legal systems as well as in their police, prosecution, judiciary, penitentiary, customs and border control systems.

27. European Commission, *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform,* op. cit., pp. 10-12; Interviews with Commission and Council officials, Brussels, April 2007.

28. Council of the EU, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR*, op. cit., p. 5.

29. Ibid, p. 4.

30. Interview with a Commission official, Brussels, April 2007.

31. OECD DAC, *Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, Paris, 2007, Foreword.

32. Council of the EU, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR*, op. cit., p. 21.

33. This point was highlighted by a Council official during an interview, Brussels, April 2007.

34. Interview, Brussels, April 2007.

35. Interview, Brussels, April 2007.

36. Interview, Brussels, April 2007.

37. Interview with Commission official, Brussels, April 2007.

38. The existence of this scepticism was raised in various interviews conducted in Brussels in April 2007.

39. Damien Helly, "Security Sector Reform: From Concept to Practice", *European Security Review*, no. 31, December 2006, p. 12.

40. Damien Helly, "Developing an EU Strategy for Security Sector Reform", *European Security Review*, no. 28, February 2006, p. 7. For other accounts of the comparative advantage of the EU in the SSR field see Saferworld, *Developing a Common Security Sector Reform Strategy for the EU*, Paper based on Expert Seminar organised by the UK Presidency of the EU, European Commission, Saferworld and International Alert, January 2006.

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Conclusions

Security in the Mediterranean in the year 2007: A reflexion concerning human security
Eduard Soler i Lecha

SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE YEAR 2007: A REFLEXION CONCERNING HUMAN SECURITY

Eduard Soler i Lecha

Coordinator of the Mediterranean Programme of the CIDOB Foundation

With contributions from:
Ángeles Espinosa*, El País;* **Rosa Massagué***, El Periódico;*
Rosa Meneses*, El Mundo*

Since their earliest days, Euro-Mediterranean relations have experienced regular attempts at revitalisation; that is to say, moments when public and private actors reiterate the idea that the Mediterranean is a project for the future, an unresolved matter and an inescapable challenge. However, these laudable attempts to reactivate Euro-Mediterranean relations, in order to move towards shared peace, freedom and prosperity, have often been frustrated, either by different regional conflicts or by a lack of political will.

One of the most important issues of 2007 was the determination of the new French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, to reactivate relations between European countries and their Mediterranean partners. France's initial proposals left no-one indifferent – neither in the north nor the south of the Mediterranean – and since then it has been said that the most commendable aspect of Sarkozy's initiative was that it reactivated the debate on Mediterranean issues.

This debate is a matter of urgency. Despite the fact that notable progress has been made in recent years in the macro-economic stabilisation of Mediterranean partner countries, and that some of them are beginning to attract significant foreign investment, in other areas the situation is less promising. Most of the objectives set by European countries and their Mediterranean partners in 1995 are still far from being achieved. How long must we wait until they become a reality?

During the course of 2007, security issues have been particularly important in the Mediterranean, even though, unfortunately, it cannot be claimed that any major progress has been made. Terrorism has continued to devastate the Maghreb region, relations between Algeria and Morocco have not experienced any improvement, and the conflict in the Western Sahara and the different conflicts in the Near East are still unresolved. Meanwhile, the situation has not been much better in the area immediately surrounding the Mediterranean: Iraq, Iran and Darfur continue to be sources of instability, and their effects can be felt throughout the Mediterranean basin. Furthermore, the old dream of adopting a Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean does not seem achievable over the short- or medium-term.

> One of the most important issues of 2007 was the determination of the new French President to reactivate relations between European countries and their Mediterranean partners

As I say, the objectives of peace, freedom and prosperity are still valid, and we need to carry on with our efforts in that direction. For several decades, Spain, and particularly Barcelona, have been scenarios for reflection and debate on Mediterranean issues. In the area of security, since 2002, the CIDOB Foundation and the Ministry of Defence have been organising seminars on security and defence in the Mediterranean that provide a meeting point for civil organisations and the military, between government representatives and experts, and between citizens from the north and south shores of the Mediterranean.

As we can see from this publication, participants in these seminars tackle some of the most important issues concerning security in the Mediterranean. On a regular basis, we analyse the progress that has been made in the various cooperation initiatives, such as the Barcelona Process, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the 5+5 defence initiative. As the contributions produced in this seminar reveal, progress is taking place, especially in the most technical issues and in the frameworks that are less visible, politically speaking. We are involved in a process that requires small steps, and which also acknowledges the importance of maintaining frameworks of political dialogue at the highest level, as well as the need for reflection on a global basis.

This year's seminar included a round table session featuring distinguished participants who analysed scenarios for security and insecurity in the Mediterranean from different regional perspectives. The addresses that have been included in this publication highlight, once again, the complexity of the various threats, the need to integrate different perspectives into the debate and the coexistence of old conflicts, featuring known actors, with other, newer conflicts that have new protagonists.

The sixth seminar on security and defence in the Mediterranean also made time for a reflection that was conceptual, but which had clear practical implications. Both the academic field and some public administrations have been promoting a new way of understanding security: I am referring to the doctrine of human security. In the Mediterranean basin, and especially in the countries on the southern banks of the Mediterranean, not only the States but also (and especially) the citizens are facing a number of different risks to their security.

Within this area there have also been major efforts made by Spain, and specifically by the CIDOB Foundation, to encourage reflection in this direction. The seminar on security and defence in the Mediterranean has represented a fresh opportunity to make progress in a debate that has (or should have) a clear relevance in the field of public policy, which includes security and defence policy.

If there is one aspect that characterises discussions on the concept of human security, this is the breadth of issues that they cover, or that they can cover. By means of its different working groups, this seminar focused on three particularly important issues. This publication contains the speakers' contributions, but in this 'conclusions' section I would like to summarise a few general ideas about the debates that took place in these groups (and for which I am indebted to the three relators for their contributions).

In the group that dealt with the issue of fundamental freedoms, the point was made that in the northern Mediterranean region, confusion exists between human rights and national interests, between the values that they defend and the politicians' behaviour. Furthermore, differences exist between the EU and the USA in the promotion of fundamental freedoms, though both exploit this issue. As a result, it should come as no surprise that different actors on the southern shores of the Mediterranean have a prejudiced view of both powers. For many of these southern actors, the new 'war on terror' that resulted from the September 11 attacks has only helped to worsen insecurity between the North and the South, from which it can be inferred that fundamental freedoms have been the victims in the fight against insecurity.

According to different analysts, European politicians see security as their main aim, with democracy as a secondary objective. One example of this is the way in which the US and European countries treated the Hamas movement, which won the 2006 legislative elections in Palestine, and which were carried out in a democratic manner. Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes use the war on terror as a bargaining chip in their dealings with the West. The West's support for certain regimes with the aim of halting the advance of the Islamists is a good example of this.

Does the EU have the legitimacy to promote increased respect for human rights? Reduction of freedoms in Europe in the wake of US anti-terrorist policy (such as information on travellers and DNA files, as well as clear human rights violations such as rendition and the relocation of torture) have been eroding the legitimacy that Europeans previously possessed.

Several participants in this working group claimed that Europe must have credibility not in the eyes of governments, but for the people and, as a consequence, it must support civil society. Does Europe have a coherent foreign policy? With whom should the EU hold talks? The democratisation of the region has been set back several decades by the war in Iraq, and the situation in Iran is not the ideal way of ensuring security in the Mediterranean.

In spite of its many faults, the Barcelona Process is perceived as the best guarantee for stability and progress for democracy in the Mediterranean, though the question must be asked as to how to strengthen security within the framework of fundamental freedoms. Existing instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and Mediterranean Dialogue (NATO) are not effective enough in this specific field. The former's action plans are too general and its incentives too weak, while the latter pays scant attention to issues concerning freedoms.

One instrument that could be of greater utility is small multilateral flexible frameworks that feature cooperation on the operating levels between security agencies and cooperation between civil organisations and military forces. However, one of the conclusions produced by this group's discussions was that security forces (and especially in the south) will need to interiorise the concept that they are serving the State and the citizens.

Reduction of freedoms in Europe in the wake of US anti-terrorist policy have been eroding the legitimacy that Europeans previously possessed

The Spanish Armed Forces have made important efforts in civil-military cooperation on the humanitarian missions and development aid projects in which they have been involved

The second working group dealt with civil-military cooperation. This is an area that is particularly important in terms of proposing specific actions that adhere to the logic of human security, and at the same time to the interiorisation of the concept of service, as mentioned by the previous group.

This working group stressed that the Spanish Armed Forces have made important efforts in civil-military cooperation on the humanitarian missions and development aid projects in which they have been involved. Spain's Armed Forces have shown signs of willingness to work under the orders of civil organisations.

Taking as an example the experience of Afghanistan, where the Spanish Army runs the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Badghis, this working group highlighted the capital represented by the army's capacity for response in the areas of transport and infrastructures, as well as emphasising the army's ability to complement the civil component. In fact, military representatives have acknowledged that their greatest success has been the fact that the military component of the PRTs has been phased out – undeniable proof that the security situation had improved. Nevertheless, these examples of progress should not lead us to ignore the fact that on a practical level, such cooperation can produce certain tensions, or even opposing interests with Non-Governmental Organisations.

The group also discussed the European context of this cooperation, revealing that there are still significant differences over how it should be tackled. On one hand, there are the EU members that favour the idea of military aid and civil aid coexisting yet clearly separated, while on the other, there are those who champion close interaction between the two. These differing approaches, together with the confusing framework that exists for carrying out preventative humanitarian action, highlight the need to work harder to define the conditions for EU action.

There was consensus over the idea that as civil conflicts increase and governments use their Armed Forces as another instrument of its external influence, there will have to be an improvement in coordination and cooperation between NGOs and Armed Forces in this area of humanitarian aid. New mechanisms may have to be established to ensure that efforts are more effective, to make better use of the contributors' funds, and to increase the efficiency of the aid for the people for whom it is meant, whether it be in Afghanistan, Lebanon or the Balkans.

In the background of the debate lay the conviction that "There can be no security without development, nor development without security". They are two sides of the same coin. To rebuild a country it is necessary to be free from fear (and thus the military's resources and experience prove necessary, albeit not sufficient), while development helps to exit conflict situations.

The third group tackled Security Sector Reform (SSR), an issue that is of great importance in many geographical areas, though insufficient attention is still being paid to this issue when governments approach the problems of security and political reform in the Mediterranean. The

group began by debating the concepts used in this field, highlighting the existence of a division between its definition and practice. The discussion emphasised the need to establish coherent, regional approaches; one of the conclusions was that there should be greater coordination between European Union organisations on SSR policies in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, when the need to promote synergies with NATO was brought up, some participants expressed their opposition and doubts as to the role of the Atlantic Alliance as an actor in both the Mediterranean region and Security Sector Reform.

Turkey is a Mediterranean country in which these issues have a particular importance, and discussions are often focused, on one hand, on whether it could constitute a model for the Mediterranean, and on the other, on the need to reform the country's security sector. As the participants of this round table pointed out, Turkey is facing several problems, the most serious of which are: the army's difficulty in accepting that it should be under civil authority; the duality between military and civil jurisdiction, which generates impunity; the need to reform the police and intelligence forces; the role of the National Security Council and its new role; the problems of authoritarian attitudes among the military and their propensity to stop reform processes, and the use of the Armed Forces in the fight against terrorism and Kurdish insurgency.

The participants were in agreement on this last point, stating that "military action is not sufficient to combat terrorism"; this opinion was echoed by the other groups. One of the most notable ideas put forward in the debate was the dimension of the concept of security forces as a service that the State provides to the population. The State should allow citizens to evaluate the Armed Forces and be prepared to demand that they operate in an ethical manner based on the principle of good governance. When security is viewed as a service (the same as health, for example), then the citizens are allowed to evaluate it.

And so, the participants reached the conclusion that what is needed is a protocol of transparency and good practice, though this should be drafted for each country and each specific case, to provide local solutions. In this sense, participants considered that the experiences of countries such as the Congo, the Balkans and other fragile states are not valid for the Mediterranean area, where there are no failed states, but rather autocratic states.

The participants also expressed the idea that working on Security Sector Reform also means working to build State institutions, in addition to the independence of Justice and Parliament and the development of the civil society. Security is a concept that goes beyond the strictly military arena, and thus brings into play a wide range of sectors, including parliaments, governments and civil society. Thus, both the Near East and North Africa will have greater and better security if more work is done to build democratic institutions.

Sometimes, strengthening security and accepting the Armed Forces as the backbone of the State represents "encouraging authoritarianism". The confusion between the democratisation of the Armed Forces and the reform of the Security sector – understood as the re-drafting of the

The dimension of the concept of security forces as a service that the State provides should allow citizens to evaluate the Armed Forces and be prepared to demand that they operate in an ethical manner based on the principle of good governance

Security Forces' objectives and roles and as the demonstration of greater transparency by the institution – leads us, once again, to the debate over having greater control of the armed forces. Nevertheless, in some Arab countries, there is resistance to this process owing to the fear of being perceived as weak in the eyes of their external enemies.

One controversial issue that set off the alarm bells at the round table was the case of private security companies and their contribution to Security Sector Reform. Most of the members of the debate group expressed their concern at the idea of granting private security companies a role in the reform of the security sector, as they considered that it would be "disastrous". The participants made their comments in light of the role played by American companies such as Blackwater, who have carried out massacres of civilians in Iraq with complete impunity.

None of the debates that took place in this seminar (and which have been compiled in this publication) can provide us with miracle cures to the problem of how to increase security in the Mediterranean, or how to do so without the initiatives having a negative impact on the individual security of citizens on both sides of the Mediterranean. Thus,we have a long way to go, during which time we will have to carry out greater reflection at both academic and political levels. Meanwhile, the seminars on security and defence in the Mediterranean will continue to be held, with this objective as their aim.

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Report

III report on weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean 2007: Beyond the nuclear threat
Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde & Balder Hageraats

III REPORT ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 2007: BEYOND THE NUCLEAR THREAT

Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde

Co-director of the Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH), Madrid

Balder Hageraats

Researcher of IECAH

Introduction

As a continuation of the efforts by the CIDOB Foundation, this third report on *Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean 2007: Beyond the nuclear threat, is an intent to respond to the central questions that have been raised* with respect to the topic of security and defense in the Mediterranean. Similar to the two previous reports – *Weapons on mass destruction in the Mediterranean 2005: Current status and prospects; and Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean 2006: An omnidirectional threat* – the present report fits within the annual series of International Seminars on Security and Defense in the Mediterranean, organized since 2003 by the above mentioned Foundation and in cooperation with the Spanish Ministry of Defense.

Following the decision adopted at the closing session of the third of these encounters, these pages are intended to offer those who participate directly in the sessions, as well as the broad national and international security community interested in the issues concerning the region, a document which facilitates an analysis of one of the most ardent problems on the international security agenda. At the same time, it is the aspiration of the authors to encourage a debate and a reflection on the threat posed by the arsenals and nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs already in existence, as well as the perturbing attempts of various state and non-state actors in acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

With this intention, the following pages look for ways to consolidate an effort that permits support for political decisions and improves knowledge about the Mediterranean. The image of this region has been characterized – both powerfully as well as negatively – in the past as well as the present by its high level of instability. The region has been characterized by, on the one hand, violent conflicts such as the one between Arabs and Israel and the conflict in Iraq, and, on the other hand, various centers of tension. This makes it difficult to imagine that in the short term anything can be accomplished by the objectives set by the Barcelona Process to create a Euro-Mediterranean region of peace and common prosperity. On the contrary, the main message coming from the region is one of general deterioration. This is not only the case in the

North-South sense but also in the more complex South-South relationships, in which the idea of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction does nothing more than fade away in the horizon.

Since the previous report the concern over the presence of WMD in the Mediterranean region has risen

Since the previous report (December 2006) the concern over the presence of WMD in the Mediterranean region – understood from the security standpoint to be the area shared both by the European Union (EU), the Balkans and Russia in the north, as well as the Maghreb, Middle East and Near East in the south and east – has risen. While the resolution to the crisis caused by the nuclearization of North Korea appears to be on track, world attention during the last months has centered on the development of Iran's nuclear program. This has led to efforts by the international community to prevent its continuation to avoid the possession of military capabilities that are perceived to be destabilizing. Leaning in one direction are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Union, above all the group of counties lead by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, who are attempting to explore all possible ways of dialogue and negotiation. Tipping the scale in the opposite direction are the Security Council of the United Nations and countries like the United States and Israel. They have managed to approve sanctions against the Iranian regime and have notably amplified their aggressive stance as a method of dissuasion. So far this has been without any success.

All this is occurring within the framework of the relentless process of WMD proliferation. From the perspective of regional security, there is elevated tension and, in some cases, even greater than one year ago. This is clearly visible from the disastrous situation in Iraq. This country is entrenched in a conflict to which there is yet to be found a clear way out and in which none of the opposing actors have sufficient capacity to impose their agenda. The same can be said about the conflict between the Israelis and their Arab neighbors. The brutal suffering produced in the Palestinian-Israeli situation - with the additional internal Palestinian rupture between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the Palestinian Authority controlled by Al Fatah - is aggravated by the Lebanese front, in which the wounds from the clash between the Lebanese Party of God (Hezbollah) and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have not had time to heal. Lebanon itself is once again on the edge of an abyss, an image that resembles the beginnings of its long and tragic civil war. Meanwhile, Syria is losing its options in Lebanon by attempting to avoid losing the territory it has always considered its own and, at the same time, trying to escape the strong pressure it feels from Washington and, even more, from Tel Aviv.

The Maghreb cannot be considered a stable region either, albeit in a very different way. It continues to be without any apparent solution to the conflict affecting Western Sahara and keeps blocking any possible advancement in the regional integration of the area. The Arab Maghreb Union has been completely paralyzed, but talks have resumed between the conflicted parties. At the same time, the terrorist threat is taking on momentum not only in Algeria and Morocco, but in the entire region – and even beyond by spilling over into the Sahel – as the rising fear inspires organizations like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb on both sides of the Western Mediterranean.

With regard to the structures of dialogue and building of trust initiated many years ago and those driven by the sub-regional order – with the Group 5+5 as the most significant – the attained balance is not exactly positive. This has been driven by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – in the framework of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue more than a decade ago – and by the European Union through the Barcelona Process. Neither one of them, neither separately nor combined, have managed to reduce the enormous breaches of inequality and high degree of instability which affect the region as a whole. Nor have they served in eliminating mutual mistrust, which over time has seeped into the broader opinion on both sides. There continues to be resistance against the necessary reforms that promote the emergence of open-societies that are well-developed at a social, political and economical level within their respective territories. With regard to the European efforts, a vague French initiative is appearing on the horizon while the European Neighborhood Policy reaches full speed. The Mediterranean Union, which still has not been able to translate words into actions, shows that, all in all, it still has not managed to find the adequate formula to manage Euro-Mediterranean issues.

Together with some changes with respect to the situation from the previous year, it is obvious that other factors and variables remain practically unaltered twelve months later. For this reason, instead of repeating the analysis of the countries and subjects with essential characteristics that have not changed in the area of WMD we refer the reader to the preceding reports. This report (Section IV) provides updates and clarifications related to the data and analysis from earlier work. In this way, and with the intention proposed at the starting point of this series in 2005, this report fills in the gaps which until now had not been given sufficient attention. Therefore, the decision was made to cover in this third issue: 1) an updated review of the nature of the nuclear threat (Section I), with special attention to the factors that drive the rising overall proliferation in this field, and to the crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear program and its repercussions for regional security; 2) a detailed regional study (Section 2) about arsenals and programs of chemical and biological weapons; and 3) an examination of the situation in the area of missiles that is related to WMD (Section III). The report closes with appendices (Section V), which include a list of acronyms used throughout the text, a detailed chronology of Iran's nuclear program during the past year, and relevant Internet websites for the subject analyzed.

As the background for the present analysis, it fits to sum up the panorama in a tone of rising concern. Given the importance that the Maghreb, Near East and Middle East have for international security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an irrefutable fact. Notwithstanding the significance that a hypothetical nuclear Iran could have, its entrance into the club would be nothing more than an addition to an already destabilizing situation. This is as much due to the already open conflicts as to the race to obtain nuclear weapons that various state actors (and most likely some non-state actors) are involved in. So far, it has not been possible to create a model for regional security that avoids hypocrisy, which produces an air of mutual trust to break the arms race, and that makes the Mediterranean a region in which differences can be resolved by peaceful means.

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The nuclear threat: a never ending story

Although subject to the volatility of diplomacy, with surprising attention and equally astonishing disregard of the subject, the nuclear threat is one of our world's solid constants. This has been the case since its tragic eruption in Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than sixty years ago. It is not so strange to consider a hypothesis which is limited to the possibility of a non-state actor (a terrorist group, specifically) obtaining radioactive materials or an operational weapon (stolen, bought or transferred directly by its owner). Above all, however, it is a reality derived directly from the danger represented by the 27,000 nuclear weapons accumulated and held by the exclusive group of countries, and the intentions of those who wish to imitate them.

The present situation is far from being reassuring in that; a) there are no signs that those who possess the weapons are seriously considering to renounce them, and some are even intend to convert them into tactical weapons; b) the control mechanisms have been surpassed by technological development that offers more options for proliferation; and c) very distinct countries (and, potentially, non-state actors) are giving in to the temptation of emulating nuclear powers. If the process in which Iran is immersed is added to this scenario, it gives a fuller and more exact idea of the severity of the threat is represented by weapons capable of annihilating all traces of human life on the planet.

Nuclear Proliferation, the permanent concern

Once more, and as a sign of hardly veiled frustration, it is necessary to point out that 2007 is coming to an end without there having been put in place any regional initiative in the subject of nuclear non-proliferation. The Mediterranean continues to exist as an excessively militarized area, both in the conventional sense as well as with regard to weapons of mass destruction. There is a constant arms race accelerated by the recent announcement made by Washington to re-arm their associates in the region, beginning with Israel[1]. In these conditions it is an illusion that there is a place for initiatives like the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in today's regional agenda. It is so often included within the international framework, but at other times simply abandoned due to the unwillingness to explore the option.

The military tendencies that dominate the region, far from increasing the security of the group of countries, continue to be obsessively focused on global re-armament that derives from the insecurity of each actor. The Arab-Israeli confrontation is – by a wide margin –the factor that most directly contributes to this dynamic. It also serves as a justification to defend other interests with respect to the enhancement of security capabilities against both internal threats as well as those from other neighbors.

An additional element worthy of similar attention is the multiplier effect, of which Iran serves as an example. Traditionally, the Israeli posture has received a lot of attention, both as a proliferator as well as an actor on the margins of any kind of international regulation. This serves as the

main argument for its neighbors who try and justify their more or less sincere intentions to enhance their own chemical, biological or nuclear capabilities. For this reason, Israel has still not been accepted as a legitimate actor within the region. Without losing sight of this factor, it is the Iranian program which is taking on momentum down the proliferation path in the Muslim world … even in Turkey. In its continuous search for regional leadership, the Shia regime of Iran is provoking rising fear among its neighbors (Muslims, but predominantly Sunni, and not only Arabs but also Turks), that will not accept that Teheran obtains such a powerful tool of dissuasion. As a consequence, favorable views on the development of nuclear energy are beginning to emerge within the region, which open the door for greater future instability.

At a more general level, other factors that further contribute to the explanation for the arms drive is the continuation of the "War on Terror", which Washington insists on pushing forward despite the clear evidence of its counterproductive effects, not only in this region but in the entire world. From that perspective, and one that affects the proliferation of WMD, it is obvious that the main focus is geared towards counter-proliferation. This approach relies on one's own strengthening and the reinforcement of military allies as essential components for the destruction of the capabilities or programs of adversaries[2] and is detrimental to non-proliferation. As a result, there is an increased feeling of mistrust about the possibilities of the frameworks, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that are of such importance. This also leads to constant criticism of the inspection work by the IAEA. Moreover, this destabilizing tendency increases when it becomes clear that potential nuclear powers tend to react to the behavior of the United States and adjust their own nuclear strategy in order to develop tactical nuclear weapons.

A final element of concern in this area is one that affects the state of the current system of non-proliferation. It seems ages ago that the decision was made in 1995 to make the NPT effective indefinitely and an agenda - which sounded realistic at the time - was put forth to make this instrument more efficient. So far, it cannot be considered a great historical success[3]. After this milestone, which appeared to inaugurate a new phase in the intentions to one day liberate the world of nuclear arms, everything changed rapidly: There was incorporation of India and Pakistan into the club in the spring of 1998, the disaster of 9/11, the North Korean crisis (withdrawing from the NPT and exploding their first nuclear device in the autumn of 2006), and there was the ongoing crisis with Iran.

Looking at it today, one gets the impression that no one is sincerely defending the non-proliferation regime. Those who have always moved at the margins of the system (Israel, India and Pakistan) obviously do not. The five countries officially recognized as nuclear powers are not ready to defend it either. They use the NPT in a selective way: To condemn some potential proliferators (while supporting others), too easily forgetting about their own obligations not to facilitate the transfer of those materials to their allies and, above all, failing to meet the mandated reductions and to eliminate their own arsenals[4]. Leaving aside those countries that consider themselves to be out of the race, and limit themselves to act as mere signatories that do not have ambitions to become regional leaders

Looking at it today, one gets the impression that no one is sincerely defending the non-proliferation regime

and/or do not feel threatened by others, there is a large number of local and regional powers left (among which Iran seems to stand out most) that view the nuclear arms as a desirable resource (even indispensable) for their strategic calculations.

In other words, the demand for nuclear weapons will not diminish as long as states which already possess them continue to portray them as emblems of great powers[5]. On the basis of the behavior of those who possess them, those who do not choose to accept the current *status quo* will resolutely try (or with a sufficiently strong incentive) to increase their international weight, defend themselves against close threats or compensate for their neighbor's superiority by means of nuclear devices.

In as far as this pattern consolidates the necessity to strengthen the NPT loses support as it is of no service to practically any of the relevant actors or to those who aspire to be one. In order to change this tendency it would be necessary, above all, to count on actors truly convinced of the advantages of having a world free of nuclear arms, in which the search for own security would not be based on the accumulation of more and better weapons. Similarly, it would be necessary to "dispel the perception that illegalizing nuclear armament is a utopian goal"[6].

In a brief panoramic overview of the current situation – keeping in mind that only the United States has the capacity to carry out a task of such nature – we find that the world's main nuclear power (behind which others hide themselves through policies of pure imitation) neither wants nor is able to do so. As its actions reveal, it is obvious that it relies on further strengthening of its military power and, as a consequence, does not feel bound by any treaty when it comes to national agreement. This is the case of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the NPT, or the never ratified CTBT. Even if it would like to, it cannot do so after having squandered its unquestionable political capital on such affairs as the manipulation of statements in order to launch the highly criticized invasion of Iraq (nor should the falsified debate about the alleged WMD of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship be forgotten). At this point, who can have confidence in Washington as a non-proliferator and as a defendant of the NPT, IAEA and of the international legislation concerning non-proliferation in general? Which other actor or organization has the capacity to lead such a process?

The problem derived from this situation is not simply about the constant weakening of the non-proliferation regime, but also about the surfacing of new countries expressing their need to revise their traditional nuclear standpoints. The fact that South Korea and, even more symbolically, Japan are following this dynamic should serve as a warning in order to avoid falling into the abyss that we are dangerously approaching. If the attitude becomes "save (defend) yourselves", we cannot avoid the growing risk of these weapons ending up in the wrong hands and that, in a tragic moment, someone may consider using them.

At this point it is important to add to the complication of the increasing significance of nuclear energy as an alternative to the growing concern about climate change through the use of fossil fuels as the driving force of the world economy (although the argument that these latter fuels are

being exhausted may carry more weight). Without having improved the security issues that go along with the use of this type of energy materials nuclear energy is once again endorsed, as it is presented as the best way to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. From the simple observation that nuclear facilities may be seen as the preferred objectives for all kinds of violent groups to the lack of technical safety and the radioactive residue of the used and stored materials, alarm bells should be ringing. Unfortunately, if this way of thinking becomes widely accepted, and there are many indications that it is[7], the 442 nuclear reactors currently active in the world may seem like only a few in several years time.

This means that in terms of geo-economical interests and the technological advances already in place, it will be much more difficult to control and regulate the use and transfer of such a delicate material. The development of this unstoppable process is not going to be slowed down – in fact it is not – for a regulatory framework to come into existence that could eliminate the security problems that can presently be foreseen. If we do not establish a more efficient non-proliferation regime, do not give more power to the IAEA in its capacity to conduct inspections, and do not look for multilateral means of management that would suit our irreversible reality, we should not be startled if our own security, and that of others, becomes more uncertain in the near future.

Evaluation of the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear program and its repercussions to regional security

In the 2006 Report, we stated that "the major part of the discussion about the Iranian crisis and its possible nuclear proliferation is burdened by the obstacles that represent a considerable number of hypotheses, falsely converted in unquestionable facts of commonly accepted knowledge. For instance, it is already assumed that Iran has a sophisticated program for the development of nuclear weapons, despite of the lack of definite proof". One year later, the same can be argued[8], but with one important and alarming difference to keep in mind while considering the volatile context of the Middle East: the constant exchange of accusations between the main actors, the evidence indicating Iran's continued effort at furthering its nuclear program (including uranium enrichment), the lack of effective dialogue, and an air of overall mistrust, are all factors that have created a highly explosive situation in which one cannot rule out the possibility of military actions.

We find ourselves at a point where the fulfillment of a prophecy seems inevitable – Iran's access to nuclear arms – and where all possibilities of resolving the crisis through diplomatic means have been exhausted. The world mistakenly seems to interpret the situation as one in which some seem obliged to attack – once they have realized the ineffectiveness of pressure and sanctions; while others are determined not to turn back – as the only way of reaching their goal of regional leadership. This type of thinking does not allow for the possibility that Iran's regime may be using its nuclear program as negotiating tactic. Iran might simply want to receive recognition of its regional status and, at the same time, use the nuclear card as an instrument to defend national security against those who wish to see an Iranian collapse. This type of thinking also does not

If we do not establish a more efficient non-proliferation regime we should not be startled if our own security, and that of others, becomes more uncertain in the near future

take into account that those who threaten with military intervention are currently not in the position to move from statements to actions. This is not due to the lack of willingness but rather mere absence of the necessary means to carry out a successful plan of attack.

Adding the possibility that, according to some sources, there are between three to five years left until Iran is in a position to enrich uranium on an industrial scale[9], we can conclude that there is time left – although each side can use it in diverse ways – in order to steer the process towards a satisfying solution … or towards disaster.

Development of the "Iran Case" in 2007

The year 2007 began in a similar way as the previous year had finished: a gradual rise in tensions about the nuclear activities of Iran, and with the IAEA attempting to act as the honest broker between the United States and Iran. As the continuation of Resolution 1696 (from July 31, 2006) by the UN Security Council, on December 23, 2006 the Council unanimously approved Resolution 1737. This initiated a sequence of international sanctions against the Iranian regime. In its text[10], and following the confirmation of the unwillingness of Iranian authorities to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and the reprocessing of nuclear material, the idea was put forward to allow 60 days for Iran to cease these actions. This was considered an initial condition to begin the negotiations to find a definite resolution to the crisis that had started because of a previous failure to comply. Simultaneously, sanctions were imposed on individuals and Iranian organisms linked to the nuclear program.

In an atmosphere where allusions were being made about the need to use force as a way of avoiding what was considered completely unacceptable (Iran controlling the complete nuclear cycle), the facilities in Natanz received most of the international attention at the beginning of the year. The main goal was to find out which parts of the Iranian regime's statements, including those by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad himself, were actually true. Special attention was given to the claims about the existence of a cascade of up to 3,000 centrifuges as an initial step before the implementation of about 54,000 (the ultimate objective leading to large scale production).

Although the start of the year may have given the impression decisive phase of the crisis was quickly coming closer, the following months began to show a different dynamic: while President Ahmadinejad and his government continued its troubled and defiant rhetoric, the attitude of the United States and the European Union seemed to be losing its previous intensity. This was even true after the events which occurred during the first trimester, on March 23, when 15 British Marines were captured by the Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf [11]. Besides some less important issues, there are two reasons that explain this change in the attitude of the West: the lack of effectiveness in the strategy used up to this point and the weakening position of the United States in the international arena.

With respect to the first one, it seems each time more undeniable that the recent White House policy – which adds to the policy of "contain-

ment" of the previous administration the idea that the regime will not fall if it is not directly pressured by force – does not work. As for the European Union, despite all efforts made to prove otherwise, its weakness as an outside actor and, above all, the impression that all its possible offers and proposals are dependent on the last word from Washington, take away their power of conviction and operational capacity in the eyes of Iran's regime.

Both with Mohamed Khatami in power before and with Ahmadinejad in power now – without forgetting that the real power without a double rests in the hands of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Ali Khamenei – Iran has continued to rise strategically, converting itself into a potential regional power that is sure of its own destiny. The relative weakness in its foreign policy is more related to the complexity of its internal politics rather than on any possible foreign pressure. None of this, however, has hindered its process of becoming a nuclear state, its ambition for more than twenty years.

Teheran has managed to play its cards well, whereas the United States and the European Union have wasted time on a game in which they have not managed to reach any basic agreement. Moreover, their behavior has revealed the unquestionable divide that exists within the Security Council. Particularly, Russia and China have served as the pro-Iran voice, and thereby halting the demands of those who argue for a harder line. Whereas their nuclear arguments remain relatively consistent, Iran has been playing with an extremist rhetoric accompanied by conciliatory actions. Basing themselves on a realist approach to the forces in the international arena, Iranian leaders seem confident of their current position. This makes their search for international recognition and guarantees for their internal security based a position of power, rather than weakness.

The second of the reasons mentioned above – the weakness of the US – is directly linked to this increased status of Iran. In a game where the two teams (Iran and US/Israel) are looking to set up their territorial hegemony, the success of one, invariably, means the failure of the other. In terms of the development of recent events, this game has evidently favored Teheran. Israel's failure in Lebanon, demonstrating the limits of traditional military power, the growing strength of the Shias and Islamist political parties in the region, and, obviously, the grave situation in Iraq and Palestine have all contribute to this outcome. Consequently, Iran feels strengthened in the same way that Americans and their Israeli partners are not able to impose their agenda on the region.

One additional effect to the notoriously lost credibility of the current US administration, both domestically as at the international level, is that the alternatives available to Washington to act against its rival are increasingly limited. Without the support of the main European countries, other powers and the regimes of the region, the possibilities to stand up to the Iranian perseverance become smaller as time goes by[12]. At the moment, none of the main nations concerned shows guaranteed support, except for Britain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Furthermore, the difficult relationship with the IAEA[13] has also become a mayor obstacle for the US ambitions. On the other hand, it is becoming more irrefutable every

Whereas their nuclear arguments remain relatively consistent Iranian leaders seem confident of their current position

day – even for the US - that Iranian partnership is absolutely necessary in confronting the challenges of regional security. In the search for solutions in Iraq, the structure of a regional security framework in the Persian Gulf, and the fight against international terrorism, Teheran turns out to be an unavoidable partner.

In short, all this provides the Iranian authorities with a wide range of maneuvers to carry on with their agenda. In this case that means to proceed with their nuclear program without much external interference. Clinging to their constantly reiterated argument that their goal is strictly focused on providing the country with alternative sources of energy to the oil and gas they possess, Teheran continues walking to walk a tight-rope by continuing to engage in activities which leave the door open for future military development. Within this scope, President Ahmadinejad announced in March 2007 that Iran had begun the construction of a new nuclear facility (with a capacity of 360Mw) in Darkhovin. The following month he added that the facilities in Natanz already have the capacity to produce enriched uranium at an industrial level[14].

The Resolution 1747 approved unanimously by the UN Security Council on March 24[15] does not seem to have changed the direction in a significant way. Once again the Resolution calls on Iran to suspend all its activities connected to enrichment and reprocessing within a maximum period of 60 days. This time, the sanctions have been broadened to include new actors (the state bank Sepah and the leaders of the Guards of the Islamic Revolution). At the same time it places an embargo on arms and blocking access to credit for the export of Iranian goods. However, it offers Iran the option of lifting all sanctions if Teheran suspends the enrichment and reprocessing activities. Whereas before this moment the only conciliatory action by Iran was the proposal announced by the chief negotiator, Ali Larijani[16], to establish a moratorium of 30 days to simultaneously lift the sanctions and suspend nuclear activities, following this new resolution nothing substantial has been noted that could unblock the diplomatic process.

Faced with Iran's position, the international community officially still continues to believe in the diplomatic option to resolve the crisis. Washington is trying to convince others in the UN Security Council of the necessity to approve the new resolution. Among the warmongering, other actors like Russia try to play on both fields, attempting not to make enemies of their Iranian clients[17] while maintaining their official image as defender of international legitimacy. In this way, what would be the third – and likely tougher - wave of sanctions is being postponed, and any possible military attack is pushed further into the future given that currently (end of November 2007) the necessary conditions do simply not exist.

It needs to be concluded that not all the right pieces have been put together to reach an immediate end to the crisis. There is strong resistance from the outside (if not outright rejection as in the case of Washington, Tel Aviv and even Riyadh) to accept as that Iran has already converted into a regional leader. To reinforce this position, Teheran may believe it needs the access to nuclear energy (civil and, most likely, military). This is precisely what is tried to be avoided at the moment by

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imposing the prohibition to enrich uranium (an activity, as it is widely known, permitted to any signatory of NPT like Iran). Like it or not, it is a weak strategy to try to bar Iran from something which is perfectly legal. To create an exception to a general norm[18] and, additionally, to attempt to make it into an initial condition to any negotiation does not seem a sufficiently consistent posture to mobilize the international community (and even less Iran) beyond the current political balance.

A chronology of the most important events during the period analyzed in this report (October 2006 to October 2007) can be found in Appendix V.2.

Deterioration of the nuclear security situation

The anxiety that a possible Iranian nuclear arsenal could create in a country like Israel – which until now has controlled the nuclear monopoly in the region – is easily understandable. For other regional neighbors and the international community the problem is of no lesser value. It derives from the overall process of world proliferation and, in particular, the Iranian case – where there is widespread nuclear insecurity due to the lack of state control. In fact, if Iran does come into possession of a nuclear arsenal, the threat would most likely not come from the regime using it voluntarily – as it is all too well aware of the rules of engagement in this field and the prestigious role of nuclear arms as a dissuasive mechanism. The greatest threat would come from an accidental error that could produce a cataclysm, or the possibility of terrorist groups gaining access to these kinds of weapons.

In the 2006 Report, we concluded that what occurs in the region could trigger the presence of illegal networks that traffic these materials – the example of the Pakistani Abdel Qadeer Khan is still fresh in our minds. This could also facilitate non-state actors with access to these types of weapons. We also declared that "it is important to highlight that this latter problem is not directly attributable to the Iranian regime. To the contrary, it is highly improbable that any state would be interested in sharing its "national treasure" with actors that are so difficult to control. Rather, the reasons for this hypothetical increase in illegal activity are the imperfections of the current non- and counter-proliferation systems. The mechanisms that are insufficiently able to avoid the emergence of new nuclear states and, even more so, to ensure transparency, security and maintenance of existing arsenals and the most sensitive materials that are necessary in their production." One year later, it seems fitting to repeat that we do not possess the tools necessary to prevent this hypothesis from becoming a somber reality.

Iran surely does not feel the need to receive approval from the West in order to follow its path to nuclear energy. However, due to the frustration it suffers from not being recognized and respected as a reliable actor – at least in administering regional issues – it would hardly be wiling to collaborate with the international community on an issue that affects us all. At the same time, a combination of Iran's reluctance and aggression by some important nations leave the IAEA in a difficult position to fulfill its duties of inspection within the region. This way, attempts to improve the channels of cooperation which would increase transparency in deal-

ing with arsenals and nuclear programs – especially in relation to Iran and its program – are constantly being blocked.

In an atmosphere of mistrust and apathy among international cooperation, any nuclear program – whether civilian or military, Iranian or any other – by definition becomes a threat to security. This is not as much due to the fear of unleashing an interstate war as it is to possible accidents or personal aspirations impossible to control or manage. Absolute secrecy, the intention to bend the rules and lack of transparency, combined with the explicit willingness to gain an advantage by any means necessary all contribute to illegal trafficking and make inspection by IAEA impossible to perform. In the case of Iran, this problem becomes even more serious as a consequence of its scarce democratic nature – in terms of the control available to the public over the actions and decisions of the various power resorts. The problem worsens with the internal complexity of the country, where it is difficult to find a consensus among the various actors whose agendas often diverge. The permanent struggle to prevail above all others does not make it easy to fit the interests of the religious hierarchy with those of certain political figures or the military establishment. Therefore, it is easy to imagine that the ever present disparity also permeates the nuclear program, which is what intensifies the fear with in respect to the level of control in this matter.

The conditions under which Iran is developing its nuclear program leave little room for comfort given its rising dependency on providers with questionable credibility. On the other hand, it cannot be said that their official sources (mostly Russian companies and the Chinese government) are models of transparency.

For neighboring countries and others alike, these facts represent an alarming level of concern that should lead to a global reassessment of the policy towards Teheran. In many ways, the "Iran case" is not any different to other challenges facing security these days, where the geo-strategic thought process used in the previous century is quickly diminishing. Instead of focusing almost exclusively on restraining the military power of a possible rival, it seems more practical to think about creating regional and global security through long-term perspectives with diverse and multilateral capabilities. Reiterating a previous point in respect to Iran, an alternative way to reduce the threat of its current tactic would be to offer guarantees to its internal security (as in the case of North Korea) and accept its importance as the key actor in the region. Unless we believe the current regional *status quo* can be maintained indefinitely – clearly in favor of Western interests, which intend to maintain control over the region without considering Teheran.

The impact on the region

With respect to WMD, the air of uncertainty surrounding Iran's true ambitions and the ability to actually attain a nuclear program is currently the main perturbing factor in terms of regional security.

Israel is growing more insecure about its own position – to some extent due to the situation in the Palestinian Territories and in Lebanon – but

especially due to the possibility of losing its nuclear monopoly in the region. Recently it has made it clear that it would not accept the nucle-arization of Iran and, in tandem with the United States, remains the most likely actor to use force in order to prevent this.

As for Saudi Arabia and many other countries in the region with a Sunni majority, they are not willing to passively accept the consolida-tion of leadership in the hands of a Shia regime. Some countries make claims – directed at Teheran and, most of all, at Washington – about alleged decisions to start their own nuclear programs (in a vain attempt to paralyze Iran's program and with the intention of provoking an effec-tive reaction from the US, which would put a stop to what they (US) also consider unacceptable). Others prefer to directly activate their own allies in Iran and in those places where their influence is greater, to cre-ate problems for the Iranian regime, and thus to force Iran to redefine its agenda.

The countries most likely to contemplate this situation would be Turkey and Egypt, although they publicly deny this. If Teheran finally does what is has been anticipated (full command over its nuclear cycle) it would indirectly fulfill its wishes of putting an end to a long period of Israeli monopoly. In the end, however, this would not be good news for any country. To start with, not for the current Turkish government, which appears to be in the process of rethinking its strategic relationship with Tel Aviv (and Washington), something which has been the cause of vari-ous problems in the Arab world. Egypt is not likely to be very concerned in the short or long term over the Persian expansion. In fact, there are indications that Egypt could be secretly supporting Teheran, with the idea of creating a counterweight to Israel[19]. Nonetheless, it still seems difficult to imagine that it would end its campaign to create a nuclear weapons free zone in the Mediterranean in order to embark on a nuclear program that would bestow it the possession of this kind of armament.

For countries outside the region the opinions about this process vary tremendously. While for its Pakistani neighbor the process does not cre-ate a noticeable concern (the ties between the two countries in terms of nuclear material have been known for years), for Russia the impact seems acceptable. Russia, not by coincidence, is the responsible for the construction of Iran's main nuclear project (the Bushehr facilities) and is also an important arms supplier (including a modern system of anti-air missiles precisely designed to protect the headquarters). Russia's attempt to regain the influence it lost during the last 15 years is creating more problems for the United States – bogged down and at the limits of it capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time that an effort is being made to keep the process under certain control, Russia continues to supply the promised fuel to the Iranian facilities, and insists on the future obligation for Iran to send back the nuclear materials already used in that center. Moscow realizes that it can improve its chances of open-ing new doors of opportunity in an area where it has already established itself, increase its presence in the Middle East – a region with special geo-economic importance- , and trigger a change in the *status quo*. All this would only be the minimum within the regional framework, and can prove to be profitable in the future.

If there is true political willingness on both sides, it is still possible to accommodate the interests in order to reach an agreement – without the need to reach for solutions involving brutal force

The US has a very different view. What Iran is questioning, in an up-front manner, is the regional framework controlled by Washington for decades. It is the kind of control that has been based on the direct presence and support for some regimes which have accepted their subordination, without much protest. This was also the case in Iran until the "Khomeini" revolution broke out in 1979. Since then, the direction taken by the new Iranian politicians has led to the direct examination of some of the regimes in the region and the leadership of the United States. Together with other decisions, the commitment to the nuclear program – if it is finalized – would consolidate Iran's role as the regional leader. It would create a new game with new rules and put Washington, Tel Aviv and Riyadh, along with others, in a fairly uncomfortable situation.

Without a doubt, everyone is concerned about the ramifications of a possible loss of control of the process that would bring about even more tension – in which Iran continues to move forward in its plan to control the nuclear cycle. Meanwhile, the international community has not found an effective method to bring it to a halt and discussions continue about a possible attack against the Iranian territory. This goes without saying that in a climate of zero transparency there remains the possibility of an accident or the "loss" of nuclear materials. This could have the weapons end up in the hands of individuals less likely to accept the rules of such a complex nuclear game.

Reasons for hope

Although conscious of the seriousness of the crisis, we understand that the point of no return has not been reached yet. It is safe to assume that if there is true political willingness on both sides, it is still possible to accommodate the interests in order to reach an agreement – without the need to reach for solutions involving brutal force. At present, there is a certain level of optimism – not very well-founded – about the effectiveness of diplomacy in the apparent success in North Korea in terms of its nuclear program. It would be erroneous to assume that what has occurred there could automatically be applied to the situation in Iran, since the internal and external situation in both countries is simply incomparable. However, there are two elements laid out in the Korean case that may prove advantageous in the search for possible solutions.

The first deals with the structural weakness of the Iranian economy. Although Iran is obviously economically more prosperous than North Korea, it faces an economic crisis that affects a significant percentage of the population – which stirs up criticism and growing dissatisfaction with the regime. It also embodies the paradoxical situation of being an oil and gas producer of global importance, but continuing to exhibit significant foreign dependence on refined and distilled products. In sum, although circumstantially the world prices of these products seem to be favorable, Iran realizes that its own financial and technological potential is not enough to satisfy the demands for the greater well-being of its population and to fully exploit its immense oil and gas resources. It needs foreign investment and technological assistance at a much higher level than what it has now. It is in this area where most possibilities exist to reach an agreement that would satisfy the conflicting parties.

The second element to consider, following the experience of Korea, is the importance of the involvement of other regional actors with interests in the matter and with direct means of communication with Iran. China, despite being Iran's industrial partner, has already made clear its concern about the Iranian program. Russia holds considerable weight to tip the scale to one side or the other. Even Pakistan would have enough to contribute to a possible strategy for the peaceful resolution of the problem. On these grounds, the United States and the EU should give their efforts a new direction in order to create a multilateral dynamic that would enable coordination among all these countries – as an alternative to the existing approach of imitating the hostile rhetoric and actions by Washington and Teheran.

Chemical and biological weapons: a strategic asset in the 21st Century?

To a certain extent it seems logical to dedicate significant attention, in terms of media and research, to the subject of chemical and biological weapons. The idea of an international terrorist group using, for instance, sarin gas in a metropolitan center is one of the nightmares haunting any responsible politician and those in charge of national and international security. However, from a strategic point of view and without the slightest disregard for its destructive potential, it is important to admit that these weapons have lost a great part of their historical value as possible weapons to be used on the battle field and in the area of deterrence – just as the WMD are viewed with respect to the confrontation between national actors. Despite the fact that many countries in the Mediterranean maintain chemical and biological arsenals and continue research in these areas (see Table 2), it is widely believed that their existence and possible use during a hypothetical war pose a greater danger, rather than an advantage.

In other words, there is no longer a coherent argument for maintaining these weapons. From this derives the argument that instead of insisting on the immorality of their use, it would be more beneficial if the international community paid more attention to the debate over the logic of their existence. Today, none of the national governments in the Mediterranean benefit from the existence of these types of arsenals, and this factor alone gives the opportunity to aim toward their absolute elimination.

The current international framework on this subject is defined by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which aspire to eradicate these kinds of weapons from the global scene. Even though both have managed to maintain a constant pace in terms of implementation (Table 4 highlights the most significant results), in practice there remain factors that hinder their fulfillment and widen the gaps for the danger of proliferation to still get through. Special attention should go to the provisions in their respective (treaty) texts, which create a grey area in terms of the meanings of "arsenals" and "capabilities"[20]. The second problem stems from the fact that often other priorities and agendas for international negotiation are established and provoke very different results to those originally pursued by these Conventions, allowing certain elements in exchange for certain achievements in other areas. Likewise, the constant poisoning of the nuclear subject makes moving ahead in this matter a diffi-

cult task. The traditional view of these ingenuities, like "nuclear weapons of the poor", in effect creates more resistance to disarmament by those who wish to maintain a certain misleading idea of a balance against the nuclear powers that they perceive as a threat (the Arab-Israeli case being the most obvious example of this). In the same way, the final element to consider is the poor example that powerful players like the United States and Russia convey to the rest of the international community through their behavior[21].

In sum, despite appearances there are still many countries that are not willing to the pay the necessary diplomatic and economic price to make the world free of biological and chemical weapons.

Chemical and Biological proliferation in the Mediterranean

In terms of what concerns the region, and what is displayed in Table 2, the situation according to each country is very mixed in respect to the level of its fulfillment of both Conventions (see Table 5) and to the proliferation power in the same areas (see Table 2).

With regard to chemical weapons, Libya, Syria and Iran have known programs, although it should be noted that Libya has cooperated with the US and the United Kingdom to dismantle their capabilities for three years. Furthermore, it seems likely that both Egypt[22] as well as Israel still have some kind of military program in progress that involves these weapons, while doubts continue to exist about the conduct of Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Israel has signed but not ratified the CWC, while Egypt, Iraq[23], Lebanon and Syria have not even signed the Convention.

In terms of biological weapons, no country admits to having active arsenals. There are some, however, that have traditionally been the ones to have developed programs along this line (like Egypt, Iran, Algeria, Israel and Syria). The majority have signed and ratified the BTWC, but a couple, like Egypt and Syria, have not taken the final step, and others have not even signed (as in the case of Israel and Mauritania).

In the present international panorama there are obvious public relations reasons to avoid being seen as a country that has opted to openly join the biological game. However, there are several countries in the Mediterranean which have at least maintained their interest in exploring the possibilities of these weapons. The convention prohibiting biological weapons leaves the door open for research and peaceful civil development of techniques associated with their use. This allows countries to steer towards military ends given that there does not exist any specific provision to detect, control or verify whether the final step has been taken. Besides that, the necessary equipment for research and production of possible biological weapons are apparently less complex. This allows it to be hidden or disguised easier than, for example, the systems required for nuclear development. At the moment, the three countries that appear to be linked to the possible production of these weapons are Iran, Israel and Syria.

The threat of chemical and biological weapons

As farfetched as it may seem, one of the reasons that explains the continued concern about the proliferation of biological weapons is one that gives rise to the possibility of future technological advancements making the current theories about controlling the basic functions of human beings a reality, starting with the wide range of possibilities genetic engineering has to offer. In addition to this, there remains the strong possibility to transfer capabilities between States and non-governmental groups, more specifically, terrorists. Contrary to nuclear weapons, it is difficult to precisely identify the origin of biological weapons, in terms of the specific laboratory and country in which they were produced. Under these circumstances, the hypothesis of this kind of exchange – from a national State, with or without explicit governmental consent, to a violent group – becomes a potential reality. Meanwhile, these actors are still able to escape the accusations of guilt, and the likelihood of reprisal.

Although the dismal panorama painted by some possible developments of the technology applied in this field should not be disregarded, its current abilities fit better into the world of science fiction than the analysis at hand. In short, it is highly unlikely that the use of real biological and chemical weapons gives a substantial tactical advantage to their owner; strategically, both continue to be eclipsed by nuclear arms. On the other hand, even on a small scale their use is extremely complex. This was revealed in the repeated failures of the Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth)[24] sect – in their intention to sow panic and destruction using the framework of their violent agenda carried out in Japan – despite having more than enough financial and technological resources to carry out their plans.

As previously mentioned, chemical weapons have a lot in common with biological ones, especially in reference to their "dual use" and "traceability" in order to identify the origin of their production and, thus, the responsibility of their use. They also suffer from a negative image that adds to the secrecy and lack of transparency, present in other categories of armament. This makes public scrutiny more difficult and thus hinders the international community in gain the necessary means to control them or, better yet, eliminate them. In all cases, although chemical and biological weapons are more widespread than WMD – mainly due to technical reasons (they are accessible to actors with average technology and economic resources) – their military use continues to be highly complicated. As a consequence, it is very unlikely that they would play a decisive role in determining the course of a violent conflict, as would the case with nuclear weapons.

The impact of chemical and biological weapons may be very serious, both in terms of direct victims as well as the psychological effects on the affected population. From a state point of view, however, there are few strategic reasons today to invest large quantities of resources into these programs. Keeping in mind the complexity of their use and the resulting danger to the troops themselves, their tactical effectiveness is very low especially in comparison to conventional alternatives. Their strategic importance is not much either – as has been demonstrated in the various wars where they have been employed (they did not have much impact on the dynamics of the conflict neither in World War I nor in the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s). Finally, their power of dissuasion is minimal or inexistent.

It is difficult to imagine that there would be governments willing to offer tactical possibilities to groups beyond their control it is not easy to imagine that there would be a state willing to face the consequences

Consequently, the idea that these weapons are a cheap alternative to nuclear arms does not hold: while nuclear weapons have served as an absolute dissuasion mechanism in terms of state conflicts, chemical and biological weapons have simply been an alternative to use on the battle field. In a globalized world, where the pressure of public opinion and other actors is each time more decisive for the successful resolution of violent conflicts, the cost of using these weapons within a "hot" conflict will always be higher to any potential benefit in relation to the direct enemy. This argument may also be used, even more convincingly, on a domestic scale – as illustrated in 1988 with the failed attempt by Saddam Hussein to control the Kurdish population through the use of chemical weapons.

On the contrary, non-state actors, for whom public opinion has little or no importance, may find the use of these kinds of weapons beneficial. This applies to combat situations – for instance, and hypothetically, in a new confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel – as well as for terrorist attacks. Even so, going back to the argument made previously with respect to nuclear arms, it is difficult to imagine that there would be governments willing to offer tactical possibilities to groups beyond their control – in the case of Hezbollah, for instance, it seems correct to assume that the use of chemical weapons by the Shia militia would cause immense damage to Syria and Iran.

With regard to terrorist activities on an international scale, it is not easy to imagine that there would be a state – although there may be some elements within the government apparatus – willing to face the consequences of being directly involved in an attack of this kind. As was mentioned above, although the possibility of verifying the origin of these weapons is not as straightforward as it is with nuclear arms, it remains unlikely that any current government – the Taliban regime was a clear exception – would be willing to invest serious resources only to supply terrorist groups with something that is accompanied by such danger to the national security of that state itself.

In parallel, the risk of losing control of the process is also rising. This comes as the result of the unstoppable technological advancement, which allows terrorist groups to consider the use of these arms in certain cases. In fact, the less advantageous the weapons become on the classic battle field, the more attractive they are for the terrorists. The emergence of "radiological terror", for example, clearly shows how weapons developed through government programs may end up being used by groups beyond the control of the state[25].

All in all, despite the strategic importance of nuclear weapons being a decisive factor in the current systems of security and global defense and, therefore making it difficult to imagine the world free of these tools of massive destruction – there are real possibilities of mobilizing the political willingness of the international community to eliminate these types of arms (chemical and biological) from the WMD category. Some of the main reasons are:

• They are difficult to manage on the battle field.
• From a strategic perspective, they do not guarantee the survival of the State.
• They have a relatively small impact during a war.
• The political and diplomatic price is very high and, in contrast to nuclear arms, they are not a sufficient deterrent to prevent the outbreak of war.

- The risk of accidents or access by non-governmental groups is very high. Therefore, they increase the risk for the original weapon's holder to suffer retaliation.

Draftiny a promising way out

The possibility of getting rid of chemical and biological weapons, in a global-scale process that would have great importance for the Mediterranean, is currently considered a realistic option. The motor behind such steps is not so much fear that these weapons induce, but rather the contrary, i.e. the lack of fear that surrounds them: the strategic benefits for any holder to maintain these arsenals are not enough to justify the costs that would have to be endured if regional powers and the international community increased their pressure in pursuit of this goal. For the international community, the importance of eliminating them from the Mediterranean scene is mainly linked to the fear represented by international terrorism and its ability to gain access to these weapons. For the region as a whole, the elimination of these kinds of WMD would contribute considerably to the improvement of trust and cooperation, barely present today.

On the other hand, research programs in these fields are of great complexity. They not only have an impact on activities of a strictly civil and commercial nature – oriented towards the peaceful use of the acquired technologies – but also some actors from the region (like Israel and Iran, for example), would like to permanently maintain the possibility of reentering the game. This would be the case if new technologies were available, which they would see as advantageous for their respective strategies or, more worrisome yet, if they detected that the opposite can provide certain advantages in this field. Even so, it is feasible to improve the cooperation in this area – at least in terms of increasing transparency and cooperation among the related activities.

The bases on which the process of total disarmament of these weapons may be founded have already been established by the set of norms and guidelines agreed upon during the last decade[26]. Adding to that all that was established in the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC, held in 2006[27], assuming that it deals with relatively modest agreements, but with a clearly promising orientation.

However, on a wider scale, the big challenge for the international community would be to take advantage of the fact that these weapons no longer have the same strategic importance as in previous times and establish an international consensus for their complete eradication. Lead by the principal European countries, the international community would have to be willing to pay a high price – economically and diplomatically – to reach its final objective, defeating the resistance that still manifests itself among the different national actors. Apart from other international security problems, it is highly recommended to avoid the high level of misunderstanding in other areas (as the one that affects Iran), which ends up blocking possible exit ways that are now present in the chemical and biological sphere. For this, it is equally essential that the existing hostility – for instance, between the United States and Iran – does not infiltrate all multilateral conferences – as it has, unfortunately, been happening recently.

Against this ambition goes the fact that this subject is not being given the necessary priority. Therefore, there is a risk that the existing window of opportunity ends up closing itself in the short-term and other actions will continue to fuel the tension. Given that state use of these weapons is becoming less likely, the countries that are still involved in chemical or biological proliferation are not doing so out of necessity, but because they do not see enough reasons and incentives to quit doing so. To encourage a change in this matter, it is necessary that the international community accepts the goal as a priority of its agenda, that it makes it clear there will be diplomatic costs for those who do not cooperate and offers important incentives in order to stimulate interest to incorporate in the process of disarmament. The mechanisms to reach this already exist; what must come next is not to lose the opportunity.

In addition to signing the two conventions, remaining loyal to the obligation to destroy the arsenals and close programs, there are other necessary steps to be taken in order to consolidate the process with real possibilities of success: a) manage to get the conventions universally adhered-to; b) eliminate the grey zones that can hide the desire to deviate from the text and spirit of these norms; c) improve the mechanisms of control and inspection to keep non-state actors away from gaining access to these materials; and d) strengthen the legislature of the signatories, with the creation of national authorities that serve as the international point of liaison and collaboration to avoid unwanted use of the arsenals or programs that still exist or could be devised.

Missiles: the fourth type of WMD

Contrary to chemical or biological weapons, military missile programs are a key component of any WMD strategy, even though they are frequently omitted in the analysis of crisis situations. The most important aspect of this principal, albeit not only[28], delivery vehicle is its ability to project power (according to its range) for those who possess them. They harbor significant destructive power when armed by conventional payloads, but their full strategic importance can only be realized when carrying nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. It is because of this that missile programs generate so much anxiety throughout the Mediterranean security agenda. However, it should also be noted that non-proliferation attempts, both at a regional as well as at an international level, are halfhearted or non-existent.

Within the framework of a "preventive war" that was developed in Washington, concepts from the Cold War – such as "preemptive" attacks - have grown in importance once again. This disquieting approach permits a nation to take anticipatory action by means of an attack in response to a hypothetical threat that has not materialized yet. Israel has adopted exactly this strategy, as was shown, for example, by its strike on an alleged terrorist camp in Syria. Another element to consider when attempting to understand the growing importance of missile technology is the gradual development of the US strategic defense system (popularly known as anti-missile shield). Other actors are increasingly searching for ways to overcome this development by increasing payload capacity and range of their own missile systems.

Although this process has so far been unstoppable, there seems to be an increased unease about the blatant and continuous interest in developing these weapons and the apparent difficulties in halting their proliferation. In

any case, any WMD program requires the parallel development of delivery systems. Of these, missiles – typically ballistic, but increasingly cruise missiles - are the most common. While at a global level countries such as Pakistan, India, China and Japan are in the process of updating and expanding their land-based cruise missile (LACM) capabilities, in the Mediterranean Israel's monopoly in this area is being threatened by similar programs in Iran. Teheran is not only looking to attend to its own necessities, but is also reinforcing its alliances. Recent proof of this is the supply of new generation missiles and even unmanned airplanes to the Lebanese group Hezbollah.

Globalization and new technologies have augmented the possibilities for the diffusion of knowledge and information, and thus offer new ways to develop weapon systems. Nonetheless, missiles remain an area accessible to only few nations. The development of the Iranian LACMs, for example, is almost completely dependent on information and material imports from Russia, Chinese, North Korean, German and French sources. Even Israel, which has a significant capacity to research and develop its own missiles, relies on other nations for its medium-range program. Its most recent version, the Jericho-3[29], is based on knowledge transferred from the French company Dassault (who cooperated in developing the Jericho-1 version) and the US government (in the case of the Jericho-2, which is similar to the MGM-31 Pershing). With respect to the other countries in the region, any missiles that exist in their arsenals have been directly purchased from foreign suppliers.

This dependency on the international market for the development of missile systems has not led to better control systems to avoid proliferation. This is mostly due to the way in which the nature of these arms has been viewed. Traditionally they have been considered conventional weapons, and as such their stockpiling and development never received the public or diplomatic attention that non-conventional weaponry got. Because of this, for decades there was no significant effort to better define the grey areas which have permitted the trafficking of regular materials (parts and subcomponents) and complete systems. As in other areas, commercial interests have become intertwined with political ones, and the focus has become the reinforcing of allies while denying access to all others. Stated differently, policy has not been based on a genuine impulse to adhere to non-proliferation. Instead, it has focused on selective criteria that are not so much based on the intrinsic dangers posed by these developments but rather on avoiding that it would go against the specific interests of the producer or seller.

In any case, during these past years there have been various attempts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime with respect to missiles and related technologies. This dynamic has been driven, in part, by the conviction, that missiles are essential elements of WMD proliferation. The most important reason, however, has been the acceleration in the spread of new technologies since the Cold War, and, especially, the concern about the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea[30].

The clearest result of this newfound willingness to take action has been the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that was set-up in 1999. It includes 34 nations that commit to avoid uncontrolled diffusion of these devices and related technology (Table 6 contains a list of participants and its principal objectives). In November 2002 the work done within this framework led to the approval of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic

There seems to be an increased unease about the blatant and continuous interest in developing these weapons and the apparent difficulties in halting their proliferation

Missile Proliferation. This integrates 119 members and established restrictions similar to those of the MTCR, albeit more general and limited. Oddly, even though the MTCR includes both ballistic as well as cruise missiles, the 2002 code of conduct does not mention cruise missiles. This omission has, voluntarily or not, contributed to convey a certain sense of legitimacy upon the acquisition of LACM over the past few years[31].

Israeli Missile Capabilities

Israel (see Table 3) has the most advanced missile program in the Mediterranean region with the exception of France. It has its own capacity as both a producer as well as an exporter in this terrain, but the program is still based in large part on the close relations it maintains with the US. The two central elements of its program are the already mentioned Jericho missiles and submarines equipped with the cruise missiles (SLCM) Popeye Turbo and Harpoon which have the possibility to carry nuclear loads and thus represent "second strike" capability.

There is – similarly to its nuclear program – a thick cloud of secrecy surrounding its missile capabilities and its volume and characteristics. It is therefore only possible to base one's analysis on rough estimates rather than exact figures, but there seems to be a consensus on the existence of roughly 50 Jericho-2 missiles with a range of between 1,500 and 4,000km. It is also assumed that Jericho-3 is already operational and that its range could be as far as 7,800km. This would mean that Israel's missile reach covers all its possible strategic targets.

Furthermore, through close cooperation with the US, Israel has developed the Arrow system which is capable, at least in theory, of destroying Scud or similar ballistic missiles in full flight. This would convert its antimissile program in one of the most advanced on the planet.

Similarly to Iran, the main objective of the Israeli missile program remains the defense of its territorial integrity. This explains why its weapon systems are mostly defensive rather than offensive. However, in contrast to Iran, Israel has shown that it has a particular interpretation of what "territorial integrity" means, something which has led to the various preventive or preemptive strikes that it has carried out against its neighbors.

Iranian Missile Capabilities

After Israel, the Iranian missile program is beyond any doubt the most sophisticated of the region (see Table 3). Its sustained efforts – economic, technological and political – come from the experiences of its own history (such as those gained through its conflict with Iraq between 1980 and 1988), Iran's desire to enhance its position as regional leader, and the will to secure its territorial integrity. Its current calculations seem to consider open warfare initiated by its main military rivals – especially Israel and the US – to be highly unlikely. This possibility seems to have become even less likely since the Israeli military failures in Lebanon and the difficulties that Washington is facing in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the moment, Iran seems to be most concerned with the threat of preemptive attacks against its military or energy facilities.

A crucial step in dealing with this perceived threat is to develop effective defense mechanisms while at the same time having retaliation capabilities in case of an attack. From this perspective, missiles have become a fundamental asset given the obvious air of superiority that Iran's opponents possess. Although the ability to retaliate does not completely guarantee one's own safety, it does complicate the plans for any potential aggressor. This is especially the case when nuclear weapons are part of the equation. Perhaps this explains the recent acquisition by Iran of eighteen BM25 missiles which can threaten any country of the region as well as some European nations thanks to its mobile platforms and 2,500km range.

The core of the Iranian program consists of the Shahab series, of which the Shahab-3 is the most advanced. Its latest version, the Shahab-3ER, has a range of 2,000km, which means that it can reach Ankara, Alexandria and Sanaa without the need for mobile launch platforms. In fact, there have been unconfirmed reports that Iran is investing in the construction of missile silos instead of opting for the traditional mobile platforms[32].

In March 2006, Iran revealed that it had added the Fajr-3 ballistic missile (MIRV) to its arsenal which has the ability to overcome certain antimissile defense systems. This should be interpreted as a response to the recent Israeli and US programs, especially the already mentioned missile defense shield.

It can be concluded that in the same way that Israel justifies its efforts with respect to missiles, Iran explains all its actions in this field as purely defensive. In practice, both nations have capabilities to defend themselves against potential adversaries, but at the same time the means to attack if that is deemed to be in their interest. An unstoppable weapons race is continued in this way. As such it is creating ever greater instability in the Middle East, and there seems to be no end in sight.

Other missile capabilities in the Mediterranean

An overview of the region shows that from this perspective the quantity and variety of missile arsenals is considerable. Moreover, with the absence or ineffectiveness of mechanisms against their proliferation (Turkey is the region's only MTCR member), there are various programs underway to improve missile capabilities. Three of the most active countries – besides those analyzed above – should be highlighted as well: Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia (see Table 3). They are not only relevant because they have relatively advanced programs, but especially because of their ties to the Iranian or Israeli programs.

Syria seems to be cooperating with North Korea and Iran for the development of its short-range Scud-B. According to Israel – but unconfirmed by independent sources[33] - Damascus carried out test flights in February of this year. Likewise, there are indications that Syria has had Iranian support in order to improve its short-range DF-11 and DF-15 missiles that were purchased from China. Other detected transfers include the Russian short-range FROG-7 and the Misagh-1, which is a Chinese copy of the US portable land-to-air FIM-92 Stinger missile. Syria also seems to be developing its own capacity with respect to Scud missiles and is attempting to acquire the Russian Iskander-E (SS-X-26)[34].

After Israel, the Iranian missile program is beyond any doubt the most sophisticated of the region

If the above is accurate, that would mean that Syria has the ability to strike any part within the region. This would advance its dual strategy: to dissuade Israel (or, hypothetically, the US) from an attack and to continue being a threat to Tel Aviv in order to enhance its regional status in the Near East.

It does not seem outrageous to link the Syrian missile program with Hezbollah and its struggle against Israel. In fact, Syria has made it clear that it has learned from the recent conflict between Israel and its Lebanese ally, and that consequently it is reforming its tactics in order to be able to resist such a militarily superior adversary. The conflict between Hezbollah and the IDF during the summer of 2006 made it abundantly clear that missiles can make a decisive contribution to rebalancing a situation in which one side has military inferiority. It is that experience that seems to have caused the Syrian interest in expanding its own missile capabilities. It is not helpful, however, to analyze the Syrian situation only in terms of Israel. It is important to understand that Damascus also has a natural concern for simple survival of its regime and has a desire to be an important player in the region.

The case of Egypt is obviously very different, but given its economic and technological resources it also has possibilities to be a significant actor when it comes to ballistic missiles. It has been exploring this option through cooperation with North Korea for decades. This was especially centered on developing its Scud-B and Scud-C programs by basing the designs on the North Korean Hwasong 5 and 6 missiles. Severe pressure from the US, however, seems to have caused a halt in this cooperation, even though Egypt continues to possess significant development capacity on its own.

Although there are no indications that in the short term there will be any radical change in its strategy, it is clear that Egypt remains interested in being a relevant actor in the Mediterranean. It is aware that an adequate missile arsenal is a fundamental aspect of such an ambition, and it is therefore likely that Cairo is keeping open its options to improve its capabilities in this area. The probable path would be by cooperation with partners that are less problematic in the eyes of Washington.

In many ways, the situation that Saudi Arabia is in resembles the Egyptian case. Both need to balance their regional ambitions and self-defense with their delicate relationship with Washington. Rather than guaranteeing its security in a region as tense as the Middle East through its own military means, Riyadh has opted for decades to rely on the protection of the world's leading country. Nonetheless, because of its regional ambitions, Saudi Arabia has become one of the world's leading buyers of weaponry and it has increasingly become interested in developing its own capabilities. Its significant economic resources allow it to explore new ways to develop more and better ballistic and cruise missiles in combination with its notorious interest to enter the nuclear field. Besides the known arsenals (see Table 3) there are no specific data available with respect to such plans, but it is not difficult to imagine that the concerns about Iranian ambitions of regional leadership as well as the potential weakening of US support are causing a Saudi reaction.

This overview of the regional situation, and the behavior of some of the most relevant actors in this area, can only be concluded with a note of concern. Although there have not been substantial advances with

respect to non-proliferation, there are numerous indications of a significant and general interest in rearmament. This threatens to unravel the regional situation and increases the probability of new outbreaks of violence. This autistic dynamic, in which every actor is only concerned about itself, usually leads to an expansion of military capabilities because of the belief that this is the only way to ensure one's own security. It is the wrong road to take, and one on which the region has been stuck for a long time already, seemingly without having learned to go down different paths.

Factual information and new realities[35]

Country Analysis

Table 1 provides a general overview of the news and events in 2006 and 2007.

Table 1: Selected News 2006/2007		
	2006	2007
Saudi Arabia	Rumors about the start of a possible nuclear weapons program. Declared interest in a civil nuclear program in December 2006.	Rumors about interests in accelerating its nuclear program.
Egypt	Signed agreement with the US to avoid nuclear trafficking through its waters.	Plan to construct a 1,000Mw nuclear reactor at Al-Dabah (within 10 years) and three more reactors of 600Mw (for 2020)
Iran	The Iranian case" is handed over to the Security Council. Continues to reject the suspension of its uranium enrichment activities. Expands its missile capacity to 550 units.	95% of the Bushehr constructed, although the completion of the Project continues to be delayed because of alleged financial problems. 22 projects of nuclear technical assistance to Iran suspended as a consequence of the Security Council sanctions. Plans to reach 54,000 centrifuges, although so far only an estimated 3,000 have been installed.
Israel	Continues to focus its nuclear strategy in large part on the threat from Iran. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, status in an interview that Israel is "a nuclear power".	Improves SPYDER, approves Iron Dome, tests Arrow; all anti-missile defense systems Bombs Syrian facilities that allegedly form part of a secret nuclear program.
Libya	Signs agreements with the US, Russia, and France in relation to civil nuclear energy production.	Continues its policy of renouncing WMD.
Syria	Reiterates the call for Israel to sign the NPT. Looks for foreign assistance to replace its Scud-B missiles.	Washington freezes US assets of three Syrian governmental organizations for being supposed WMD proliferators.
Turkey		The Turkish nuclear agency announces that the first civil nuclear facility will be finished between 2012 and 2015, as well as plans to construct a further two.

While realizing that one year is not a lot of time to notice radical changes in an area like WMD, the following pages give an overview of the situation in the region from a national perspective.

Algeria

Algeria has a 15Mw nuclear reactor (Al Salam) which has probable been upgraded to 40Mw. It is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention but remains without integrating itself into the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Saudi Arabia

Although during the past year there has not been specific news about possible developments in its WMD programs, there is an increasing amount of signals coming from Riyadh about the desirability of a nuclear program to enhance national security. It is clear that the government is aware of the structural weakness of its military, and that it is increasingly uncomfortable with its excessive dependency on Washington's protection. As far as it is known, the country does not have the capacity to produce its own weapons. It is likely, however, that through the financing of other countries' nuclear programs, it has obtained the necessary knowledge and technology as well as ways to import component or weapons if Saudi Arabia decides that it wants to go down that path.

At the end of 2006 several prominent figures issued statements on the kingdom's interest in starting a civil nuclear program. Although there is no visible link with the Iranian problem, it seemed obvious that - at the very least - these declarations were a reflection of the growing anxiety that their Shia neighbor was causing. The fact that Saudi Arabia sees itself as the principal Sunni actor in the region only adds to the tension.

In December 2006, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – which includes Saudi Arabia – held meetings with a team from the IAEA about possible plans to develop a joint civil nuclear program. It is also worth pointing out that the country keeps open its communication channels for nuclear matters with Russia, Pakistan, and even North Korea[36].

Egypt

Egypt's ambition to restore its nuclear program is increasingly becoming reality. The Minister of Electricity and Energy, Hasan Younes, stated in March 2007 that the country is training staff, preparing basic infrastructure, and searching for locations suitable for this project. Its objective is to construct ten nuclear power generators throughout Egypt. At the same time he announced that there were plans to construct nuclear facility at Al-Darah with a capacity of 1,000Mw, and possibly three other with 600Mw capacity. It is estimated that the first one will be ready within a decade, and the other three before 2020. So far, Egypt has not shown interest in a uranium enrichment program.

The international community has not been negative about the Egyptian decision to restart its nuclear program. The US, France and Israel do not consider it a threat to proliferation as long as there is no uranium enrichment. Russia, China and the US have shown interest in becoming involved in the project.

Younes emphasized this positive reaction from the international community with respect to the Egyptian plans, with eight billion Egyptian pounds (roughly a billion euros) invested in the energy sector during the 2007-2008 fiscal year. The World Bank declared in March of 2007 that it would be willing to finance any Egyptian nuclear program that is civil, and Russia and Egypt have reached a preliminary agreement to cooperate in this field. It should be noted, however, that the IAEA has stated that Egypt will need at least another ten years before it possesses nuclear capacity.

In the meantime, the Egyptian regime continues to update its antimissile capabilities through contract with Raytheon Co. In similar fashion, it is currently enhancing its SM-1, SHORAD and Skygard "Amoun" system through a contract with Boeing.

Iran

Besides its nuclear program on which all the world's attention seems to be focused, Iran successfully tested the sophisticated short range anti-air missile Tor-M1 of which it owns 29 units that were purchased from Russia. It also possesses the SSN4 (Raad) cruise missile which has a range of roughly 300km and can carry warheads of up to 500kg. Moreover, it can fly at low altitudes and thus avoid detection by radar or electronic means.

Iran has also confirmed that it is testing rocket launchers, emphasizing at every stage that its ultimate objective is not to launch missiles but rather commercial satellites into space[37]. The Pentagon argues, however, that these launches are a step towards the Iranian development – to be finished in 2015 - of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with the ability to reach the US. It also seems[38] that Iran has successfully managed to convert one of its Shahab-3 missiles into a satellite launcher. This would mean that it has moved from single stage launch vehicles (such as the Shahab-3) to the technologically more complex two or three stages. If this is true – and there are many signs that it is – Teheran will have taken a highly significant step; the only difference between a satellite launcher and an ICBM is simply the load that it carries.

Israel

Israel's stance continues to be similar to the past years, albeit perhaps with a more proactive role. The declaration – or, possibly, slip of the tongue – by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in December 2006 recognizing that Israel is a nuclear power has neither changed its traditional policy of calculated ambiguity nor the behavior of its neighbors.

In September 2007 documents circulated[39], which indicated that the country is attempting to gain an exemption status from the international non-proliferation regime while it continues to strengthen its ties with suppliers of nuclear technologies and materials.

In the same month, Israel attacked facilities within Syrian territory. Unofficially it confirmed several weeks later that the strikes were aimed at halting a supposed nuclear program. This action, besides being a warning to its regional adversaries, can be interpreted as a new Israeli approach to strengthen its international image as an actor that is fighting proliferation. Notwithstanding the above, it seems unlikely that Syria is indeed developing such a wide-reaching nuclear program.

Overall, Israel combines its own capacity with support received from other countries. It continues to develop its nuclear arsenal in order to possess a radical element of dissuasion and hypothetical punishment. As such, it serves as an ultimate recourse when faced with possible scenarios of the state's destruction through regional conflicts and, especially, the threat

it increasingly perceives from Iran. This explains, for example, that most of its research is centered on the development of systems against missiles and not on the development of missiles with greater ranges. As a consequence, Israel announced in November 2006 improvements of SPYDER – an anti-air protection system which can intercept medium range threats – and in February 2007 it approved Iron Dome - a short-range anti-missile defense system – which is expected to be operational within 24 months.

Also in February 2007, Israel successfully tested the anti-air defense system Arrow through simulations of the Iranian Shahab-3 ballistic missile. Arrow is capable of intercepting missiles at much higher altitudes than former systems, and thus permits a second attempt if the first one fails. Together, these three systems are developed to defend Israel against threats as varied as rudimentary Palestine Qassam rockets or the Iranian Zelzal. This requires an increase in the number of Arrow 2 systems and their deployment throughout the country[40].

 At a diplomatic level, this year Israel signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and, at a purely military level, the US Department of Defense prolonged support for the aforementioned Arrow system for another five years.

Additionally, the Israeli Airforce (IAF) presented in March 2007 a new version of its unmanned aircraft, the Heron, with autonomous flight capability of up to 30 hours at a speed of 225km per hour and at an altitude of 10,000 meters. This gives it a range of 6,700 kilometers and, as such, to cover all of Iranian territory and the rest of its Middle Eastern neighbors. The IAF has already received eight Heron, and India has signed agreement to purchase another fifty.

Also, on March 20th, 2007, Israel carried out military exercises in how to react to a hypothetical simultaneous missile attack against different target in the country. Police, security forces and rescue services – including soldiers, firemen, ambulances, government officials and healthcare personnel - were all involved. The operation had as its main objective to show the lessons that had been learned from the violent confrontation between Israeli forces and Hezbollah during the summer of 2006.

Libya

Libya continues it policy of renouncing WMD. Following this line, and at the request of Libya, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons extended its deadline for the destruction of Schedule 1[41] chemical weapons to the 31st of December 2010. Similarly, the OPCW has insisted that Libya should destroy its Schedule 2 chemical weapons[42] as soon as possible and, in any case, no later than the 31st of December 2011. In contrast to this, however, was the refusal by Libya to adhere to the agreement in June 2007, regardless of the fact that it had reached a deal with the US to destroy its arsenal. It seems clear that Libya is not willing to break its promises, but that that delays have been caused by economic difficulties.

On the other hand, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in April 2007 that the Russian Atomic Energy Agency will cooperate with Libya in the development of peaceful use of nuclear energy, especially for medical purposes.

Morocco

Morocco forms part of the NPT and its actions in this area have been limited to a recent request to construct a small nuclear research reactor. This was subsequently authorized by the US government, and construction began shortly afterwards.

There is no indication that the country has chemical or biological weapons. It is a signatory of the BTWC and it has also signed, but not ratified, the CWC.

Syria

Syria continues to insist that it is not developing a nuclear program and that it has no intention to become a nuclear power. However, it emphasizes that it might be forced to go down that path in the future as the only available alternative to deal with its high national energy consumption (growing at 10% annually) and its dwindling oil reserves.

Besides the problems caused by the alleged existence of a nuclear program, Syria finds itself in an even more delicate situation because of its possession of chemical weapons. Even if this arsenal was initially created because of national security concerns, its mere existence has become a source of conflict as it makes its neighbors feel threatened. It seems clear that abandoning these programs would help the regime and the country to improve its security situation. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine such a decision to be taken given the significant efforts over many years that have gone into them.

From an analytical perspective, it seems prudent for Damascus to reexamine its priorities and evaluate if maintaining is chemical arsenal compensates for the costs[43] and for the risks of more serious attacks than the one on the 6th of September 2007.

With respect to missile development, Israeli media announced in January 2007 that Syria had tested a Scud D, a short-range (700km) ballistic missile which could hit any part of Israel. Also, according to intelligence sources, Syria developing new capabilities for the rest of its Scud arsenal, and is attempting to acquire the Russian Iskander-E (SS-X-26).

Turkey

This year, Turkey announced plans to construct three nuclear energy generating facilities. They would have a capacity of 5,000Mw at a cost of roughly 5.4 billion euros, and are supposed to be operational somewhere between 2012 and 2015.

Although the increasing fear caused by the Iranian nuclear program has renewed the national debate on the necessity to react to the perceived threat, there is no proof that Ankara has decided to initiate any type of military nuclear program.

Tables

Table 2: Overview: WMD in Mediterranean countries				
Country	**Biological**	**Chemical**	**Nuclear**	**Ballistic Missiles**
Saudi Arabia	*None*	*None?*	*Research?*	*Yes*
Algeria	*Research*	*Research?*	*Research*	*No*
Egypt	*Development?*	*Reserves*	*Research*	*Yes*
Iran	*Development*	*Deployed*	*Development*	*Yes*
Israel	*Production capability*	*Production capability*	*Deployed*	*Yes*
Jordan	*None*	*None*	*None*	*No*
Lebanon	*None*	*None*	*None*	*No*
Libya	*Finished*	*Finished*	*Finished*	*Yes*
Morocco	*None*	*None*	*None*	*No*
Mauritania	*None*	*None*	*None*	*No*
Syria	*Research?*	*Deployed*	*Research*	*Yes*
Tunisia	*None*	*None*	*None*	*No*
Turkey	*None*	*None*	*None*	*Yes*
Yemen	*None*	*None?*	*None*	*Yes*

Legend:
- Production capability: Capable to produce WMD, without having produced significant quantities.
- Deployed: Nuclear, chemical o biological weapons integrated into the armed forces and operational.
- Development: Involved in activities to develop production capabilities.
- Research: Involved in dual-use activities (civil, although with potential to be used as military means).
- Finished: Production in the past. Has dismantled the program and its ammunition.
- ?: Inconclusive reports or information
Sources: Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS)

Tabla 3: Programas de misiles seleccionados				
Country	Missile	Quantity	Range (Km)	Pay Load (Kg)
Irán	Shahab-1 (Shehab-1, Hwasong-5, Scud-B)	200-300	320	1.000
	Shahab-2 (Shehab2, Hwasong-6, Scud-C)	100-150	500	1.000
	Shahab-3 (Shehab-3, Nodong)	25-100	1.000	1.000
	Shahab-4	1-2 prototype	2.000	1.000
	Shahab-5 (ICBM)		10.000	1.000
	Tor-M1	29	short range	-
	SSN4 (Raad)	1	300	500
Israel	Lance (SRBM)		130	450
	Jericho I (SRBM)	~50	500-650	450-500
	Jericho II (MRBM)	~50	1.500	1.000
	Jericho III (IRBM) under development		4.800	unknown
Siria	Popeye (SLCM)		200-350	200
	Harpoon (SLCM)		120	200-220
	SS-21 (Scarab)	200	70	160
	Scud-B (SS-1C, R-17 Elbrus)	200	300	1.000
	Scud-C (Hwas ng-6)	60-120	500-600	1.000
	Scud-D? (Nodong 1)		700	1.000
Arabia Saudí	DF3-A/CSS-2	50-120	2.200	2.000

--?: Inconclusive reports or information
Sources: GlobalSecurity.org, fas.org, SIPRI --?: Inconclusive reports or information
Sources: GlobalSecurity.org, fas.org, SIPRI

Table 4: Summary of BTWC and CWC framework		
Convention	Year	Results
BTWC	1972	Currently, 158 countries (with 16 pending ratification) have signed the agreement prohibiting the development, production and storage of biological and toxin weapons.
1st RC	1980	Agreement reaffirmed by the members.
2nd RC	1986	Beginning of the verification system and ways to create trust.
3rd RC	1991	Expansion of the ways to create trust.
4th RC	1996	New protocols of verification.
5th RC	2001	Without a final declaration due to a veto by US. Agreement about annual meetings to strengthen the convention in terms of its mechanisms of action in the area of security, international response against it possible illegal use or related illnesses, institutional support for detection and reaction, and a code of conduct for the scientific community.
6th RC	2006	Recuperation of the "positive dynamic", lost following the failure of the 5th CR. Agreement about next the steps to discuss – but not negotiate – the different aspects of the Convention.
CWC	1993	182 members dedicated to the prohibition of development, production and storage of chemical weapons, and to the cooperation with mechanisms for their verification and control.
1st RC	2003	Evaluation of the existing mechanism and reaffirmation of political willingness through two final documents: The Political Declaration and The Revision Document
2nd RC	2008	-

Leyend:
BTWC: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
RC: Revision Conference.
CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention.
Sources: www.opbw.org; www.opcw.org

Tabla 5: Participación de países mediterráneos en la BTWC y la CWC																	
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1979	1982	1984	1993	1995	1996	1997	1998	2000	2001	2002	2004	2007
Saudi Arabia	SIG RAT							SIG		DEP							
Algeria*								SIG	DEP					SIG RAT			
Egypt*	SIG																SPF
Iran*	SIG	RAT						SIG		DEP							
Israel*								SIG									SPF
Jordan	SIG			RAT							DEP**						
Lebanon	SIG			RAT													SPF
Libya						APR		SIG								DEP	
Morocco*	SIG							SIG	DEP						RAT		
Mauritania*								SIG				DEP					SPF
Syria*	SIG																SPF
Tunisia*	SIG	RAT						SIG		DEP							
Turkey*	SIG		RAT					SIG		DEP							
Yemen	SIG				RAT			SIG					DEP				
Other Mediterranean Actors																	
United States*	SIG			RAT				SIG			DEP						
France*							APR	SIG	DEP								
United Kingdom*	SIG			RAT				SIG		DEP							

* = Member of the UN Conference on Disarmament.
** = Accession instrument deposited.
SIG – Signed; RAT – Ratified; APR – Approved; DEP – Deposited; NFP – No Formal Participation.
BTWC: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention.
 Sources: www.opbw.org; www.opcw.org

Table 6: Basic Information about MTCR	
Members	Germany, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Spain, United States, Russian Federation, Finland, France, Greece, Hungry, Ireland, Island, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey y Ukraine.
Objectives	To limit the diffusion of technology and systems – missiles with a minimum of 500kg pay load and 300km range and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) – used as missiles to launch nuclear weapons. Cooperation and transparency in related commerce.

Appendices

List of acronyms

ABM   Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction.

BTW   Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention.

CTBT   Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

CWC   Chemical Weapons Convention.

US   United States of America.

ICBM   Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.

IDF   Israeli Defense Forces.

IRBM   Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile.

LACM   Land Attack Cruise Missiles.

MIRV   Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle.

MLRS   Multiple Launch Rocket System.

MRBM   Medium-Range Ballistic Missile.

MTCR   Missile Technology Control Regime.

IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency.

UN   United Nations.

OPCW   Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ENP   European Neighborhood Policy

SLBM   Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile.

SLCM   Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile.

SRBM   Short-Range Ballistic Missile.

SSBN   Ballistic Missile Submarine.

NPT   Non Proliferation Treaty (of Nuclear Arms).

EU   European Union.

AMU   Arab Maghreb Union.

UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

NWFZ   Nuclear Weapon Fee o

Chronology of the Iranian nuclear program (October 2006 – October 2007)

28/10/2006. Iran confirms that a second set of centrifuges for uranium enrichment has been made operative.

23/11/2006. Mohamed El Baradei states that there are still issues pending before it can be affirmed that "undeclared" nuclear activities do not exist in Iran.

23/12/2006. Resolution 1737 is unanimously approved by the UN Security Council. It imposes sanctions against Iran for not having stopped its uranium enrichment process as it had instructed to do by Resolution 1696.

06/02/2007. Iran proceeds with the installation of 3,000 centrifuges in Natanz, against the ultimatum given by the UN Security Council. The final goal is the installation of 54,000 centrifuges.

10/02/2007. The IAEA suspends half of its technical assistance projects in Iran. It is a reaction against the lack of cooperation by Teheran, and depends on the approval of the organization's committee.

22/02/2007. The IAEA publishes a report for the UN Security Council about Iran's nuclear activities. It maintains that Teheran has accelerated its uranium enrichment program instead of adhering to the ultimatum set by the Council. It also includes information about the ongoing construction of nuclear installations, the activities in the Natanz installations and the growing quantities of centrifuges.

06/03/2007. The head of the Iranian atomic agency, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, declares that Iran has begun the construction of a new nuclear installation in Darkhovin. It will have a capability of 360Mw.

09/03/2007. The IAEA committee approves the suspension of 22 projects dealing with Iran's nuclear assistance, as part of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.

21/03/2007. The construction of a nuclear reactor in Bushehr appears to have stopped following Russia's removal of its technicians and engineers. Russia alleges that there is a delay in payments by Teheran.

24/03/2007. Resolution 1747 is unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council. It imposes new sanctions against Iran, including the selling of arms as well as financial measures.

09/03/2007. The president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, announces that Iran has the capability to produce nuclear combustible at an industrial level.

23/04/2007. Russian officials declare that the Bushehr reactor will not be operational before the summer of 2008 – due to Iran's inability to make the necessary payments.

15/05/2007. Iran rejects the "Swiss plan" that proposes detain the uranium enrichment process in return for the suspension of UN sanctions.

25/07/2007. Iran warns that it would consider "illegal actions" – even threatening to withdraw from TNP – if UN sanctions in reaction to its nuclear program continue.

27/08/2007. The IAEA publishes a document drawn up by Iran, dealing with the cooperation between Teheran and the organization.

02/09/2007. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announces that Iran has met important goals in its nuclear program and has 3,000 operative centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.

11/10/2007. Iran asserts that it has provided information about its centrifuges during a meeting with the IAEA. Furthermore, it expresses its hopes for the viability of the Swiss plan in order to facilitate the dialogue between Iran and the international community.

Sources for tables and websites

Abbreviation	Name	Website
ACA	Arms Control Organization	www.armscontrol.org
OPBW	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	www.opbw.org
CNS	Center for Non proliferation Studies	http://cns.miis.edu
CDI	Center for Defense Information	www.cdi.org
CTBTO	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	www.ctbto.org
FAS	Federation of American Scientists	www.fas.org
	Global Security.org	www.globalsecurity.org
OIEA	Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica	www.iaea.org
IMF	International Monetary Fund	www.imf.org
ISIS	Institute for Science and International Security	www.isis-online.org
NTI	Nuclear Threat Initiative	www.nti.org
OPAQ	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	www.opcw.org
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	www.sipri.org
The Bulletin	Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists	www.thebulletin.org
UNTD	United Nations Treaty Database	http://untreaty.un.org

Notes

1. An initial analysis about this subject can be found in Jesús A. Núñez, "Venta de armas, estabilidad y democracia en Oriente Medio", El Pais, August 9, 2007.

2. In 1981 Israel had fulfilled this task, destroying what was to be the first Iraqi nuclear reactor in Osirak. Now (September 6th of this year), all indications are that its combat planes have returned to do the same in the Syrian territory.

3. Nothing less than compel the five nuclear powers to reduce, and even eliminate, their arsenals and the other 188 signatories to renounce the acquisition of nuclear capacity.

4. Great Britain is the only member of this exclusive group that has dared to, at least theoretically, develop a plan that envisions the renunciation of the arsenals it possesses.

5. George Perkovich analyzes this with great precision in "The End of the Nonproliferation regime?", Current History, November 2006.

6. The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction (2007): Las armas del terror; librando al mundo de las armas nucleares, químicas y biológicas, UNESCO Etxea/Asociación para las Naciones Unidas en España.

7. It is sufficient to point out that Morocco announced in March its decision to construct a nuclear base (a contract desired by Russian, American and French companies) or the accord signed between Libya and United States, also in March, which deals with the development of nuclear activities for peaceful purposes.

8. During an IAEA meeting, its director, Mohamed El Baradei from Egypt, declared that, despite four years of inspection Iran's nuclear ambitions, his organization is unable to state with certainty that the Iranian nuclear program is of a peaceful nature. USA Today, March 5, 2007.

9. This point, in a worst case scenario, would not be more than a middle phase. It would be relevant, however, in the process of acquiring military capacity in the nuclear field in years to come.

10. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/45/PDF/N0668145.pdf?OpenElement

11. The Marines were freed three days later, as an "Easter present" – in the word of President Ahmadinejad himself – who did not fail to use this brief crisis as way to regain prestige with respect to his internal rivals, very critical of his management and who had grown in influence after the negative results of his allies in the municipal elections last December.

12. This is the way the little impact of the sanctions approved by the UN Security Council has presented itself until now.

13. According to BBC, on July 7, 2007, Mohamed El Baradei made statements against "the new madmen who want to bomb Iran", http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/nuclear_detectives/6707457.stm

14. Although all evidence reveals that the quantity of the installed centrifuges is not yet enough to reach this point and, on the contrary, technical problems have occurred when attempting to reach optimal performance with those already connected.

15. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/281/43/PDF/N0728143.pdf?OpenElement

16. Alter various failed attempts to resign, he finally left his position on October 20th 2007 and was replaced by Saeed Jalili, who, until then, had been Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs for Europe and America.

17. It is interesting to observe Moscow's game, as the main supplier of the Busherh reactor. It does not want to lose the balance between preserving its links with Teheran but is, in practice, repeatedly delaying the delivery, especially of the nuclear fuel necessary to begin its production.

18. This worked, in fact, during the period of 2003-05, when Iran responded positively to Germany, France and Great Britain's request to start negotiations.

19. D. Dassa Kaye & F.M. Wehrey (2007): "A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours", Survival, 49 (2), pp.111-118.

20. It remains difficult to distinguish between scientific reasons and military activities, as it is clearly demonstrated by the ambiguities of General Purpose Criterion in the CWC – where the products that are prohibited include "toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes".

21. It is enough to mention that when the CWC went into effect (1997), between them they had accumulated 98% of the existing chemical weapons. Today (2007), with the prospect of eliminating all chemical weapons by April 2012, the US has destroyed only 40% of its arsenal and Russia just 20%.

22. Egypt has a clear profile of a proliferator in the area. It is has been documented that it used mustard gas during the Yemen War between 1963 and 1967. It also seems likely that just before the Yom Kippur War (1973), it transferred chemical weapons to Syria.

23. Iraq has had arsenals and development programs in this field and has used in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and against its own Kurdish population. Presently (November 2007), its integration into the international process is being negotiated with the OPCW.

24. After ten failed attempts, their only "successful" attack occurred in July 1995 when they used sarin gas in Tokyo's metro.

25. J. Acton, M. Brooke Rogers & P. D. Zimmerman (2007): "Beyond the Dirty Bomb: Re-thinking Radiological Terror", Survival, 49(3), pp.151-168.

26. For an outline of the current situation see Graham S. Pearson (2006): "The Importance of Implementation of the General Purpose Criterion of the Chemical Weapons Convention", Kemijau Industri, 55(10), 413-422, http://knjiznica.irb.hr/hrv/kui/vol55/broj10/413.pdf. Also, Nicholas A. Sims (2007): "The Future of Biological Disarmament: New Hope After the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention", The Non Proliferation review, 14(2), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol14/142toc.htm.

27. http://www.opbw.org/rev_cons/6rc/6rc_press.htm.

28. This category also includes various types of aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), space vehicles and land-based platforms such as nuclear mines and even "nuclear suitcases".

29. Probably operational since 2005.

30. It is shocking to note that there does not seem to have been serious concern about the combination of missiles with chemical or biological weapons. After all, it was exactly this combination that caused an increased global interest in the subject of missile proliferation after the Iraqi attacks on Israel with Scud missiles in 2003. Seemingly without a just cause, chemical and biological weapons continue to be associated with terrorist activity whereas missiles tend to be almost exclusively linked to nuclear weaponry.

31. This is the – critical and concerned - view of Dennis M. Gormley, in "Missile Defence Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq War," *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 4 (Winter, 2003-04), pp. 61-86.

32. Uzi Rubin in "The global range of Iran's ballistic missile program", Jerusalem Issue Brief V. 5, N. 26, 20 June 2006, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

33. "Israeli media says Syria has tested Scud," Agence France Presse, 2 February 2007.

34. According to the *Nuclear Threat Initiative* (www.nti.org).

35. The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of Júlia Viladomat in writing this section of the report.

36. The contacts with these last two countries seem to be the result of financial operations during the 1990s.

37. It is probable that the missile in question is a North Korean Taepodong-2 of which simply the exterior colors and flag has been changed. Even if this is the case, however, it still shows the level of cooperation with North Korea (and Pakistan) and Iran's willingness to move forward in this area.

38. *Aviation Week&Space Technology*, 26 January 2007.

39. George Jahn, *Israel Seeks Exemption From Atomic Rules*, Associated Press, 25 September 2007.

40. Currently there are two series deployed: one in the south and one in the north. A third series could be deployed around the Dimona nuclear facility.

41. Weapons based on "schedule 1" chemicals. They are labeled as "high risk", and include sarin and VX.

42. Weapons based on "non-schedule 1" chemicals. They are labeled as "significant risk", and include phosgene.

43. As happened on January 4th, 2007, when Washington decided to freeze US assets of three Syrian governmental organizations which had been accused of being proliferators of WMD.

6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean.
Human Security

Seminar programme

The initiative of jointly organising this international seminar goes back to the year 2002. Since then, and on a yearly basis, the Ministry of Defence and the CIDOB Foundation have brought together, in Barcelona, the principal experts, both academic and governmental and both civil and military, who are involved in the study and practice of security and defence in the Mediterranean.

The main objectives of this encounter are, in the first place, to increase transparency and knowledge in the development and implementation of different initiatives in the field of security; secondly, to promote spaces of relationship and mutual knowledge among figures from different backgrounds and disciplines; and thirdly, to contribute to the political and academic debate on security and defence in the Mediterranean.

In this edition, the Seminar emphasises both the scenarios for security in the Mediterranean and issues related to human security (fundamental freedoms, civil-military cooperation and security sector reform).

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2007

16:00 INAUGURATION

      Welcome speech by:
      Narcís Serra, President of the CIDOB Foundation

Inaugural conferences:
      José Antonio Alonso, Minister of Defence of Spain
      João Mira Gomes, Secretary of State for National Defence
      and Maritime Affairs, Portugal

Coffee break

18:00 BALANCE OF THE COOPERATION INITIATIVES

      CFSP and ESDP in the Mediterranean
      Martín Ortega, Lecturer on International Law, Universidad
      Complutense, Madrid

      The Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood
      Policy
      Eduard Soler, Coordinator of the Mediterranean
      Programme, CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona

      Cooperation in Western Mediterranean: 5+5
      Mario Rino Me, Admiral, Chairman 5+5, Italian Minister of
      Defence

      NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul
      Cooperation Initiative
      Alberto Bin, Head of Regional Affairs and Mediterranean
      Dialogue of NATO

Debate
      Chairman:
      Luis M. Cuesta Civís, Secretary General for Defence Policy,
      Spanish Ministry of Defence

      Dinner
      Keynote speaker: **General Félix Sanz**, Head of the Joint
      Chiefs of Staff of the Spanish Ministry of Defense

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6

10:00 ROUND TABLE: SCENARIOS OF SECURITY (OR INSECURITY)
          IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Director, Institute of Security
Studies of the European Union (ISS-EU), Paris

Khadija Mohsen-Finan, Senior Research Fellow, Institut
Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris

Shlomo Ben-Ami, Vice-President, Centro Internacional
Toledo para la Paz, Madrid

Fred Halliday, Professor of International Relations, Institut
Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) and London School
of Economics (LSE)

Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall
Fund of the United States

Meliha Altunisik, Professor of International Relations,
Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara

Debate
          Chairman:
          Haizam Amirah Fernández, Senior Analyst,
          Mediterranean and the Arab World, Elcano Royal Institute,
          Madrid

Lunch

15:00 **WORKING COMMITTEES ON HUMAN SECURITY**

COMMITTEE A:

FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND SECURITY IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN

Chairman:
          Jean-François Coustillière, Rear Admiral, Head of the
          Cabinet, JFC Conseil
Panellists:
          Isabelle Werenfels, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
          (SWP), Berlin
          Nadir Benseba, International Federation of Journalists,
          Algiers
          Salam Kawakibi, Kawakibi Centre for Democratic
          Transition, Paris
Reporter:
          Rosa Massagué, El Periódico de Catalunya

COMMITTEE B:

CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS

Chairman:
Hans Gunter Brauch, Chairman, AFES-PRESS; fellow, United Nations University- Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS)
Panellists:
Benito Raggio, Division General, General Director of Defence Policy, Spanish Ministry of Defence
Radek Khol, GS Council of the EU, DGE IX
Francisco Javier Gan Pampols, Colonel of the Spanish Armed Forces
Reporter:
Ángeles Espinosa, *El País*

COMMITTEE C:

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Chairman:
Yahia Zoubir, Professor of International Relations, Euromed Marseille School of Management.
Panellists:
Arnold Luethold, Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva.
Volkan Aytar, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Istanbul
Gemma Collantes, post-doctoral research fellow, Institut Barcelona de Relacions Internacionals (IBEI), Barcelona
Reporter:
Rosa Meneses, *El Mundo*

Coffee break

18:00 CLOSING SESSION

Presentation of the 2007 Report on Weapons of Mass Destruction
Jesús Núñez Villaverde, Director, Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria (IECAH), Madrid
Report of the working committees: **Rosa Massagué**, *El Periódico*; **Ángeles Espinosa**, *El País*; **Rosa Meneses**, *El Mundo*
Concluding remarks
Celia Abenza, Director General of Institutional Relations, Spanish Ministry of Defence

19:00 FAREWELL COCKTAIL