

**5th International Seminar
on Security and Defence
in the Mediterranean**
Multi-Dimensional Security

Naz

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5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Presentation.
Narcís Serra and Celia Abenza



PRESENTATION



PRESENTATION

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This monographic work contains all the papers, addresses and reports presented in the 5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean, held in Barcelona on 4th December, 2006. The seminars, which were organised jointly by the CIDOB Foundation and the Spanish Ministry of Defence, have been held on an annual basis since 2002.

The previous 2005 Seminar took place at a time of great expectancy, only two months before the Euro-Mediterranean Summit. The 2006 Seminar, on the other hand, was held after a year in which the Mediterranean had once again become the centre of a violent conflict: three members of the Barcelona Process, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, became embroiled in a violent escalation, the main victims of which were the inhabitants of the region.

As every year, the 2006 Seminar carried out an evaluation of the progress made in various co-operation initiatives, including the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, 5+5 Initiative, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the ESDP. At the same time, it analysed a number of practical cases, such as Morocco's participation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and some of the ESDP missions in the Middle East. One of the main innovations in this year's Seminar was the introduction of small working committees responsible for tackling some of the basic aspects of security in the Mediterranean, such as the control of migration flows, energy issues and the compatibility between the promotion of governance and security in the Mediterranean. Part of these contributions has also been included in this publication.

The sensitive issues that were discussed in the seminar, which could easily have hampered dialogue among some of the participants, were not influenced by the current political situation. This demonstrates the importance of holding debates that help to strengthen co-operation in the area of security and defence in the Mediterranean. With this objective in mind, our annual Seminar is becoming consolidated as a necessary meeting point between the governmental representatives of the countries of the European Union, the members of NATO and the countries to the South and East of the Mediterranean, with the aim of sharing information and debating the main challenges to security in the

region. It also provides an opportunity for prestigious scholars and actors that are there on the ground, both civilians and members of the military forces, to discuss these same challenges and to develop a fruitful dialogue.

We at the CIDOB Foundation and the Ministry of Defence consider it essential to promote collaboration on projects that help to consolidate spaces for dialogue among representatives from both sides of the Mediterranean and which, in turn, serve to bring these debates closer to our country's specialists on the region. Likewise, by publishing the speeches and reports deriving from the Seminar, we also contribute to disseminating this information among the general public.

This monograph, which is the result of the debates generated by the 5th Seminar, is therefore a work that contains different positions and sensitivities in the face of the multidimensional challenges to security in the region. Furthermore, if we recognise that most of these challenges affect the Mediterranean as a whole and not only its individual states, then encouraging shared reflections on these issues represents one of the most important tasks being carried out by institutions such as ours.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Preface

Spain and the security in the Mediterranean.
José Antonio Alonso

José Antonio Alonso

Minister of Defence, Spain

The programme for this seminar lays out in detail all the possible aspects of the vitally important issue of security and defence in the Mediterranean, which is one of the most important geographical and political areas in terms of the evolution of Europe, the world, and Spain in particular. As a consequence, I may well touch on some of the issues that have already been mentioned; if that should prove to be the case, please see it as underscoring those points rather than as unnecessary repetition.

In 2003, the European Council passed the European Union's first strategic instrument, which has become known as the "Solana Document", in which Europeans opted for a multilateral approach based on the conviction that no country can tackle, on its own, problems as complex as the ones that we have to face in today's world. The document, entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World", dealt with the need to contribute to facing threats and to bringing opportunities to fruition. In short, the aim was to build a world that was safer, fairer and more united. Thus, the European Security Strategy echoed the difficulties experienced by many people on the planet and, specifically, the need for "a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process".

I believe that there is increasing conviction that unilateral actions in international politics only result in failure. Furthermore, I think that the belief that one-dimensional actions do not contain solid approaches or generate stable, lasting solutions is also becoming more widespread. I imagine that any Foreign Affairs Minister would find it hard to draw up a solution or a plan for specific crises and conflicts without bearing in mind, in addition to diplomatic strategies, economic instruments and, particularly, those of security and defence. And I also imagine that no economic director would ever think of drafting a plan for investment, development or cooperation without considering the political conditions, context and background, as well as the conditions, context and background in terms of security. I also assume that none of a Defence Minister's specific powers would be sufficient if the many other areas within which peace, progress and security are constructed were not taken into consideration.

A few days ago, at a conference on the subject of defence, somebody claimed (and rightly, in my opinion) that Europe is not undergoing a crisis, but rather it is under construction: a construction project that has made great advances, though in addition to building from the top down, construction also has to be carried out from the bottom up. Taking this idea further, it does not seem ridiculous to claim that this new world of the 21st Century is also under construction, but as there are no set plans or qualified architects available, we have to carry out the work, step by step, in conjunction with as many others as possible. In my view, it is clear that a huge distance exists between the level of construction in the European Union community and that other one which is so large and diffuse that we generically refer to it as the international community. However, this analogy, on a different scale, can also be applied to the Mediterranean, a millennial region which now also requires step-by-step construction to create a common space of development and mutual trust.

In the same way that in some North African countries there are experts (and especially economists) who speak of the cost of a “no-Maghreb” (in the sense that possibilities for development exist that come to nothing owing to a lack of a stable regional integration), one could also talk about the enormous cost deriving from the “no-Mediterranean”, the negative consequences for all the countries in the region that would result from living with their backs turned to each other; in a state of confrontation or with relations that were unbalanced or lacking in due respect.

What is needed is dialogue and cooperation between northern and southern countries, as well as between the different southern nations, in addition to continuing to improve Mediterranean relations through unified European action. These approaches are necessary because the Mediterranean exists, because the problems of one country affect others, and because, as some of the speakers at this seminar have made clear, it is impossible to geographically compartmentalise issues of peace and security. In this sense, the Mediterranean is an interrelated whole.

Recently, the 8th Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Ministers for Foreign Affairs took place, which coincided with the NATO summit in Riga. At this event, both the Spanish Minister and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy referred to issues relating to peace and security as being matters of particular importance. With these step-by-step construction processes (European construction, the international construction in general, and the Mediterranean in particular), and given the certainty that neither one-dimensional solutions exist, nor fields wide enough to cover them (this includes the military option), there is no doubt that a fundamental contribution is being made by the armed forces and within the area of defence in general, both in terms of missions executed and of the exercising of what we have come to call “defence diplomacy”.

What is Spain’s current defence policy in the Mediterranean area? It does not possess any atypical or exceptional features, just the characteristics of the new Spanish defence policy. Firstly, it is rigorously scrupulous in terms of international law. Secondly, it is an area that is considered to be a priority for Spain. The Mediterranean has traditionally been at the core of our overseas focus, and the current National Defence

Directive presents the region as one of the guidelines in terms of the development of defence policy at international level. This approach was also present in previous directives, though it has probably never been put into practice with as much force as at present. Thirdly, it is a policy with a multilateral application that is developed within the framework of initiatives and organisations such as the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the 5+5 initiative, in which Spain is jointly participating with nine other countries from both sides of the Mediterranean. This initiative, which was proposed by France in 2004, was devised to tackle the issues of security and defence in the western Mediterranean area from a military perspective.

It is, therefore, a policy with a great deal of commitment, and this is clearly demonstrated by Spain's presence in Lebanon, in the eastern Mediterranean. There are 1,100 Spanish troops taking part in the complex mission of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) to guarantee global stability in a space that has many implications for the immediate area, the Near East, but also for the rest of the world.

I should also mention that one of the main characteristics of Spain's defence policy is the aim of achieving peace. To this end, we are building trust through cooperation, proposing approaches and objectives to the international community (such as the Spanish-Turkish proposal of the Alliance of Civilisations) as well as involving ourselves in the resolution of conflicts such as the one in Lebanon, and in peace initiatives such as the one in the Middle East, in which we worked alongside France and Italy.

Finally, I would also like to point out that Spain does not merely plan to implement a regional policy. We have long shown a commitment to the idea that many issues in the Mediterranean, one of the most conflictive areas on the planet, should be considered and approached at both a European and a global level. We know that many of the worrying phenomena (in terms of global security) arrive at our door from the various countries with which we coexist in the Mediterranean area, and so we have to put our shoulders to the wheel in this specific area, which is so important from a strategic point of view, both for Spain and for the world in which we live.

Our leadership of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference and the Barcelona Process is proof of this, as is our insistence on Mediterranean Dialogue within the Atlantic Alliance, as well as the actions of the Spanish delegation at the Riga summit. As you know, one of the issues discussed at this summit was the reform of the different partnerships, and we in Spain have long worked to promote Mediterranean Dialogue so that its importance is recognised and remembered, and to ensure that these reforms do not have a negative effect in terms of finances or support. Spain has also worked to guarantee that all the participating countries are duly (and flexibly) provided with the instruments appropriate for the partnership.

In broad terms, this is the present global and strategic position of the Spanish Government with respect to these broad issues of peace, dialogue, cooperation and security in the Mediterranean.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Balance

The Barcelona process and the European neighbourhood policy.
Rafael Dezcallaraz

Rafael Dezcallar

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Security in the Mediterranean is perhaps one of the central issues in international relations at the beginning of the 21st century. I am not going to speak about more specialised aspects on this topic, which you know far better than I do, but rather I am going to try to give you a vision of how this issue is seen from the point of view of the current Spanish government.

Security, of course, is a subjective concept. It is necessary to begin by saying that security is not the same for those who have it as for those who do not, and, moreover, the fact of having it sometimes has more to do with perceptions than with reality. The subjectivity of security, that is to say, the ambiguity of the concept in a world like, for example, the Mediterranean, so accustomed to subtleties and the double-dealing nature of words, must not allow us to forget the ultimate political objective which it deals with: to prevent undesired, forced, mandatory changes in situations that are better to handle on the basis of consensus, co-operation and mutual agreement.

On the other hand, the concept of security is a very broad one. It can include both the idea of the use of force in order to prevent those changes or to cause them, and the search for common agreement to generate such changes. It is in this conviction that the word ownership arises, a word which is a key concept in the Barcelona Process, which Spain and the countries that have impelled it firmly believe in. Without ownership the Barcelona Process would have never been possible, because it is a process which is understood as being shared by both parties due to their interests. The same thing, of course, is applicable to the European Neighbourhood Policy or the Alliance of Civilisations initiative which is being promoted by Spain, Turkey and United Nations.

However, security by means of force (or at least by the possibility of using the force when it is strictly necessary out of national interests) and security by means of mutual conviction (collaboration on the basis of shared interests) are non-exclusive paths. That is, no state is going to abandon the instruments of defence and security that guarantee their security by means of force, in exchange simply believing in the idea that through negotiation and dialogue those shared objectives will be reached. Both instruments will continue to be necessary. Of

course, when we are speaking of security, we are not only speaking of its foreign dimension, it is necessary to consider also the domestic dimension of security. Good governance, that is, the control that citizens have over their own lives, their governments and their political systems, is probably the greatest source of domestic security we all have.

So, how have we conceived the generating of security in the Mediterranean within the Barcelona Process? We have conceived it by creating a complex framework of relationships that generate a structure of shared interests, that is, a situation in which the interest of one party must necessarily be taken into account by the other and, in this way, allow the process as a whole to move forward. It is a matter of creating a framework of shared interests to generate a process in the end, the Barcelona Process or other processes that can follow the same direction.

The Barcelona Process, which is the process that has advanced the most since its creation eleven years ago, has a series of dimensions you know very well: political dimension, economic dimension and also a security basket. The political dimension is, without a doubt, the most important because it is the one that creates the ultimate source of legitimacy for all the other dimensions. High-level meetings have taken place (the first summit took place in Barcelona last year) as well as ministerial meetings. However, it must be recognised that the political process has been limited to a certain extent by the contamination of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The political process (councils of ministers, Summit, the existence of a concept of shared interest) exists, and if it did not we would miss it enormously. If all this did not exist, it would be necessary to set to work immediately to start creating it. But, it is true that on its way, in terms of the scope and ambition that have managed to take shape in specific objectives, the political process has been contaminated by the ups and downs in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Lately a basket has been created which is really important when speaking of subjects such as justice and home affairs, immigration issues like the meeting that must be held next year, or the code of conduct on terrorism that was approved in the last summit. Important instruments have been created to generate this awareness of shared interests and values like the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, whose future potential is very large. All in all, in other words, the limitations of the Barcelona Process must serve us exclusively as stimuli for looking for the way to overcome them and never as arguments to invalidate a process, the need for which is still as vital today as when it was created.

The European Neighbourhood Policy, for its part, is in a certain way a complement to the Barcelona Process. It is a policy based on the concept of neighbourhood, an innovative concept in the European Union, and it takes as a basic premise that the security and prosperity of the EU's near abroad are keys to the stability and prosperity of the region and of the Union itself. For this reason, the neighbourhood policy has not only financial but also co-operation instruments, as well as instruments for generating relationships and monitoring. They are very powerful instruments that, by the way, I must emphasise have been mainly oriented towards the Mediterranean. The Southern countries

have absorbed 70 percent of the budgetary funds of the neighbourhood policy, versus 30 percent of the funds for Eastern countries.

The neighbourhood policy is complementary to the Barcelona Process. Just as the Barcelona Process has a series of horizontal co-operation mechanisms and a meeting structure, the neighbourhood policy establishes a bilateral relationship between each country and the EU. Through such a bilateral relation, each country generates, in common agreement with the Union, an action plan that tries to bring the domestic mechanisms of that country closer to the mechanisms of the single market, thus creating the conditions for an economic and political collaboration with the EU at the highest level.

It has often been stated that the neighbourhood policy is thought to give to those countries which benefit from it all the benefits of the EU except for participation in its institutions. Nevertheless, unlike the countries of the South, for the countries of Eastern Europe, the neighbourhood policy can be contemplated as a prelude to accession. Sometimes when the countries of Eastern Europe insist on speaking about their accession without being prepared yet and the option of the neighbourhood policy is offered to them, they do not understand it so much as an alternative to accession but as an anteroom. While for them it can be an anteroom, for the countries of the South it is the best possible alternative to a relation with the EU based on sharing the single market and interests of all type. Perhaps the term single market sounds excessively economist, but the neighbourhood policy does not refer only to instruments and economic and commercial matters but also to all types of collaborations, including the political collaboration as well as in other spheres.

As mentioned above, security in the Mediterranean is such a central concept in the contemporary international relations that neither the Barcelona Process nor the European Neighbourhood policy are the only routes that are being used to try to enhance, deepen and ensure this security. I can tell you, for example, that this was one of the major issues of the last NATO summit in Riga. There interventions were made by specific countries that have focused on the subject of security in the Mediterranean as a basic concept. Both the Alliance of Civilisations and the question of Afghanistan, a country of an Islamic culture, are subjects very closely connected with the questions of security in the Mediterranean.

And, what are the causes for this question to be such a key subject nowadays? Without a doubt it is due to the series of political and military crises that have been succeeding each other in a series of Islamic countries and that have their political repercussion in the Mediterranean: the problem of the Middle East, the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the problems of terrorism, the questions of immigration and, of course, the questions of good governance. It is really difficult to affirm projects of collaboration and good governance between both shores of the Mediterranean when differences in income still exist like that, for example, between Spain and North Africa, differences on the order of thirteen or fourteen times in income per capita. It is fundamental to establish good governance so that stability and security may be possible between both shores of the sea.

I was saying that, aside from the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy, the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, the 5+5 Process and the Alliance of Civilisations itself are other routes for trying to tackle the problem. The Alliance, at heart, is a way of supporting the moderate sectors in the face of the extremist ones, affirming the common values that unite the moderate sectors of the north and south. Stigmatisation can be avoided, not only of Islam as a religion supposedly linked to violence (a totally false statement), but in general of any ideology that does not embrace violence. With these common values as a starting point, it is a matter of defining common actions, already specified in the Action Plan presented in the Report of the High-level Group to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in its Istanbul meeting a couple of weeks ago. These common actions must encompass the political sphere as well as the spheres of education, the media and youth.

Deep down, it is a matter of fighting in a battle about the ideas, since the problem of security is going to be resolved much more on the level of ideas and principles than on the level of force. This is precisely the result of seeing the limitations of the use of force or unilateral policies to obtain the objectives that they supposedly achieved. The legitimacy of ideas is a weapon which must not be underestimated; although naturally one must not be ingenuous either and it must always be a complement to other operative forms, for example, in the fight against terrorism. Against terrorism we fight not only with ideas but also with operational co-operation. It must be made clear that, of course, the Alliance of Civilisations is not an instrument to fight against terrorism; it is an instrument to fight against destabilisation, threats to security, the separation between the values and the negative drift in mutual perceptions.

The Alliance does not have to be a means to generate radical changes overnight, either. The battles of ideas are by definition mid-term battles. But whereas it seemed until now that these mutual perceptions, these ideas on double standards, on the operational ability of the Security Council in some cases and the lack of operational capacity in others, were generating greater and greater disagreement between the moderate sectors of the North and the South of the Mediterranean, the Alliance is basically trying to change tendencies, so that the trends do not only go down a negative path, but rather to generate trends in a positive direction as well. Although the Alliance is not a crisis management instrument, I can tell you that has fulfilled this function on one certain occasion. When the cartoon crisis took place, a meeting of the Alliance of Civilisations was held in Doha, and in a parallel way, Kofi Annan called another meeting with the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and the Spanish and Turkish ministers, out of which emerged a declaration calling for moderation and understanding at the height of the crisis. It was the first call for moderation, in the midst of a situation in which it seemed as if nobody would stop the spiral of mutual recriminations and lack of understanding. This meeting took place on a Saturday. The following Monday, this call for moderation was endorsed by the EU Council of Ministers. As I have told you, it is not a matter of trying to change the world overnight, but to reverse tendencies, to take negative trends and try to transform them into positive ones.

None of this will be possible if political crises at heart of the threats or security in the Mediterranean are not tackled. These crises are, for example, the crises of Iraq, where the only solution is the creation of internal consensus and determined, sincere support on the part of the neighbouring countries. I do not believe that there is any country in the region that has an interest in the indefinite continuation of the chaos in Iraq or its dismemberment; it is essential to continue working in the direction I have just outlined. The Afghanistan crisis is another example. At this moment there is still an important degree of support for the presence of international troops in Afghanistan to favour the stabilisation and the institutional reconstruction of that country. It is essential to capitalise on that support, broaden the security work of the international community to other spheres, such as generating concrete co-operation projects so that people perceive that their lives are improving thanks to them. The fight being waged in Afghanistan, as in almost all parts, is not going to be resolved at a military level but at a political level. We must be conscious of the fact that security in the Mediterranean is also at stake in Afghanistan, Iraq and naturally in the Middle East, which continues to be a permanent source of mutual recriminations, accusations, double standards and a lack of understanding between the Western and Islamic worlds.

Thus, there was the necessity for the EU to adopt a political approach, an initiative of its own in this sphere. Spain, France and Italy have decided to take the initiative and to submit to the EU a project of ideas to make the political process advance. It is not a matter of replacing the Quartet, or by all means placing itself in the place of the parts. It is a question, nevertheless, of the EU adopting a higher, more ambitious, and more determined profile in the political impetus of the Quartet. That is to say, the EU cannot be simply waiting for decisions to be made by others and then try to adapt to them, but rather we must push those decisions in the direction of most interest to us, which is none other than the direction of political negotiation. Spain, France and Italy, three countries with troops deployed on the ground in Lebanon, are very conscious of the need to do so and that the option of remaining still, with our arms crossed, waiting for the next crisis or the next war to break out, is not an option. For this reason, we need to give impetus to the political process. For this reason, we were trying to activate the rest of the EU countries. For this reason, we are trying to get the European Council of 14 December 2006 to pass a declaration in which the EU was given a mandate to perform actively in the Quartet and push the political process. As I was saying, the EU is not going to act on its own, but rather it will always do so within the framework of the Quartet, which is the most useful existing structure in the international community for tackling this problem.

As I was saying, security is of course a matter of armies, defence mechanisms and operating agreements, but, in the end, it is much more a question of policy, ideas and principles. The most difficult thing, naturally, is to generate common values and interests and, from there, common actions. That is what the Barcelona Process has been doing for many years. That is what the EU must do now, perhaps with a greater role towards the countries of the South, and that is also what this present conference is undoubtedly going to contribute to developing.

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Balance

The NATO Mediterranean dialogue and the Istanbul co-operation initiative.

Pablo de Benavides Orgaz

THE NATO MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE AND THE ISTANBUL CO-OPERATION INITIATIVE

Pablo de Benavides Orgaz

Spanish Ambassador to NATO

One of the characteristics of NATO is the enormous practical meaning we try to give all of our actions. For this, and in the first place, in the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, the Mediterranean Dialogue established the objective of arriving at a *genuine partnership*. And, to achieve this, the objectives that shape co-operation with these countries were laid out for the first time:

1. The deepening of political dialogue
2. The fight against terrorism
3. Defence reform
4. Interoperability among armed forces

In addition, the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (ICI), which also emerged from this summit, seeks the development of a relationship (for now, a bilateral one) between NATO and the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, with the idea of improving security and stability in the region. So far, four countries have joined in: Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.

The development of this initiative is being carried out within the areas of the modernisation of the armed forces and co-operation in military matters. NATO maintains relations with these countries in order to carry out a series of annual co-operation activities from which each country chooses those that are of interest to it. During the current year, there are thirteen areas of co-operation.

The Riga NATO Summit

What have we done this year? To answer this question, we must make reference to the past NATO Summit in Riga. There are two especially important initiatives aimed at the South: the enlargement of NATO's system of partnerships and co-operation in the training of the armed forces. These two new initiatives, explained to the affected governments, will now form part of a more intense dialogue in regard to their implementation.

Enlargement of NATO's System of Partnerships

This initiative signifies the progressive opening up of all of the instruments of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to the countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the countries in the ICI. It signifies a very important qualitative leap, because they go from being, in the jargon of the Atlantic Alliance, partners with a lower-case *p* to Partners with a capital *P*. Or, in other words, this is their entrance into the Euro-Atlantic Forum, which brings together 46 European countries, both members and non-members of the Atlantic Alliance.

At the same time, this reform of the partnerships introduces a more flexible system in meetings for combining the previous criteria based, of course, on ownership and the second fundamental criteria in Brussels, that of inclusiveness, along with a third criteria not incompatible with the previous two, that of self-differentiation. It is a matter of offering all of these partners the chance to participate in the Partnership for Peace activities that each country voluntarily chooses. This is what in the Brussels jargon we call 26 + *n*, that is, all of those countries that are interested in a given programme can become involved in it.

And finally, there is the 26 + 1, that is, the countries are empowered so that, on an individual basis, they present their programme of co-operation with NATO. We will refer to this in detail further on.

Co-operation in Armed Forces Training (Training Initiative)

This is a co-operation initiative in training in order to modernise defence structures and train security forces in the Middle East. It is an initiative that, at the request of the countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI, open all of the NATO centres to the training of officers and civilian personnel of the Ministries of Defence and, at the same time, facilitates the sending of our leaders to these countries. Not only are we referring to the most well-known centres, such as the Defence Colleges in Rome, Oberammergau (Germany), and Stavanger (Norway), but also to the Partnership for Peace Centres existing in other countries. A famous Spanish centre is the one in Hoyo de Manzanares, which specialises in landmine clearance, concretely.

A second, more ambitious phase, the progress of which will depend on the results of the first phase, will be the creation of an ICI regional security centre in one of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. It will not be a NATO centre; it will be a Mediterranean Dialogue and NATO centre, property of the country that offers to be its location and in which joint teaching and training activities will take place.

Consequences of the Riga Summit

Political Co-operation with the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI

The transformation of the partnerships, decided upon in Riga, has consecrated the importance of political dialogue among allies and partners. All of them already recognise the principle of the indivisibility of security and, therefore, the importance of sharing a common strategic vision in order to face the new security challenges. They also recognise self-differentiation and the existence of specific interests for each partner or region. For this reason, they have introduced the possibility of calling meetings in the 26+n format, that is, with those partners in the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI, and even some contact countries, for certain subjects that affect regions in which NATO is involved in some way. With these decisions, NATO is not only preserving the specificity of the Mediterranean Dialogue but also contributing means for demonstrating that it considers it to be a true partnership.

At the same time, what is fundamentally pursued is the maintaining of the dialogue, trying to preserve it from the political situation that exists in the region. This by no means signifies that we ignore the problems in the region, but we are completely aware that it is not up to NATO to solve the problems of the Middle East and that, therefore, we orient ourselves to a relationship of a pragmatic nature which does, in fact, contribute to solving the problem in the Middle East, through greater trust, greater transparency and, above all, joint action in the delicate area of armed forces training. We all know the weight of the security and armed forces sectors in our countries (in Spain, there was a democratic transition that determined an absolute revolution in the security sector). In the Middle East, this is a subject that, through the decisions of these same countries, will evolve in the way that they consider opportune.

From Istanbul to here, important steps have been taken in improving political consultations: the meetings of ambassadors in the 26 + 7 format are the most frequent and substantive ones. A meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one of Ministers of Defence, and, when the political atmosphere warrants it, the high-level meetings will continue.

Practical Co-operation

What instruments already exist for the Mediterranean Dialogue, and which ones did we open in Riga? They can be divided into four chapters:

1. Improvement in the interoperability between the NATO forces and those of the Mediterranean Dialogue so that they can work together in NATO operations, including capabilities, teaching, training and exercises.

- *Annual Working Programme of the Mediterranean Dialogue*

This provides a detailed plan for all of the Mediterranean Dialogue. The programme clearly establishes the structure, the practical objectives of co-operation and the scope of around 600 activities in 31 agreed-upon areas (we have gone from 100 activities in 2004 to 200 in 2005 and 400 in 2006). It is a catalogue of activities organised and conducted by NATO and its member states. It is developed and maintained by ePRIME. It is a programme that is open to the seven countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

- *Individual Co-operation Programme*

This is a programme that is open to each of the candidate countries. Their governments come to NATO with an individualised working programme in the sector of armed forces co-operation. It aims to help in the drawing up of national policies and in allied policies in a joint way. It provides the interested countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue with the capability of framing their practical co-operation in a forward-looking, strategic way, including middle- and long-term goals. The individual activities are selected from the Working Programme. Morocco and Egypt will enter the programme soon. Israel has already presented one.

- *The Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC)*

This aims to improve the level of interoperability and military effectiveness of the forces of the partners in the PfP and the Mediterranean Dialogue (since 18 November 2005). This includes a database on the available and declared forces susceptible of participating in joint peacekeeping operations, as well as assessment and feedback to ensure compliance with NATO's standards and requirements.

- *The Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP)*

This pursues the training of officers at an operational and tactical level for their homologation with allied training. In the end, what is sought is a modernisation of the armed forces of these countries, with new concepts, new technologies, the acquisition of new capabilities, and interoperational systems of command, control and communication, in order to provide these armed forces with modern technology. It is the main tool for promoting learning and training in support of interoperability. It promotes collaboration among the institutions devoted to the training of personnel (at an operational and tactical level) who form part of multinational general headquarters. The Mediterranean Dialogue has been participating in this programme since 30 March 2006. During 2006, 1.000 officers from seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries have passed through the Brussels centre.

- *The Political Military Framework (PMF)*

This is a politico-military conceptual working framework for NATO-led operations. It establishes the principles, modalities and guidelines for the involvement of all of the partnership countries in political consultations and decision-making in operational planning and in command agreements for NATO operations.

- *Partnership Co-ordination Cell (PCC)*

This has a fundamentally practical orientation. It co-ordinates joint military activities, and among its competences is that of carrying out

the military planning necessary for implementing the military aspects of the Working Programme, including exercises and activities such as peacekeeping and search-and-rescue tasks. The PCC also co-ordinates and evaluates the military aspects Strategic Command support activities. As a new development, it can be highlighted the fact that Morocco has named the first Liaison Officer in the PCC for KFOR operations in SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), the top allied command post.

- *Partners for Peace Status of Force Agreements (SOFA)*

This is the system that guarantees the presence of armed forces in a territory. At this time, it is in a phase of discussion among the allies in the Mediterranean Co-ordination Group. This tool would facilitate practical co-operation between NATO and its partners, providing a legal framework for matters relating to the presence of military personnel in a host country.

- *NATO Fuels and Lubricant Working Group*

The NATO Pipeline Committee (NPC) seeks all of the progressive co-operation in the area of energy and the protection of critical infrastructures as well as lines of communication. It has admitted the Mediterranean Dialogue countries into the NATO Working Group on fuels and lubricants and in the meetings of its subordinate Working Groups in EAPC sessions, except for when operational matters are dealt with.

- *ePRIME (Partnership Real-Time Information Management and Exchange System)*

This is the successor of PRIME. Launched in July 2006, it is the first internet-based tool employed for managing the co-operation programme. This includes an electronic library for Mediterranean Dialogue documents, a catalogue of co-operation activities, distance-learning modules, messenger and chat features and working group facilities.

2. Modernisation of the Armed Forces and Defence Structures

- *NATO Contact Point Embassies (CPE)*

The NATO Contact Point Embassies have been established in all of the countries in the PfP, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI to support the efforts of NATO's public diplomacy. At this time, the CPEs are Algeria, Italy, Egypt, the United Kingdom, Israel, the Czech Republic, Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Mauritania, Spain, Tunisia and Canada. Our defence advisors fundamentally act through these Contact Point Embassies.

- *Fiduciary Funds*

This is a mechanism for obtaining contributions from allies and partners for destroying anti-personnel mines, and for meliorating the consequences of defence reforms and the training of excess military personnel in the armed forces. The Spanish Prime Minister announced in Riga that Spain will lead the first fiduciary fund in the Mediterranean Dialogue, which will foreseeably consist of a fund for the destruction of unexploded munitions. This fund will probably be co-led by Norway and will be established in Jordan.

- *Clearing House*

This is an informal forum for discussing assistance programmes and initiatives foreseen by NATO authorities or its member states. This forum can also be used to harmonise and avoid duplications in specific programmes.

3. The Fight against Terrorism

- *The Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T)*

This is the main platform for co-operation in the fight against terrorism. It is a plan for co-operation and the exchange of intelligence among the secret services of the seven countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the 26. It is a flexible conceptual and political framework more than a mechanism structured for systematic co-operation. It is still open to members of the PfP, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the ICI and contact countries. To date, there have been four meetings of the main heads of security of the seven countries and the 26 in Brussels.

- *Aerial Defence*

The NATO Aerial Defence Committee (NADC) agreed to open up the Aerial Situation Data Exchange (ASDE) Programme to the countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue. ASDE is an important aspect of co-operation in aerial defence, which has become particularly important since 9-11 and represents a significant contribution in the fight against terrorism.

- *Operation 'Active Endeavour'*

This arose from the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, with the objective of demonstrating resolution and the presence of NATO in the fight against terrorism, invoking Article 5. It is a maritime operation designed to prevent activities linked to terrorism and illegal trafficking in the Mediterranean and to provide escorts for allied ships in the Straits of Gibraltar. It began on 26 October 2001, initially in the eastern Mediterranean and later it was extended to the Straits of Gibraltar and throughout the Mediterranean. At the moment, there are 11 non-NATO countries that have shown their interest in contributing to the operation at different levels of involvement, among which are: Russia, Ukraine, Albania, Morocco, Algeria, Israel and Georgia. These countries are involved in the surveillance operation on the illegal trafficking in human beings, goods and arms in the Mediterranean Sea. Russia, Ukraine and, recently, Israel have already engaged in an exchange of letters with NATO, formalising their contributions.

- *Defence Initiatives of Military Capabilities against Terrorism*

Of the all of the initiatives in the sphere of the CNAD (Conference of National Armament Directors), two are open to the Mediterranean Dialogue: those led by Slovakia in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and by Spain in measures against improvised explosive devices (IED). It is worth mentioning the interest of experts from Israel, Morocco and Tunisia in the Spanish-led initiative and the participation of Israel and Morocco in the conference organised by Spain and held in Madrid on 7 and 9 November 2006.

- *Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU)*

This facilitates and accelerates the exchange of information between NATO and its partners, especially in matters relating to terrorism, through the drawing up of agreements that facilitate the exchange of intelligence information.

- *NATO-BICES Agency*

The NATO-BICES system is a system for compiling and exploiting intelligence information. This system is managed by a NATO agency called BICES, which is researching practical forms of information exchange with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, with the aim of fighting terrorism.

4. Improvement in Co-operation in Civil Emergency Planning

- *The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)*

This is an operational tool for co-ordinating the response of the EAPC countries to a disaster that may occur in the EAPC geographic area, Afghanistan or countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue, in principle, although it could also respond to requests from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). This includes responses to terrorist incidents that involve the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents. It has already acted in Pakistan, and it is also active in fighting against the problem of drought in western Afghanistan.

Conclusions

To end, I have to mention only a couple of points. First of all, the future of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue requires more co-ordination with the European Union. We must not duplicate activities, but one of the main messages that has emerged from the Riga summit is that it is becoming high time that the international organisations overcome their bureaucracies and inertias and seek out ways that they can complement each other and not duplicate efforts. It is a question of seeing the added value of an organisation in relation to another one, and the Riga statement is full of allusions to the United Nations and the European Union in particular. Secondly, there already exist concrete offers, and now we, both of the sides involved in this, must provide them with content. Let us trust in this.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Balance

A 'More active' European Union in the Middle East.
Sven Biscop

Sven Biscop

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In 2003 the European Union (EU) adopted the *European Security Strategy*, the first ever strategic document providing long-term guidance for the whole of EU foreign policy. The Strategy calls for the EU to be 'more active' in pursuing its strategic objectives, through a holistic approach putting to use 'the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities'. 'Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights' should produce 'a world of well-governed democratic states' – this overall method and objective can be described as 'effective multilateralism'.

And active the EU has become, including in the diplomatic and military field. At the time of writing, in early 2007, no less than 11 civilian and military crisis management operations were ongoing in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), across the globe: the Balkans, Palestine, Sudan, DR Congo, Aceh... Together, these involved about 8.000 troops and 500 civilians. Many more troops from EU Member States, up to 80.000 in total, were simultaneously deployed in other frameworks: on national operations, as UN blue helmets, on NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and, still, in the coalition of the willing in Iraq. On the diplomatic front, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, travels around the world as the voice of the EU in preventive diplomacy. The EU together with its Member States already is a global security actor to be reckoned with, much more so than many people realize.

The two probably most salient examples of a 'more active' EU are to be found in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the EU has taken the lead in providing troops for a reinforced United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Hopes are that this is the beginning of a renewed activism towards the region, not only on the domestic situation in Lebanon and its relations with Israel, but also on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself. In Iran, the 'EU3' (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) are leading negotiations on nuclear proliferation.

Both cases can be seen as positive examples of an EU that is more united and hence 'more active', living up to the ambitions of the *European Security Strategy*. Yet, on closer inspection they also provoke a number of fundamental strategic questions, on the ambitions and potential of EU policy towards the region, but also on the broader issue of the overall scope of the EU as a global strategic actor. These questions the EU inevitably will have to confront if it continues its 'more active' role in the Middle East.

The EU and the Middle East

The first question that rises concerns the *objectives* of EU policy: which end-state does the EU desire in the Middle East? This immediately leads to the question whether the *instruments* at the disposal of the EU are sufficient to achieve those objectives.

Iran

With regard to Iran, the short-term objective is to prevent the country from acquiring a military nuclear capacity and ensuring that any civilian nuclear programmes are put under the complete supervision of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). In order to achieve that aim, the EU has consciously opted for negotiations rather than the – immediate – use of force, thus clearly presenting an alternative way of dealing with proliferation issues as compared to the US reaction to the alleged proliferation threat posed by Iraq. Whether this approach will ultimately be successful is difficult to predict. It has been successful so far to the extent that war has been avoided – while according to well-informed sources the US was at some point on the brink of going to war – and that for a while Iran suspended its enrichment activities. To have demonstrated that an alternative way based on 'effective multilateralism' exists, and can be applied in concrete cases, in itself can also be regarded as a success.

Implementing this approach in the case of Iran also raises numerous issues however:

- By its very nature, the process of negotiations is a very drawn-out one. The difficulty is how to judge when negotiations have failed or at least necessitate a next step. Presumably, the EU will show more patience than the US and Israel, but the process can not go on indefinitely either. After the imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in December 2006, a new diplomatic initiative is required, for by themselves the sanctions will not lead to a solution.
- In the negotiations, the EU has put rather more emphasis on the proverbial carrot than 'classic' coercive diplomacy. Nevertheless one must ask whether negotiations can only succeed if at the same time diplomacy is backed up by a credible threat of force. For the EU, the question is whether the use of force can be envisaged at all, in view of the ambiguous nature of the case. Iran has the legal right to develop a civilian nuclear capacity. Because of a lack of compliance with the supervision mechanisms provided by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

the suspicion has arisen that Iran has military intentions, but no positive proof is available. Can force be used without such proof?

- The answer to this question is related to the threat assessment. Is the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran sufficient to warrant military intervention? Apart from the damage to the NPT-regime (which has already been damaged by the US nuclear deal with India), any military threat would be mainly 'South to South', i.e. against Iran's neighbouring countries rather than against the EU. More generally, one should not equate possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) with the intention to use them. Assuming that intervention is technically possible and that the capabilities are available, would the negative effects – strengthening of the regime by providing an external enemy, reinforcing the image of a clash between Islam and the West and furthering radicalization worldwide, and, simply, people getting killed – not be too important? The threat assessment of the EU on the one hand and the US and Israel on the other hand seems to be substantially different.
- The US has subscribed to the EU approach, even though perhaps more out of necessity than out of conviction. More active, positive engagement with Iran from the part of the US would greatly facilitate the process. At the same time, Iran should refrain from negative involvement in Lebanon and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).

Less obvious are the EU's long-term objectives vis-à-vis Iran. If the current regime is not much liked in the capitals of Europe, it must be borne in mind that its stance on the nuclear issue is shared by most if not all opposition actors. Is it the EU's aim to promote wider – political, social, economic – reforms in Iran and, if so, how will it go about it?

Lebanon and Israel-Palestine

Unlike Iran, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine are dealt with in the context of the elaborate policy frameworks of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Even if questions can be asked regarding the desired end-state and the feasibility of the ENP/EMP, notably with regard to the more authoritarian neighbouring countries, these are the three most democratic partners in the Mediterranean, hence EU objectives towards them in the political, social and economic field are both clearer and more feasible. With regard to the security dimension however, even if numerous EU documents clearly state the desired end-state, the feasibility of that solution is much more questionable:

- Past experience shows that only a concerted EU-US initiative has any hope of success in furthering the Middle East Peace Process. It is highly unlikely however that any initiative will be forthcoming from the US side before the 2008 presidential elections. Positive steps in the MEPP could otherwise be linked to negotiations with Iran and the need for it to halt any negative involvement. European and American views on Israel-Palestine remain fundamentally different. The US decision to invade Iraq rather than take an initiative on the MEPP as a way of increasing legitimacy and reform in the Middle East is the clearest example of this divide.

1. SSR: "Security Sector Reform" and DDR: "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration".

- The question is therefore what the EU can hope to achieve in the absence of an American initiative, first of all with regard to the National Palestinian Authority. The decision to limit relations and support following the Hamas election victory, which contrasted sharply with established EU policy, seems to have been taken under US pressure. A reassessment is now in order, to establish how the EU can most effectively influence developments in the National Palestinian Authority, notably in the field of effective government and prevention of the use of force, making use of the different instruments of support at its disposal.
- The same question – which leverage does the EU have in the absence of US action – poses itself with regard to Lebanon. Through its substantial participation in the enlarged UNIFIL, the EU has certainly increased its presence in the region. The fact itself that various actors called on the EU to provide the core of UNIFIL is proof of its enhanced standing. Yet, UNIFIL will not disarm Hezbollah – it will demilitarize the border region and basically buys time for a political process that should integrate all actors in a democratic Lebanese polity. Only in such a wider political framework can SSR/DDR¹ schemes result in the integration of the armed Hezbollah in a united Lebanese army. Does the EU have the leverage to put this process in motion, given the linkages with outside actors and developments in the broader region, notably on Iran? In any case, the EU should shoulder the responsibility to at least launch such a process, or the window of opportunity will be closed.
- EU-Israel relations seem to have been further strained by recent developments. In Europe, the ongoing use of force in the Palestinian territories is widely seen as disproportionate to the threat and as highlighting the absence of any attempt at constructive engagement. Ongoing incursions into the UNIFIL zone – and incidents such as the firing at a German ship – can also be seen as a lack of constructiveness and pose the question of whether and how the EU – and European forces in UNIFIL – should react.

The EU as a Global Strategic Actor

The current commitment of the EU in the Middle East is proof of its growing international actorhood. *Vis-à-vis* Iran, the EU is playing a proactive role and is leading the international negotiations – and has been accepted as such by the international community. That an initially reluctant US have subscribed to this approach, and escalation has so far been prevented, is an important achievement. In Lebanon, the scale of the European deployment – 8.000 troops – and the fact that initially the option of making it an ESDP operation was seriously considered – but in the end not pursued because only the UN framework was acceptable to all parties on the ground, while interestingly NATO never was an option – are clear indications of the EU's growing military actorhood.

At the same time, its implication in the Middle East highlights a number of broader strategic challenges for the EU which it will have to confront if it continues its development into a fully-fledged global actor.

- In the EU view, the use of force can only be an instrument of last resort and, in principle, with a UNSC mandate, hence e.g. the preference for a diplomatic process of negotiations to settle the Iranian nuclear problem. Inevitably, there will be cases however when it will come to this ultimate stage, when the choice is between inaction and forceful action. The question is whether EU Member States are willing to consider the use of force in an ESDP framework. Even though most Member States do put their forces in harm's way in national, NATO or coalitions-of-the-willing operations, and although legally the Petersberg Tasks include operations at the high end of the spectrum of violence, politically the Member States are still extremely divided over the EU's level of ambition in this field. As Member States rest divided, in crisis situations the EU-level is more often than not out of the loop. Consequently, even though the EU has proven that it can mount high-risk operations if the political will is present, most EU-led operations are of lower intensity and often of smaller scale. The still very young ESDP needs a number of successes to legitimize itself, hence the tendency to select operations with a large chance of success. To some extent therefore the criticism is justified that the EU takes on important but mostly 'easy' operations, in the post-conflict phase, in reaction to the settlement of a conflict – a criticism which can of course be applied to the international community as a whole. One must thus question whether the Member States are willing to fully accept the implications of the strong EU diplomatic support for the principle of 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) that was endorsed at the UN Millennium+5 Summit in September 2005. R2P implies that if a State is unable or unwilling to protect its own population, or is itself the perpetrator of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity, national sovereignty must give way to a responsibility to protect on the part of the international community. In such cases, the Security Council must mandate intervention, if necessary by military means, which per definition implies high-intensity operations. Does not fully-fledged global actorness imply the capacity, and the will, to engage in autonomous high-intensity operations if necessary? Which criteria will the EU use to determine whether to engage or not? The EU cannot save the world and intervene in every single crisis, but activation of the R2P mechanism or a crisis in regions of vital interest, including the Middle East, seem to be minimal criteria. But what about the Caucasus or Central Asia, or energy supply?
- The leading role played by the EU3 in the negotiations with Iran led to criticism from other Member States, who felt excluded from the decision-making process, even after the involvement of Solana. Council. Are institutionalized mechanisms needed to deal with such scenarios? Or would the EU Foreign Minister and European External Action Service as provided for in the draft Constitutional Treaty be the answer? In any case, EU engagement in the Middle East once again firmly demonstrates that the Member States can only hope to influence the course of events if they act as one, as EU.
- The US is the most important ally of the EU, with whom it shares basic values and, mostly, overall objectives, though not always the approach to achieve those objectives. More and more, the basic strategic views of the EU and the US are diverging, as is proved by the fact that even the EU Member States that supported the invasion of

Iraq opted for an alternative course of action vis-à-vis Iran. For the greater part, this divergence is likely to be structural. As the EU emerges as a strategic actor in its own right, the alliance with the US has to become more balanced. In the Middle East especially joint EU-US initiatives are in order. Are the current mechanisms for dialogue between Europe and the US sufficient to allow for coordination of policy and, most importantly, to generate new policies?

- The EU as a matter of principle operates via the collective security system of the UN. The UNSC is regarded as the 'ultimate arbiter in the case of non-compliance', as the EU Strategy on WMD words it. This approach can only work if the Permanent 5 at least adopt a non-obstructive, if not a cooperative attitude. The same holds true for the conditionality-based holistic approach and the use of sanctions. The case of Iran is an excellent example. 'Strategic partnership' with Russia and China is thus essential for the implementation of 'effective multilateralism'. How to give more substance to existing partnerships is another challenge for the EU.

Conclusion

The EU has come a long way in a very short time. But it is not a mature strategic actor yet – as the cases of Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine show, certain doctrines and instruments have to be further developed. The EU's neighbourhood, comprising the Middle East, the Caucasus and extending to the Gulf, comprises many of the most important challenges for the world as a whole. Furthermore, developments in this region are inter-related: policies on Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine are not only mutually dependent, but the room for manoeuvre is also determined by developments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In dealing with its own region, the EU must effectively become a global power.

But the lack of complementarity with current US policy on the region puts the EU for a dilemma. If the EU does not continue its active policies, the image of powerlessness will be confirmed. If however it does act, but fails because of a lack of constructive US activity, the result will be the same. This dilemma does not contradict the fact that the EU is ever increasing its actorhood, but just confirms that in today's globalized world no one power can solve complex crises by itself – neither the EU, nor the US. The EU cannot afford not to act – and the US must consider whether a failure would really be in its interest.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Balance

The “5+5 security and defence” initiative.
Jean-François Coustillière

Jean-François Coustillière

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The “5 + 5 Security and Defence” Initiative had its second anniversary in December 2006. This paper reviews the foundations of the initiative, recalling the background of its development and, finally, takes stock of the project up to the end of 2006, thence to conclude by identifying the factors that have contributed to the initiative’s success.

Foundations of the “5 + 5 Security and Defence” Initiative

The Barcelona Process had its eighth anniversary in 2003, at which point it was manifestly clear that the results were disappointing. This is a highly original initiative since it is concerned with real cooperation rather than with aid, assistance or unilateral action but, unfortunately, while it was making slow progress with two of its three guiding principles, the area of “policy and security” was going nowhere.

Security and prosperity in the Mediterranean represent a major challenge for the coming years thanks to the crucial strategic interest of the area and also the close ties uniting the countries of its North and South shores. The latter Mediterranean zone, immediate southern neighbour of the European Union (EU), is important to Europe, in particular the four so-called Latin countries. Our futures are inevitably linked and we must pull together and support each other.

Hence, in September 2003, the idea arose of attempting to do, with a limited number of people, what was not being achieved with 35 members. The French Ministry of Defence proposed that we should settle for:

- A limited number of countries,
- A geographic area limited to the Western Mediterranean,
- Selected joint projects, on the basis of interests identified as common.

The Initiative aims to be both pragmatic and progressive with the goal of establishing, in the long term, a dynamic of consensus politics and exchanges in the Western Mediterranean. Eventually, this endeavour should be shared with the other Barcelona Process partners since the final objective is to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

1. The "Dialogue 5 + 5", constituted at the Ministerial Meeting held on 10 October 1990 in Rome, inaugurated a process of general cooperation consisting of three areas: Policy and Security, Economic and Socio-cultural. The five countries of the Maghreb (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Libya) and five European countries of the Western Mediterranean Basin (France, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Malta) attended the meeting. Organised by the Foreign Affairs ministers, the first Heads of State and Government summit was held in Tunisia in December 2003.
2. The aim is to reduce the risks deriving from fraudulent use of the freedom of navigation on which Maritime Law is based, in particular the use of the seas for terrorist ends, and to prevent illegal exploitation of fishing zones, the transport of large quantities of drugs and other illegal trafficking. A further aim is to prevent or respond to catastrophes like contamination, shipwreck and maritime accidents.
3. In some cases of natural disasters, the contribution of the Armed Forces is indispensable and swift, well-coordinated intervention by friendly nations can limit their consequences.
4. The risk of air terrorism has a singular nature because the time in which preventive measures must be applied is very short. In this case, regional cooperation facilitating the foresight that is necessary for swift decision making should be sustained. This may take the form of activities of coordination and exchanges of information between military centres.

It very soon became evident that, in order to guarantee its chances of success, the Initiative would need to be open to the "5 + 5" member countries.¹ Accordingly, the aim was to establish an association restricted to ten countries that would together determine practical initiatives of joint endeavour in response to needs they would identify as shared, within a limited geographic space without major tensions.

If these goals, while modest, were achieved one might reasonably imagine that the positive experience could spread like an "oil slick", thereby gradually constructing a well-balanced association that is based on trust, wherein the different members would find shared interests that they themselves had identified.

Chronology of the Development of the Initiative

On 21 December 2004, the Ministers of Defence of the ten countries in question – Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia – signed in Paris the basic documents for the "security" entente in "5 + 5" format: the Declaration of Intentions, and the Action Plan for 2005.

The Declaration of Intentions, which establishes the framework, goals and ambitions of the initiative, stipulates that:

- The Ministers of Defence will meet once a year in order to assess the functioning of the Plan and to improve the Plan of Action for the following year.
- A Governing Committee, consisting of two appointees from the Defence Ministry of each country, will meet twice a year. The Committee is responsible for launching each action, carrying out follow-up of its implementation, and nominating *ad hoc* expert committees. At the annual ministers' meeting, the Committee must report on the progress of the implementation of the Plan of Action and propose priorities for the coming year.
- Finally, the *ad hoc* experts' committees will organise, when required, the seminars stipulated in the Action Plan.

The Declaration of Intentions perfectly reflects the guidelines that the ministers wished to introduce into the project whose "informal" nature requires a "light-handed" architecture.

The Action Plan determining the goals for 2005 stipulated coordinated activities and exchanges of information between military centres, with three main objectives in mind:

- Contribution by the Ministries of Defence to maritime vigilance² in the Mediterranean.
- Contribution by the Ministries of Defence to civil protection³ in the Mediterranean.
- Contribution by the Ministries of Defence to air security⁴ in the Mediterranean.

The Plan of Action is a response to the wishes expressed by the ministers. The actions agreed upon are specific and feasible in the short term, and are fruit of an approach that is based on association in a spirit of joint responsibility. They fall within the areas of common interest that are to serve as meeting points where experiences and knowledge can be shared.

The inaugural one-year Presidency was occupied by Algeria. The first Governing Committee meeting was held in Algiers, presided by Algeria, on 15 March 2005. The meeting approved, for 2005, the holding of a seminar in Spain on maritime vigilance attended by the Navy Chiefs of General Staff, two seminars on the military contribution to civil protection in Spain, and activities towards a Rome-based organisation of commercial shipping in the Mediterranean.

At the second meeting of the Governing Committee, held in Algeria in November 2005, the Presidency confirmed that the four planned activities had been carried out. These were undeniably modest initiatives and they were introduced by countries from the European shores of the Mediterranean, but they did substantiate the clear resolve of all the countries concerned to maintain a firm commitment to this new form of association.

The second Ministerial Meeting of the ten Ministers of Defence, held in Algiers on Monday 12 December 2005, enabled the adoption of the group's internal regulations and the formulation of the Plan of Action for 2006, this including fifteen activities, several of them in the countries of the Mediterranean's southern shores. In the discussion, a number of new spheres for possible joint action were raised:

- The struggle against locusts (Algeria);
- A landmine clearance training centre (Libya);
- Procedures for coordination of activities in case of natural disaster;
- Creation of a 5 + 5 leadership training school on the basis of shared experience;
- A virtual monitoring centre for maritime control (exchange of information).

The three main concerns of the seminars for 2006 were focused on the following areas:

- In the sphere of air monitoring: contribution of the armed forces in SAR.⁵
- In the sphere of the contribution of the armed forces to civil protection: deployment of the emergency sequence; support to civilian authorities.
- In the sphere of maritime monitoring: reflection on the joint establishment of detection and identification systems; struggle against pollution.

Finally, Italy opened its annual "Canale" exercise, organised in cooperation with Malta, to the other members of the 5 + 5 group. France was nominated to occupy the Presidency for 2006. The Governing Committee meeting held in Paris on 30 March, inaugurating the French presidency, accepted the following proposals:

6. CIMIC: Civil-military concept, equivalent to CMA (civil-military action).
7. VRMTC: Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre
8. CPX: Command post exercise.
9. IPC: Initial planning conference.
10. *Solidaridad*: Non-secure Internet Network of operations centres.
11. This centre would be based on the Italian V-RMTC (Virtual regional maritime traffic) system, a computer programme that permits Internet exchanges of non-classified information.

- Seven seminars: two (CIMIC⁶ and VRMTC⁷) proposed by Italy; one (landmine clearance) proposed by Libya; one (action against locusts) proposed by Algeria; one (aerial) proposed by France; one (maritime) proposed by Tunisia; and one (support for civilian authorities) proposed by Spain.
- A meeting of the Navy Chiefs of General Staff, proposed by France.
- Five exercises: one (civil protection) proposed by Portugal; two (General Staff CPX⁸) with a preparatory conference (IPC⁹) proposed by Spain, this including the *Solidaridad* (Solidarity) 06¹⁰ exercise; “Canale” proposed by Italy, with a debriefing conference; and one (Polmar) proposed by Morocco.
- A landmine clearance (landmines and unexploded ordnance) training centre proposed by Libya.
- A virtual centre for maritime monitoring in Italy.¹¹

All the member countries proposed activities except Mauritania and Malta, although the latter is a co-organiser of the “Canale” exercise.

The Governing Committee meeting held on 14 and 15 November in Nice confirmed that the fifteen exercises planned had been carried out. However, note was made of the need for the proposed exercises to fall directly within the 5 + 5 framework, without confusing them with other activities. The third ministerial meeting was held in Nice on 11 December 2006. On this occasion, the ministers stressed that the number and scope of activities should not be increased too quickly because of budgetary and availability considerations. The idea of a “5 + 5 school of security and defence” is still included among the projects but would adopt the form of a network of schools at the different levels possible, with the aim of promoting exchanges of experiences and points of view among officers. This kind of organisation already exists in European military establishments.

Italy has accepted the Presidency for 2007 and Libya will take over the chair in 2008.

First Assessment at the End of 2006

The ministers today are undoubtedly concerned with information exchanges and jointly organised actions. This is a first step. Nonetheless, the first joint General Staff or armed forces (Livex) exercises have been proposed. In fact, developments are so rapid that the pace should be measured in order not to exceed the organisational capacity of the organisation or possibilities for member participation. It is also necessary to look more fully into some areas so as not to commit conceptual errors that could lead to plans being rejected. This is the case, to give a specific example, of the group’s 5 + 5 school. Defining the parameters of this project requires prudence in the process of reaching agreement.

It must be emphasised, nevertheless, that the ten participating nations all have a special interest in the success of this “5 + 5”-format “defence and security” initiative because:

- It represents a true initiative in association where, for the first time, the options are the object of concerted action;

- It creates a meeting arena for the concerned parties of the Defence in the Maghreb;
- It can provide answers to the real need for practical cooperation;
- It constitutes the first step in the introduction of confidence-enhancing measures;
- It originates, in particular, with the countries of the Northern shores that have been able to define a common strategy, as well as being resolved to undertake the commitment.

An event that occurred in Algiers in March 2005 fully confirms this assessment. One night, the representatives of the Maghreb countries held a meeting outside the official framework in order to work on an agreed position on one specific matter. Since these were military men and, only a few months earlier at a conference in Spain, I had heard representatives from Algeria and Morocco state that their countries were “on a war footing”, the “5 + 5” initiative seems to be particularly hopeful.

In this regard, although the initiative is still engaged in very modest endeavours, it does appear to be a true testing ground for the area of “policy and security” of the Barcelona Process, and it is now in a position to be able to offer new dynamism to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the long term. The countries of the North are making an effort to present a united volition, while the countries of the South are working hard on promoting proposals. All of this creates the conditions of success for the initiative, which has not yet occurred with the Barcelona Process. The members as a whole therefore have the sensation that they are really giving life to an association in which each member contributes with proposals, while sharing responsibility for the tasks being carried out.

Conclusion: Factors in the Initiative’s Success

The cooperation between both shores of the Western Mediterranean has not yet materialised in very ostensible military operations. We have still not reached the point of engaging in joint maritime patrols, although it is possible to cite, as did the French Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie in 2005, the example of an Algerian officer who boarded a Breguet-Atlantique, a maritime reconnaissance aircraft of the French Aeronaval Forces, in order to assist in identifying and following up on a suspect vessel that had been detected in the Mediterranean forty-eight hours earlier. However, it does not seem that there is any shared interest to date in engaging in any very advanced type of joint military endeavour. This basically depends on what the countries might identify as shared interests.

Yet, at present, it has been possible to identify areas of cooperation and to engage in joint actions deemed by the members as a whole to be in their interests. Is this not, in fact, what an association is really about? The “security and defence” initiative in 5 + 5 format once again offers an arena where Defence representatives from the ten partner countries can interact and work together, thereby getting to know each other, appreciating each other’s points of view and sharing perceptions. Is this not where the dynamics of the means of trust are to be found?

The initiative is progressive. It should be emphasised that, while the countries of the North are used to cooperation either among themselves or with countries of the South, the countries of the South have no real experience of South-South cooperation. On the contrary, mistrust is what has predominated for the most part. Prudence, therefore, is indispensable. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the basic reasons for the success of this process lie in:

- The wish of the parties involved to maintain the conditions of true association wherein everyone participates in decision-making, in discussing options and in sharing responsibilities. There is no place for unilateral actions, instrumental manoeuvres with barely concealed aims, paternalism or condescension deriving from an overwhelming difference in skills. Now, all at once, the South can have its own ideas.
- The determination of the countries of the North to find shared strategies, hence showing particular coherence in the orientations to be given.
- The modesty of members who are resolutely decided to opt for cooperative activities that are practical and specific, responding to needs that are identified as being shared and not aiming at excessively ambitious goals, which are doubtless secondary concerns with regard to the priorities of the countries of the South, in particular.

To conclude, the key, perhaps, is an ability to listen, an aptitude that requires delicacy in its application, especially when it is known where the strength lies and when there is also undue division with regard to the goals being pursued. There is no doubt.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Balance

The alliance of civilisations.
Máximo Cajal

Máximo Cajal

*Ambassador of Spain
Representative of the Presidency of the Government
for the Alliance of Civilisations*

I do not believe I would be mistaken, from the point of view that corresponds to me in this intervention, namely that of the Alliance of Civilisations, if I stated that this Fifth Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean is taking place at the right time. The people in charge of the CIDOB Foundation, therefore, must be congratulated today for the opportunity that they have granted us. They could hardly have chosen a more propitious set of circumstances in which to bring us together in Barcelona, at the mid-point between the 13th of November, when formal delivery of the document of recommendations on this initiative was made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the 18th of December, when Kofi Annan will present his Action Plan to the international community in New York. All of this coincides with the elections in the United States, the surprising statements by the British Prime Minister on the development of the war in Iraq and the tactical movements by different neighbouring countries. Added to this is the proposal on the Middle East presented by the President of the Government on 16th October 2006 in Girona, which was immediately endorsed by France and Italy.

This chain of events is projected onto the invariable background of deterioration in the Iraqi situation and the open wounds in Lebanon and Gaza, Israel's entrenchment and the growing influence of Iran. And, naturally, onto the entrenched Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a decisive destabilising factor that transcends the limits of this hard-hit region, which demands the urgent renewal of the Peace Process, although this may not please Prime Minister Olmert. This is a proposal which the High-level Group also includes among its policy recommendations, the most important one of all, without any doubt. This conflict is the only one that, in their opinion, constitutes a real threat to peace and security in the world.

In addition to having a clear dimension of security – of a “soft” concept of security – and a determined vocation for universality, the Alliance of Civilisations is, above all, a political initiative. It is of a political and security nature because it arose, a little over two years ago now, from the political recognition of the need to stand up to the danger of an irreparable fracture between societies, particularly between the Muslim and Western worlds, which, if not corrected, calls international peace and stability into question. Independently of other considerations, the

confrontation that pits these two worlds against each other is not religious or cultural, as some would have it, but radically political, as the High-level Group also sustains in its document of recommendations. Moreover, the core of this problem lies in the unresolved issue of the Middle East, which symbolises, like no other, the increasingly deep breach between the West and Islam and is the main cause of the growing rift between the two societies, so much so that the Group affirms outright that if this situation is not channelled properly, the objectives of moderation, tolerance, mutual respect, appreciation of diversity, coexistence and, above all, peace which the Alliance of Civilisations pursues will not be reached.

The threat that we are trying to fight is also of a political nature. Or is the oft-repeated desire to impose a global caliphate not political? The principles that inspire the Alliance are political as well: commitment to multilateralism; resolved support for the organisation in service to which it is dedicated, the United Nations, in the person of its Secretary-General; strict observance of international legality and respect for human rights, the primacy of human dignity.

It is, in the end, a global initiative, since the danger that it is trying to avert (terrorism in particular), the call to all of us to take a stand against extremisms, and the universal sphere par excellence in which it aims to act, the United Nations, are all global.

These three distinctive characteristics appear repeatedly within the conceptual framework that shapes this proposal, in the mandate received by the High-level Group and, of course, throughout the final document made public in Istanbul. In addition to its universal vocation, and without leaving aside the dual political and security dimension inherent in it, the Alliance of Civilisations can, and must, also be contemplated from a regional and, why not, a national perspective. Therefore, I will now talk about the regional perspective, the Mediterranean one in this case.

In the first place, the political guidelines that this proposal proclaims are not reduced to a handful of well-meaning ethical invocations, of international morality and a global scope, destined to be ignored or deliberately violated. They oblige us all, governments, international organisations, civil society, and nobody escapes their demands. As we are seeing, without the application of this ethical framework in international practice, coexistence among nations will become more and more difficult, and, over time, the international tension will become unbearable. It is precisely for this reason that it is also in the national sphere that we must begin to make those principles a reality, so that our outward discourse, always so easy to be lavish with, will not be belied by the facts. This is so that the oft-repeated reproach of a double morality, of double standards, cannot be thrown back in our faces, especially when it comes to promoting democracy and applying international law.

No one will have failed to notice that both co-sponsors of this proposal are Prime Ministers of two Mediterranean countries, Turkey and Spain, both situated within the confines of this sea and to which, in accordance with their own peculiarities, a fundamental role and responsibility in the task of preserving our security and defence befalls. The Alliance of

Civilisations must contribute decisively to this end, which has regional importance, if, indeed, we all set ourselves to executing the concrete measures that the plan proposed by Kofi Annan contains in the fields of education, youth, mass media and migratory movements. However, this will not suffice. It will also be necessary for us to scrupulously adhere to the moral considerations contained in the first part of the document of recommendations of the High-level Group, which, undoubtedly, the still-Secretary-General of the United Nations will make his own.

The Spanish Government, as is well known, supports Turkey's accession into the European Union. It is a political option that is fully coherent with the philosophy of the Alliance, independently of conditions established by the European Commission to this end, provided they do not become a kind of rising filibuster destined to make the Turkish accession impossible. As long as this difficult process moves forward, regardless of the ups and downs it may suffer, this positive dynamic will give credibility to the Spanish-Turkish co-sponsorship and to the initiative itself, and it will strengthen the position of the women and of the men in Turkey who are struggling for the modernisation of their country. It will simultaneously weaken the position of all those who advocate an exacerbated anti-European nationalism and a fundamentalist vision of Islam there. This process will also comfort all those who in the Arab world are following the vicissitudes of the Turkish demand for accession and are promoting the evolution of their own respective societies towards modernity, respect for human rights and democratic progress. It will also improve the perception that the Arab and Muslim world have of Europe, which, if it fails in this endeavour, will be viewed as a Christian bastion sealed off to the outside.

Finally, the Turkish accession will give the European Union a decisive projection in a key strategic region of Eurasia and, if Brussels does not abdicate this ambition, it will allow Turkey to become a main actor in the approaching multipolar world and to bring the values and principles that constitute its moral heritage to that scene. In any case, from the vision of the Alliance, the Turkish sponsorship is already contributing an element of symmetry to the original Spanish initiative at the same time as it strengthens the discourse and principles that inspired it.

For Spain, the commitment is not minor. It also befalls us to play an exemplary role, both within and outside of our borders. Domestically, by constructing, among us all, that State of Autonomous Regions that demands, precisely, sowing the fields of own coexistence with a good dose of the principles that the Alliance of Civilisations promotes: moderation, mutual respect and appreciation of diversity. Will we be capable, for example, of bringing this imperative of civil ethics into our school books? Also within the domestic sphere, by promoting an immigration policy in accordance with the measures contained in the Action Plan in order to prevent xenophobia, discrimination, rejection of the "other" and at the same time incorporating the "other" into the values and principles of our society.

Outwardly, we will contribute to the objectives of the Alliance by decidedly helping in the construction of a united, prosperous, stable Maghreb, a factor of peace in this part of the Mediterranean. If we want to be

coherent with our paradigm, Morocco is our foreign priority. For this reason, it is necessary to courageously assail our legacy and our history with this neighbour and friend. If we do not, the wounds still open there will not heal. Let us jointly review our common history and draw the pertinent conclusions together. Let us support, by all means, a privileged status for the neighbouring kingdom in its relationship with the European Union. And let us assume, wherever possible, a principal role within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Process, a fundamental piece in the plans of the Alliance of Civilisations for reaching the so necessary goals of peace and security in this troubled part of the world.

A good proof of the credibility and potentiality of this initiative, this time applied to the broader European frame, is the constant interest that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has shown in it. In 2007, Spain will assume the presidency of the OSCE. This is another opportunity we must not fail to take advantage of in order to combine their efforts and the objectives they have in common, the Mediterranean repercussions of which must not be underestimated at all.

Recently, in Riga, NATO also expressed its recognition of the role of the Alliance of Civilisations in promoting common values, reform and dialogue between peoples and cultures, all of it within the framework of the fight against terrorism.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

The practise of cooperation in security and defence issues.

The participation of the Moroccan royal armed forces in operation
ALTHEA.

Mokhtar Marsou

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MOROCCAN ROYAL ARMED FORCES IN OPERATION ALTHEA

Mokhtar Marsou

Colonel of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces

The signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995 put an end to three years of genocidal conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the start, NATO was given a mandate to implement the agreement's military requirements through the launching of its largest-scale peace operation ever. This resulted in the deployment of the IFOR (Implementation Force) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In this context, a request for troops for the force was submitted to the Kingdom of Morocco, a nation considered to be a credible international actor in the framework of the United Nations, a strategic ally of NATO and a privileged European Union partner. So it was that in March 1996, a contingent of 1,300 troops of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR), equipped with armoured vehicles and tanks, was sent to the theatre of operations in the area under French command, to become an essential element of the Southeast Multinational Division. On their arrival, the Moroccan troops were deployed in two areas: in Sarajevo and Mostar, the country's two emblematic cities. They were immediately entrusted with important missions along the Sarajevo-Mostar axis, as well as other missions to protect the IFOR headquarters and the electronic war emplacements.

A year later, once hostilities had finally been brought to an end, NATO decided to transform IFOR into a Stabilisation Force (SFOR), within which the FAR contingent would continue to operate. In late 2004, a multinational European Union force (EUFOR) replaced NATO's SFOR. This mission was called Operation ALTHEA.

Having presented this brief, yet highly evocative background description, I will now proceed to evaluate the FAR's performance in Operation ALTHEA, under EUFOR command.

With the aim of submitting an idea that supports an appropriate approach to the Moroccan contribution to debate, I invite you to reflect on it, in asserting that, in all senses, the participation of Moroccan troops in Operation Althea manifests the commitment of the Kingdom of Morocco to the EU efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In

this sense, and with great diligence and determination, the Moroccan contingent has guaranteed a safe and favourable environment for the military headquarters and for the different components of Multinational Task Force South East (MNTF SE) that actively operate in the framework of EUFOR, for the purpose of achieving stability and a return to normal life in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

To put the Moroccan participation in context, I will begin by recalling the “transition phase” from SFOR to EUFOR, after which I will go on to demonstrate the commitment of the FAR contingent in the framework of Operation ALTHEA. I will end by examining the lessons learned from this experience.

From SFOR to EUFOR

In late 2004, the objectives of SFOR were basically to establish secure conditions. Earlier, in June 2004, the EU and NATO had decided that an end should be brought to NATO’s participation in the form of SFOR, and that this force should be replaced (in accordance with the Berlin Plus agreement) by Operation ALTHEA. The new operation would be implemented by EUFOR in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

With the objective of constituting and organising the new force to be transferred to the EU, NATO enquired as to the intentions of the Kingdom of Morocco in relation to the Moroccan presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EU, for its part, had requested that the contingent be placed under European control. Once the Royal Decision had been made to maintain the contingent *in situ*, the representatives of both parties signed the participation agreement in Brussels. On 2 December, 2004, a ceremony was held in Camp Butmir in Sarajevo that marked the historic launching of Operation ALTHEA, in which 22 European countries and 11 non-European countries are participating. It is worth mentioning that Morocco is the only African country to take part in this large-scale European operation.

The choice of the name ALTHEA for the operation was not mere coincidence; in Greek mythology, ALTHEA is the goddess of healing, a well-chosen name for an operation principally aimed at helping to ease the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for the country’s ethnic populations.

To carry out this task, EUFOR, which had its headquarters in Sarajevo, has adopted the same structures and troop numbers as SFOR (7,000 troops). It has also maintained the same distribution for the new force across the three sectors of control, each of which included an MNTF: the North, Northeast and Southeast forces. The latter was named “Salamander”, and includes the Moroccan contingent.

I will now sketch out the details of Moroccan participation in the framework of Operation ALTHEA.

The contingent in the framework of Operation ALTHEA

As part of Salamander, together with the German, Spanish, French, Italian and Albanian contingents, the Moroccan contingent has continued to be deployed at the Mostar-Ortiješ base.

The organisation of the contingent

It must be remembered that as the forces changed from being Divisions to Brigades, to subsequently become MNTFs, the Moroccan contingent's organisation has developed in a parallel manner, with successive reductions in troop numbers; these decreased from 1,300 to 800, then to 350 and down to 240, before stabilising, in May 2004, at a figure of 130 soldiers, all of whom are deployed at the Mostar-Ortiješ base.

In its current form, the contingent (whose troops, for obvious reasons of cohesion, are from the same regiment), functions as a headquarters detachment responsible for administration and support duties, and as a guard company organised into two guard platoons and one intervention platoon.

The contingent's logistical support is organised by means of two complementary chains:

- a national chain that guarantees, through a monthly air link, the supply of spare parts and small calibre ammunition, when necessary;
- and a French chain which, in accordance with the military cooperation agreement between Morocco and France, provides quality logistical features that includes food and fuel supply, health support and miscellaneous running costs.

The contingent's missions

With respect to missions, it should be emphasised that, just like at the other EUFOR bases, the Mostar-Ortiješ base is permanently at risk from attempts at intrusion and information gathering. To counter this, the guard company's main mission is to guarantee the security and protection of the base.

This mission requires maximum availability and a permanent state of vigilance. This translates into daily tasks consisting basically of:

- Guarding the main and secondary entrances of the base and certain sensitive points.
- Screening all staff and vehicles entering the base.
- Carrying out daytime and night-time patrols, in close collaboration with the *Guardia Civil* and the *Carabinieri*.
- Reacting to any action that might affect security at the base.

Participation in combined manoeuvres is another of the important aspects of our activities. The guard company's intervention platoon regularly takes part in simulation manoeuvres organised by the Base Commander, along with intervention forces from the other nations that comprise the southeast MNTF. These manoeuvres are aimed at familiarising the participants with security and defence procedures, as well as enabling them to develop reflexes and a capacity for rapid reaction in specific situations.

Meanwhile, apart from its routine medical activities, the Moroccan Level One Medical Unit has been incorporated in a professional manner into the multinational health care chain, in accordance with the synergic collaboration proposed for Salamander's various medical units. In this context, it guarantees (through a rotation system, one week per month) the MERT (Medical Emergency Response Team) service for treating MNTF patients.

In the same way, the Moroccan dental surgeon works at the French Level One Dental Surgery, providing assistance to Task Force patients. In addition, CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) actions, in keeping with a spirit of multinational cooperation, play an important role in the work of the contingent. Thus the Moroccan dental surgeon and his French counterparts frequently make outside visits, to provide health care and promote awareness of dental hygiene to orphanages, refugee camps and among people with limited resources in different regions in the area of responsibility covered by "Salamander".

In the same way, the contingent's doctor is often required to accompany the Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT) to carry out medical-social work among people in rural areas who are living in a state of poverty.

The medical care provided by the contingent also takes a social-humanitarian form, with the occasional distribution of medicines and food.

Lessons learned

My contribution will not be complete without a summary of the many, varied lessons we have learned from the experience.

The importance of languages

To begin with, from the very first days of our deployment in the theatre of operations, the importance of communication has been greatly valued. The ability to speak foreign languages –and particularly English, the main language in EUFOR activities– can guarantee greater symbiosis and facilitate understanding and communication. In this sense, we have realised the importance of learning foreign languages, and particularly English, which is the *lingua franca* in the framework of the Peacekeeping Operations. One admirable example of such communication is that of the Spanish General Benito Raggio, commander of the Southeast MNTF, and

his chief of staff, the French Colonel Claude Minjoulat-Rey; each is able to speak the other's language, as well as English. This clearly reflects the multilingual communication skills that are increasingly required for these types of operations.

Strengthening military cooperation

With respect to cooperation, Morocco, a member of both the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Barcelona Process, has demonstrated, through its participation in the management of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis since 1996, its firm desire to develop effective multilateral military cooperation with NATO and the EU. Thus, the incorporation of Moroccan officers into EUFOR headquarters may help to reinforce such associative actions in the field of officer training, as well as promoting the idea of interoperability between armies.

Capitalising on the experience

Another important aspect in this learning process is capitalising on the experience. After having worked in a multinational environment and making contact with troops from other nations, the Moroccan soldiers have indubitably learned a new approach in the struggle for peace, particularly in terms of its humanitarian dimension. The joint manoeuvres and CIMIC actions have enabled Moroccan soldiers and officers to take their first steps in learning in the rules of international engagement. Some 500 Moroccan soldiers have benefited in this way from Operation ALTHEA, which has taught them to master the use of resources and rigor in their application of the rules of engagement.

Consolidating the image of the Moroccan soldier

There is no doubt that the consolidation of the image of the Moroccan soldier represents an important part of the lessons we have learned. In this sense, given the multinational nature of the force, which is operating in a totally different setting, it is particularly important and gratifying for soldiers to enjoy the appreciation of local people and the staff of multinational forces. To achieve this great satisfaction, the members of the contingent have always adopted an approach of strict neutrality with respect to all the inhabitants, without making any distinction. This attitude of rigor, impartiality and transparency has, to date, helped the soldiers of the contingent to carry out their mission peacefully and without incident. Thus the prestige of the Moroccan soldier, while continuing to grow among the different participating nations, is also gaining official signs of recognition in the form of decorations and honourable mentions.

Conclusion

Thanks to this participation, Morocco has reaffirmed its desire to strengthen its links of cooperation and friendship, which were already close, with European countries. While the experience and professionalism

of the FAR in Bosnia-Herzegovina has continued to arouse admiration and consideration among all concerned, it should be emphasised that the Moroccan contingent has become, over time, an important element in the military structure of Salamander MNTF in the framework of Operation ALTHEA, the final objective of which is to move from the stabilisation phase to the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the European family.

Finally, I would like to read you some extracts from testimonies concerning the Moroccan troops provided by generals who have led the Southeast MNTF since the launching of Operation ALTHEA.

The French General, J. Michel Cherau, said: "The work carried out by the Moroccan detachment has been a deciding factor for the Southeast MNTF, and they have executed it commendably. This is the impression of all the [Moroccan] detachments in the country that I encountered in the various fields of operations. I was impressed by the rigor and professionalism of all the [Moroccan] troops I met".

Meanwhile, the Spanish General Benito Raggio said: "Being your TF Commander I started to feel proud of your achievements and your heritage of presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As your predecessors many years ago, I found good commandments, excellent discipline and proud of being a Moroccan soldier serving in EUFOR".

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

The practise of cooperation in security and defence issues.

The European security and defence policy mission at the Rafah crossing point.

Jesús Castilla Paz

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY MISSION AT THE RAFAH CROSSING POINT

Jesús Castilla Paz

*Commander of the Spanish Guardia Civil
Member of the EUBAM Rafah
from 20 December 2005 to 23 December 2006*

The European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah, “EUBAM Rafah”, was inaugurated on the 25th of November, 2005, following Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September of that year and letters of invitation to the European Union from both the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) (20 November 2005) and the Government of Israel (23 November 2005). The objective of the mission was to facilitate the functioning of the Rafah crossing point, between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.

EUBAM would play a “third party” role between the Palestinian National Authority, which was then assuming control of the border crossing, and the Government of Israel, which was withdrawing from this checkpoint, with the aim of fostering trust between both parts in the management of this international crossing point which was so strategic for the Palestinian nation. EUBAM would assume, over the Palestinian civil servants working at the crossing point, observation, supervision, verification, advising, sponsorship, training and evaluation tasks, while at the same time it would perform liaison functions, not only between the two parts, but also with the Egyptian side to the extent necessary for the functioning of the crossing point.

EUBAM temporarily established itself in the Israeli city of Ashqelon, located about twenty kilometres north of the Gaza Strip, on the Mediterranean coast. The working day of the European monitors begins every day with a drive from Ashqelon to the customs terminal in Kerem Shalom, which is located on Israeli ground right in the vertex where the Gaza Strip, Israel and Egypt come together, a trip of about eighty kilometres. At the entrance to Kerem Shalom, an Israeli army patrol awaits the EUBAM team to lead it to the fence separating Kerem Shalom and the Gaza Strip. In order to enter the Gaza Strip, the European monitors adopt the same passive security measures as the Israeli soldiers deployed in the area: they use armoured vehicles and wear a helmet and a bulletproof vest. An Israeli patrol opens the gate and the EUBAM team crosses. On the other side, a Palestinian Security Services patrol with two vehicles is waiting to escort EUBAM to the Rafah Terminal, which is about three kilometres away. Once in the Terminal, the EUBAM members take up their positions in the arrival area for buses, passport control, baggage inspection and the rest of the

places where Palestinian civil servants (customs officers, immigration police and security service) work, in order to be able to observe the tasks of these civil servants throughout the day, which is just beginning. According to the agreements between the parts, the crossing point cannot be opened without the presence of the European monitors.

It must be stated that the Rafah Crossing Point is open solely to exportation, not importation, and to the passage of Palestinians on foot, not the crossing of vehicles nor the entry of foreigners, with some exceptions in the latter category, the so-called "exceptional cases", which are subject to prior notification, with a minimum 48-hour notice. The Palestine side formalises this notification in writing to the Israeli side in a common room, called the "Liaison Office", located in Kerem Shalom. The "exceptional cases" refer to four categories of non-Palestinian citizens: diplomats, international investors, members of international and non-governmental organisations and humanitarian cases. The Israeli part has 24 hours to present whatever objections it may have to the entry, and the Palestine part has another 24 hours to reply to these objections. Vehicles cannot cross through Rafah, as the facilities and technical equipment necessary to inspect automobiles are not available, and, in regard to imports, according to the agreements signed between the Palestine National Authority and the Government of Israel, they must go through the Kerem Shalom crossing point. However, for now, the only imports that pass through this point consist of humanitarian aid coming from Egypt for Gaza, fundamentally Egyptian trucks bringing sacks of flour. The crossing of people is made, therefore, on foot in the following way: a bus arrives from Gaza and stops in front of the Terminal. The passengers get off, cross through the interior of the Terminal, pass through a metal detector and passport control and leave through the other side, where the bus is waiting again to take them to the Egyptian Terminal. In a similar way, the buses that come from Egypt leave the passengers in front of the Terminal. They get off and pass through the metal detector and passport control, while their luggage is run through an x-ray monitor. Then, they collect it and move on to the customs room, in which all the luggage is checked manually by the Palestinian customs workers. Afterwards, they leave with their luggage through the other side, where a Palestinian bus is waiting to take them to their destination in the Gaza Strip.

In the Kerem Shalom Liaison Office, the three parts are represented: Israelis, Palestinians and EUBAM. Normally, the Israeli representation consists of an army officer and a member of the Israeli security services; the Palestine representation consists of a member of the Palestinian security services and a civil servant, while EUBAM is present with one or two monitors. In this office, the disputes that may arise during the functioning of the Rafah crossing point are settled, or they are referred to a higher level in cases of disagreement. The Liaison Office is equipped with three screens where images from forty video cameras distributed throughout the Rafah Terminal are received, while at the same time, every two or three minutes, by means of fibre optics and microwave connecting Rafah with Kerem Shalom, the computer system transmits an updated electronic file with the data on all of the passengers who have crossed through Rafah until that moment of the day. All of these images and data are stored electronically in such a way that it is possible

to review the passage of any person who has crossed during the previous days. This computer system, which was installed by American engineers in collaboration with Palestinian and Israeli technicians, in conjunction with the traditional systems of communications (radio, telephone and fax), allows one to maintain monitoring of what is happening in the Rafah Terminal.

In regard to the opening hours of the crossing point, it must be pointed out that, of course, the Mission's objective is the permanent opening of this crossing point, that is, 24-hour-a-day operation. This objective should have been met by March of 2006 according to the initial plan. However, it has not been accomplished yet, basically for security reasons related to the changes that have occurred in the political and social panorama of Palestine since the Mission began in November of 2005. Here, events such as the following should be mentioned:

- The Palestinian legislative elections of the 25th of January, 2006, yielded a victory for the Hamas political party, which consequently led to the formation of a new government composed of this political group. Hamas is considered a terrorist organisation by the European Union, and, therefore, the EU was reluctant to establish relations with members of this new government. The matter was resolved with the creation of a Palestinian Border Administration, directly dependent on the Presidency of the PNA, and with the cessation of the Preventive Security Service, dependent on the Palestinian Home Affairs Ministry, in security tasks in the Terminal as well as in escorting and protection tasks for the EUBAM during its stay in the Gaza Strip, with the Presidential Guard replacing it for these tasks from the 11th of April on.
- The dawn attack on the 1st of January, 2006, when Palestinian militants handcuffed the watchman of the United Nations Club in the city of Gaza and then blew up the premises with two explosive charges.
- The riots that occurred during the first days of February were caused by the reaction of the Muslims to the appearance of cartoons portraying the prophet, Mohammed, in some European press media. These disturbances culminated in such events as the launching of grenades at the French Cultural Centre in the city of Gaza on the 1st of February, the assault on the European Union office on the 4th of February and the attack on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) Mission, supported by United Nations, by a group of agitators on the 8th of February.
- The incidents on the 14th of March, when groups of Palestinian agitators set fire to the British Council headquarters in the city of Gaza. At the same time, armed men retained nine foreigners in Gaza and the West Bank, as a protest against the United States and Europe, blaming them for not having done anything to prevent the Israeli army raid on the Jericho prison.

These and other events caused the initial plan of transferring the EUBAM Headquarters to the city of Gaza to be reconsidered, along with the rest of the Mission to the border Terminal. Already, during a visit by a delegation from the Security Office of the Council of the European Union in February, this delegation advised against the two locations that had been chosen as possible options for the site of the Headquarters. Construction work on a

camp for the rest of the Mission's monitors had already begun at the beginning of the year on an approximately 50 x 80-metre piece of land ceded by the PNA within the fenced-in area of the Rafah crossing point. The construction of this camp was effectively carried out by a Swedish agency in collaboration with a Palestinian construction firm. The camp was handed over on the 28th of March. It was constructed by using metal containers, and in it, a space of a little more than 2 meters wide by 3 meters long is assigned to each person. Nevertheless, occupation of the camp has been postponed without a set date.

The Mission, therefore, continues to be located in Ashqelon. As a consequence, one needs to take into account the time for daily journeys, which is about one hour for the trip between Ashqelon and Kerem Shalom and about twenty minutes between Kerem Shalom and the Rafah Terminal. The initial seventy-person staff of EUBAM had been calculated considering that the European monitors would be housed at the Terminal itself. For this reason, in order to reach the same objectives, living in Ashqelon, a staff increase was necessary. Over time, this increase in personnel has been attained, in part. The incorporation of new members has been gradual from the beginning, which has allowed for an extension in the opening times. In December it went from 5 to 8 hours, in January to 9, in March to 10, and May to 11 hours. By the 12th of June, it was anticipated that it would reach fourteen hours, from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. However, here a new problem arose: in this area of the Middle East, even in the month of June, it is already dark by 10 p.m. During that month, the confrontation between the Israeli army and Palestinian militants was especially violent, with numerous collateral victims in the Israeli attacks and with launchings of homemade rockets from the Gaza Strip into the area of Kerem Shalom. The Israeli army informed EUBAM that it was not willing to risk its soldiers' lives by opening the Gaza Strip gate in hours of darkness, so, if EUBAM wanted to extend the opening hours, the European monitors would have to stay overnight in the Terminal and cross the next day in daylight. EUBAM did not accept this solution, and, therefore, the opening hours would continue to be eleven hours, from 8:00 in the morning until 7:00 in the evening.

Within this context, on the 25th of June, an attack took place, launched by a Palestinian commando that had infiltrated through a tunnel dug under the gate and had crossed over into Israeli territory near Kerem Shalom and attacked an Israeli patrol, with the result of two Israeli soldiers dead, two more wounded and one kidnapped. As a consequence of this attack, Israel decided to close Kerem Shalom and with it the Rafah crossing point also. Since then, the crossing point has only been opened in exceptional cases: two days in July, five in August, three in September, seven in October, six in November; and this is still the situation today.

In its meeting on the 14th of November, the Council of the European Union decided to prolong EUBAM Rafah for another six months, until the 25th of May, 2007. From the 26th of November on, Israel has suspended its combat operations in the Gaza Strip after the Palestinian National Authority stated it had reached a compromise with the militant factions to suspend their aggressions against Israeli territory. This cease-fire could signify a first step towards a return to normality at the Rafah Crossing Point.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

The practise of cooperation in security and defence issues.

UNIFIL 2.

Luis Meléndez Pasquín

Luis Meléndez Pasquín

Spanish Marine Infantry Colonel

As you well know, I am here to try to transmit my feelings to you about the wonderful experience of having had the opportunity to contribute my grain of sand to the pacification of an area which, due to circumstances of fate, has been in an unstable situation for many years. In the last fifty years innumerable war operations have taken place in this region which have caused suffering to many people. I firmly believe that the so-called “Western” countries have a pending debt with Lebanon.

The objective of this article is to present the tasks of our troops in the mission of the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). This mission, stemming from the mandate included in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, consisted, basically, in supporting the Lebanese army in its deployment toward the south (occupying the strip between the Litani River and the border with Israel, better known as the “Blue Line”) as well as preventing the presence of armed elements in this zone. Nevertheless, these were not the only tasks deriving from this resolution; there were others related to assistance in the return of the displaced civilian personnel of the zone and to the protection of United Nations interests, in terms of personnel and material.

I will briefly explain the reason for choosing the Marine Infantry for this mission. The foremost characteristic of our Corps is the high degree of readiness always associated with the amphibious ships of the fleet’s Battle Group. One of the demands of Resolution 1701 was to have, by the 15th of September, at least 5.000 soldiers deployed as an unavoidable condition for the Israeli army to leave the occupied zone in the south of the Lebanon. The high readiness maintained by the Marine Infantry allowed us to get equipped, embark, disembark and begin to operate in the zone in less than fifteen days. However, this same readiness which demands, among other conditioning factors, having a small logistic burden, also forces it not to remain deployed in the area of operations for too long, which is why we were relieved by another unit before completing the regular deployment times, which are four or six months.

I would like to stress that the experiences and conclusions that I am presenting here are taken from direct contact with Lebanese army personnel and the civilian population in the zone. It is natural that

someone may doubt the consistency of opinions based solely on the experience of a month and a half. Perhaps they are right, but I insist that they are based on direct contact, which on occasion was even deep, and I can tell you, in confidence, that in my heart I carry friendships and memories that I will never forget.

Relationships in peacekeeping missions are not easy, especially when they develop in countries with a culture and customs that are very different from our own. Moreover, there are other factors that influence human relationships and co-operation in an important way, which we must not forget in our analysis, such as language or religion. In peacekeeping missions, human relationships usually follow three main paths. In the first place, we find relationships with the civilian population of the zone, which tend to be the most complicated ones, but which also turn out to be the most appreciated ones in the end. The second path corresponds to the relationships that must be maintained with the parts in conflict. Normally, these parts are regular armies, with which the relations could be easier; however, if it is an army and a guerrilla movement, these relations can become complicated. Finally, we emphasise relationships with the rest of the international forces integrated into the multinational force. However, because of time constraints, I will not be able to deal with this last type of relations, in spite of its interest. Let us begin, then, by presenting the conclusions drawn from our relationship with the civilian population and, afterwards, that corresponding to our collaboration with the Lebanese army.

I will not blush in recognising my superficial knowledge about the area in question at the time I received the news that we could be designated to participate in the aforementioned mission, in spite of its having been an object of study in most of the military courses I have attended. We have always heard about the conflicts in the region, and some of us, owing to our ages, still remember when Lebanon was known as the Switzerland of the Mediterranean. If we take into account the frequent changes and intense combat activity, invasions and withdrawals in the zone, one almost has to be an expert to understand the situation in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and similar places.

The first news we had about the area in which we would operate was that it was populated mainly by Shiite Muslims. It is an area in which, moreover, the influence of Hezbollah was significant and which, as a result of this, had been one of the most hardest hit ones during the conflict. It could seem, in principle, that this would complicate our mission, but as we shall see, it was almost the opposite. Upon our arrival, we were received in a way that could be described as expectant and distrustful. This was an understandable distrust if one bears in mind the punishment that had been received and the initial idea, very widespread among the population that the objective of the arrival of the Western forces was to defend and support Israel. We could clearly see this latter view in our first approach to the civil population, consisting of a visit to the mayors of the main municipalities in our area, accompanying the Ambassador of Spain in Lebanon. During this visit, we could see that what the majority were demanding from us was precisely that we help them against their enemy, Israel, in particular that we defend them from any future attacks. Here begins the complicated

work, typical of this type of mission: to try to maintain a clear, determined impartiality. In fact, if impartiality is lost, it could jeopardise the fulfilment of our mission; although, if impartiality is maintained, it could considerably worsen relations with the population. This is the complicated game. On this visit, the Ambassador laid out the collaboration and investment plans that the Spanish government anticipated carrying out in the zone actions mainly oriented toward reconstruction and activities of a cultural nature. Without a doubt, these plans had a clear impact in the positive perception towards us.

Another very prominent aspect was the recognition and gratitude that the authorities in the area showed for the international position, maintained by Spain from the beginning of the conflict, of demanding the cessation of hostilities the whole time. It must be emphasised that this fact did not favour the hoped-for impartiality, but it clearly had a great influence on the acceptance of the Spanish troops on the part of the local people.

It is necessary to stress the importance of knowledge of and respect for the habits and customs of the people of the area, whenever this is compatible with the fulfilment of our mission. The following anecdote is a good demonstration of it. Despite the improvement we had experienced in our relations with the civilian population of the zone thanks to the promises of the Spanish government, our perception continued to be that we were being treated coldly, since our patrols were not waved at by people in the streets when they passed through towns. This began to change when we learned, through our Civilian-Military Co-operation cell, that it was necessary for us to wave at them first so that they could answer our greeting.

Another fundamental aspect to emphasise due to its influence on human relations is knowledge of the Arabic language. Despite eight centuries of coexistence and our proximity and relationship with countries in our surroundings, which we almost called brothers, it is striking how little knowledge the Spanish people, and therefore our Corps, have of the Arabic. In sum, for contact with the civilian population we had to resort to the use of interpreters, who sometimes had an ample knowledge of Spanish, but sometimes did not. The truth is that, in general, their contribution was good, and to a great extent they contributed to improving our relations with the population.

Our humanitarian aid activities had a favourable influence among the civilians of the zone. As you know, this area was, and is, inundated with large amounts of unexploded munitions and mines. Concretely, they affected the olive groves, the main source of funding for the local people. Harvest time was beginning, and the fields were not clean. Immediately, in collaboration with the city councils of the zone, we started to detonate as much materiel as came within our reach. These actions were complemented with diverse medical services rendered by our medical team in these same towns. The assistance given could only be that relating to basic medicine (common illnesses) and eminently oriented to children and the elderly. At first, the same thing happened as with our presence in the area: the people's use of our doctor's surgeries was scant until the population was convinced of the effectiveness of our aid, when the number of users increased exponentially.

Finally, I cannot leave aside the religious aspect, due to the implications that it could have had in our relations with the civilian population. At first, the decision was to establish a relationship of courtesy with the representatives of all the religions existing in the area. However, the orders received from UNIFIL Headquarters were to not establish these kinds of relations, or at least to not participate in activities of this nature. This decision probably was based on the complexity of the mixture of religions in the area and the influence that they have on their followers. Any participation in activities of this type could be misinterpreted by any of the parts. Nevertheless, in my opinion, establishing such relations would have improved the perception the people of the area had of us even more.

To round off, I would like to highlight the fact that our month-and-a-half stay coincided with the month of the Ramadan, and the implications that this month has in Muslim customs are well known. On the part of UNIFIL we were recommended not to eat off base during daylight hours, and if this were the case, it was to be done out of sight of the people so as not to offend them. We were even told that their mood gradually changed as the day wore on, motivated by hunger. At the outset, maximum precautions were taken, but, as the days went by, we realised that the mood of people was not affected as much as we had been told, and the month passed without any incident worthy of mention. On the other hand, it was observed that there were fewer people in the streets during the daylight hours.

In sum, it can be said that we developed our work in a cordial atmosphere where, as we were told on some occasions, we had been welcomed as brothers, our work had been facilitated at all times and we had been treated much better than what was to be expected at first. Perhaps, as I already said at the beginning of my presentation, the position maintained by our government from the beginning of the conflict could have had a key influence. Thus, I would like to again emphasise the importance of knowledge of and respect for the habits and customs of the country with which one is to collaborate, the positive influence of humanitarian aid activities and the importance of subsequent investments in the area.

Now let us see how our relations with the army of Lebanon were, which one of our fundamental missions was. From the first moments of the mission, the Commander of the UNIFIL established as one of his main objectives that of maintaining excellent relations with them, expressing it in his Operating Orders. From our point of view, I can attest that our relations with the Lebanese armed forces did not differ very much from those we had with the civilian population. In the first place, I would like to say that they were always excellent, or rather, correct. From the first moment, liaison officers were exchanged between units, with the objective of co-ordinating all joint activities. The Lebanese army always showed interest in maintaining good relations. One example of this was their concern that their liaison officers know Spanish to a high degree, contributing thus to maintaining fluid relations with them.

As happened with the civilian population, we had the impression that the Lebanese army received us expectantly and with some distrust. However, after some time, we realised that this sense of expectancy and

distrust was not the case, but rather it hid a feeling of responsibility in relation to the mandate of Resolution 1701. It could even be said that they did not want or need our support. I firmly believe that they thought that, as the army of a sovereign country, they were the ones who were commissioned with carrying out the mandate. As a detail, it is necessary to mention that at no time was it ever revealed to us, even though we asked them on repeated occasions, what their deployment intentions were in the area. Another aspect that can demonstrate this perception is the fact that at the moment of our departure from the area, no agreement on the protocol for joint action between the UNIFIL forces and the Lebanese army had yet been reached. Such a protocol, of utmost importance, had to clarify what the possible assistance of the multinational force to the Lebanese army would consist of.

Lastly, it would be good to highlight the fact that UNIFIL's intentions to collaborate with the Lebanese army included aspects that went beyond those merely related to Resolution 1701. For example, the planning of activities for the joint training of units was anticipated, among which there was the exchange of knowledge about tactics and techniques as well as firing exercises. Regrettably, before our departure from the area, we could not carry out any of these activities.

As a conclusion, it can be said that our relations with the representatives of the Lebanese army were always correct and that the latter always showed an apparent desire to collaborate with UNIFIL.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Towards a shared approach to security in the Mediterranean?
Pinar Bilgin

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Ten year anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995) was marked by statements of disappointment over the limited nature of progress achieved, notwithstanding the commitment and contributions of myriad governmental and non-governmental actors on both sides of the Mediterranean (see, for example, Solana, 2005; Al Mubadara, 2005; Amnesty International, 2005). Indeed, the US-led invasion of Iraq (2003) and the predicament of the Iraqi people, al-Qaeda linked bombings in Istanbul (November 2003) and Madrid (March 2004), Israeli operation in Lebanon (2006) and the rise of anti-immigrant (often anti-Arab and/or anti-Muslim) feelings in Western Europe, when coupled with the impasse in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking and the omnipresence of the threat of 'global jihadism' in 'Western' policy lexicon, have alienated the two shores of the Mediterranean and left little reason to celebrate.

Yet, while making statements of gloom and doom, many failed to note a singular achievement of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: revitalizing the Mediterranean as a framework for shaping the thinking as well as actions of those willing to take up the challenge of 'change'. Even those who express disappointment over the little progress that has been made in securing the 'Mediterranean', nevertheless remain within the 'Mediterranean framework' in expressing their disappointment. The focal point of the discussions between the European Union (EU) and its southern neighbors is no longer the Euro-Arab dialogue (EU's former focus) or the Eastern Mediterranean (a.k.a. the southern flank, one of NATO's Cold War focal points) but the 'Mediterranean', which is increasingly considered as a shared environment, a region in the making (Adler, Crawford, Bicchi & Del Sarto, 2006). Notwithstanding its shortcomings, creating a new framework for thinking differently about security in this part of the world is no minor achievement of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Prevalent accounts on the shortcomings of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership put the 'blame' on either of the two sides. Whereas the EU is found lacking in 'sincerity', the non-member Mediterranean partners are criticized for limited cooperation. Some have pointed to the discrepancy between northern and southern priorities as the problem, namely the clash between 'regional stability and democratization' vs.

1. The calls for including other, non-Mediterranean Arab countries in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership have not been as vocal. Nor were they rooted in similar concerns.

'regime security' (Haddadi, 2004). Others went so far as to identify the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a "contract between democratic and non-democratic states which bribes the latter for accepting some interference in their affairs through the exercise of EU financial and normative power" (Nicolaidis & Nicolaidis, 2004: 20). Arguing against the more cynical understandings of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a neo-colonial project in post-colonial garb (Crawford, 2005: 16), this article finds fault with the broader security conception shaping the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership—or lack of it! Rather than locating the roots of the problem in EU's 'insincerity' or southern actors' 'reluctance', this article maintains that what has failed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a misdiagnosis of the nature of Mediterranean insecurities and inappropriateness of the model chosen in addressing them—that of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In what follows the argument is built in the form of five interrelated arguments.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, notwithstanding its shortcomings, has been successful in so far as the EU and its southern neighbors have begun thinking about themselves as sharing a common space, the 'Mediterranean'

Geographical labels and regional definitions are not unimportant. There is nothing 'natural' or 'neutral' about them. Throughout history, identification and labeling of geographical sites have had their roots in the politico-bureaucratic and military-strategic interests of some (Lacoste, 1976). What is at stake is not merely one of choosing one label over another ('Latin' or 'South' America?) or plotting boundaries (where is 'Europe'?) but also policy; to be more precise, what is at stake is the kind of foreign policy considered 'appropriate' for that part of the world. For, "to designate an area as 'Islamic' or 'Western' is not only to name it but also brand it in terms of its politics and the type of foreign policy its 'nature' demands" (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995: 48). That is precisely the reason the 'Middle East' was received critically by some Arab intellectuals: it was considered as breaking up the 'Arab homeland', thereby allowing for non-Arabs to position themselves in this part of the world (Bilgin, 2004a; 2005).¹

The Mediterranean, as a new framework for thinking about security, has proven relatively successful for the same reason. It constitutes an alternative to the Middle East framework which has, over the years, disillusioned many (Bilgin 2005). More recently, the Middle East framework has been discredited by the US-led war on Iraq that was packaged as a part of a democracy promotion effort a.k.a. the 'Greater Middle East initiative'. The Mediterranean framework has proven 'successful' in so far it has been able to get the EU and its southern neighbors to begin thinking about themselves as sharing a common space, the 'Mediterranean' (Bilgin, 2004a). Given the connotations of the Mediterranean as a birthplace of civilization/s, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has a different ring to it compared to the alternatives. Since region-building (as with all kinds of community building) is about appealing to the hearts and minds as well as the

'pockets' of myriad actors (Adler & Barnett, 1998), the advantages to identifying the common space as the 'Mediterranean' as opposed to 'Euro-Arab' or 'Euro-Maghreb' cannot be denied.

If 'thinking' about security in this shared space is yet to be backed up by 'doing'—an issue picked up by most critics—this is mostly due to the absence of a common vision as to what 'security in the Mediterranean' should look like. Whereas EU member states have had their own expectations from the Barcelona Process, non-member Mediterranean partners had different ideas in mind when they agreed to join. More than a decade into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process, there is little movement towards generating a common vision of what 'security in the Mediterranean' should look like. This article contends that what has failed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is this long-lasting lack of a shared approach to security. Needless to say, this contention goes against representations of the limited success of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a consequence of the failure of Middle Eastern peacemaking (Solana, 2005) and/or EU irresoluteness and southern unwillingness. Notwithstanding the weight of the past (Moulakis, 2005), which is significant, what would be helpful in mobilizing a variety of actors from all sides of the Mediterranean to work together within the Mediterranean framework is a shared understanding of security.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has not yet been successful in producing a common vision of 'security in the Mediterranean'

The EU documentation through which the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been written into being are ridden with notions of 'peace', 'stability', 'partnership', 'solidarity', and 'development'.² Yet, there is very little agreement among the various parties ('Southern' and 'Northern', governmental and non-governmental) as to the precise meanings they attach to these notions within their specific context. Although such ambiguities may have allowed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to rapidly become popular among Mediterranean-littoral states in the early 1990s,³ they can no longer be tolerated if the Partnership is to fulfill its promise of bringing 'peace' and 'stability' to this fragile 'region'.

Having said that, while joint declarations on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are characterized by ambiguous rhetoric on the issue of a common vision, the European Union has never been less than precise as to its own insecurities and what it seeks to achieve. As early as 1992, Presidential Conclusions of the European Council declared that:

"The Southern shores of the Mediterranean as well as the Middle East are geographical areas in relation to which the European Union has strong interests both in terms of security and stability. The Union has therefore an interest in establishing with the countries of the area a relationship of good neighborliness. The goal should be to avoid a North-South gap in the region by favoring economic development and promoting full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law."⁴

2. See "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process". Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/. Accessed January 25, 2007.
3. Signatories to the Barcelona Declaration were a record number of twenty-five, including Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Syria.
4. European Council, "Presidency Conclusions and Annex. European Council in Lisbon" 26 - 27 June 1992. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lisbon/li2_en.pdf. Accessed January 25, 2007.

5. People-to-people diplomacy and civil societal dialogue have proven to be difficult in the 'South' where civil society suffers from both the grip of the state and the intellectual hold of the colonial past. See: Pasha, 1996 and Blaney & Pasha, 1993.

The tri-fold set up of the Barcelona Declaration covering 'politics and security', 'economics and finance' and 'social, cultural and human affairs' revealed what was at stake for the EU: preventing problems of the 'South' from becoming problems for the 'North'. Encouraging economic development and growth while providing support for stable transition to democracy and strengthening the rule of law have emerged as the twin tools of reaching this goal.

The rationale behind the set up of the tri-fold structure rested on past practices of the European Community/Union towards the former Soviet Bloc. The Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE, on which the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is modeled, were designed to generate people-to-people diplomacy and exchanges at various levels so as to build confidence and enhance security cooperation between the eastern and western parts of 'Europe'. Both institutions contributed to the relatively peaceful end of the Cold War. Notwithstanding Reagan administration's claim to having won a 'victory' over the Soviet Union (Schweizer, 1994), the end of the Cold War was made possible by the efforts of various state and non-state actors who operated through official and non-official channels (Kaldor, 2002).

No matter how successful the CSCE model may have proven in helping to secure 'Europe', seeking its transfer to the 'Mediterranean' context have failed so far. This is not only because the model is not fit for a different geography occupied by a different culture—the usual explanation. This is also because the model is not 'applied' fully in the Mediterranean context. Two examples should suffice.

- During the Cold War, the 'West' considered (and insisted on) human mobility and the right to leave one's country as 'human rights'. Throughout the Cold War years, the two 'rights' were utilized as a way of contesting the legitimacy and/or efficiency of 'Eastern' regimes (Noll 2006). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, on the other hand, denies that very right. People-to-people diplomacy and cultural exchanges are designed to keep Southern peoples in the South. Whereas CSCE sought to work with people in the attempt to influence governmental behavior, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has sought to work with governments influence people's migratory behavior.⁵ There is no mistaking the differences in the philosophical outlook of the two efforts.
- CSCE rested on the assumption that peoples could work together only if the obstacles put on by the governments could be overcome. A similar pattern does not emerge in North-South interactions in the Mediterranean in that in EU actors' interactions with their southern counterparts, the very identity and value system of the 'South' has emerged as a major part of the problem. It is not only the southern governments (as was the case with the 'East' during the Cold War) but also the southern peoples (or their 'Muslimhood') are viewed as contributing to the tension between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea. In the CSCE framework, when 'Western' citizens looked to their 'Eastern' counterparts, they saw potential partners. Now, the northerners when they look to the South see people who are impossible to co-exist with and therefore must be kept where they are. When southerners look to the north, in turn, they see former colonial actors who speak about the virtues of 'European values'.

Thus, if the CSCE model designed to seek security in 'Europe' has so far not worked in the context of the 'Mediterranean', this has to do not only with southern lack of willingness but also northern ambivalence (not insincerity) in its relations with the 'South'.

The two sides of the Mediterranean do not see eye-to-eye on security issues

One way of accounting for EU ambivalence towards the 'South' is to blame the intellectual hold of 'Eurocentrism'. As various EU actors' hesitance towards Turkey's membership also suggests, the European Union is not immune to civilisational (not to say hierarchical) categorizations when thinking about and acting towards those who are located in the 'non-North' (Bilgin, 2004b). Although moving beyond such 'Eurocentrism' may not be a feasible goal, raising awareness of the EU's predilection to discriminate along 'civilisational' lines may constitute a good starting point if the aim is generate genuine dialogue on cooperating for security. Needless to say, such awareness would also need to be matched by an increase in Southern neighbors' different insecurities.

Another explanation as to why the EU has remained ambivalent in fully applying the CSCE is that it has mistaken its own security concerns for that of the 'Mediterranean region'. The EU's broadening of the security agenda to include non-military issues such as migration, drug trafficking and Islamic activism has not been helpful in that these concerns do not constitute a priority for the South in the way that they do for the North. On the contrary, they have been quite divisive for North-South relations insofar as they have lead to claims of anti-Arab/Muslim 'racism' and 'xenophobia'.

Arguing against the charge that the EU prioritizes security above all else, some have sought to show, through careful discourse analysis of EU documentation, that the problem has less to do with the EU's intentions than its irresolute approach to prioritizing security concerns. The EU, it is argued, operates with two security discourses, which compete with each other thereby complicating EU policy-making towards the Mediterranean. "[T]he Mediterranean is constructed as a threat and as a partner, as an inferior and underdeveloped subject that is to be reformed, and as an equal partner with whom the EU shares security perceptions and threats" argues Melle Malmvig (2004: 18). Indeed, EU documentation stresses regional stability at times and democratization at other times. Putting aside the debate as to whether the two are incompatible in practice or not, what is significant for the purposes of this article is the problematic nature of such characterizations of the current impasse as due to EU's irresoluteness in choosing between two different security concerns. For, it conflates 'security understanding' and 'security strategy'. The difference between the two discourses of the EU is one of 'security strategy' and not 'security understanding'. Both discourses rest on an understanding of security that prioritizes the EU's own concerns. Whereas 'values' and 'human rights' are central to the definition of 'European identity' and therefore 'European security' in one discourse,

6. On different approaches to understanding and escaping the security dilemma, see: Booth & Wheeler, 1992.

they are marginal to the other one. The EU remains to be the object to be secured in both discourses. Whether they are represented as a 'partners' or an 'inferior and underdeveloped subjects that are to be reformed', non-member Mediterranean partners' concerns do not make it on to the definition of what constitutes 'security in the Mediterranean' in either of the two discourses. The broader point being that if the CSCE model has not worked in the Mediterranean context, this is because it has not been fully applied, which has to do with EU ambivalence towards its southern partners and their insecurities.

A common vision of 'security in the Mediterranean' would begin to emerge when parties recognize 'insecurity' itself as the enemy

The two sides of the Mediterranean are locked in a 'security dilemma'. Already existing frictions and mistrust between the North and the South has deepened since September 11, 2001 and al-Qaeda linked bombings in Istanbul, Madrid and London. To quote Ulla Olum, "[t]he European fear of the return of the past in the form of the destruction of European values by terrorism gives rise to the Southern Mediterranean countries' fear of return of the colonial past" (Holm, 2005: 25).

Identifying the security dynamics between the two sides of the Mediterranean as a 'dilemma' need not render it more intractable. The essence of the 'security dilemma' is in the structure of the relationship. Mistrust between the two parties is both a function and a quality of the security dilemma in the Mediterranean. Diagnosing the 'security dilemma' as such could potentially help move cooperation for security forward by helping to identify a common 'enemy': 'insecurity' itself. After all, there is no escape from a security dilemma other than recognizing that the problem is 'us' as much as 'them' and that 'we' need to work with each other in order to escape it.⁶

Pointing to 'insecurity' itself as the enemy may come across as tautological. The current impasse in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, as argued above, rests on a misdiagnosis (lack of sincerity for the EU, lack of will for the non-member Mediterranean partners) of the problem, which rests on another misdiagnosis as to the identity of the 'enemy'. Invoking the term 'security dilemma' often rests on a denial of such ambiguity regarding who the enemy is: the enemy is 'them' for 'us', and 'us' for 'them'. Yet, it is often forgotten that for the two parties locked in the security dilemma, the enemy is in the structure of the relationship, a particular zero-sum way of approaching international relations that reproduces itself.

Diagnosing East-West insecurities as a security dilemma had been central to the CSCE process. Hence the logic behind the adoption of the CSCE model for the Mediterranean. However, before the CSCE, there was EC/EU, which evolved as an ingenious way of approaching the problem of 'in/security in Europe'—not vis-à-vis the 'East' but within 'Western Europe'—among a group of states which had fought each

other in two world wars during the 20th century alone.⁷ The ‘enemy’ was not only the Soviet Bloc, but also ‘mutual security policy’ (Wæver, 1998). European policy-makers at the time recognized that the best way to approach the security dilemma in ‘Europe’ which gave way to two destructive wars, was not

“a question of assuring a good, stable security system, but of avoiding security concerns being directed as each other at all, by somehow circumventing this traditional logic, directing energies elsewhere” (Wæver, 1998: 83).

This ‘novel’ approach to ‘security in Europe’ allowed European policy-makers to channel their efforts into setting up the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor of the European Community/Union. ‘Insecurity’, which was located in Europe’s own past, was the enemy. Securing ‘Europe’ required learning new ways of relation to each other internationally. During this period, European policy-makers invented a new way of ‘doing security’ while downplaying the securityness of what they were doing (Wæver, 1998).

Amidst all the talk about the European Union as a ‘postmodern entity’, a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative power’, its origins as a security project is often forgotten. While this forgetting may be a part of the success of European integration as a security project, remembering that past would prove helpful in relating to southern insecurities and addressing the security dilemma with the ‘South’. The model that helped to maintain ‘security in Europe’ was that of the EC/EU itself, not the CSCE, which came later and helped to address the question of ‘East Europe’.

Doing ‘security in the Mediterranean’—the EC/EU model

Jean Monnet’s strategy for avoiding going back to the era of instability (that characterized Europe’s modern history and gave rise to two devastating world wars) was that of integrating European countries to the point that war would become unthinkable. Encouraging further democratization and respect for human rights was and is at the heart of the project of European integration that has, over the years, Europeanized ‘Europe’. In the wake of the Cold War, EU policymakers have sought to secure Europe’s future by expanding towards the ‘East’ while deepening integration. Even where the CSCE model had worked (i.e., the ‘East’) it was not considered satisfactory in that the EU put into effect its own model of expanding towards Central and Eastern Europe.

Seemingly oblivious of that background, some EU actors interact with non-member Mediterranean partners through projecting an image of the EU as a ‘postmodern’ entity, a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative power’. This is an EU that relates to its neighbors through exporting ‘European values’ through non-military (and sometimes military) means. Arguably, such a stance not only runs the risk of slipping from the mission of ‘civilian power’ into ‘civilianizing power’ (Manners, 2006) but also goes against Jean Monnet’s vision of Europe as contributing to peace by setting an example of a different way of doing international relations.

7. On the emergence of ‘common security’ as a different way of ‘doing security’ with the ‘East’, see Independent Commission, 1982. On a reading of European integration as security policy, see: Wæver, 1998.

8. What is understood by 'Europeanization' here is the transformation EU members and candidates go through when responding to (and shaping) political processes in the European Union. Understood as such, 'Europeanization' has two dimensions. The top down dimension involves members and candidates making the necessary reforms to meet EU conditionality. The bottom up dimension involves members changing existing understandings and practices in the EU (e.g. Sweden actively lobbying for the EU to ban the export of dangerous waste to developing countries). In the early years of the accession process, countries are usually on the receiving end. Once their 'Europeanness' is recognized (with the beginning of accession negotiations and later full membership), they get the opportunity to export their own understandings and practices to the rest of the members. See: Featherstone, 2003.

Notwithstanding their won not-so-distant experiences, EU policy-makers' approach to their southern neighbors have so far demonstrated a lack of empathy. Such lack of empathy has not allowed northern actors to recognize that the European Union itself went through a similar period of insecurity. 'European values', which are sought to be exported to the southern neighbors as a solution to their insecurities, did not exist during those turbulent times amidst the militarism of the 1930s and 'anti-communism' of the 1940s and 1950s when it would have been difficult—to say the least—to think of 'Europe' as a 'normative' or 'civilian power'. 'European values' were invented as part and parcel of the project of securing Europe through integration (a.k.a. Europeanization)⁸. Understanding 'European values' as a product of a security project (which, in turn, was a response to European insecurities) could help EU policy-makers to empathize with their southern counterparts. Representing 'European values' as a product of a security project, would also ease their embrace by southern actors. If values such as human rights and institutions such as the rule of law and democracy are seen as the products of conscious human action and not a heritage specific to European geography, it might be easier for non-European others to seek to build similar values and institutions. What the South really needs from its northern partners is a degree of humility cognizant of the difficult processes through which 'European values' have been (re)invented in 'Europe'—which, in turn, has allowed inventing the image of 'Europe' as a 'normative power'.

Conclusion

This article has sought to point to the possibility of arriving at a shared approach to 'security in the Mediterranean'. It is argued that arriving at a shared approach requires an accurate diagnosis of the problem at hand. Arguing against those accounts that put the 'blame' on EU 'insincerity' or southern 'reluctance', the article has identified the problem as the absence of a common understanding of security, which, in turn, is rooted in incongruities between the understandings of security between the North and the South on the one hand and governmental and non-governmental actors on the other. Contra popular representations of EU being divided between 'stability' and 'democracy' and the 'South' seeking stability at all cost, there are, on both sides, those who seek to achieve security through establishing and/or democracy, human rights and the rule of law on both sides. Insecurity, and not each other, is their enemy. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has so far failed to tap this potential, not only because of inherent difficulties (democratization may not produce stability in the short-term, see Mansfield & Snyder, 1995) but also because of EU preconceptions regarding an inherent (cultural) incompatibility between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. This is evident in the different ways in which the EU has approached its eastern vs. the southern northern neighbors, which smacks of 'civilizational geopolitics' (Bilgin, 2004b) at best and 'orientalism' at worst. This could be overcome by changing the model—that of CSCE—which clearly is not working. What non-member Mediterranean partners need from their EU counterparts is not the 'European values' but learning about the ways in which those values have been (re)invented in 'Europe' in the aftermath

of two devastating world wars. What the southern partners need is to learn from the *experience* of 'doing security' in the EC/EU way.

Thinking of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as the means and ends of 'doing security' in the EC/EU way would be a good starting point in revamping the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for at least two reasons.

1. It would help the north rid itself of the burden of neo-colonialism. The mission for the EU would not be that of exporting 'European values' but 'European experiences' of 'doing security'—the experience of (re)inventing 'European values', finding democracy and human rights in Europe's own heritage when they had, for so long, been forgotten by the practitioners. The difference between the two (exporting values vs. exporting experiences) is not insignificant. One is ridden with assumptions of culturalism—thinking of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as culture specific commodities. The other allows for similar values and institutions to be found in the experiences of or (re)invented by the others.

2. It would empower southern actors to seek these values and institutions in their own experiences. The South has focused so much on others' experiences (either accepting them or rejecting them) that it has paid little attention to finding moments of democracy and human rights in their own past. Such instances do exist, however momentary. Arguing against claims of lack of respect to women's rights in Islam (and among Muslims), Fatima Mernissi has written about *Forgotten Queens of Islam* (1997), and has therefore sought to open up space for Muslim women's participation in politics. Mustapha Kamal Pasha (2002) likewise has argued that moments of secularism in 'Islam' could be found and utilized by those who consider secularization as an essential aspect of democratization in the Muslim world.

Re-thinking the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership along the lines suggested above could be liberating for both sides. What is more, it would help to go beyond the current impasse by embracing democracy, the rule of law and human rights as essential *components* as well as *ways* of 'doing security'.

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5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Energy and non-proliferation: An old or new Challenge?

Energy and non-proliferation.
Jorge Segrelles

Jorge Segrelles

Repsol YPF Foundation, Managing Director

The increasing concern in the economies of the developed countries about energy dependence, the security of supplies, forecasts about the exhaustion of fossil fuels, their rising prices, and the incessant increase in CO₂ emissions at the world level, have led to the appearance of different proposals in the European Union (EU) and the United States. These proposals share a bet for energy efficiency, research and development of clean, renewable energies and the use of nuclear energy, although the EU leaves it up to its member countries to choose their mixtures of energy sources.

The latest International Energy Agency studies (IEA, *World Energy Outlook*, 2006) foresee a world-wide growth in installed nuclear power for the year 2030 from 368 GW (gigawatts) in 2005 to 416 GW in the reference scenario, or up to 519 GW in an alternative energy policy scenario. According to the IEA, in an optimistic scenario of technological progress, electricity generated from nuclear power in the year 2050 would double that of today. Nuclear waste management and the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons are the main obstacles, while nuclear fusion will not be viable before 2050 in the most optimistic scenarios.

The international debate on nuclear energy is open. In some EU countries, the possibility of a change in energy policies is being considered. For example, Spain inaugurated a "Table of Dialogue" and in the United States, the "Global Nuclear Energy Partnership" was launched. A bolstering of the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is requested. Meanwhile, countries like North Korea and Iran may come to increase the number of countries with nuclear weapons, and recently, six Arab countries have shown their intention to construct nuclear powerplants for civilian uses.

The expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is inevitable and it is necessary to direct efforts toward agreements and pacts that guarantee this peaceful use.

The energy future

In the last few years, with the increase in the price of crude oil, geopolitical tensions and heightened awareness of the effect of CO₂ on climate change, the developed economies have shown a growing concern for sustainability and security in the supply for their energy systems.

The predictions of a fast decline in oil reserves, with their depletion forecast for the next decade according to Hubbert's "peak oil" theories (called into question at present by discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico), the concern about the delay in the called-for reductions of greenhouse gas emissions with their foreseeable effect on climate change and the growing energy dependence for oil supplies on third countries with unstable political situations, such as some in Latin America and the Middle East, were the motor of the revising of energy policies. This revision began simultaneously with the United States Energy Law and Bush's "Advanced Energy Initiative", and the launch of the "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy" in the European Union.

Both strategies share common features:

- Efficiency in energy use.
- The use of renewable wind, solar or biofuel energies.
- Provision of incentives for research to develop clean technologies (without CO₂ emissions).
- The use of nuclear energy. Whereas the United States place their stakes on the use of this energy, with clear proposals like the GNEP (*Global Nuclear Energy Partnership*), the EU limits itself to recommending a debate on nuclear energy, leaving it up to each state to choose its energy mix, bearing in mind the criteria of sustainability and the security of supply.

Within this context, the International Energy Agency has recently published its annual study on the long-term forecasts of the energy sector (*World Energy Outlook*, 2006). It presents two scenarios, a Reference Scenario, with no change in energy policies, and an Alternative Policy Scenario, with the implementation of policies that stimulate energy efficiency, the reduction of CO₂ emissions and the security of supplies.

In the reference scenario, world-wide demand for primary energy grows by over 50% between 2004 and 2030. All types of energy increase, but the one that does so the most in absolute terms is coal. Consequently, CO₂ emissions fundamentally rise by 55% in this period, due, fundamentally, to new electricity-generating projects using coal in India and China. The installed power of nuclear electricity generation grows only by 13%, from 368 GW to 416 GW. In this scenario, oil and gas supply security is threatened, due to diminishing production in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The increases in demand for oil must be covered through greater production on the part of the Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC), while those for gas must be met by Russia and countries in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. CO₂ emissions cannot be reduced, either.

The alternative scenario contemplates a series of energy policies, among which we summarize the most important ones in terms of their effect on world-wide energy consumption:

- Energy efficiency: Improved mileage in vehicles in the OECD countries, increased energy efficiency in the residential and commercial sectors in the OECD countries and China and improved efficiency in coal-burning electricity plants in China.
- Increase in the use of renewable energies in general.
- Lengthening of the useful lives of nuclear plants in the EU and the United States and a greater weight for nuclear energy in China and India.

With the implementation of these policies, the alternative scenario yields a primary energy consumption in 2030 which is 10% lower than in the reference scenario. Fossil fuels go from making up 81% of the total demand in the reference scenario to comprising 77%, which is still a very significant figure. The greatest decreases with respect to the reference scenario occur with coal, followed by oil and gas, in this order. The greatest increase between both scenarios, in absolute values, occurs with nuclear energy, which rises from 416 GW to 519 GW. The relative weight of this type of energy is 7% of the total demand. Renewable energies provide 16%. CO₂ emissions are reduced by 16% with regard to the reference scenario; 78% of this decrease is due to efficiency measures, 12% to the greater use of renewable energies and 10% to the greater weight of nuclear energy.

This year, the International Energy Agency also prepared a study on the prospects of energy technology for 2050 in response to a request from the G-8. In the most optimistic scenario regarding technological advances, fossil fuels will be 58% of the total in 2050, with a reduction in the use of coal and oil and an increase in gas; nuclear energy will represent 12% of the demand and renewable energies will make up 30%. The installed capacity for nuclear energy will double that of the present day, which in reality means a renovation of the pool of nuclear plants with more efficient Generation III+ and Generation IV powerplants.

Nuclear energy

Doubts about the security of supplies, prices of fossil fuels and the impossibility of reducing CO₂ emissions have again put the discussion of the role that nuclear energy must play in the energy mix on the table. As we have seen, energy efficiency and renewable energies will play an increasingly important role. Nuclear energy also will have a growing role, but not all countries contemplate this type of energy in the same way, since often social rejection (safety issues, nuclear wastes, proliferation) is greater than the technical and economic advantages.

The main advantages of nuclear energy are:

- The non-emission of CO₂ or other air pollutants, such as SO₂, NO_x or aerosols.
- Reduction in dependence on gas importation. There are sufficient uranium reserves distributed throughout the world.
- Stability in production costs, since the cost of fuel represents only 15% of the total, including its treatment.

As disadvantages we can mention:

- High cost of investment and long maturation periods for a project (between ten and fifteen years).
- Social rejection over the safety of the location (increased by the possibility of terrorist acts) and over the handling of nuclear waste.
- International concern about proliferation.

In 2005, there were a total of 443 installed nuclear reactors for electrical production. Of these, 351 are located in the OECD (the United States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Korea, Canada and Germany are the countries with the most installed capacity: 297 reactors altogether), 54 in transition economies (Russia, Ukraine and other countries of the old Commonwealth of Independent States - CIS-) and 38 in developing countries (mainly China and India). In addition, there are 284 research reactors in 56 countries and 220 reactors running military vessels. At present, of all the electrical energy generated in the world, 15% is of nuclear origin, accounting for 368 GW, but there is a great difference among countries. Thus, in the European Union, 31% of the electricity is produced by nuclear powerplants, but with enormous differences (79% in France, 26% in Germany, 20% in Spain, and 4% in the Netherlands, while countries like Austria, Denmark and Ireland prohibit the use of nuclear energy to generate electricity). In emerging countries like China, India and Brazil, only a little over 2% of the electrical energy is produced by nuclear powerplants.

Only five countries within the OECD have taken measures to construct new plants: Finland, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States. Seven countries have legal restrictions on the construction of new plants: Germany, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. The rest of the countries have yet not defined a concrete plan or are discussing the role of nuclear energy, such as Spain, which recently hosted a "Table of Dialogue on the Evolution of Nuclear Energy in Spain", which proposes a two- or three-year debate to define a sustainable matrix of primary energy with a time horizon of the period between the years 2020 and 2030, maintaining, however, the anticipated plan to close powerplants.

Nuclear technology and proliferation

Without getting into excessively technical details, we can divide the present nuclear fission reactors into three categories:

- Open, once-through, thermal reactors, which use enriched uranium, with the spent fuel being disposed of (these comprise the majority of

existing powerplants).

- Thermal reactors with reprocessing using a closed fuel cycle, in which plutonium is separated from the irradiated fuel by means of a process called PUREX/MOX. The fuel not used by the reactor is recycled, and the other products from fission that are not used are disposed of.
- Fast reactors, which use uranium and plutonium oxides as fuel.

The so-called Generation IV reactors presently being developed are variants of those types of reactors in which new possibilities of cooling the reactors through liquid metal, gas, water at supercritical pressure and higher operating temperatures due to new materials are being developed. All of this leads to greater efficiency (and less waste material). They will be available beginning in 2030.

The nuclear fuel cycle, which goes from the enrichment of uranium ore to its recycling and later treatment and the storage of radioactive waste, has a great importance from the point of view of the risk of proliferation. The reprocessing of fuel with the separation of plutonium PUREX/MOX, currently used in Europe and Japan, represents the greatest risk of nuclear proliferation. At present, there may be 250 tons of separated plutonium world-wide (8 kilograms of plutonium or 25 kg of uranium is sufficient to make a bomb according to the IAEA).

According to an interdisciplinary Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study on the "The Future of Nuclear Power", one way to prevent the accumulation of plutonium as waste from used fuel would be a balanced combination of open thermal reactors, distributed world-wide, and a balanced number of fast reactors located in safe nuclear parks in industrialized countries, which would reprocess the fuel used by thermal reactors and eliminate the separated plutonium. The GNEP (*Global Nuclear Energy Partnership*) proposal of the United States goes in this direction. There would be fuel providers operating advanced nuclear plants and fuel-cycle facilities, minimising waste, and there would be nuclear fuel users, those who operate reactors, and they would receive the fuel, use it and return it to the supplier for reprocessing and final storage. In this way, the use of nuclear energy could be expanded without increasing the risk of proliferation.

The GIF (Generation IV International Forum), comprised of ten countries, has the objective of developing the technology of the future nuclear powerplants, the so-called Generation IV ones, which will be available from 2030 on. One of the objectives of the Generation IV group is for its systems to be "proliferation-resistant", that is, for them to not be very attractive and to offer the least desirable path possible for obtaining materials that could be used in nuclear weapons.

Fusion reactors, the development of which is not expected before 2050, would be the clean answer to nuclear energy, without waste or risk of nuclear proliferation. The ITER program for the construction of an experimental fusion reactor in France will take ten years to build and will need 25 years of operating time before an industrial prototype can be constructed. Therefore, this technology will not be available until the second half of the 21st century.

Beyond technology

Although it is true that the expansion of nuclear energy for civilian uses could increase the risk of proliferation, at present, technological barriers do not exist for making experimental reactors and facilities that would allow for the enrichment of uranium. On the other hand, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognizes the right of any signatory country to investigate, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Safeguard Agreements between the IAEA and the signatory countries of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are not always enough to guarantee the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the case of Iran, as Mohammed El Baradei showed in November 2006 in the meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in Vienna, the Agency needs transparency measures that go beyond the legal requirements in the Safeguard Agreement to ensure the peaceful nature of the nuclear activity of Iran.

In addition, according to the IAEA, six Arab countries (Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Tunisia) have recently shown their intention to construct nuclear powerplants to generate electrical energy for desalination plants. According to experts on proliferation, this announcement, in some way, is a consequence of Iran's position. Already in their book, "Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran", published by the Institute of Strategic Studies of the United States Army, Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson anticipated the possibility that neighbouring countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Algeria, would follow Iran's example. If Iran obtained nuclear weapons at some point in time, it could trigger a nuclear arms race in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

It will be necessary to strengthen the role of the IAEA to supervise this expansion of nuclear energy and watch over compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. New tools, like the treaty to prohibit the manufacturing of nuclear fuel (FMCT), under negotiation for a long time, would be useful in preventing proliferation. In addition, a great diplomatic effort will also be necessary for implementing initiatives such as the GNEP, which, in some way, limit the competencies of the user countries in the face of the supplying countries.

We can conclude that the expansion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is inevitable and necessary, especially in developing countries, and we must direct efforts toward reaching agreements and pacts that guarantee that the technologies available now and in the coming decades be used in an appropriate way.

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Multi-Dimensional Security

Energy and non-proliferation: An old or new Challenge?

What energy security for the EU? The case of oil and gas.
Bichara Khader

WHAT ENERGY SECURITY FOR THE EU? THE CASE OF OIL AND GAS

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The issue of energy security appeared in the year 2000 and, after having been concealed or confined to circles of experts for too long, it has now become a subject for debate in Europe's official circles and the media. Several events helped to bring about this increased awareness:

1. The rise in oil prices, which went from \$20 a barrel at the beginning of 2000 to a current average of \$60 a barrel, after having peaked at \$70 in early 2006.
2. The attack on the French supertanker *Limburg* off the coast of Yemen in 2003 highlighted the threat of terrorist attacks on the main arteries of energy transit.
3. A growing energy dependency on countries or areas deemed to be "at risk" (e.g. Venezuela, Russia, the Caucasus, Nigeria, the Middle East, etc.).
4. The problem of climate change emphasises the link between energy security, sustainability and competitiveness¹.
5. The exhaustion of the oil supply:
 - Due to exhaustion of reserves or the temporary interruption of the supply;
 - Due to the use of energy as a political weapon (e.g. Russia-Ukraine, Russia-Georgia, Venezuela-United States, etc.);
 - As a consequence of attacks on transport networks (e.g. attacks on oil pipelines in Iraq), refineries or oil installations (successful or frustrated attacks in Riyadh and in eastern Saudi Arabia);
 - As a result of natural disasters (such as Hurricane Katrina's devastation of New Orleans, which forced several refineries to close down);
 - As a consequence of an electricity blackout, such as the one that affected California in 2003.
6. The uncontrolled consumption of oil, especially in developed countries, has awoken fears of the exhaustion of oil reserves. At present, 16% of the world's population consumes 70% of the oil

1. Document from the European Commission and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy before the European Council, S160/2006.

2. *Institut français du Pétrole*, "Face à une demande pétrolière en croissance, les réserves de pétrole peuvent-elles suivre ?" *Pétrole et gaz arabes*, 1 October, 2006, P.39.

produced. On average, four barrels are consumed per inhabitant per year, though this average changes to 11 barrels for a French citizen, 20 for an American and 1.5 for a Chinese². How many "Saudi Arabias" would have to be invented if all the Chinese and the Indians began consuming oil like the Americans?

Even so, the EU began examining the problem of energy security a long time before the attack on the Limburg in 2003, the power blackout in that same year or the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2006. As far back as 2001, the EU published a Green Book on the European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, prompted by alarm in the EU at the rise in rates of consumption, dependence and concentration, as well as by the effects of unbridled energy consumption on global warming.

A Brief Summary of the EU's Green Book

The European Union is consuming an increasing amount of energy, and importing more and more energy products. As a result, dependency on external energy is continually growing. The dizzying rise in the price of oil (the price of crude has tripled since March 1999, a fact that could undermine the recovery of the European economy) highlights, once again, the structural weaknesses in the European Union's energy supply. Specifically, these are: Europe's growing rate of energy dependency, the role of oil as the price guide for energy and the disappointing results of policies for control of consumption. Without an active energy policy, the European Union will be unable to free itself from this growing energy dependency.

If nothing is done to modify these trends, within a period of 20 to 30 years, around 70% of the EU's energy needs will be met by imported products, compared with 50% at present. This dependence is reflected in all sectors of the economy. Transport, the internal sector and electricity are all generally powered by hydrocarbons and are at the mercy of erratic fluctuations in international prices. The EU's enlargement will serve to accentuate these trends. The consequences of this dependence are significant in economic terms: in 1999, they represented a cost of 240,000 million € that is, 6% of total imports and 1.2% of the GNP. In geopolitical terms, 45% of oil imports come from the Middle East, while 40% of natural gas imports come from Russia. Currently, the European Union still does not have the necessary means to influence the international market.

In the long term, the European Union's energy supply security strategy should aim to guarantee the physical and continued availability of energy products on the market, at a price that is affordable for all consumers (both private individuals and industry), while at the same time respecting environmental concerns and the requirements for sustainable development as stipulated in the European Union Treaty (articles 2 and 6).

Security of supply does not mean maximising energy autonomy or minimising dependence, but rather reducing the risks associated with same. The objectives that should be aimed for include achieving a balance and diversification among the different sources of supply (in terms of

products and geographical regions) and successfully encouraging the oil-producing countries to join the World Trade Organisation.

During the coming decade, investment in energy (which covers both the replacement of outdated infrastructures and the meeting of growing energy needs) will force European economies to come to a decision over the different energy products that will determine the next 30 years, owing to the inertia of energy systems.

The European Union's energy options are determined by the world context and by the Union's possible enlargement to 30 Member States with differentiated energy structures; but above all, the EU's possibilities are determined by the energy markets' new frame of reference: the liberalisation of the sector and environmental concerns.

The environmental concerns, which are now widely shared by public opinion owing to the damage caused by the energy chain (both damage of accidental origin, such as oil spills, nuclear accidents, methane leaks, and damage linked with pollutant emissions), have highlighted the disadvantages of fossil fuels and the problems involved with nuclear energy. The fight against climate change, meanwhile, represents a challenge and a long-term struggle for the international community. The objectives set down in the Kyoto Protocol are no more than the first steps. Though the European Union stabilised its greenhouse gas emissions in the year 2000, since then, they have been increasing, both in the Union and in the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, the establishing of an internal energy market means that demand for energy now occupies a new place and a new role. New tensions are arising for which our societies will have to find viable compromises: the fall in the price of electricity works against policies for controlling the growing demand and the fight against climate change; the competition introduced by the internal market has altered the conditions of competition for the different energy sectors (coal, nuclear energy, natural gas, oil and renewable energies).

At present, the Member States are interdependent in terms of both the fight against climate change and the development of the internal energy market. Energy policy has taken on a new dimension within the European Union, despite the fact that this situation has not yet resulted in the creation of new Union powers. In this respect, new ways should be found of tackling the subject of Europe's energy policy other than through the internal market, harmonisation, the environment and a fiscal approach. The European Union should possess greater control over its energy destiny; the crisis in oil prices that has developed since 1999 means that this situation is an urgent one.

This debate should be approached while bearing in mind that current energy consumption can be broken down as follows: 41% is covered by oil, 22% by natural gas, 16% by solid fuels (coal, lignite and peat), 15% by nuclear energy and 6% by renewable energies. If no action is taken, by the year 2030, energy consumption will still be based on fossil fuels: 38% will be covered by oil, 29% by natural gas, 19% by solid fuels, a mere 6% by nuclear energy and 8% by renewable energies.

3. European Commission, "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy", March 2006 (doc. 7070/06 (COM 2006) (end of 105).

The Green Book goes on to sketch out, in broad terms, a long-term energy strategy:

- The Union must rebalance its supply policy through clear actions to encourage a demand policy. Though the EU has little room for manoeuvring with respect to the growth in supply, the panorama seems to be more promising with regard to demand.
- With respect to demand, the Green Book issues a call for a real change in consumer behaviour; it focuses on the possible use of tax instruments to orient demand toward a more controlled consumption that has less impact on the environment. It promotes the idea of fiscal or parafiscal deductions for penalising the environmental impact of different energies. The transport and construction sectors should also be the object of an active policy of energy saving and diversification in favour of non-polluting energies.

As for supply, priority should be given to the fight against global warming. The development of new and renewable energies (including biofuels) is the key to change. Doubling their contribution to energy consumption from 6% to 12% and raising their use for electricity production from 14% to 22% is an objective that should be reached by 2010. Such an ambitious objective could only be supported by financial measures (e.g. state aid, tax incentives or financial support). One of the other options that should be explored is for profitable energies (oil, gas, nuclear energy) to finance the development of renewable energies that have not benefited, as conventional energies have, from different types of aid and support.

In the medium-term, the use of nuclear energy should also be considered. This debate would include such important points as the decision by most Member States to turn their backs on nuclear power, the fight against global warming, security of supply and sustainable development. Independently of the conclusions that may result from this debate, active research should be continued into waste management technologies and the practical application of nuclear energy in optimum security conditions.

In the case of hydrocarbons (imports of which are steadily growing) a stronger strategic reserve mechanism should be devised, as well as new import routes. Any technological progress will strengthen the effects of this new approach to energy strategy.

A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy

As a result of Member States' reactions to the Green Book, the Council called on the European Commission to prioritise the actions to be taken more clearly, and to provide elements for establishing a foreign relations strategy within the area of energy. In response to this request, in 2006, the Commission published the document "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy"³.

On the subject of foreign policy, the Commission's document sets a major challenge for the EU: to design a clear, coherent foreign policy in the area of energy, and with a dual objective:

- a) To strengthen the EU's collective security with respect to energy.
- b) To effectively counteract any possible strategies implemented by major foreign energy suppliers to influence the market base.

Such foreign policy objectives cannot be achieved without a prior condition: a coherent internal policy in the area of energy.

Building the internal energy market

For the EU, the establishing of an internal energy market (a decision made by the Barcelona European Council in March 2002) should produce an internal market that is more open, and which creates greater solidarity between the Member States, particularly in the sectors of oil, gas and electricity. Even so, the Commission observed the opening-up of the internal energy market has not been completed, while energy dependency is increasing and the available resources for action continue to be inadequate.

1. The integration of the markets has not been completed, neither for oil nor gas. This is because, on the one hand, the energy sector is still to a great extent a captive national market, and on the other hand, because the large energy companies tend to maintain control over the entire energy chain, while competition, in contrast, demands the "separation of energy activities" (known as "ownership unbundling"). As a consequence, a clear community framework should be established in order to guarantee the external security of the energy supply in a way that is compatible with the functioning of the internal market.

2. Over-dependency on foreign supply is dangerous. The Commission claims that if no action is taken, by 2030 the proportion of oil imported into the EU could reach 90%, while gas figures could be as high as 70%. This huge dependency involves a threefold risk, given the instability of the exporting countries, the excessive concentration of supply in a small number of exporting countries and the vulnerability of sectors that are over-dependent on oil (98% of transport, for example, depends on oil).

Inadequate resources for action

There are several danger areas in this respect:

a) In the event of a crisis, the Commission has no power over the use of security reserves. Organisation in this area is effectively fragmented: some states possess a reserve agency, while in others the reserves are in the hands of the oil companies. Such practices not only lead to a competitive imbalance, but also uncertainty with respect to the effective mobilisation of reserves in the event of a crisis.

What is going on with the framework of the International Energy Agency (IEA)? The Commission claims that it has not proved satisfactory. In the first place, the IEA's crisis mechanism (the provision of reserves in the event of interrupted supply) requires unanimous agreement by the

4. European Commission, "The internal energy market: Strengthening the security of supply", Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Memorandum 2002, <http://www.europa.eu>

26 members. Furthermore, the mechanism links the administration of the EU's oil reserves with that of numerous foreign partners (particularly the United States) whose priorities are not necessarily the same as those of the EU.

b) The supply of gas presents another problem. At present, no community framework exists to guarantee the security of the gas supply. The gas market has been left in the hands of the European gas industry. Nevertheless, the Commission points out that no assurance exists that gas suppliers will give strategic priority to security of supply⁴.

All these factors (incomplete internal market, over-dependency on imports, inadequate resources for action) are justification for the drafting of a European Community Energy Code that would have the following objectives: strengthening mutual trust and support between the Member States on this issue, managing supply security and the security of infrastructures and, in short, encouraging market stability. The Commission believes that this would require the harmonising of national reserve systems through the creation of a public reserve organisation, as well as drafting a common strategy for the coordinated use of reserves, defining a general policy on security of supply (particularly through long-term import contracts, which would require the establishing of a dialogue on energy with the exporting countries) and, finally, creating a European observation system to monitor the supply of hydrocarbons.

The threats to energy security

Such threats are diverse in nature: an imbalance between supply and demand, the absence or insufficiency of investment, terrorist attacks and a lack of ecological sustainability.

The outlook for energy

The work of reference for this subject is the *World Energy Outlook* by the International Energy Agency. The Reference Scenario (monitoring of current trends) in *World Energy Outlook 2006* highlights several key factors:

a) Global demand for oil could reach 99 million barrels per day (mb/d) by 2015 and 116 million by 2030, compared with 85 million in 2005. However, it is unlikely that oil production could exceed a rate of 100 to 110 mb/d. While future tension in the energy markets is not inevitable, it is at least highly probable;

b) The main proportion of the required oil supply will probably be covered by a small number of countries, in particular the Gulf States, and especially Saudi Arabia.

Table 1. Net energy imports by region

	2004	2015	2030
OECD	1.657	2.123	2.444
Coal	113	117	98
Oil	1,272	1,569	1,712
Gas	272	436	634
Transition economies	-492	-641	-745
Coal	-27	-39	-46
Oil	-345	-476	-541
Gas	-120	-126	-158
Developing countries	-1.228	-1.549	-1.776
Coal	-70	-71	-45
Oil	-1,007	-1,168	-1,256
Gas	-152	-310	-476

Source: *World Energy Outlook* ©OECD/IEA, 2006, Table 2.2, page 74. * Reference Scenario.

Table 2. Net oil imports by region (mb/d)

	Alternative Scenario			Reference Scenario	
	2005	2015	2030	2015	2030
OECD	27.6	30.9	30.5	32.7	35.7
North America	11.1	12.1	11.9	13.0	15.0
Europe	8.8	11.0	10.8	11.5	12.2
Pacific	7.7	7.9	7.8	8.2	8.5
Developing Asia	7.1	11.7	17.8	13.0	21.7
China	3.0	5.6	9.6	6.3	11.8
India	1.8	2.7	4.1	3.8	5.2
Rest of developing Asia	2.3	3.3	4.1	3.8	5.2
European Union	10.9	12.2	11.7	12.7	13.0

Source: *World Energy Outlook* ©OECD/IEA, 2006, Table 7.5, page 181.

The two tables above forecast a greater dependency on oil imports by 2030, a dependency that will reach 65% for OECD countries as a whole, while for the EU it will reach up to 92%; this would be equivalent to net imports of 35.7 mb/d for OECD countries and 13 million for EU countries.

Now, a high percentage of these imports would be covered by the OPEC nations (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), and particularly the Gulf States; their market share for oil would go from 40% to 48% in 2030, with 56.3 mb/d (34 for Saudi Arabia, which would be producing 15 mb/d in 2030 compared to 9 mb/d in 2006). The result would be greater influence over the market for these countries.

This merely serves to verify a situation that already exists, and which will become more consolidated in the future, especially "if the demand for oil shows a limited price-elasticity"⁵, or rather, that an increase in price would only have a limited effect on demand. This means, generally speaking, that guaranteeing large exports, such as those of Saudi Arabia, is an essential element in the world energy security strategy.

5. Interview with Claude Mandil, Executive Director of the IEA, *Pétrole et gas arabes*, 16 November, 2006, P. 8.

The colossal investment required

The financing costs necessary to place supplementary amounts of oil on the market would be on a Pharaonic scale. The IEA has calculated that the sum needed to create or maintain energy supply infrastructures will reach \$20,192 billion (2005 dollar prices) in the coming 25 years. These figures are not only mind-boggling, when they are broken down they are also puzzling: developing countries will effectively have to pay out the most, 52% of the total (i.e. \$10,515 billion), compared with 35% for OECD countries (i.e. \$7,289 billion) and only \$1.85 billion for transition economies, of which \$1,195 billion corresponds to Russia.

Table 3. Investments in energy supply 2005-2030*
(in billions of \$ 2005)

	Coal	Oil	Gas	Electricity	Total
OECD	156	1,149	1,744	4,240	7,289
North America	80	856	1,189	1,979	4,104
Europe	34	246	417	1,680	2,376
Pacific	42	47	139	582	809
Transition economies	33	639	589	590	1,850
Russia	15	478	440	263	1,195
Developing countries	330	2,223	1516	6,446	10,515
Developing Asia	298	662	457	4,847	6,264
China	238	351	124	3,007	3,720
India	38	48	55	967	1,108
Indonesia	13	49	86	187	335
Middle East	1	698	381	396	1,476
Africa	20	485	413	484	1,402
Latin America	12	378	265	719	1,374
Brasil	1	138	48	252	439
Interregional transportation	45	256	76	-	376
World mundial	563	4,266	3,925	11,276	20,192

Source: *World Energy Outlook* ©OECD/IEA, 2006, Table 2.3, page 77. * Reference Scenario.

Table 4. Dependence on oil imports * (%)

	1980	1990	2004	2010	2015	2030
OECD	59	53	56	60	62	65
North America	32	31	42	45	46	49
United States	41	46	64	66	69	74
Europe	82	67	58	69	75	80
Pacific	92	90	93	91	93	95
Japan	100	100	100	100	100	100
Korea	100	100	100	100	100	100
Developing Asia	-2	6	48	63	63	73
China	-9	-16	46	63	63	77
India	69	44	69	77	77	87
European Union	-	-	79	89	89	92

Source: *World Energy Outlook* ©OECD/IEA, 2006, Table 3.4, page 101. * Reference Scenario.

The breakdown of the spending required highlights the predominant importance of the electricity sector (\$11,276 billion), i.e. 55.8% of the total, compared with 21.1% (\$4,266 billion) for oil and 19.4% (\$3,925 billion) for gas. Coal (\$563,000 million) and biofuels (\$161,000 million) come much further down on the list.

In view of the size of the investment required, the IEA believes that the reference trend scenario is unsustainable, both in respect to the mobilisation of financial resources and to the threat that it represents for the ecosystem.

Ecological threats

In an article on the IEA's "Energy Outlook for 2006", the *Financial Times* dubbed it "An unsustainable Outlook"⁶. Claude Mandil, the Executive Director of the IEA, shares this concern. As a result, the IEA strongly recommends alternative policies that will act on CO₂ emissions, and which would have a bearing on both demand and supply. With respect to demand, the IEA places emphasis upon energy efficiency, new technologies in the automobile sector and policies that foster a reduction in the consumption of polluting energies. As for supply, it champions another energy mix that emphasises the re-launching of nuclear energy, which is, the IEA claims, less polluting (though no mention is made of nuclear waste).

All these proposals are aimed at reducing CO₂ emissions, but even in the alternative scenario that the IEA appears to be supporting (a reduction of energy consumption), the 2030 forecast for CO₂ emissions is still very high. Thus, the IEA has proposed to public administrations that they invest in CO₂ capturing and storing technologies, which constitute a very promising solution in the fight against the "greenhouse effect", according to the experts.

Re-nationalisation of Oil Fields, Terrorist Threats and Organised Crime

"If a ship that cost us less than \$1,000 has succeeded in destroying an oil tanker of that size, imagine the magnitude of the danger threatening the West's trade artery ..."⁷. This extract, taken from an Al Qaeda communiqué following the attack on the French supertanker *Limburg* off the coast of Yemen, starkly demonstrates the threat that terrorism represents to the energy trade. One can understand, therefore, the interest being paid to energy security not only by Western governments but also by NATO⁸ in order to "stabilise" the areas in which energy interests are concentrated, as well as to "guarantee" the main energy flows and strengthen military and security cooperation with exporting countries.

Terrorism is a very real threat, but it is not the only one. In some African and South American countries, criminal activity is disrupting the operations of large companies (local mafias re-routing oil

6. *Financial Times*, 20 October, 2006.
7. BRICET des VALLONS, Georges-Henri, "La question de la sécurisation pétrolière" *Géostratégiques*, no. 9, October 2005, P. 21.
8. Report by VAN GENNIP, Jos, *Energy security*, Nato Parliamentary Assembly, 064 ESC 06 E / www.nato-pa.int.

9. Proposal from a report by Henri Revol and Jacques Valade, "*La sécurité d'approvisionnement en énergie de l'UE*" French Senate, ordinary session, 2000-2001 Rapport d'information no. 218, presented 7 February, 2001.
10. "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy" Com (2006) end of 105.

pipelines, murders, destruction of infrastructure, etc.). And while piracy continues to wreak havoc on the high seas and in the straits, the sabotaging of oil pipelines, such as in Iraq, has also become a common phenomenon. When the defeated Iraqi army set fire to the Kuwaiti oil wells in 1991, it was a further illustration of the threats endangering the energy supply.

Western countries also tend to view policies of re-nationalisation of oil or renegotiation of contracts (as in the cases of Bolivia and Venezuela), and even the return of nationalism ("resource nationalism"), as in the case of Russia, as a threat.

Maritime disasters, or when an oil tanker simply runs aground in a strait or at the mouth of the port, would combine a terrorist threat with an ecological one. In the same way, the location of strategic reserves could also be the objective of malicious acts, or even a terrorist attack. Given this huge range of real threats, no importing state is free from danger.

Admittedly, countries can adopt protective measures, which range from what Bricet des Vallons calls the "offshorisation" of production to reduce the vulnerability of terrestrial sites, to the construction of attack-proof gas pipelines, such as the Tunnel Bomb Killer (the TBK is a kind of pipeline comprised of eight layers of galvanised steel). Other measures include the Container Security Initiative, the International Ship and Port Facility Security, monitoring by air or satellite and the introduction of alternative routes for gas and oil transportation (such as the Bakú-Ceyhan and Bakú-Supsa oil pipelines, routed so as to avoid passing through Russian territory). Finally, another extreme, highly dangerous measure (as we have witnessed in Iraq) is the use of military means to take control of a producing country.

The European Geopolitics of Energy

On the energy supply map, Russia, Algeria and the countries of the Arab-Persian Gulf are the main partners with whom the EU has to establish an open and reciprocally beneficial dialogue. The EU represents 15% of world energy consumption, but it can only achieve any influence over the energy markets by means of diplomacy. For example, the EU could encourage its oil companies to become more involved in oil-producing countries, particularly in the Gulf States; it could also foster investment in these countries and guarantee that oil-producing countries benefit from Europe's technological advances.

With respect to gas, the EU is extremely interested in proposing a solid long-term association to Algeria and (particularly) Russia that would include contractual clauses involving payment to ensure security of supply⁹. An official Commission document claims that this association would guarantee security and predictability for both parties and would smooth the way for the long-term investments that would be needed to increase supply capacity. It would also encourage "fair and reciprocal access to markets and infrastructure including in particular third party access to pipelines"¹⁰.

Thanks to the progress made in geophysics and computers, the EU can help to improve the success rate for prospecting (through improvements in subsoil analysis), thereby providing the mining companies with more accurate forecasting of possible discoveries, the quality of the reserves, existing volumes, the nature of the hydrocarbons, etc. European technology can also improve the secondary and tertiary recovery of existing oil through the injection of oil or steam into wells, as well as facilitating access to oil and gas that is difficult to extract¹¹.

The EU and Russia: the Challenge of Gas

Russia is not a great producer of oil. It is calculated that the country possesses approximately 6% of the world's oil reserves, though prospecting is advancing at speed and Russia expects to be exporting 11 mb/d by 2030. Russia is, however, particularly rich in gas; it is calculated that the country's gas reserves total 47.8 trillion (thousand billion) cubic metres of gas¹², and that its current production stands at 616,500 million m³. Even so, despite the abundance of its energy resources, Russia's GDP is lower than those of Belgium and Holland. The oil and gas sectors represent approximately a quarter of the country's GDP, though they only employ 1% of the population.

The EU currently imports half of the energy products that it consumes (73% of oil and 44% of gas). By 2030, these percentages are forecast to rise to 92% and 81%, respectively. Gas imports, particularly, are expected to rise from 180,000 million cubic metres in 2005 to 650,000 million in 2030. In view of this, Russia, which is already an oil exporting country, is clearly set to become a major actor in the gas sector. Even now, approximately 20% of the oil and over 35% of the gas consumed by the EU comes from Russia. While these percentages represent the European Union average, contrasting situations exist behind them: Slovakia, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania all depend 100% on Russian gas; this is not the case for Romania (29%), France (26%) and Italy (29%)¹³.

This predominant proportion of Russian gas in EU imports will increase in the coming years. Besides, this will cause deep concern in EU countries, for a number of reasons:

- Russia and the EU do not share the same views on the administration of energy resources. For Russia, energy is a source of power and the very basis of sovereignty. Its rulers believe that it should be employed, first and foremost, to further the economic and strategic interests of the Russian state. In contrast, the EU would prefer the removal of any political barriers that might limit access to oil and gas resources. These two opposing strategies¹⁴ are known as the "Open Door" approach and the "Flags" strategy, in which energy is used for strategic ambitions¹⁵. One key question arises from these contrasting views: who should control the industrial chain (the extraction, transport, refining and distribution of oil and gas)?
- Russia appears to be fluctuating between these two models. On the one hand, it needs western capital to modernise its oil and gas-producing infrastructure, exploit new oil and gas fields and build new

11. Institut français du Pétrole, "Face à une demande en croissance, les réserves du pétrole peuvent-elles suivre ?" PGA, 1 October, 2006, P. 42-44.
12. *L'Echo*, 9 November, 2006.
13. *El País*, 24 November, 2006.
14. BOCHKAREV, Danila, "La diplomatie des pipelines". LOUVAIN, October - November 2006, 165, P. 26
15. LIZIN, Anne-Marie, Gazprom, stratégie de la Russie, Brussels: ed. Luc Pire, 2006.

16. BOCHKAREV, Danila, art. cit. p. 29 (s); VAN GENNIP, Jos (speaker) Energy security, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 4 April, 2006, P. 5.
17. CLEUNTINX, Christian, The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, DG for Energy & Transport, European Commission, 2003.

oil and gas pipelines. As a result, the country should opt for openness, given that the investment required is enormous. Gazprom, in particular, has been forced to seek overseas financing to modernise its 152,000 km of gas pipelines that have become obsolete, to finance the construction of Blue Stream, which will pipe natural gas to Turkey, as well as the Yamal-Europe Pipeline, which runs through Belarus and Poland and the North European Gas Pipeline which, from 2010 onwards, will serve Germany, avoiding the expensive piping (transit rights) through other countries. It is estimated that Gazprom will have to invest \$11,000 million in the gas sector annually to meet its commitments.

On the other hand, Russia wants to maintain as much control possible over its energy resources. Russian leaders have declared many times that Russia does not want to turn into a “banana republic”, but instead that it is a sovereign actor that aims to defend its vital national interests. As a consequence, one can understand Russia’s reluctance to rush into signing any legal agreements that it considers too constricting, such as the “Transit Protocol” that is linked to the “Energy Charter”, “which, in its present form, authorises foreign companies to have access to the Russian gas pipeline network”¹⁶. This “energy nationalism” is also expressed through Russia’s preoccupation with diversifying its export markets. By opening up to China and India, and even to Japan and the United States, Russia is attempting to gain greater room for manoeuvring. The country’s “cooperation” with Muslim republics already constitutes a central axis of its regional politics.

The Muslim republics have unwillingly agreed to this, as they have no other choice: their gas is piped through Russian territory, and it is Russia that unilaterally sets the price at the border. The recent replacement of Alexander Riazanov, Deputy Director of Gazprom and head of the ex-Soviet countries, by an ex-KGB head, Valeri Gólubev, is quite a revealing choice with respect to Gazprom’s new policy towards these countries. Being well aware of its strengths, those of energy and geography, Russia has clearly opted for the path of increased nationalism, for which energy appears to be the central hub. This nationalist attitude is problematic for the EU. The Union is afraid that the transit infrastructures will group together in cartels, leaving the EU at the mercy of political blackmail (as the Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Georgia crises clearly highlighted in 2006). Consequently, one of the central points in the EU-Russia negotiations is how to reconcile the interests of both parties and to reach an agreement on ground rules that are acceptable to everyone.

Even so, and independently of the result of these negotiations, one thing is certain: Russia does not have the money with which to carry out its ambitions. Gazprom lacks the resources to finance all its projects. Specialists estimate that the amount of investment necessary for Russia’s energy development will total approximately \$715,000 million between 2003 and 2020¹⁷. Gazprom can no longer satisfy European demand with its own production alone, and it has even been forced to purchase gas reserves in Central Asia (particularly in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) to meet its commitments to foreign importers.

Europe and the Arab-Persian Gulf (Arab countries + Iran)

To say that the Middle East is going to play an even more important role in the EU's oil imports is simply stating the obvious; as it is there that the largest reserves are concentrated. At present, the region produces around 28% of the world's oil. By 2030, that figure is set to rise to 43%, with 50 mb/d; that is, an increase of 74%. As for Middle East gas production, it should at least triple during the next 25 years.

Saudi Arabia stands head and shoulders above the rest with its huge reserves (262,000 million barrels) and a production rate that could reach 15 or 16 millions of b/d by 2030, compared with 9.2 mb/d in July 2006. Oil-rich Saudi Arabia is the swing producer *par excellence*. Furthermore, it also possesses gas reserves. These are believed to total 6.7 trillion cubic metres (a conservative estimate), and though they are, admittedly, much smaller than those of Iran (28 trillion m³) and Russia (48 trillion m³), they are sufficient to enable production to rise from 80,000 million in 2006 to 155,000 million in 2030. Nevertheless, it is Iran that possesses the largest gas reserves in the Middle East. This means that two Middle Eastern countries will be largely dominating the energy stage: Saudi Arabia with its oil and Iran with its gas. But this does not mean that other Gulf countries' reserves are of little significance. On the contrary, Kuwait has larger oil reserves than those of Russia (99,000 million barrels compared to Russia's 60,000-69,000). The same applies to the United Arab Emirates, which possesses reserves totalling 97,000 million barrels, or rather, more than the United States and Canada put together (27,200 million). Meanwhile, Qatar's gas production is also becoming increasingly important.

The Arab Middle East is, therefore, a sponge soaked in oil and gas. And if we add the North African Arab countries to the equation, it is plain to see that the Arab world has an extremely important economic and political lever in its hands. Furthermore, just like in Russia, national companies have a monopoly on energy resources; this is the case, at least, with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. But the energy market will not be able to stay closed for much longer: many countries are starting to open up to foreign participation, even if it only means the exchange of oil producing technology.

Much to the EU's regret, this openness is still hesitant. But the fact is, unlike other producers, the Gulf countries currently possess a financial cushion (\$400,000 million) that is sufficient for investing in new production capacities without having to be rushed into signing agreements with international companies that would limit their room for manoeuvring and, of course, their profits.

The diversification of the export markets of the Middle East countries and, to a lesser extent, those of North Africa, reinforces their autonomy still further, placing them in a position of strength in relation to Western companies. This diversification will become stronger in the future and estimates for 2030 suggest that Asia will be the main export market for the Middle East's energy products, ahead of the EU and the United States.

18. GNESOTTO, Nicole and GREVI, Giovanni, *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006, P. 59.
19. Al Qaeda has threatened several times to attack the oil infrastructures of exporting countries: <http://www.iags.org/oil transport.html>
20. VAN GENNIP, Jos, from the above-mentioned report, P. 11.

In terms of energy security, Middle Eastern countries are perceived as a source of concern. The war in Iraq is turning into a nightmare; the country is devastated, fragmented and exhausted. The US is in a tight spot and right now, there seems to be no viable exit strategy from the crisis. None of the strategies that are under discussion (which are, basically, “stay the course” or “cut and run”) are risk-free. Given this situation, Iraq’s future in terms of energy is uncertain. The case of Iran, meanwhile, raises other concerns. This country is rich in energy resources and could even become an important transit country, but the nuclear issue has poisoned its relations with the West. As a result, in order to break out of its isolation and to achieve the investment it needs, Iran has turned towards Asia. It is possible that the EU will have to pay for the cost of the confrontation by becoming leapfrogged by India and China in the Iranian market.

All the other Gulf nations enjoy good relations with the EU and the US in terms of energy security, and this stability provides a relatively calming effect. However, they are not completely safe from knock-on effects of the Iraq crisis or possible negative impact deriving from the confrontation between Iran and the West. These countries have important Shiite minorities (the Shiites have just taken power in Bahrain’s parliament), who are concentrated in the oil-producing areas (the east coast of Saudi Arabia), and there is always the danger that Iran will use them in a deliberate strategy to destabilise the Gulf and to reaffirm Iran’s role as an actor in the region. Thus it is clear that in terms of energy security, it is not so much resource nationalism¹⁸ that would be a problem for the EU here, but regional destabilisation, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as a consequence of a blockade or the destruction of an oil tanker¹⁹ and the interruption of supply. The danger is a very real one. One only has to observe the dizzying increase in the cost of insuring an oil tanker, which has gone from \$150,000 to over \$450,000 per voyage, without counting the insurance for the cargo, which is covered by another insurance policy²⁰.

What kind of Alliance for Europe with the Oil and Gas Producing Countries?

Let me say it once again: the economic growth sustained by developed countries and the spectacular emergence of the new Asian Tiger economies, particularly China and India, bring with them fears of an explosion in the demand for energy, in particular gas and oil. This is a worrying prospect, and not only because of the exhaustible, non-renewable nature of fossil fuels but, and particularly, because of the environmental effects of such unbridled consumption. Thus the consumer states are attempting to reduce their level of dependence by reducing their demand, and especially by improving energy efficiency. The GDP of EU countries has increased by 155% during the past 20 years, with a 25% increase in energy use. The same has occurred in the United States.

The idea is a commendable one, but the rates of energy consumption (especially gas and oil) are so high (America’s 300 million inhabitants consume 25% of the world’s oil production) that even an annual

growth in demand for energy limited to 1% would result in a colossal demand and, therefore, in a huge oil bill. And that is without considering the fact that it is by no means guaranteed that such a demand could be satisfied.

In fact, strangulation is already taking place in terms of production (instability), prices (volatility), refining (insufficient investment, accidents, natural disasters) and distribution (infrastructures requiring modernisation or construction). Let us not forget that the IEA has estimated that between now and 2030, \$20 billion will be required to guarantee world demand, especially that of developing countries and emerging economies.

Nevertheless, energy security is not limited to the mobilisation of new financiers; it also requires a permanent dialogue with the producing countries. This particularly affects the EU. Europe's dependence on Russia makes it vulnerable to the whims of the Russian regime, which could interrupt its supply whenever it chooses, or refuse to open up its gas market and transport infrastructures to its competitors. The EU is obliged to try and guarantee its gas supply, while at the same time avoiding becoming the victim of possible blackmail. The task is not an easy one, given that the EU has limited possibilities for diversifying its gas imports. Even so, the EU is still the main destination for Russian gas, and this hard fact should lead Russia to behave in a more conciliatory fashion when it comes to opening up its market to foreign investment, and to stop practising what the Spanish newspaper, *El País* (November 8th, 2006), has called "disgraceful neo-imperialism".

Oil imports are the EU's other Achilles heel. The proportion of oil in the energy system (currently 40%) will continue to be predominant, particularly because of its ever-increasing importance to the transport sector. To guarantee its oil security, the EU has pledged to increase its efforts in the areas of energy efficiency, diversification of supply resources, exploitation of non-conventional oilfields (deep sea oil, heavy fuels, bituminous schists, etc.) and the utilisation of secondary and tertiary recovery (enhanced recovery). But all these projects must be based on a mutually beneficial dialogue with the producing countries, in particular with the Arab countries, which possess most of the planet's known reserves. These countries are undergoing a period of instability of an endogenous and exogenous origin, and as an actor, the EU is not coherent and proactive enough to be able to contribute to the stabilisation of these countries. However, it can help to guarantee production (investment), access routes (joint control) and the transport infrastructure.

To this end, an important association has been created, in the form of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The EU must finalise (and without it being subjected to too many alterations) the Free Trade Agreement with the GCC countries, discussions on which have been going on since 1989. Once this has been concluded, the agreement will enable the EU to take a step closer to accessing these countries' energy markets. The EU-GCC association is even more necessary, given that these countries are being called on to play a central role in the energy supply for the coming 20 years. As a

21. SAGAR, Abdelaziz, "Energy Shapes New Security Architecture", *Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics*, Globe Home, Rome, October 2006, P. 63.

consequence, they are being closely wooed by China and India, two countries that will have to import 90% of their oil needs by 2030. Therefore, it is foreseeable that these Asian countries will attempt to deploy a diplomacy based on dialogue and energy cooperation with the Gulf countries, which are expected to look favourably upon this approach, as well as on the fact that neither India nor China has been a colonial power.

The EU, therefore, will have to face competition with Asian countries on all levels in the Gulf region; the growth of Chinese trade in these countries is already evolving in a spectacular fashion. It was by no means a coincidence that the highest-profile overseas trips made by the king of Saudi Arabia in 2006 were to China and India. Europe does not pay sufficient attention to the Saudi Kingdom out of a fear of a confrontation with European public opinion, which only perceives Arabia in terms of its "conservative, retrograde Wahhabism".

With its 260,000 million barrels of known reserves, Saudi Arabia holds the key to world energy security. This country could raise its production to 15 mb/d in just a few years, an achievement that is beyond any other country. In 2006, there were 90 oil wells operating in the kingdom—double the number that there were in 2004.

Europe cannot afford to ignore this situation. Nevertheless, in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf, the EU also has to deal with the massive presence of the Americans; they consider the region to be their private hunting ground, and the Europeans cannot afford to risk overshadowing them. At the same time, the Gulf countries would like stronger ties with Europe, so as to escape from the United States' embrace, an embrace that is considered to be too asphyxiating and embarrassing. In the words of Abdelaziz Sager, an expert on the Gulf States: "Arab countries in the region do not see any practical or viable alternative to their basic reliance on the physical and diplomatic power of the US as the guarantor of stability and security. At the same time, they are deeply worried and concerned by the US policy and behaviour in the region and beyond, which undermines the credibility of such an alliance, and generates embarrassment to many local governments facing pressure from internal public opinion"²¹.

Given this problematic relationship between the United States and the Gulf countries, the EU finds itself in an uncomfortable position. It cannot ignore the Gulf countries and postpone the signing of an agreement of association that would favour its interests, but neither does it want to upset its North American ally by applying an over-proactive policy.

Conclusion

Oil and gas represents and will continue to represent (at least for the next 25 years) indispensable energy resources for the functioning of globalised economies. Nevertheless, from now on, the market for these energies will become an integrated one, because the security of oil and gas is a "collective global asset". Nowadays, the EU countries depend no less on oil from Venezuela, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia than the United

States, China and Japan do, in the sense that, in an integrated market, “all the consumers depend 100% on a world oil market that is supplied by all the producers”²².

Thus, no importing country has its “own” supplier, which means that any problem that an exporting country (A) has with another country (B) will never result in the interruption of the supply to country (B), but rather in an increase in prices for all consumer importers. Consequently, the use of oil as a political weapon, in particular through an embargo, such as the one declared by the Arab oil-producing countries in 1973 against the United States and Holland, does not have too much impact on the countries in question, and only results in an increase in the price of the barrel. In an integrated oil market, oil is only effective as a weapon if used for a prolonged period, and if carried out jointly by many exporters.

And so, we need no longer fear an extended embargo, given the fact that the seller is just as keen on selling as the buyer is on buying. This is also true for gas exporters: Russia can turn off the gas tap to the Ukraine but, since Russian gas pipelines run through Ukrainian territory, Ukraine also possesses a retaliatory weapon. It is an inescapable fact, which the newspaper, *El País*, expressed thus on 8 November 2006: “Exerting too much pressure on its natural allies could end up backfiring on Russia”²³.

One final observation: when America decided to invade Iraq, I wrote that it was a war that stank of oil. By that I did not mean it was for the purpose of gaining access to Middle Eastern oil, but rather a way of guaranteeing the supply: a political dialogue with Saddam Hussein would have guaranteed this access without any problem. But what I really wanted to emphasise was that the United States, through its control of Iraq, was above all attempting to open up the Iraqi oil market to enable foreign companies to gain the rights to exploitation and production. This, Washington thought, would have the effect of breaking OPEC’s monopoly on the setting of oil prices through the quota system, and thus limiting the natural control of Gulf countries over the international oil market and, as a consequence, facilitating access (as competitive as possible) for American and foreign companies to the oil in the Middle East, and the rest of the world²⁴.

Thus oil security does not only signify access to a regular supply, but also the opening-up of the sector to competition and the “de-cartelisation” of producing countries. This is the cornerstone of western liberal doctrine on the subject. It is worth asking whether that oil security should involve giving sanctuary to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. “Yes”, the Americans reply. In fact, the protection of the “Saudi ally and the moderate Gulf States” continues to be at the core of America’s military planning in the region. It is here that US and European concerns converge, and this explains the reiterated calls to preserve security in the Gulf region.

22. NOEL, Pierre, “Les Etats-Unis et la sécurité pétrolière mondiale”, Ramsès 2005, Paris, Dunod, P. 174.

23. *El País*, 8 November, 2006, P. 12

24. NOEL, Pierre, op. cit., P.48.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

The migration flows: An opportunity for cooperation in the Mediterranean.

The phenomenon of migration in the Mediterranean: The case of Spain.

Mehdi Lahlou

THE PHENOMENON OF MIGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE CASE OF SPAIN

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“**T**he fortress has fallen”, announced European Commissioner Franco Frattini in early October 2005, expressing his view that the European Union could no longer prevent the arrival of foreigners by using “barbed-wire fences”¹. His comments came after repeated attempts, between late August and early October 2005, made by hundreds of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa to scale the wire fences built by Spanish authorities around Ceuta and Melilla, Spain’s enclaves on Moroccan soil. These immigrants are living in Morocco for increasingly long periods of time in the most absolute poverty, and, above all, they are seeing their hopes of gaining access to the other side of the Mediterranean progressively fade, despite having the lights of the El Dorado of Europe in sight, as all manner of control systems are reinforced on both sides of the sea.

1. *Le Monde*, 8 October 2005.

A declaration like this by the main European official in charge of migration policy then constituted an acknowledgement of the failure of the security-based policies followed by countries such as Italy, and especially Spain (in particular, between 2001 and 2002) to protect Europe’s southern borders. These policies existed both separate from and within the framework of the externalisation policy for migration flow management, conceived and introduced by the European Union in the mid-1990s.

In fact, this failure was highlighted even more starkly by the explosion in the number of immigrants in an irregular situation who arrived in Spain during 2006, most of whom entered the country via the Canary Islands, instead of the Andalusian coast. This seems to indicate that the purely security-based protective measures adopted have not only proved to be inoperative, but that they have led to somewhat more complex situations, which is virtually the opposite of the original aim. Immigrants (and the trafficking networks to which some of them resort) constantly manage to slip through or go around the mesh of the protective systems.

This situation was confirmed between November 2005 and May 2006 with the advent of what could be called the “Dakar-Canary Islands” sea route.

Thus, the almost total closure of the Straits of Gibraltar to immigrants seeking to enter illegally, together with the combination of various Spanish and Moroccan land and maritime surveillance services (which

2. Between 1,167 and 7,000 immigrants have lost their lives by drowning or have disappeared during this crossing, according to data collected by APDHA Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía in its report for 2006.

have also been more effective in the stretch between Morocco's Saharan coast and the islands of Fuerteventura and Lanzarote) have led almost automatically to the opening of the "Dakar-Canary Islands" maritime route, which is longer and more hazardous², though cheaper and more direct. Though it had been foreseeable for some time, the opening of this new route surprised everyone with the speed with which people began to use it, as well as with the volume of immigrants that have used it, particularly during the summer of 2006.

In fact, the considerable reduction in the flow of immigrants through the Straits of Gibraltar into Europe can be largely explained (and has been widely compensated) by the fact that migration corridors have moved towards Western Africa, from Mauritania to Guinea. In this sense, Mauritania became a new point of departure in November 2005, followed by Senegal in spring 2006, for what seems to be an authentic explosion in the number of immigrants that have entered Spanish territory in an irregular way, with the Canary Islands becoming the main point of entry into Europe, on its southern flank.

As the following tables show, during 2006, over 31,000 sub-Saharan immigrants reached the coast of the Canary Islands (and mainly the island of Tenerife, the most populated and most tourist-oriented island in the archipelago). They arrived on board small vessels called *cayucos* that usually transport between 100 and 170 immigrants, whereas the smaller *pateras* that cross over to the Andalusian coast carry an average of 20 to 40 immigrants. The 2006 figure is virtually four times the number of arrivals recorded in the Canary Islands in 2002, the year in which it was believed that a historical peak had been reached since the beginning of the current migration phenomenon.

Table 1. Detentions of immigrants (of all nationalities) on arrival in Spain (via southern maritime routes) between 1993 and 2006

Year	Point of arrival			% of arrivals via Canary Islands/total
	Straits of Gibraltar	Canary Islands	Total	
1993	4,952	*	4,952	-
1994	4,189	*	4,189	-
1995	5,287	*	5,287	-
1996	7,741	*	7,741	-
1997	7,348	*	7,348	-
1998	7,031	*	7,031	-
1999	7,178	875	8,053	10,86
2000	16,885	2,387	19,272	12,38
2001	14,405	4,112	18,517	22,2
2002	6,748	9,756	16,504	59,11
2003	9,794	9,382	19,176	48,92
2004	7,425	8,426	15,851	53,15
2005	7,066	4,715	11,781	40,02
2006	6,976	31,106	38,082	81,68

Source: Mehdi Lahlou, from Spanish newspapers, including *El País* and the report for 2006 from the *Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA)*.

Table 2. Arrival of immigrants to the Canary Islands in 2005 and 2006		
	2005	2006
Tenerife	637	17,261
Gran Canaria	1,416	5,460
La Gomera	72	3,371
Fuerteventura	2,249	2,232
El Hierro	0	1,974
Lanzarote	329	822
La Palma	48	0
Total	4,751	31,106

Source: *Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía* (APDHA) (report for 2006, January 2007) and *El País*, 28 August 2006.

These tables confirm, for the year 2006, the new process of migration that began in Africa in autumn 2005 and which has resulted in the shifting of migration routes to more than 2,500 kilometres away from the Spanish coast of Andalusia. These new routes have forced Spain to extend its surveillance and security operations to cover areas that have never fallen within the country's sphere of political, economic or cultural influence, with all the diplomatic problems that this involves.

Thus, until late 2005, migration routes followed the traditional South-North axis, crossing the Sahara (via Gao, followed by Kidal in Mali and Agadez in Nigeria), on to Algeria, continuing to Morocco and ending in Spain, via the Straits of Gibraltar. A variant of this South-North axis bifurcated, on reaching Morocco (or, from approximately 2003 onwards, southeast Algeria), toward the Atlantic, *en route* for the Canary Islands. More recently, these routes have changed to a South-West or East-West axis, bringing with them immigrant populations from most of the sub-Saharan region who make straight for the Canary Islands, which has become a springboard onto continental Spain and Europe. There is one important difference in the routes: while previously, immigrants had to make the crossing in a zone that was very heavily patrolled (and easily controllable), the 15 kilometres of sea between Tangiers and Tarifa, for example, the route is now over 1,200 kilometres long, from Senegal to the Canary Islands, across an ocean that requires entire fleets of ships to maintain a minimum level of surveillance.

This can be explained by several direct reasons, the most important being:

- The psychological effects of the dramas of autumn 2005 on would-be immigrants. The bloody events of September and October 2005 on the outskirts of Ceuta and Melilla, which resulted in the deaths of at least 11 immigrants³, generated great fear, and not only among the immigrant communities living in that country. What became clear was that the danger of being shot and killed by Moroccan or Spanish security forces on the migration route could no longer be discounted, which caused a certain degree of fear among both immigrants present in Morocco in late 2005 and early 2006 and their families.
- The strengthening of the *Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior* (Integrated Overseas Surveillance System, or SIVE) by the Spanish security and defence authorities. One of its essential ground components was the raising of the "protective" walls around the cities of Ceuta and Melilla.

3. On 3 July 2006, five immigrants died from gunshot wounds, in very similar situations, on the outskirts of Melilla.

4. *Agence de Presse AP*, Algiers, 5 February 2005.
5. These manoeuvres took place in 2003, 2004 and 2005. In 2006, they were carried out from 10 February to 24 March, and subsequently from 10 May to 15 June.

- The tightening of land and marine controls on the Moroccan side, following the mobilisation (in September 2006) of almost 9,000 police and soldiers entrusted with the task of implementing the immigration policy of Morocco's *Direction des Migrations et de Surveillance des Frontières* (Directorate-General of Migration and Border Control). This body was created in November 2003 by the authorities in Rabat in an attempt to apply the 02/03 Migration Law passed by the Moroccan Parliament in May 2003, and which came into force in November that same year.
- The significant tightening of controls at Algeria's borders with Mali and Nigeria in October and November 2005. This included, for the first time, massive expulsions of sub-Saharan immigrants in an irregular situation (particularly around the city of Maghnia)⁴ by the Algerian authorities, as well as an attempt by the authorities in Mali to improve controls for the issuing of national passports. This was because a Malian passport allowed the bearer to enter Algeria easily; until 2004 this situation produced a booming trade in this particular travel document, which was highly sought after by immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa.
- The large increase in the number of U.S. military manoeuvres in the Sahara region as part of the American initiative (dubbed PSI Ian Sahara Initiative) to fight terrorism in Africa. In the first half of 2006, the U.S. and Mali carried out two joint manoeuvres in the Gao region⁵, thereby turning it into a high risk area for would-be immigrants passing through, given the presence of numerous well-equipped and highly mobile military forces. This new foreign presence has become increasingly visible in Mali, where the Americans are building (2006/2007) their third-largest embassy in Africa, after those in Pretoria and Cairo.

Thus the migration flow, which experienced a certain lull between mid-May and mid-July 2006, changed its starting point (from Nuadibú, in northern Mauritania, to Dakar) and became, this time, a veritable flood of people heading for the Canary Islands (and particularly Tenerife). As a result, the archipelago received almost 12,000 new sub-Saharan immigrants in less than two months, between 15 and 16 July and mid-September 2006.

Particularly concerned by the turn of events in 2005 and 2006 (in terms of the new countries of origin, the new migration corridors and the enormous scale reached by these flows, especially in August and the first two weeks of September 2006), the Spanish authorities reacted on three levels simultaneously. This reaction can partly be explained by the pressure the country was receiving from its EU partners (including the French, the Germans and the Austrians) to explain Spain's policy on legalising immigrants in an irregular situation, a policy that some EU countries viewed as being rather unfair to them. On the level of domestic policy, the Spanish government began to employ a greater firmness in its declarations and announced major changes that would be rapidly enacted, particularly with respect to repatriation and the duration of periods of detention for the purpose of identifying undocumented immigrants. On the level of its relations with Europe, Spain stepped up its requests for help and support from the other EU countries. And on the level of its relations with countries of origin, Spain

called on them to take responsibility for repatriating their citizens (particularly in the case of Senegal and, to a lesser extent, Mali) and demanded the application of the clauses concerning readmission as specified in the Cotonou agreement (especially article 13).

Indeed, Spain has a great deal to do in this respect, as between July and September 2006, most EU states erupted into a cacophony of declarations and allegations that indicated the existence of a wide range of interests and general confusion. After making an attempt to speak with one voice in Rabat in July 2006, the EU gave particular support to demands that African countries of origin and transit should strengthen their border controls and should accept and facilitate identification and repatriation procedures for citizens of theirs who arrive clandestinely (or who live clandestinely) in Europe, in exchange for promises to increase the number of "legalised immigrants", as well as to diversify and intensify the exchange of students and researchers and to allocate supplementary funds for the development of the migration "corridors".

Given the critical situation Spain (and, to a lesser extent, Italy and Malta) is undergoing in terms of migration⁶, the EU countries as a whole seemed to be reluctant to come to any decision on the problem, and for at least three reasons:

1. The problem of migration has by far exceeded the initial diagnosis and the resources introduced to reabsorb it, especially in Rabat. It therefore involves political measures and funding that the European Union and its Member States are not in a position to apply rapidly or in a significant way. The clearest example of this is the case of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), created in October 2004. This agency, which was formed with the support of eight Member States to establish a naval and aerial surveillance system along the coasts of the Canary Islands, Senegal, Mauritania and the Cape Verde Islands, and which would be "enlarged to include other African countries in a few months"⁷, clearly shows the gap that exists between discourse and reality in Europe. More importantly, it reveals the break between what is possible in theory and what is effectively achievable on the ground (in peacetime) when it comes to managing such an important issue as irregular immigration. Thus, while the Spanish Home Affairs Minister had announced on 11 August 2006 that the Frontex-led operation had begun on that same day, and that "the resources allocated (for this purpose) will arrive in the next few days", the agency, which had just released 3.2 million to launch its plan, refused to announce the exact date when the operation in the area would be set in motion, when said operation "(was) ready for launching", in the words of the European commissioner responsible for the matter, and for whom "it was a historic moment in the history of European immigration policy"⁸. In fact, only four countries⁹ from the Union ? France, Italy, Portugal and Finland ? had agreed, in late 2006, to contribute to an operation that would cover a large part of the West coast of Africa and the Canary Islands, and which would be implemented by a team numbering a total of... 65 people. In early September 2006, there was only one Portuguese corvette patrolling the coasts of Cape Verde in the framework of the Frontex plan¹⁰.

6. Italy and Malta received over 11,000 and 3,000 illegal immigrants, respectively, during the first eight months of 2006.

7. An announcement made in Brussels on 23 May 2006 by the EU Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security.

8. Agence France-Presse, 11 September 2006.

9. Germany, together with other countries, categorically refused to support such a project, claiming that Spain is a large country that is sufficiently wealthy to be able to finance such initiatives on its own – initiatives to which it resorts for its own protection.

Euronews, 22 September 2006.

10. *Le Monde*, 1 septembre 2006.

2. Variations exist between the economic and demographic interests of different countries, and therefore the same approach cannot be used for solving the problem of irregular immigration. In any case, this problem has not achieved the same intensity in countries such as Sweden, Germany and Malta, and it does not have the same impact on that island as it does on the Baltic countries, for example.

3. National and local policies suffer from so many limitations (including the ones that arise during election campaigns or from particular situations in certain European labour markets) that governments' approaches to what are fundamentally human and political problems are inevitably different, as well as depending to a great extent on the spheres of economics and development (i.e. the factors that generate migrations). On occasions they are even contradictory, especially when an attempt is made to go further on the issue of border control. In this respect, the security imperatives of some countries are not on the same level –nor do they generate the same urgency– as those of other countries.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

The migration flows: An opportunity for cooperation in
the Mediterranean.

Illegal migration in the Mediterranean.
Martin Baldwin-Edwards

Martin Baldwin-Edwards

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The 1980s saw the emergence of southern European countries as new countries of immigration and caught their governments unawares (Baldwin-Edwards, 1999). In the absence of immigration infrastructure, and with significant black economy activity, illegal immigration and immigrant participation in informal employment came to predominate throughout southern Europe (Reyneri, 2002). By 2005, the estimated number of immigrants in Italy was 2.5 million (4% of total population), in Spain 4.8 million (11.1%) and in Greece (in 2004) was 1.15 million (10.3%) (IFRCRCS, 2006; Baldwin-Edwards, 2004b).

We can identify four common forms of illegal migration – namely, unauthorized entry, fraudulent entry (i.e. with false documents), visa overstaying, and violation of the terms and conditions of a visa (Papademetriou, 2005). For most of southern Europe, the majority of illegal immigrants actually entered legally but overstayed or broke their visa conditions (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002a: 33); in the case of Greece, the land border with Albania means that illegal entry has been the primary mode of entering Greece, after the collapse of the Albanian socialist regime in 1991 (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004a).

There are, broadly, three patterns of migration in the Mediterranean Basin. The first consists of South-North movements from North Africa to southern European countries, mainly Spain and Italy, and to a lesser extent Greece and France. The second is South-East-North, which involves migrants from Asian countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, or African countries such as Nigeria and Senegal. The migrations transit through many other countries on their journey, with their last transit countries being usually North Africa or Turkey. With tighter European controls, the latter have now become countries of final destination. The third route might be loosely described as North-East-West; this concerns only the former socialist countries, such as Albanian migration to Greece and Italy, Bulgarians and Romanians to Italy, Spain and Greece. These latter migrations are now looking less problematic, despite the very large numbers concerned (more than 1 million legalized migrants from the three Balkan countries), because of the impending accessions to the European Union of Bulgaria and Romania, and also because Albanian migrant numbers have more or less stabilized.

The South-East-North migrations are complex stepwise movements, across land and sea, but with the final stage typically by sea. It is these illegal migrations which, although relatively small in number, have created significant problems for receiving countries: they consist of clandestine arrivals by sea, principally into Spain and Italy, and to a lesser extent, Greece, Cyprus, and Malta. Starting with small-scale smuggling in the early 1990s, the smuggling of African immigrants into southern Europe by boat had become a major humanitarian crisis by 2005 and appeared to worsen over 2006. Although the total number of (known) illegal arrivals by boat in the region remained under 40,000 for 2005, the arrival of immigrants in poor condition on small islands such as Lampedusa and Fuerteventura presents massive problems for local management of relatively large numbers. Furthermore, deaths at sea are now commonplace, and estimated at over 10% of known arrivals.

Table 1, below, shows the most recent confirmed official data on migrant interceptions across southern Europe.

	Canary Islands	Straits of Gibraltar	Italian islands	Malta	Greece	Total
2002	9,875	6,795	23,719	1,680	3,286	45,355
2003	9,382	9,794	14,331	568	2,636	36,711
2004	8,426	7,249	13,635	1,369	3,112	33,791
2005	4,715	7,066	22,824	1,800	3,116	39,521

Sources: National Ministries

The nationalities of the migrants are not well-documented (and are frequently concealed to avoid deportation), but ICMPD (2004) estimated for 2003 that about 25% were sub-Saharan, another 25% from other countries, mainly Asian, and about 50% from the south or east Mediterranean. 2004 data for Italy show an increasing proportion of Egyptians (60%) and about 28% sub-Saharans, whilst for Malta the principal nationality in 2004 was Somali (40%) followed by Egyptian (15%) and Eritrean (15%). Spanish apprehensions at sea over 2004 were mainly of sub-Saharan nationals: the main countries of origin were Mali and Gambia, with smaller numbers from Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Sudan, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria and Guinea Bissau (European Commission, 2005). A few hundred Indians and Bangladeshi were also apprehended. Spanish data for 2005 show that of 368 corpses or missing persons, 267 were sub-Saharan, 85 from the Maghreb and 16 from Western Sahara (APDHA, 2006: 15).

In the two temporary reception centres in Ceuta and Melilla, in late 2005 some 2,000 persons were detained. 61% were from sub-Saharan countries, of which the most numerous were those from Mali (23%) and Cameroon (7%), although there were also smaller numbers from the entire region including Guinea Bissau, Guinea and Ghana. 18% of those detained were from India, and 17% from Algeria. A small sub-sample of the sub-Saharan migrants by educational level showed that over 20% were university graduates and another 46% had a reasonable level of education (European Commission, 2005: Annex 2, Table 5).

A 2006 survey of 667 apprehended illegal migrants, carried out by the Red Cross in Mauritania in May-August 2006, found that the great majority (71%) were from Senegal and Mali (19%). 62% were under the age of 35, and 74% said that they had used their own personal money (as opposed to family donations or loans) to finance the trip.

Similarly, research conducted in Morocco and Ceuta in 2005 (Collyer, 2006) suggests that illegal migrants are neither the richest nor the poorest in their countries of origin. Those interviewed in Morocco (almost entirely sub-Saharan Africans) paid from several months to several years average salary for their trip, although few could pay it all in advance. In Ceuta, Bangladeshi were the most numerous at the time of the interviews in the camp. They reported paying 6,000-8,000 euros for their multi-tiered trip: by plane to Dubai then Bamako (Mali), overland to Morocco, and then by sea to Ceuta. Their motivations for migration involved self-perceived (i.e. relative) poverty, but more important was the effect of political instability on employment and financial security.

Southern European policy responses concerning illegal migrants/workers

The southern European countries of Spain, Italy and Greece have more than two decades of illegal immigration from, and more recently via, the neighbouring poorer countries of North Africa and the Balkans. All of southern Europe has been deficient in the management of organised immigration policy and application of employment laws, to the extent that the great majority of legal immigrants have acquired their status through legalization programmes. Effectively, the immigration policies of Spain, Italy and Greece have excluded legal migration but facilitated legal status after illegal entry or residence and illegal working. Thus, the economic role of immigrants in their economies is one of the primary explanations for the extent of illegal immigration into southern Europe (Reyneri, 2002).

There is a limited number of policy options open to the State in responding to the presence of illegal immigrants on its territory. The policy options are of three types:

- *Toleration* of immigrants' illegal presence and employment
- Attempts to coerce illegal immigrants into legality, e.g. through *legalisation* programmes
- *Expulsion* from the territory

In practice, every country uses a combination of all three instruments, but until recently with rather different emphases (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004c). In the early days of large-scale immigration in southern Europe, all three countries were inclined toward toleration. In the late 1980s, Spain and Italy added legalization to their policy responses, and from 1991 Greece started to use expulsion as a major policy. Beginning with its first legalisation in 1998, Greece also added more seriously after 2001 the policy of legalization, especially after a legal ruling of 2001 prohibiting expulsion without legal process. More recently, Spain and Italy – especially after EU initiatives in this area – have started to develop

policies of expulsion. Thus, by 2006 there is a high degree of similarity between the three countries' policies in the management of illegal immigration, with strong emphasis on legalization and expulsion measures, and relatively little toleration. However, Spain, Italy and Greece have entered into apparently endless processes of legalization of illegal migrants and/or workers; typically, more than 50% of those legalized lapse back into illegality (for a variety of reasons), and yet more illegal immigrants continue to arrive.

Within the European Union, there has been great pressure on southern Europe to control more aggressively the phenomenon of illegal migration. There exists a plethora of agreements and guidelines from the EU on the management of illegal migration, but almost nothing on the management of necessary legal immigration. This deficit largely reflects the interests of northern European countries, with their diverse histories of immigration policies and experiences. Thus, there is now a tension between the specific economic interests of southern Europe and the demands of the EU in controlling illegal immigration.

Recent co-ordinated policies for the management of illegal migration flows

Most recently, the debate has moved away from immigrants as such, and is more focused on maritime migrations – despite the relatively small proportion of illegal immigration through that route (10% for Italy and Spain, ca. 5% for Greece). This is for two principal reasons: the symbolic importance of state control over its frontiers; and the local impact of relatively large numbers of illegal immigrants. Thus, disproportionately high resources are allocated to deal with maritime arrivals; the new EU agency FRONTEX is also involved in co-ordination exercises in the western and eastern Mediterranean, with military ships being used to patrol the coastlines. International or bilateral co-operation is an essential component of migration management, whether it is legal or illegal. There is, in fact, very little co-operation concerning recruitment of legal migrants: most regional and bilateral co-operation is focused upon stopping migration flows or returning illegal migrants.

Returns of illegal migrants

The policy of expulsion of illegal immigrants, which has become a much more important instrument since the year 2000, cannot legally be affected without co-operation with the country to which the migrant is to be expelled. Occasionally, this can be done by informal agreement between governments; more normally, bilateral (and more recently, multilateral) readmission agreements or treaties are needed. Typically, such agreements specify the *modus operandi* of readmission, particularly concerning procedures and the conditions and nationalities of migrants who will be accepted for return. The matter of accepting the return of third country nationals, who do not hold the citizenship of either of the two countries concerned, has been highly problematic across the world.

Across the European Union, for the period 2002-4, the European Commission has calculated that roughly one in three return decisions is actually implemented. Table 2 gives data for return decisions and implementations for those EU countries with significant numbers.

	Decisions	Implemented returns		Total Returns	Ratio of returns/decisions
		Voluntary	Forced		
Germany	429,000	33,381	77,137	110,518	26%
Italy	235,462	18,445	62,155	80,600	34%
UK	210,000	3,975	16,918	20,893	10%
Spain	192,322	2,394	81,822	84,216	44%
Netherlands	186,000	8,694	53,774	62,468	34%
Belgium	155,384	9,421	31,486	40,907	26%
France	155,062	2,562	33,759	36,321	23%
Greece	88,920	0	41,030	41,030	46%
Czech Rep.	80,179	981	1,307	2,288	3%
EU-25	1,986,139	139,272	523,105	662,377	33%

Source: European Commission, 2005, MEMO/05/288.

As can be seen from the table, the southern European countries are implementing the highest numbers of returns after Germany and the Netherlands. Greece, Spain and Italy also have the highest ratio of implementation to decisions, along with greater reliance upon forced returns. These figures undoubtedly reflect the nature of illegal immigration into Spain, Italy and Greece, in that border infractions do not require legal process for return, except when political asylum is requested. They may also reflect, however, the frequent refusal of authorities in southern Europe to respect the right to apply for asylum.

Data on nationality of returned migrants are not published. Some calculations from Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration of the EU (CIREFI) data have been made, showing that in 2004 about 58% of returns from Spain were of Maghrebi nationals, compared with 37% from France and 14% from Italy.

Readmission agreements in the Mediterranean area

Readmission and other co-operation agreements have proven difficult to negotiate in the region, although Italy has had more success than Spain in negotiating these – primarily by linking them with development aid and other benefits. Table 3 shows the current state of affairs in the region (Cyprus and Malta have no signed or valid agreements within the Mediterranean area, so they do not appear in the table).

Table 3: Known Readmission and/or Police Cooperation Agreements in the Mediterranean region

Readmission with:	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Greece</i>
Albania		1998 V	1995 V
Algeria	2004 V	2000 F	
Bulgaria	1997 P	1998 V	1998 V
Croatia		1998 V	1996 V
Egypt		2000 V	2000 V
Gambia	2006 F		
Guinea Bissau	2003 P		
Guinea	2006 F		
Libya		2000, 2003, 2006 F	
Morocco	1992 P; 2000 F	1998 F	
Mauritania	2003 P		
Nigeria	2001 F	2000 F	
Romania	1997 V	1998 V	1995 V
Tunisia		1998 V; 2003 F	1990 F
Turkey		2001 V	2002 V

V = in force

S = signed

P = provisional

The Spanish agreements with Morocco have permitted only very small numbers of return of sub-Saharan Africans, since about 2004; generally, there are problems with the return of third country nationals to Morocco. The agreement with Mauritania has operated since early 2006 with return of Senegalese and Malians, with some informal indications that these are the only third country nationals that Mauritania will accept. Spain also has an informal agreement with Mali, and over 2006 has been discreetly returning small numbers of Malian nationals.

The Italian agreements have been in force for some time with limited usage. Since the mass illegal arrivals in recent years have mostly been via Libya, Italy has negotiated several arrangements for forcible return of all nationalities to Libya. These arrangements include the financing of one detention camp in northern Libya, and two more in the South. Italy also finances the repatriation flights from Libya to country of origin (including Eritrea).

Greece operated without legal oversight its police agreement on returns with Albania from 1991 to 2001, until the policy was ruled unconstitutional for other than border violations. The more recent agreement with Turkey has had serious implementation problems, with Turkey refusing to accept the return of third country nationals – similar to the difficulties between Spain and Morocco. There are serious problems of unauthorized “dumping” of illegal migrants by both the Turkish and Greek authorities across the banks of the River Evros (a natural border dividing Northern Greece from Turkey), such that some illegal migrants have drowned through these unlawful actions.

Other bilateral and multilateral initiatives

Bilateral co-operation has occurred for over a decade in the Mediterranean region, particularly concerning border controls (Lutterbeck, 2006). One of the earliest examples was between Italy and Albania, with police co-operation and joint patrols along the Albanian coast, along with provision of technical equipment and intelligence sharing. This was within the framework of the 1998 Italy-Albania readmission agreement, aimed at stopping trafficking of migrants. Similar co-operation has occurred between Spain and Morocco, although with more difficult diplomatic relations. The co-operation has covered joint patrols along land and maritime borders, exchanged liaison officers in airports and border checkpoints, and sizeable financial aid to Morocco for its development of border control systems. More recently, Italy has signed various co-operation agreements with Libya, with provision of technical equipment, training courses and exchange of liaison officers to improve Libyan border control capacity. In 2006, Senegal accepted the presence of Italian and Spanish patrol vessels in their coastal waters, for surveillance purposes only.

In September 2006, the European Commission decided to finance emergency measures for maritime controls with three projects involving Spain, two with Malta, and one by Italy. The Spanish projects were for reception and first aid facilities in the Canary Islands, and for coastal surveillance to prevent illegal immigration from Mauritania. The projects for Malta were for reception centres and surveillance; and the project for Italy concerned reception facilities on the island of Lampedusa. Also in September 2006, the Commission announced financial assistance to Libya for combating illegal migration. It had been hoped that the financial provision (3 million) would secure Libyan co-operation with an exercise co-ordinated by the new EU agency FRONTEX, and involving military ships from Italy, Malta, Greece, France and Germany in the eastern Mediterranean. Libya's position was, and remains, that the primary focus should be prevention of illegal immigration into Libya, rather than patrol of the Mediterranean Sea. The exercise, code-named Nautilus, was concluded without Libyan participation or co-operation.

Humanitarian issues, human rights and international law

Thus far, Europe has resisted development of the US and Australian practices of interception at sea, and relied more upon a humanitarian approach of "rescue". Legally, there are two quite separate issues involved with the rescue process – an important point frequently neglected by both states and pressure groups. The rescue of persons (including migrants) from ships is a humanitarian matter, governed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Art. 98 (1)), and is now customary international law. The subsequent disembarking of the rescued persons is not clearly defined by current law, although may change when recent amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea enter into force (van Selm & Cooper, 2006: 7). Upon disembarkation, the Geneva Conventions apply and the principle of *non-refoulement* prevails: thus, all clandestine migrants are entitled to apply for political asylum.

Generally, migrants from Africa disembark onto European territory and require temporary housing, food and in some cases medical treatment: the costs of administering these procedures are high. This is despite the fact that a rather small proportion of the migrants have any sort of claim to the asylum process (Feller, 2006).

The alternative approach – of interception at sea – might seem attractive in some quarters. Since 1999, Australia has used its navy and customs service to intercept migrant-carrying boats within its territorial waters and other zones. The US policy dates back to 1992, and basically prevents ships from entering US territorial waters. In the case of Australia, ships are forcibly boarded and either returned to Indonesian waters or the occupants taken on board a naval vessel and shipped to an offshore location or Papua New Guinea. In the case of the USA, vessels are either returned to the country of origin (often Haiti) or passengers are taken to Guantanamo Bay. In both cases, conformity with the Geneva Conventions is largely circumvented and the policies are arguably illegal.

Were the EU countries to follow the US/Australian approach, it is probable that the political costs would far outweigh the gains, and would also run the risk of legal challenge in European courts. US courts consider that international humanitarian law does not apply unless the immigrants land on American soil. There appear to have been no political costs attached to that policy: in Europe, this would not be true. There are also issues of practicality: the boats arriving in southern Europe are very small, and could not easily be intercepted without physical risk to the occupants. Again, this makes a contrast with the US experiences of maritime illegal immigration.

Thus far, the policies adopted in Spain and Italy have relied upon readmission and expulsion procedures. Even these have serious legal problems – not least with Libya – owing to the lack of developed refugee and human rights protection in North Africa. To extend further the role of North African states in acting as a buffer zone for Europe would be to expose the EU further to charges of neglect of fundamental rights of migrants. Given that this debate has already started in relation to human rights of terrorist suspects, and “extraordinary rendition” by the USA to Middle Eastern countries known to practice torture, such a policy would constitute a serious political error. There is no public support for Europe to follow United States patterns of public policy.

Thus, the current policies being developed are the only apparently rational ones. They involve the following complementary measures:

- Legalizations at periodic intervals, to stabilize the domestic situation of non-legal residents
- Increased monitoring of illegal employment and the informal economy [very weak measures at this time]
- Detection and expulsion measures [Southern Europe has the highest expulsion rates in the EU]
- Humanitarian rescue at sea, with adequate temporary camps for detained migrants
- Coastal patrols, with extensive collaboration between countries [being developed by FRONTEX]

- Readmission agreements with African and Asian countries, and effective procedures for third country nationals and humanitarian legal obligations [currently absent in North Africa]
- Measures in countries of departure to limit embarkations [recent activity in this area]
- Economic investment and development of Africa, alongside promotion of political stability

However, despite such measures, it is clear that Africa has now made the transition to being a continent of emigration. In the medium term, there is probably nothing that Europe can do to stop this: the only response is to manage the migration, and to permit legal semi-skilled labour migration in fairly large numbers. Given demographic decline across the EU, and unfilled job vacancies in certain unskilled sectors, this policy option might be the best at combating the illegal boat migrations.

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5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

The migration flows: An opportunity for cooperation in the Mediterranean.

FRONTEX. The European agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the member states of the European Union.

Gil Arias Fernández

FRONTEX. THE EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL COOPERATION AT THE EXTERNAL BORDERS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Gil Arias Fernández

Deputy Executive Director, FRONTEX

Role of FRONTEX

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) is a Community Body established by the EU Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004. FRONTEX main purpose is the coordination of intelligence driven operational cooperation at EU level to strengthen security at external borders. FRONTEX focuses on six principal areas:

1. Carrying out risk analyses.
2. Coordination of operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders.
3. Assistance to Member States in the training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards.
4. Following up the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders.
5. Assistance to Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders.
6. Providing Member States with the necessary support in organizing joint return operations.

Finally, FRONTEX also provides the European Commission and the Member States with necessary technical assistance and expertise.

Activities carried out in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic: POSEIDON, NAUTILUS and HERA

POSEIDON

The main aim of Joint Operation (JO) "Poseidon" was to tackle illegal migration flows by sea, which are organized by criminal networks using vessels of any type in the Eastern Mediterranean EU Member-States' maritime borders and more specific to the Aegean Sea. This JO was implemented during ten days (between 25 June and 5 July 2006) in two

1. All activities that will have legally binding consequences (arrests, apprehensions, detentions, interviewing) were carried out by national authorities

geographic areas: at land borders and at sea borders. The basic methods used during the operation were¹:

- Surveillance of maritime traffic (vessels, boats, yachts, etc.)
- Checking of suspicious vehicles, vessels, boats, yachts, persons, objects, etc.
- Detection of transportation means used for illegal activities
- Apprehension of persons involved in illegal activities (illegal border crossing, smuggling, trafficking etc.)


As far as the land borders geographic area is concerned, Poseidon focused on the Greek-Turkish Borders. The Joint Operation was implemented at the Border Crossing Point of Kipi, which is the most important crossing point between Greece and Turkey. At the same time the operation was implemented at the green borders between the two countries in order to detect illegal migrants crossing the borders illegally.

Respecting to sea borders geographic area, the joint operation was implemented during ten day at the areas of Eastern Aegean Sea (for flows coming from Turkey coasts); Central Aegean Sea (for flows from Bosphorus, Turkey coasts and Egyptian coasts) as well as Ports of Patras Igoumenitsa Brindisi Angona (For extra Schengen controls and second line police controls).

Two EU Member States, Greece and Italy, participated actively in this operation. Furthermore, FRONTEX (as an official organization), Germany, France, Spain, United Kingdom, Albania, Austria, Romania, Ukraine and Italy as well as EUROPOL participated as observers. The competent authorities carried out controls of crew, cargo, passengers, and vehicles of vessels and ferries, in protected areas of specific Greek and Italian ports (Patra, Igoumenitsa, Bari and Brindisi). Several Hellenic Patrol Vessels carried out checks and patrols in pre-selected sea regions in the East Aegean Sea (Mitilini Island, Chios Island, and Samos Island).

NAUTILUS

In accordance with Article 8 of FRONTEX Regulation, Malta requested FRONTEX support in a situation requiring increased technical and operational assistance. Two operations were prepared in the region. Within the first one, a group of experts dealing with identification of migrants started working in Malta on 1 August 2006, including experts from the UK, Denmark, Hungary, Germany and Italy. Besides, a joint sea operation was conducted to tackle the migration flow in the Central Mediterranean region targeting Malta and Italy. The operation, in which five Member States participated (Malta, Italy, Greece, France and Germany), took place between 5 and 15 October 2006.



Source: FRONTEX


HERA

After having been addressed by the Spanish authorities to support their activities tackling the migration flow towards the Canary Islands and based on the results of its fact finding mission, FRONTEX launched a joint operation in the area. Operational assistance for Spain consists of two modules: expert assistance and joint operation on the sea.

The deployment of experts (HERA I) was commenced already on 30 June 2006 when a group of experts from the Member States arrived in the Canary Islands to support the Spanish authorities in identification of the migrants and establishment of their countries of origin. These activities included the involvement of France, Portugal, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Norway.

The second module – joint surveillance operation called HERA II, having started on 11 August - brought together technical border surveillance equipment from several Member States with the aim to enhance the control of the area between the West African coast and the Canary Islands, thus diverting the vessels using this migration route and contributing to the reduction of human lives lost at sea during the dangerous long journey. Apart from Spanish vessels and helicopters, the operation included one Portuguese and one Italian vessel; and one Italian and one Finnish air craft. The duration of the operation was 9 weeks, later prolonged until 15 December 2006. A Finnish aircraft was used during the prolongation.

HERA I and HERA II



Source: FRONTEX



Running Projects related to Southern Sea Borders and Mediterranean Region: MEDSEA and BORTEC

The Presidency Conclusions of European Council meeting of 15/16 December 2005 gave FRONTEX a number of tasks in the Mediterranean region. In reaction to the conclusions, a Risk Analysis report on Africa has been produced by FRONTEX to present an overview of the situation in the region, assess the needs and propose possible solutions. The European Council also called FRONTEX to:

- Launch a feasibility study on reinforcing monitoring and surveillance of the Southern Maritime borders of the EU, namely in the Mediterranean Sea, and on the possibility of creating a Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network involving EU Member States and North African countries, as early as possible in 2006 (MEDSEA).
- Explore the technical feasibility of establishing a surveillance system covering the whole southern maritime borders of the EU and the Mediterranean Sea by the end of 2006. Such a system would use modern technology with the aim of saving lives at sea and tackling illegal immigration (BORTEC).


MEDSEA

The aim of the feasibility report (MEDSEA) was to study the reinforcing monitoring and surveillance of the southern maritime border of the EU, and more concretely in the Mediterranean Sea, and the possibility of creating a Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network involving EU Member States and North African countries. When created, the Network would enhance the management of security risks in sea zones and enhance daily cooperation. Such a network would serve not only as a reliable platform for regular exchange of information but also as a platform for jointly planned border control measures and FRONTEX coordinated joint operations.

The main conclusion in the study as shown in the above indicative diagram is the setting up of two-level structure consisting of:

- Level I: National Coordination Centres (NCC) in each Mediterranean Member State will be connected to a FRONTEX network to ensure the cooperation and coordination of activity at the maritime borders and areas.
- Level II: Each NCC shall be connected to Operational Entities (in each Operational Area -OA-) at national level. The operational working concept would depend on the cooperation between them, both at national level and also between Member States.

NCCs are the multiplier and would fully ensure the communication between the two levels.



BORTEC

Besides, FRONTEX is now working on another study aimed at exploring the technical feasibility of establishing a surveillance system covering the whole southern maritime border of the EU and the Mediterranean Sea (BORTEC). Such a system would use modern technology with the aim of saving lives at sea and tackling illegal immigration. The main objectives are the following ones:

- Overview of the existing technologies in use, the different areas of coverage and their technical solution, and the needs and wishes for further development.
- Definition and overview of the technical management system for different technologies and their possible compatibility with other ones.
- Overview of area which is not covered by any systems today and which systems are covering the neighbouring area.
- Technical feasibility to have a surveillance system covering the southern maritime borders of EU.

As it was for the MEDSEA study, a Core Team consisting of experts from Member States and experts from FRONTEX staff are elaborating the study. Additionally the JRC (European Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy) contributes to the study with one expert to the Core Team. Moreover, a Support Group has been established with similar tasks to the ones already performed during MEDSEA Project.

Role of Armed Forces in the control of migration flows: Possibilities for cooperation

The EU and other international entities and bodies responsible for security and defence related issues are not the main priority for FRONTEX while establishing external relations with international Organizations. Nevertheless, we can identify some areas where the activities carried out by Security and Defence Organizations, mainly EDA (European Defence Agency) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) can be linked to some extent to the ones assigned to FRONTEX: they are mainly the areas related to border security issues. In general terms, the areas where FRONTEX might establish in the forthcoming future some kind of cooperation with these two Organizations are research and technology, training and exchange of information and risk analysis.

Finally it is also necessary to stress that the control of the borders can benefit from experiences at national and European level with similar surveillance systems. Possible synergies with existing European surveillance systems for other activities, namely those performed by Armed Forces, should also be explored.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Governance and security in the Mediterranean.

Governance and security: An approach to state-building and
institution-strengthening.

Clare Lockhart

GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY: AN APPROACH TO STATE-BUILDING AND INSTITUTION-STRENGTHENING

Clare Lockhart

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The fields of development and security are increasingly converging in language and approaches, having identified the issue of state-building as fundamental in each field. The end of the Cold War, the intensification of global inter-linkages in flow of goods, services and information, the failure of the development industry to have tackled the root causes of poverty and the attacks of September 11th have all brought the inadequacies of our current institutional practices in tackling the problems of development, governance and security into sharp relief. As a result, there is increasing consensus among economic, political and security actors that their mental models, organizational structures and processes are not up to confronting our current challenge.

At the heart of the current challenges lies a discrepancy between an international system that assumes that states can perform certain functions, and the reality that a number of states lack the institutional capability to meet their responsibilities externally to the international community and internally to their citizens. We have termed this discrepancy the “sovereignty gap”. It is now recognized that 40-60 countries are not capable of performing a basic set of functions, and many more are deficient in meeting the duty of care to their citizens in many other ways.

At the same time, the international organizations created in the wake of the Second World War are increasingly struggling when confronted with the challenges of institution-building. The stove-pipes that exist in the international system play out on the ground in any country context to create dissonant and sometimes contradictory strategies and policies, with a myriad of fragmented projects and policies which substitute for and undermine rather than strengthen institutional capabilities. Organizational structures, processes, skills and incentives are not aligned to the goal of institution-strengthening in the countries which those organizations are designed to serve.

We propose that to meet this sovereignty gap, a new approach to international relations, security and development is required. First, a global public discussion is required to define the functions that states must perform in today’s world to meet the expectations of their citizens

and requirements for global peace and stability. We propose that ten functions are required, and have launched a public discussion to refine and develop this framework. The functions that we propose are: to maintain a legitimate monopoly on the use of force; to manage public finances; to retain administrative control and manage information flow; to nurture human capital, to provide infrastructure services; to manage the assets- both tangible and intangible- of the state; to regulate the market; to define citizenship rights and obligations; to maintain international relations and exercise the sovereign guarantee; and to uphold the rule of law.

Rule of law is the foundational function that binds all others. However, all functions are interconnected and many cannot be attained unless other functions are adequately performed. Many can be realized primarily through performance of other functions. For example, we argue that it is through performance of the other nine functions that the first, the legitimate monopoly on the use of force, can be maintained. In today's world, maintenance of order cannot be attained through repressive means alone. Rather, it is the legitimacy of order- citizens' trust in their state- that determines a state's ability to maintain order.

Second, we propose that this framework could be the basis for an integrated system of international, national and sub-national institution-building. This will require that institutional capabilities for each of these functions are measured to allow for diagnosis, benchmarking and transparent reporting over time. Defining a common framework as above would allow for ranking between countries and identification of progress and decline in state functionality over time. We have proposed that a Sovereignty Index, or State Effectiveness Index, be compiled and reported on, on an annual basis. This index could be the basis for discussions at the UN General Assembly and the World Bank Annual meetings, to allow for consensus to be generated on priorities for attention and investment.

Third, we propose that long-term, integrated strategies be prepared for each country that falls below a certain level on the index, designed to increase the institutional capability of the countries over time. These strategies would form the basis for "double compacts" between the citizens of a country and their government on the one hand, and the government and international actors on the other. As such, they would bring alignment between the promises made by leaders in manifestos or other promises to their populations, and the myriad conditionalities, international agreements and initiatives that countries are obliged or encouraged to undertake to meet international actors' demands.

This approach formed the basis for the design of a set of instruments that were applied in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005, including the Bonn Agreement, the National Development Framework, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, the National Priority Programs and the Afghanistan Compact. This approach and some of these instruments in turn have subsequently formed the basis for analytical and policy work in a range of other countries.

Rather than a cookie-cutter approach where inflexible models are applied regardless of country conditions, this approach requires that this analytic framework is carefully calibrated and adapted to context. All too often, international actors in their planning processes assume a blank slate, and apply pre-prepared models without a careful grounded analysis of existing conditions. Instead, a mapping of existing institutions, assets and constraints would set the basis for actions designed to overcome those constraints, building on existing institutions and tailored to existing capabilities. This approach would allow “modern” institutions to mesh with local traditions and existing practices. Examples of this approach in Afghanistan include mobilization of the *hawala* dealers in 2002 to perform the currency exchange; using the traditional concept of the *Loya Jirga* as the basis for legitimization of the Bonn Process; and building on the institution of the *shura* at village level as the platform for management of funds and projects by communities through the National Solidarity Program.

1. The *Greentree Estates Meeting* was held on in September 2005. Its proceedings are summarized in: GHANI, Ashraf, LOCKHART, Clare and CARNAHAN, Michael, “An Agenda for State-Building in the Twenty-First Century”, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 31: 1, Winter 2006.

This approach was the basis for a meeting convened by the World Bank and the United Nations at the Greentree Estates¹, where the leaders of twelve post-conflict transitions met to discuss the framework described above and refine the functional approach. Subsequently, the approach has been the subject of high level discussions in the UN, World Bank, and other organizations.

A number of changes in the international system would be required to support such an approach. First, time frames for planning would need to alter, from the one to three years typical in donor planning time frames to the ten to fifteen years that is realistic to achieve sustainable institutional change. Second, modalities of provision of technical assistance would need revision. Currently, technical assistance is often of low quality and unaccountable to the populations or governments of the country of work, with few mechanisms inbuilt to ensure hand-over of skills. Instead, twinning arrangements and exchange of knowledge from fully functional organizations could be more effective, as used during the European Union accession process. Also, ensuring that technical assistance contracts have adequate measures to ensure genuine knowledge transfer and full accountability would be necessary.

Third, instead of each donor preparing and contracting a number of small projects, international actors would have to agree to a long-term, joint strategy with each other and the country government and channel their financing through common channels. Fourth, instead of requiring separate reports and monitoring missions, the international actors would agree on a common reporting framework that the government would be obliged to fulfil. Fifth, the modalities of engagement of the international community would change from one of direct implementation or monitoring alone to partnership in development and implementation of strategy.

This in turn would require a significant shift in skill sets, incentives and mental models of the staff of international organizations and national governments. Within international organizations, staff would need to acquire skills of “co-producing” institutional change with their counterparts rather than acting only as direct implementers or as monitors. They

would also need to acquire deeper analytic skills. At the country level, it would require empowerment of a generation of leaders and managers who would be allocated both the right and responsibility to lead such processes. To support them, devising ways to invest in their leadership and management skills would be important. These could include re-energizing secondary and tertiary learning institutions, equipping students with the teamwork and problem-solving skills necessary to succeed in today's world; providing support and learning networks outside traditional learning institutions; and ensuring that they receive adequate remuneration.

The approach delineated above would bring all domains of the state - security, political and economic- within a common framework that recognizes the interdependencies between these domains. As such, it allows for the "black box" of governance to be prised open, and the structures and processes of institutions to be mapped using a common language. The recent high profile afforded to the issue of "state-building" through the ongoing challenges evident in both Afghanistan and Iraq have brought such issues to the fore of the global public. It is hoped that such attention can be translated into sustained attention to the issues and careful consideration of the root causes of and appropriate responses to challenges in development and security across the world.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Governance and security in the Mediterranean.

Security and good governance in the Mediterranean: Securitization
vs. democratization.

Yahia H. Zoubir

SECURITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: SECURITIZATION VS. DEMOCRATIZATION

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In recent years, bad governance has come to be regarded as one of the major causes of instability, insecurity, underdevelopment and conflict in all societies. Governments, both in the North and the South, seem to concur that good governance is necessary in promoting peace, stability, security and development, not only within societies but also in international relations. Many leaders in the South in general have now realized that if a well-defined link between good governance and the security sector is not established, the peace and stability essential for development would not materialize. In fact, some donors, like the World Bank, are making their assistance and credits conditional upon reforms that guarantee 'good governance'. There is also consensus for the need for good governance in the security sector in order to achieve not only peace, dignity, respect for human rights, democracy and stability, but also to be able to initiate genuine development.

Governance is a concept that has developed with the evolution of human civilization; it applies to various organizations, small or large: corporations, NGOs, nation-states, international organizations and other entities. The generally accepted definition is that governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are carried out or not carried out. Thus, one can expect good governance to aim at assuring good results for the whole society, particularly for those not in positions of power. Note that 'government' is only one of the actors in governance; the other actors outside the government and the military are grouped under the label of 'civil society'.

While governance is understood differently, good governance has a number of characteristics; it must be: participatory; consensus oriented; accountable; transparent; responsive; effective and efficient; equitable and inclusive; and, based on the rule of law.¹

One can safely say that, in general, none of the Southern Mediterranean nations fulfill the characteristics of good governance enumerated above and suffer from a huge democratic deficit.² Despite recent attempts at reforms which, in some cases, have been undertaken in the security sector area³ assisted by the EU's MEDA protocols, meaningful transformation remains limited in the region for

1. <http://www.unescap.org/huset/gg/governance.htm>
2. This deficit has been detailed at length in United Nations Development Program, *Arab Human Development Report 2004-Towards Freedom in the Arab World*, New York: UNDP/Stanford University Press, 2005.
3. ROMDHANE, Dalila, "Supporting Penal and Prison Reform in North Africa: Algeria and Morocco," in FERGUSON, Chris and ISIMA, Jeffrey O., *Providing Security for People: Enhancing Security through Police, Justice, and Intelligence Reform in Africa*, Swindon (UK): Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, 2004, pp. 67-74; ZOUBIR, Yahia H. and HAMADOUCHE, Louisa Aït, "Between Democratization and Counter-Terrorism: Penal Reform in Algeria", in FERGUSON, Chris and ISIMA, Jeffrey O., *Providing Security for People: Enhancing Security through Police, Justice, and Intelligence Reform in Africa*, Swindon, UK: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, 2004, pp. 75-84.

reasons that are too many to elaborate on in this essay. But, it is clear those countries with greater experience should assist Southern Mediterranean countries in promoting democratic governance. The difficulty, however, seems to be that since the events of 11 September 2001 and the Islamist bombings in Casablanca (May 2003) and Madrid (March 2004), the Mediterranean region has become a zone of strategic importance dominated by issues of security at the internal and external levels. Terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration have become strategic challenges; this has resulted in greater police cooperation between the countries on the two shores of the Mediterranean. In other words, security issues seem today at the heart of cooperation despite the normative rhetoric about democracy and human rights, which in fact have moved to the backburner.

There have been different responses to the terrorist menace. Both in Europe and, to a lesser degree, in the United States, analysts have identified the democratic deficit in the South as one of the main causes of Islamist terrorism. This explains why, at least at the level of political discourse, promotion of democracy has become a priority for US and EU policies toward the Mediterranean. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the US Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the G-8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative are the best examples of policies that seek to promote democracy in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East regions. In Europe, the thinking is that the best guarantee for Europe's security is the promotion of a neighbourhood made up of well governed democratic states. But the dilemma is that convincing the Southern Mediterranean countries to democratize is not without problems, for no one doubts that free elections are likely to result in the victory of Islamist parties. This is precisely the scenario that Europeans and Americans wish to avoid, as their reaction to the victory of Hamas in Palestine illustrates. Although they do not oppose 'moderate' Islamist parties, they would prefer secular semi-authoritarian regimes to Islamist regimes, no matter how moderate. They, of course, would like these semi-authoritarian regimes to have a façade of democracy; but, these regimes are quite resilient to change. They have been reluctant to bring about genuine political reforms. They also play on Western fears that reforms would produce the opposite effect, that is, they would be beneficial to the enemies of democracy, namely, Islamists. Although they agree with their Western counterparts on the necessity for good governance, Southern Mediterranean regimes argue that they need more economic aid from and closer security cooperation with the EU and the United States. With respect to security, those regimes interpret it as national security and regime stability. Thus, access to EU markets is necessary for socioeconomic development and stability.

Today, governments and international organizations recognize the link between democracy transformation of a society and the need for democratic governance of the security sector. There is consensus that the absence of democratic control over the armed forces, police and intelligence services has both internal and external consequences. Internally, this is characterized in the Southern Mediterranean countries by:

- Limited civilian participation in and oversight over security policymaking. These are generally the preserve of the military.
- Limited separation of police and military forces, i.e., “the functions of internal and external security forces are blurred, with the military playing a considerable role in internal security, as well as in domestic politics more generally.”⁴
- High levels of defense expenses as percentage of the countries’ Gross Domestic Products characterized by lack of transparency.

In recent years, it has become apparent that the countries in the Southern Mediterranean need different patterns of civilian-military relations. The rather difficult issue is how to make the transition from a security sector traditionally dominated by the military. Or as a Nigeria scholar put it: “One of the fundamental issues in the management of the security sector is the acceptance of a democratic polity and its values of transparency and accountability.”⁵ The difficulty, of course, is how to make such transition in societies where the military has traditionally played an important role in state-building and has often intervened in politics. The other dilemma is how to persuade Southern Mediterranean countries to initiate reforms, through different external policy instruments, without appearing to be interfering in those countries’ internal affairs. One of the means has been for the EU, in particular, to initiate the issue of democratic governance of the security sector by linking it to the questions of development, democracy and security. But, it does not seem that the EU has developed a global reform policy of the security sector in spite of the fact that it has not only the experience but also the means to engage its partners in the Southern Mediterranean in an effective interchange and concrete cooperation. Undoubtedly, the EU and the United States are reluctant to promote democratic governance of the security sector in the Southern Mediterranean states because of the crucial role that those states are playing in the US-led Global War on Terror. The EU, for instance, has made human rights and democratization in the Mediterranean as a strategic imperative of its policy; yet, there is no indication that this has really been a priority for the EU.⁶ The same of course can be said about US policy.⁷ As indicated earlier, Western countries, especially since 9/11, are more interested in the stability of the regimes in the Southern Mediterranean than with the promotion of democracy. The fear is that ‘unstable’ regimes, even if more democratic could produce negative consequences for Europe, such as the flux of refugees. Although some European countries condemned the Algerian regime for cancelling the election in 1992 because of the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front, it is not at all certain that they truly wished to see Islamists come to power. This explains why following 9/11, Western countries have become rather silent concerning human rights abuses in countries that support the Global War on Terror. Thus, there was no condemnation of Morocco’s harsh repression following the Casablanca bombings in 2003 or the continued abuses of human rights there, as well as in Egypt, against suspected terrorists. In fact, there was little complaint about the farcical, rigged re-elections of Egypt’s and Tunisia’s presidents, respectively. The courting of the dictatorial Libyan regime illustrates such turnabout on the push for democratization.

4. TANNER, Fred, “Security Cooperation: A New Reform Orientation?” in AMIRAH-FERNÁNDEZ, Haizam and YOUNGS, Richard (eds.), *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade*, Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano and Fríde, 2005, p. 76.
5. ELAIGWU, J. Isawa, *African Responses to Good Governance, Peace, and Security in the Region: Towards Confidence Building*, Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF, 2002, p. 11.
6. HADDADI, Said, “Political Securitisation and Democratisation in the Maghreb: Ambiguous Discourses and Fine-tuning Practices for a Security Partnership”, Institute of European studies, University of California, 2004.
7. See, ZOUBIR, Yahia H., “The United States, Islamism and Democracy in the Maghreb: The Predominance of Security?” in ZOUBIR, Yahia H. and AMIRAH-FERNÁNDEZ, Haizam (eds.), *North Africa: Politics, Region and the Limits of Transformation*, London: Routledge, forthcoming.

8. See, the good commentary by Amr Hamzawy and Michael McFaul, "The US and Egypt: Giving up on the 'Liberty Doctrine'", *International Herald Tribune*, 3 July 2006.
9. HADDADI, op. cit., p. 20.

In conclusion, one might say that because of the Global War on Terror, neither the Southern Mediterranean countries nor the Western countries are making democratic governance a priority.⁸ The EU and the United States have the instruments to influence the Southern Mediterranean countries in a democratic direction; however, at the current juncture, it does not seem that they have the willingness to do so. The risk of course, is that, "With repetitive forums of little or no concrete result on security and democracy, the discourse on the construction of peace and security will tend to be perceived from the population in the south as political stagnation by other means."⁹

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Conclusions.

Security in the Mediterranean in 2006: A multidimensional reflection.
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In 2006, the Mediterranean was, once again, the scenario of armed conflict. The situation in the Palestinian territories, as well as the conflict in Lebanon has shown, once more, that a great deal of work remains to be done before one of the main objectives of the 1995 Barcelona Process can be achieved: that of turning the Mediterranean into an area of peace and security.

Furthermore, in recent years, the Mediterranean has continued to be the setting for some of the greatest economic, political and social disparities on the planet. On a domestic level, these disparities represent a seed of tension and, therefore, of insecurity. Other threats, which can on occasions assume a global scale (such as international terrorism and climate change), are also making their presence felt on the countries that ring the Mediterranean.

2006, the year in which the fifth International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean was held, was also marked by regrettable, cyclical outbreaks of violence in different points in the Middle East. The summer of 2006 will be remembered for the military offensive in Lebanon and for the increasingly critical situation in the Palestinian territories, particularly the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, the violence in Iraq continues to cast doubts on the future of the country and on the stability of the region as a whole.

And so, the course of events in the Mediterranean, and especially its eastern basin, is demonstrating once again that the European Security Strategy accurately summarised the challenges that exist to European security and to the stability of the international system as a whole.

Nevertheless, these same events – especially with respect to the situation in Lebanon – have also shown that the European Union, working in collaboration with its Mediterranean partners, has a long road ahead of it in terms of strengthening its foreign and security policies.

In order to tackle new and old threats, the actors involved need to move forward toward a policy of constructive cooperation. Dialogue and political determination are essential ingredients for the task of ensuring progress with the various security cooperation frameworks currently under way in the Mediterranean. From the Barcelona Process to NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, from the 5+5 initiative to the European Neighbourhood Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy, there are many arenas in which this issue is being debated and worked on at present.

However, these efforts do not always reach the attention of the public, and this is why seminars such as the one held regularly in Barcelona by the CIDOB Foundation and the Spanish Ministry of Defence are so important. They make visible the work that is done by different actors, thereby increasing the mutual trust between them, as well as reflecting, on a long-term basis, on what the main priorities are in terms of security in the Mediterranean.

For the 2006 seminar, three subjects were chosen which, in all probability, will continue to head the agenda with respect to cooperation in the Mediterranean: energy, migration flows and governance. These subjects were debated by working groups to which Chatham House rules were applied; that is, none of the comments made during the discussions could be directly attributed or quoted textually. Even so, this does not prevent us from listing, in this section of conclusions, some of the most promising ideas that arose during these discussions.

With respect to energy, the speakers highlighted the fact that interest in energy and security issues increases and diminishes cyclically, adding that since the year 2000, the importance of these topics has increased significantly, to the extent that discussions connected with geopolitics, geo-strategy and energy security are nowadays subjects of great importance. This is owing to several factors, including the rise of "energy nationalism" in some of the producing countries; the importance of fossil fuels at the present time (and even more so in the future) and, finally, the perennial debate for and against the use of nuclear energy. Moreover, it should be pointed out that consumption of fossil fuels has serious environmental implications. Phenomena such as climate change may generate serious security problems on a world scale, and the Mediterranean region would be particularly vulnerable to the social and economic changes that these phenomena could produce both inside and outside the region.

Energy security is an area that depends on multiple factors, such as rising prices, instability in producing regions, attacks on infrastructures and oil tankers, and natural disasters. Furthermore, the alarmism that exists over the exhaustion of reserves means that progress has to be

made on several different fronts, including the increase of energy efficiency (focusing on the aspect of demand), research into developing renewable energies and the increase in spending on “clean” energies.

As we mentioned above, the debate on the use of nuclear energy has been reopened. Different views exist on this issue, particularly those concerning public opinion reaction to the possible danger of nuclear accidents. One of the important advantages of nuclear energy is that it does not produce carbon dioxide or any of the other gases that cause global warming. In addition, stability of supply can be controlled and operating costs can be competitive. As for the disadvantages, the main ones are the high risk to the population in the event of accident or radiation leaks, the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials, and the treatment of radioactive waste.

Several Arab countries in the Mediterranean, including Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates and Tunisia, are planning to use nuclear energy to generate electricity and desalinate water. Meanwhile, the Iranian nuclear programme has opened an international crisis amid fears that Teheran wants nuclear technology for military ends.

In spite of being the fourth largest world producer of oil, and of possessing the second largest gas reserves (after Russia), Iran is in fact an importer of fuel, partly owing to lack of investment. In addition to this, the country’s crude oil production capacity has fallen in recent times, while domestic demand has increased.

While oil is a global asset, gas depends more on regional markets. In the European Union (EU), imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) are rising. LNG production is also increasing in Mediterranean countries such as Algeria, Libya and Egypt, as well as among other producers. It is a striking fact that Spain is the third most important destination in the world for LNG transport vessels and the main European country in terms of the number of regasification plants. In fact, Spain has five operating plants that absorb over 65 per cent of the volume of liquefied natural gas that arrives in the EU.

As for the European Union’s stance on energy supply policies, disputes and the general crisis regarding this issue (specifically with respect to Russia), there is a lack of necessary consensus to enable the EU to speak with one single voice. In this sense, the EU is also suffering from a lack of ideas in terms of coordinated common action. One vitally important question for the EU is how it can progress in its plans for the diversification of its common sources of supply and transport networks.

Proliferation issues tend to be dealt with in less depth in public debate than energy issues. Even so, in recent times, the nature of the challenge facing the international community has changed, owing to the advent of terrorism and the dangers linked with nuclear proliferation. In this sense, it is of vital importance that the International Atomic Energy Organisation should be strengthened and that more measures for transparency should be created, beyond the existing defence system. The seminar’s discussion group also dealt with the role of NATO in the face of such a challenge. Among other points, it was stressed that

NATO's role in safeguarding energy security is by no means a new one, as reference was made to this point in its Strategic Concept document defined in 1999. Economic interests and energy security are also priority issues in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, given the fact that 65 per cent of the oil and gas consumed in Western Europe arrives by crossing the Mediterranean. One of the responsibilities of the Atlantic Alliance is to analyse the main threats to the energy supply and to provide assistance to Allied countries, including maritime surveillance.

One of the main conclusions the seminar's participants reached was that energy can be a factor not only for conflict, but also for integration. In the same way that steel and coal were key elements in the European integration, perhaps energy and water can become integration elements for the troubled Mediterranean region.

As for the issue of migration flows, the discussion was essentially based on the control of these flows and, therefore, the central importance of borders. One of the most controversial topics was that of how this control could be made compatible with another fundamental priority ? human rights. This subject, currently of great importance given the humanitarian crises in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and along the terrestrial borders of several North African countries, should be given particular emphasis if security is to be defined in terms of human security.

The participants also discussed what the optimum framework for cooperation should be with respect to the subject of migration between EU countries and their Mediterranean partners. The main debate revolves around the need to make the various existing initiatives fit together, and that these initiatives should be coherent with each other. One specific point on which the states of the Euro-Mediterranean region should reflect is whether the multilateral framework that is the Barcelona Process is the most suitable framework for the situation, or whether strictly bilateral cooperation could produce better results.

This consideration of frameworks for regional cooperation leads us to define what the ideal geographical space is for developing such cooperation. During the seminar the point was made that in addition to the traditional border that the Mediterranean represents, another, much more porous one has developed in the Sahara Desert. In recent years, it has become clear that the control of borders such as the ones at Ceuta and Melilla do not solve the control of flows; instead they simply move the problem to other borders. Thus, migration flows in the Mediterranean do not take place on a solely Euro-Mediterranean or Euro-Maghrebi scale, but rather they have grown to Euro-African dimensions.

Taking a different approach, the participants also remarked upon the fact that a fixation with effectively controlling migration flows might have caused us to forget the importance of promoting development processes as long-term measures for managing migration flows in a more intelligent, less traumatic way. Thus, one of the aims of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership –to create an area of shared prosperity– is linked with the issue of migration. Nevertheless –and given the fact that the focus of attention is not limited to the Mediterranean, but rather it has widened to include Africa– development policies on this continent are equally important.

In all these debates, different answers were offered and diverse lines of action were outlined. Particularly, the seminar represented an opportunity to find out, at first hand, about some of the policies and initiatives that are already in progress. Among the subjects discussed were regularisation processes, cooperation in the area of rescue and the specific experience of FRONTEX, the agency responsible for controlling the EU's external borders.

Finally, the working group turned to the subject of governance, and the problem of how to promote policies of "good governance" that would simultaneously result in a climate of greater security and stability in the region. The tension between promoting an agenda of democratisation and an agenda for stabilising the regions bordering the EU has been a constant feature of EU policy, and that of some of its Member States with respect to the Mediterranean.

Within the framework of this seminar, one central issue came under discussion –that of the links between governance, human rights and democratisation processes. Some participants made the point that it sometimes seems as if "governance" is used as a euphemism for democracy. However, during the course of the debate, it was agreed that governance is a concept that goes beyond respect for human rights and democratisation, and that it is particularly important –especially in the medium and long-term– in the construction of an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean.

In view of the political situation in the region, the issues under discussion included the current correlation of forces in the region, the different strategies within the EU, and between the EU and the United States, the impact of open regional conflicts and international terrorism, and the role of reform in the security sector –all of them subjects that generate a considerable amount of debate in the academic community as well as in governmental circles.

The working commission also discussed the subject of how to improve the situation of governance in the region. Various ideas were put forward, including the need to carry out projects with a broader time frame, as well as the suggestions that technical aid should be substantially increased and that in order to avoid suspicion deriving from historical memory, these processes should be executed by domestic actors to prevent them from being seen as having been imposed from outside.

Particular emphasis was placed on the idea that it was necessary to move forward toward a greater coherence between the EU's specific principles and policies. This point, which represents a wider problem in terms of European construction and its international scope, acquires greater prominence when it comes to tackling highly sensitive issues such as that of promoting processes of good governance. Without this coherence, the EU will obtain few positive results, and may even lose its legitimacy.

Thus, the plenary debates and work sessions represented an opportunity to carry out an in-depth examination of the challenges to security in the Mediterranean region; challenges that are taking on an increasingly multidimensional character, and which make it necessary to strengthen cooperation between Mediterranean countries.

This cooperation, as several participants stressed, should bear in mind the idea that the security that Euro-Mediterranean leaders should be considering is not only the security of states, but also –and especially– that of their citizens. Cooperation on the issue of security in the Mediterranean cannot be excluded from this dynamic, as new initiatives linked with a conception of "human security" will have to be incorporated.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Reports

Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean: An
omnidirectional threat.

Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde, Balder Hageraats and Ximena Valente

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN OMNIDIRECTIONAL THREAT

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Introduction

Similarly to the first report on *Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean: current status and prospects*, released in 2005, this second report (*Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean: an omnidimensional threat*) is the result of an initiative – responding to a sustained interest in matters of security and defence in the Mediterranean - by the CIDOB Foundation. It is therefore fitting to mention the annual seminars on security and defence that are held in Barcelona since 2002. In line with the decision taken at the third of these meetings, the aim of this report is to facilitate – both for those attending the sessions directly as well as the wider security community interested in the region - the analysis of one of the most pressing problems on the international agenda. At the same time, the report is an attempt to stimulate debate and reflection on the related threats. This includes both the existing nuclear, biological and chemical programmes and arsenals as well as the worrisome attempts to obtain such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by various state and non-state actors.

It is with this in mind that the following pages are intended to serve as a continued effort to offer tools for policymaking as well as to deepen the understanding of the issues at hand. These issues strongly influence the image of a Mediterranean that is characterised by high levels of insecurity. On the one hand there are highly poisoned and openly violent situations such as in Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict, while on the other hand there are sources of tension. These make it difficult to imagine in the medium-term a fulfilment of the objective of the Barcelona Process to create a Euro-Mediterranean space of shared peace and prosperity. On the contrary, the main signals emanating from the region point toward a generalised deterioration which pushes the notion of a Mediterranean free of WMD even further away. This worsening of the situation seems especially true in the more complex South-South relationships, rather than those between the South and the North.

Since the presentation of the last report, there has only been an increase in concern over WMD¹ in the Mediterranean – understood from a security perspective as the space made up by the European Union (EU), Balkans and Russia in the north, and - in the south and east - the

1. Similar to the first report, the concept of WMD is used in its general understanding of having the three basic components of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In practical terms, however, the main focus of this report is on nuclear weapons given that these are the only ones that truly fit the profile of WMD at the moment.

Maghreb, Near East and Middle East. Most attention during the past months has centred on the evolution of Iran's nuclear programme –together with the crisis surrounding North Korea– and the efforts by the international community –led by the EU, or, more specifically, the UK, France and Germany, with explicit support by the United States (US)– to avoid Iran possessing military capabilities in this area.

From a regional security perspective, it is hard to find a relevant fact that points towards a lessening of tensions. The conflicts in Iraq and the one between Israel and its Arab neighbours have only worsened, while there is still no solution for the situation in Western Sahara or for the shadows that surround the relations between neighbouring nations in the Maghreb. The structure for dialogue and the confidence measures that were started years ago have so far failed to sufficiently reduce the enormous gaps of inequality and high levels of instability that affect the region as a whole. Among these measures are both those initiated by NATO and by the EU –with the Process of Barcelona– and some countries of the southern coast, and which are already more than a decade old, as well as those of sub-regional order, such as the 5+5 Group.

In general terms, however, not all dynamics that were identified in the first report have undergone significant changes. Consequently, rather than repeating the same analysis again for countries whose profile with regard to WMD has not substantially changed, the reader is referred to last year's report and to the update of the main issues per country in Section IV of this present report. The first report already announced the aim of successively filling the gaps which were not covered then. Therefore it was decided that the structure of this second report would be as follows: 1) Provide analysis (Section I) of northern countries that either because of their WMD capacities (France and the United Kingdom) or global interests with obvious links to the region (United States) should form part of this research on WMD in the Mediterranean. 2) Dedicate special attention –even if it was already analysed in last year's report– to the case of Iran (Section II) which remains the most obvious priority after the events of the last twelve months. 3) Study in greater detail (Section III) the threat of so-called nuclear international terrorism which is nowadays considered –albeit not always backed-up by sufficient facts– to be one of the principal threats to international security. The report is completed by an Appendix (Section V) which contains a list of acronyms used in this text, a detailed chronology of Iran's nuclear programme, and a list of internet sites related to the subject and which serves as an addition to the bibliographical references in Section VII of the first report.

It is to be hoped that, in a future report, regional initiatives of non-proliferation will merit a whole section dedicated to them. This would be an indication that there exists a common political will to free the region from some arsenals and programmes that, rather than guaranteeing the security of separate countries, only contribute in increasing the insecurity of the whole. At the moment there is nothing worth adding to the report from 2005. At the global level, the conference on revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has demonstrated the enormous difficulties that exist in overcoming related obstacles in order to advance the agenda. At a regional level, it has

been for a long time already that the differences in perception between Israelis, Arabs and Persians make it impossible to integrate the issue into the agenda for Mediterranean security.

The analysis in this report is framed within an environment of international security that remains dominated by the badly-named “war on terror”, spearheaded by the US. It is within this framework that WMD proliferation, together with international terrorism, is identified as the two main threats that hang above our heads. It is also in this model that multilateral approaches to deal with global threats, identified after the Cold War, have been neglected. These threats themselves have also been largely ignored in order to give way to unilateral and militaristic methods.

The problems worsen even further after detecting a clear preference of counter-proliferation methods –which are basically centred on the use of force and coercion– rather than strengthening non-proliferation –turned towards instruments of international law and political agreements. Concern also grows after finding that important state actors such as the US are repositioning their own nuclear strategies in order to make them into weapons for combat situations.

Finally, there is an insistence on using double standards for evaluating different actors (India, Pakistan, Israel, and even North Korea). By considering that the problem is not so much possessing nuclear weapons in the first place but rather the profile of the owner, this only serves to feed the negative comparisons that cause others (Iran being the most obvious example) to accelerate the process of obtaining them themselves.

In spite of the short time that has passed since the beginning of the implementation of this strategy –initiated by the US– it seems already sufficient in order to conclude that it is an inadequate tool. This is not only because it fails to effectively respond to problems such as poverty, exclusion, pandemics or environmental degradation –all real international security threats– but also to deal with the two main threats identified above which have turned into obsessions that are badly understood and managed even worse.

Together with the persistent negative contamination that the “war on terror” provokes in the area of WMD in the Mediterranean region, the other starting points and influences that were identified in the first report remain valid. There is therefore no need to repeat them again, but they should be taken as principal factors that explain the pages that follow. It is with this in mind and with the final goal of ultimately achieving a Mediterranean that is free of WMD that this present report aims to contribute to promoting a climate of greater transparency, mutual confidence, and to raise awareness about a subject matter that is usually shrouded in secrecy and has the potential to worsen even more the regional relations that are clearly in need of improvement.

As already pointed out, this report will not clear up all doubts and uncertainties in the area of WMD. In order for that to happen one day –in combination with other statistical sources and analyses– it would be necessary to be able to rely on the true cooperation of both state as well as non-state actors in order to clarify the facts and strategies that they are

2. Future reports of this series will cover other nations that, because of their arsenals or industrial/technological WMD capabilities, also influence the overall security situation in the Mediterranean.

responsible for. At the moment this report is based on publicly available sources. Even though this is logical, it does mean that by definition the information available is incomplete and not always up-to-date. Just like the 2005 report already states, "it is therefore possible to miss more and better information about certain countries and about certain projects, but – rather than reflecting weaknesses of its authors - that should be interpreted as an additional call for cooperation to improve the final product that is, or should be, in the interest of all concerned".

WMD in selected northern countries of the Mediterranean

Rather than considering the existence and proliferation of WMD as problems only affecting countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean, it should be remembered that among the nations of its northern coast (understood in its wider context as going beyond purely geographical terms) there are powerful state actors that have been developing WMD for decades. No analysis of geopolitics and geostrategy in the region would be complete without the dynamics that define and drive, for example, France, the UK and the US².

Their integration into a report on WMD in the Mediterranean is therefore based on the idea that these actors cannot be identified as mere external spectators of the region. On the contrary, their involvement in the past, present, and, without a doubt, future of the Maghreb, Near East and Middle East is unquestionable. This is true even though they themselves usually attempt to paint an aseptic image of their role, making it seem as if all their actions are surrounded by a halo of authority. Such behaviour creates the illusion that their motives are purely the defence of principles and values, rather than caring about narrow self-interests. For good or for bad, the history of the region has left clear fingerprints of each of the mentioned nations, as well as of others not mentioned here because of lesser relevance to the subject matter of this report.

From a western security perspective, the Mediterranean, although historically regarded as being of secondary importance, the local situation it is clearly fundamental to European security. This has been understood for a long time already by the EU and by its mayor member states, and has made been perfectly clear by them in situations where their interests were involved. These countries have made their voices heard, both in the conventional areas as well as that of WMD. Because of this, and in order to have a comprehensive picture of a region whose future, at times, depends on events outside of its geographical borders, it is necessary to discuss the realities and perceptions that define those events.

Although it is important to differentiate between the situations of each, all three nations discussed in this section are important strategic players in the Mediterranean. However, there exists a tendency to overlook with too much ease their behaviour concerning the regional security climate, while at the same time the words, actions and failures of the southern nations are scrupulously studied. While there are powerful arsenals and WMD programmes in the countries of the North, it seems nothing worrisome can emanate from them and that all that counts is the

behaviour of Israel and Iran. This mistaken habit has thus been consolidated over the years. It is conveniently forgotten that the foreign policy of these western powers are always backed-up by their nuclear capabilities, at least implicitly. Moreover, not enough attention is given to the fact that they have been augmenting their WMD capabilities for quite a while, especially in the case of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, Washington and London are in the process of renewing their arsenals and strategies in this field. Paris, on the other hand, through the words of its president, declares a willingness to use its nuclear weapons against states involved in terrorist attacks against France, thereby creating serious doubts about its future intentions³.

3. "Chirac prepared to use nuclear strike against terror states", *The Guardian*, January 20, 2006.
4. At the moment there is no evidence that it has chemical or biological weapon programmes; as a result, this section focuses exclusively on its nuclear and missile capabilities.

In none of the countries above would it be correct to interpret the construction of WMD arsenals and capabilities as decisions in a principally Mediterranean environment. This obvious fact makes it more difficult to incorporate them into the analysis of WMD in the region. Whereas southern nations have opted to develop nuclear, chemical or biological weapons in response to regional circumstances, powers such as the US and Russia as well as France and the UK, have shown very little interest to participate in initiatives concerning this area. The classical argument that their WMD capabilities respond to global strategic considerations do not seem to convince their Mediterranean neighbours: A frequent reason against pressure to abandon WMD programmes is that they will not do so without similar gestures or incorporation into the process by the northern nations. Although at times the rejection to advance towards arms control and disarmament hides other motives – and even though there exists no such process at the moment – it seems likely that if one day real advances are made in this area, said powers will find themselves caught in a very uncomfortable situation if they stay at the sidelines.

In any case, their historical support of some of the most blatant proliferators in the region, as well as the mere existence of their arsenals, has been – and still is - a determining influence on the security agenda of the region. In some instances they have been identified as potential direct threats to their neighbours of the South. On other occasions, they are viewed as interested proliferators of their partners, either because of commercial or political interests, or both, as seems to be the case most of the time. These countries have already been protagonists in Mediterranean affairs for a long time. This is the main reason why they appear as case-studies in the pages that follow.

France and its strategy of "tout azimuth"

Being one of the traditional five nuclear powers (together with the US, Russia, the UK and China), France has a long history of developing its "force de frappe"⁴. It possesses the third largest nuclear arsenal in terms of nuclear warheads (see Table 1). Furthermore, its geographic position and obvious interest in the Mediterranean make France the main nuclear power in the region. However, it is difficult to analyze its capabilities and model in purely Mediterranean terms given that, similarly to the UK, its nuclear strategy has traditionally not seen the Mediterranean as a priority,

5. *World Nuclear Association:*
www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf40.htm
6. For a complete list see
<http://www.icjt.org/npp/lokacija.php?drzava=8>.
7. "*Nuclear Weapons Archive*"
 estimates 500 – 2.000kg:
<http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/France/>

Table 1: Nuclear warheads worldwide		
	Nuclear warheads	First
Declared states		
<i>United States</i>	5,735/9,960*	1945
<i>Russia</i>	5,830/16,000	1949
<i>France</i>	350	1960
<i>UK</i>	<200	1952
<i>China</i>	200	1964
<i>India</i>	60	1974
<i>Pakistan</i>	24	1998
<i>North Korea</i>	1-10	2006
Undeclared states		
<i>Israel</i>	75-200	Possibly 1979

*Two numbers represent the estimate of active warheads/total warheads

Sources: SIPRI; Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Ever since its beginnings, the French nuclear strategy has always been defined as "tout azimut", i.e. a defence in all directions, rather than solely in response to the Warsaw Pact which was clearly the principal concern, at least until the end of the Cold War. The Mediterranean constitutes an obviously important part of French interests, and as such the region has a preferential role in its global strategy.

Given that basic facts create a picture of the French position with respect to WMD, it is of interest to point out that the country ratified the NPT in 1992 and that already since 1981 it has been adhering to a system of safeguards which remain in place up to this day. It has not carried out any test since January 27, 1996 (when it carried out number 210), and France signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 24, 1996 (ratifying it on April 6, 1998). With respect to its bureaucratic structure, the Division of Military Applications of the Atomic Energy Commission has the exclusive responsibility for research, development, monitoring (previously also testing) and production of nuclear warheads.

Nuclear Facilities

France is, after the US, the world's second largest producer of nuclear energy with 78%⁵ of all its energy production coming from nuclear plants. Its fifty-nine nuclear reactors at twenty different locations account for about 18% of total world nuclear energy production⁶. It maintains a calculated ambiguity between its civil and military programmes, and this has led to significant amounts of plutonium being produced at civil plants while used for military purposes⁷. Table 2 shows the most important centres and facilities related to the French nuclear arsenal.

Table 2: French Nuclear Facilities (selected)	
Name	Description
Centros de Investigación	
<i>Centre d'Etudes de Limeil-Valenton</i>	Central laboratory for the design of nuclear weapons. It has a staff of around 950 and was established in 1951.
<i>Centre d'Etudes de Valduc</i>	Assembly centre for nuclear weapons. It also processes residual materials from weapons production and does research in various areas. Established in 1958.
<i>Centre d'Etudes du Ripault</i>	Produces high-explosion components and is responsible for maintenance tasks. Established in 1962.
<i>Centre d'Etudes Scientifiques et Techniques d'Aquitaine (CESTA)</i>	Militarization of the warheads from the <i>Centre d'Etudes de Limeil-Valenton</i> . Established in 1965.
<i>Centre d'Etudes de Bruyeres-le-Chatel (CEB)</i>	Research of metallurgy, electronics, seismology, toxicology and diagnostics for nuclear explosions. Established in 1957.
<i>Centre d'Etudes de Vaujours-Moronvilliers</i>	Research of explosives and high-pressurisation. Established in 1955.
Production Facilities	
<i>Pierrelatte</i>	Uranium enrichment until 1966. Established in 1953. Closed in 1998.
<i>Marcoule</i>	(i) Weapons-grade plutonium production until 1992. Established in 1952. (ii) Thermal reactors Celestin I and II (190Mw). Isotope, tritium and plutonium production. It has sufficient plutonium production capacity (750Kg) for the entire French nuclear arsenal (around 200kg a year). Established in 1967. (iii) Phenix (prototype reactor) of 563Mw. Established in 1973.
<i>La Hague</i>	Plutonium separation. Capable of handling 800 tonnes of fuel annually. Established in 1966.
<i>Instalaciones Civiles</i>	Some seem to have been part of military programs. Most notably: Chinon-1, Chinon-2, Chinon-3, St. Laurent-1, St. Laurent-2 and Bugey-1.

Sources: *Nuclearweaponsarchive.org*; *World Nuclear Association*

All uranium supplied to France is under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) control and subject to bilateral safeguards, with those by EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) covering civilian facilities while the IAEA safeguards are active in most French nuclear reactors.

Evolution⁸ and military capabilities

Immediately after the Second World War France began to develop civil nuclear activities and General Charles de Gaulle established the "*Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique*". The discovery of large quantities of uranium deposits in the surroundings of Limoges stimulated the ambitions and potential of the programme even more as it made France practically independent of foreign supply. September 26, 1954 the then Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France authorised the development of an atomic bomb. This was in part an attempt to regain some of the international prestige lost after the loss of Indochina and, afterwards, a reaction to the humiliation of the Suez Crisis. With the loss of international influence and the lack of US and UK support, France – under the leadership of De Gaulle - began to expand its security and defence capabilities in order to achieve independence from foreign powers. Thus, as a result of the quest for national prestige and pride, it

8. For a more detailed discussion, see <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/France/FranceOrigin.html>.

9. The nuclear tests continued to take place on Algerian territory until February 16, 1966 (almost four years after its independence). The facilities were returned to Algiers in January 15, 1967, and the French nuclear tests continued on the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa, in the Pacific Ocean.
10. During a visit to Moscow on September 26, 1997, Chirac confirmed that none of the French nuclear forces was targeted at specific objectives.
11. France has three squadrons with a total of 60 *Mirage 2000N* that have nuclear tasks. Two of these (*Dauphiné* and *La Fayette*) are based at Luxeuil-les-Bains, 130km to the southwest of Strasbourg. The third (*Limousin*) is at Istres, 40km to the northwest of Marseilles.
12. NORRIS, Robert S. & KRISTENSEN, Hans M., "French Nuclear Forces, 2005", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 61, No. 4, July/August 2005, PP. 73-75.
13. France is also preparing to enter into service a long-range ASMP (*ASMP-Amélioré* (ASMP-A) – Improved-ASMP), which could reach up to 400-500km, thereby going significantly beyond the 300 of the current standard model. The ASMP-A will be equipped with a new type of warhead designated *Tête Nucléaire Aero-portée* (Nuclear Air transported Warhead). This is a variant of the *Tête Nucléaire Oceanique* (TNO) which is expected to go into service in 2007 together with the modified *Mirage 2000N K3*, and with the *Rafale* in 2008.
14. The *Rafale* programme consists of 234 aircraft for the airforce and 60 for the navy. Among other conventional tasks, their function will include the delivery of the nuclear ASMP-A. The airforce began to form its first *F2 Rafale* squadron at Saint-Dizier in February 2005. The second squadron is expected to be operational in 2008.
15. A fourth SSBN *Triomphant*, *Le Terrible*, is under construction at Cherbourg and is expected to become operational in 2010.
16. During a speech in February 2005, Chirac announced a new SLBN, known as the *M51*, which will replace the *M45*. It is expected to enter service in 2010, can deliver up to six warheads and will have a range of 6.000km.

re-launched its nuclear programme. This led to its first nuclear test on February 13, 1960, at Reggane (Algeria)⁹ and its first thermonuclear bomb test on August 24, 1968.

In 1959, France began to develop launch capabilities parallel to its nuclear forces. Its first missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead – the strategic ballistic land-to-land missile SSBS S2 – was presented in 1965, followed by various tactical weapon programs (bombs and missiles), which entered into its arsenal between 1972 and 1973. Between 1972 and 1978 France also deployed its first strategic submarine model with five units of the so-called "*Escadrille des Sous-Marins Lanceurs d'Engins*" (although designated as SSBN). Completing its nuclear capabilities, the country began the "*Air-Sol Moyenne Portée*" (ASMP) programme which allowed the launch of nuclear weapons from the air (until 1996 from the *Mirage-IVP*), culminating in its first deployment in 1986.

More recently, in February 1996, President Jacques Chirac made public the nuclear plans of his country during a wider announcement on general military reforms for the period 1997-2002. He stated that the nuclear forces would be consolidated into fewer transport and delivery vehicles and that a new generation of nuclear systems would be developed¹⁰. On September 11, 2002, the government presented a new military plan for the following five years which guaranteed the financial resources for the programmes that were approved in 1996. As a result, the 2005 budget for nuclear arms was 3.18 billion euros (roughly 10% of the total), of which around 1.85bn was designated to the submarine programme.

Currently France continues to modernize and update its nuclear forces. Its arsenal consists of an estimated 348 warheads which can be launched from submarines with ballistic missiles installed, from warplanes based on its aircraft carrier and from bombers based at land bases (see Table 3), such as the *Mirage 2000N*¹¹ and the *Super Étendard*. It is estimated¹² that France has around 60 operational ASMP, although it should be pointed out that additional inactive missiles could be stored¹³.

Table 3: French Nuclear Forces (in January 2006)

Delivery vehicle	Number deployed	First year of deployment	Range (km)	Warheads x load	Stored warheads
Aircraft based at sea					
<i>Mirage 2000N</i>	60	1988	2,750	1 x 300kt ASMP	50
Aircraft based at sea					
<i>Super Étendard</i>	24	1978	650	1 x 300kt ASMP	10
SLBM					
<i>M45</i>	48	1996	6,000	6 x 100kt	288
Total					348

Sources: SIPRI YEARBOOK 2006; Natural Resources Defense Council.

With respect to the delivery vehicles, France intends to eventually replace all its *Mirage* aircraft by the *Rafale* model, its new multirole fighter¹⁴. Finally, as shown by Table 4, France presently operates four SSBN of two different classes; one of the *Le Redoutable* class and three¹⁵ of the *Le Triomphant* class (with 16 *SLBM M45*¹⁶ each, and a capacity for six TN75 warheads).

Class	Name	Year	Warheads x load
<i>Le Redoutable</i>	<i>L'Indomptable</i>	1976	16 x M4/TN71
<i>Le Redoutable</i>	<i>L'Inflexible</i>	1985	16 x M45/TN75
<i>Le Triomphant</i>	<i>Le Triomphant</i>	1997	16 x M45/TN75 (M51 from 2010)
<i>Le Triomphant</i>	<i>Le Téméraire</i>	1999	16 x M45/TN75 (M51 from 2010)
<i>Le Triomphant</i>	<i>Le Vigilant</i>	2004	16 x M45/TN75 (M51 from 2010)
<i>Le Triomphant</i>	<i>Le Terrible</i>	2010	16 x M51.1/TN75 (M51.2/TNO from 2015)

Source: *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ja04tertrais)

It should equally be pointed out that France does no longer possess medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM). In 1996 the only base for these types of missiles, in Plateau d'Albion, was closed.

However, France's plans for the future remain ambitious. It aims to maintain its full independence and autonomy at all levels of its nuclear programme; it is creating an expensive system of test-simulation for nuclear weapons (which would conflict with its international obligations); it is updating the majority of its missiles and nuclear warheads – especially oriented towards their use against new types of threats, presumably tactical¹⁷, rather than existential ones - ; and there are even indications that it is interested in an anti-missile shield.

Strategy and nuclear doctrine of France

On January 19, 2006, President Chirac held a speech at the nuclear submarine base Ile Longue in which he described the new French rational with respect to its nuclear deterrence. The president mentioned the dangers of regional instability, the growing extremism and WMD proliferation, making it clear that the nuclear deterrence of the country was the ultimate guarantee of its security. Likewise, he threatened using France's nuclear weapons against any state that supports terrorist activities against France or that is considering using WMD against France. In line with this, he announced that France had reconfigured its nuclear arsenal accordingly.

Furthermore, from his words it can be deduced that there are at least six new elements in the French nuclear doctrine: The concern with deterring states that sponsor terrorism; the threat to attack the "capacity to act" of the enemy; the option to employ more discriminatory and controllable systems; the willingness to launch attacks as "final warnings"; the guarantee to protect sources of energy that are understood as "vital interest"; and the presentation of nuclear deterrence as the basis of a preventive and, if necessary, military intervention strategy¹⁸.

In any case, and regardless of what can be deduced from the information available about its capabilities, the exact French nuclear strategy is a well-kept secret¹⁹. From a perspective that has been based from the very beginning on its high levels of independence, there exist clear advantages to this type of secrecy, even if only to add another layer of risk to potential aggressors by keeping them in the dark about its exact response. Nonetheless, the desire for autonomy has been noticeable on other occasions as well, for example when Paris decided to unilaterally close its

- 17 Since 1996, France considers its entire nuclear arsenal "strategic". This means that any use of its nuclear capabilities will happen as a defence of vital interests, and will signal a radical change in the nature of the conflict.
18. YOST, David S., "France's new nuclear doctrine", *International Affairs*, Vol. 82: 4, 2006, PP. 701-721.
19. Bruno Tertrais in "Nuclear policy: France stands alone", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 60: 4, July/August 2004, PP. 48-55- is correct in arguing that "Nuclear policy in France is shrouded in secrecy - even more so than in other Western nuclear weapon states - and transparency has long been anathema in Paris".

20. In October 1999 during a speech to the Institute for Defence Studies in Paris, the then Prime Minister Lionel Jospin argued that the nuclear deterrence should defend France against any threat, even those farthest away. On June 10, 2001, in the same institute, President Chirac reiterated that the nuclear arsenal has three functions: to guarantee the survival of the nation, to defend France against blackmail by other nuclear powers, and to contribute to European and transatlantic security.
21. "Des Français en Irak? 'Pas à l'ordre du jour'", *Le Journal du Dimanche*, July 13, 2003, P. 2.

activities at Pierrelatte and Marcoule, to destroy its IRBM capabilities, and when it reduced its vehicle delivery systems by 50%.

However, it would be a mistake to interpret France's nuclear posture as simply another tool for its diplomacy. In comparison with other nuclear powers, the French republic has been consistently aggressive in its declarations about the possibilities of using the nuclear capabilities at its disposal. In 1995, for example, a white paper from the ministry of defence declared that "vital interests" are not necessarily interpreted as simply existential matters, i.e. that the nuclear arsenal could be employed in a wide range of potential situations.

It is similarly clear in its rejection of the idea of "no first use", basing this position on its right to self defence as stipulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This should be understood from a nationalist perspective as the possible use of nuclear force even when it is a response to a non-nuclear attack. Being the result of various declarations by French leaders during the past decade²⁰, this posture has relevance for countries in the sense that - even if they do not threaten French territorial integrity or intend to do so - they need to carefully calculate the possible consequences of harming French interests in general. The ambiguity that stems from this posture can be summarised by the four following points:

1. **It is based on the independence of France and its international position.** In this way it is stressed that its nuclear arsenal is not an instrument of last resort, but rather a tool that could be used in many different situations.

2. **It is independent of other national or international organisations.** In contrast with, for example, the UK, France does not believe it needs NATO, nor the US or any other actor to be able to use its nuclear weapons. This allows for a greater flexibility in the defence of its exclusive interests.

3. **It is flexible in relation to the strategic functions that it might be used for.** The French nuclear arsenal does not only exist to guarantee national integrity and survival of the state, but it also serves to defend other types of interests. This characteristic comes from the various programmes in existence and the diversity of its operational capabilities which are designed to offer options in a wide range of hypothetical situations.

4. **It is deliberately lacking transparency about the state of its forces.** Combining the frequent declarations about the hypothetical scenarios and possibilities of its use, there exist sufficient levels of doubt to contribute to an increased level of deterrence given the uncertainties that potential adversaries face. However, this has not kept France from being clear about its counterforce doctrine, insisting that in the case of a nuclear attack against a lesser power it would identify centres of power²¹ as primary objectives. France has also been clear about its idea of "*ultime avertissement*", i.e. the possibility of a limited attack as a last warning before nuclear destruction.

In short, the exceptional profiles of French nuclear systems as well as the fact that it remains the third nuclear power in the world, make France into a country of significant importance from a non-proliferation perspective. This is true even though its official line is that the French arsenal is one of “no use” in the present international context. In many regards, France has been the prototype of voluntary proliferators (in line with its strategy of “*tout azimuth*”), as it adopted this idea no so much from an explicit necessity of national survival but rather because of the desire to maintain itself among the main global powers. It is likewise an example of those who erroneously believe that nuclear weapons can prevent present-day threats.

The United Kingdom: Nuclear dependence designed for the 20th Century

The United Kingdom is, similarly to France, one of the traditional nuclear powers and as such has a long nuclear history and an operational arsenal that is well known and internationally accepted. The arsenal is currently composed of around 200 nuclear warheads, a number that is practically the same as the one of Israel and, possibly, China. Another parallel with France is that its political (and military) involvement in the Mediterranean has not translated into a strategic nuclear interest in the region. On the other hand, its capabilities and weapons range more than cover the area and it should, therefore, accept greater responsibility in matters of proliferation in the Mediterranean.

Two fundamental differences in nuclear matters with France are its doctrine – based on close cooperation with (and dependence on) the US – and a more limited vision of the importance of its arsenal when it comes to non-existential concerns. Since the very beginning, cooperation with its transatlantic partner has been intimate, both with respect to the development of capabilities as well as its maintenance. Although official use of the arsenal is fully independent, it would be difficult to imagine a practical scenario in which nuclear action is taken independently. Furthermore, the UK has always viewed its nuclear status as an ultimate line of defence against threats to its territorial integrity, rather than a possible tool to influence diplomatic or political issues. These two aspects are clearly related: the fact that the country has less nuclear flexibility and independence fits well with its own vision in which the nuclear option only serves to safeguard survival (as long as it can rely on its “special relationship” with Washington). It thereby renounces to a large extent other possible uses.

London has traditionally been very active diplomatically to promote non-proliferation. It signed the NPT on June 1, 1968, and the CTBT on September 24, 1996 (ratifying it April 6, 1998). This has not stopped it, however, from continuing to modernize its own nuclear capabilities. Its military nuclear programme completely falls under the ministry of defence, and since 1987 the production and maintenance of its nuclear warheads is controlled by the “Atomic Weapons Establishment”²².

- 23. For a complete list, see www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf84.htm.
- 24. <http://www.ukaea.org.uk/>
- 25. www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/non-proliferation/nuclear/safeguards-office/euratom-uk/page25345.html
- 26. www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/non-proliferation/nuclear/safeguards-office/iaea-safeguards/page25360.html

Nuclear Facilities

The UK produces roughly 20% of its energy in its 23 nuclear reactors²³, and since 1996, it has an important reprocessing facility at Sellafield. The organization that is responsible for its civil activities, the “UK Atomic Energy Authority”²⁴, is detached from its military nuclear activities. It is worth pointing out, however, that its first known facility was primarily aimed at the production of weapons-grade plutonium. All British civilian facilities function under both EURATOM²⁵ safeguards as well as those by the IAEA²⁶, with the Additional Protocol signed in 1998 and in effect since May 2004. Table 5 shows the main centres and facilities of the British nuclear arsenal.

Table 5: British Nuclear Facilities (selected)	
Name	Description
<i>AWE Aldermaston</i>	The centre of military nuclear activities. Most of the British nuclear research is conducted here, as well as the design of weapons and the production of nuclear components. Established in 1950.
<i>AWE Burghfield</i>	Here the final assembly of nuclear weapons takes place. It currently produces non-nuclear components and it is the deposit for weapons ready for dismantling or maintenance. Established in 1954.
<i>AWE Cardiff</i>	Produces complex components and assembly. Specialised in systems for thermonuclear weapons. It stores around 50 tonnes of depleted uranium. Established in 1963.
<i>AWE Foulness</i>	Testing area for high-explosives and the simulation of nuclear detonation impact.
<i>Sellafield/Windscale/Calder Hall</i>	Civil facility. On various occasions (most recently during the 1980s) it has been used for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. Established in 1950.
<i>Chapelcross</i>	Four military production reactors. Primary source of tritium.
<i>Capenhurst</i>	Production of enriched uranium. Established in 1953.

Sources: Nuclearweaponsarchive.org; World Nuclear Association

In great contrast to its French counterpart, Britain has only carried out 45 nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1991.

Evolution and military capabilities

In 1940, the UK became the first country to seriously study the possibilities of nuclear weapons and it subsequently made some important conceptual advances. Close cooperation in this area with the US (and Canada) started with the Quebec Agreement (1943). Britain was also an active member in the *Manhattan Project* and on August 29, 1945 the then Prime Minister Clement Attlee established a formal nuclear policy. Its first nuclear bomb (the 25kt *Hurricane*) was tested on October 3, 1953 near the island of Trimouille, off the North West coast of Australia. In November of the same year Britain began to deploy the first nuclear military devices.

After its first successful test of a hydrogen bomb in 1958, London signed a treaty with Washington (*US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement*) which consolidated the intimate and interdependent (in theory) relationship between the two countries. The agreement covered nearly all aspects of the nuclear arsenals, including missiles, the exchange of plutonium, early warning systems, and testing (at the Nevada facilities in the US). Since

the cancellation of the *Blue Streak* ballistic missile in 1960, the UK has not developed a single independent nuclear weapons programme. Although the agreements has been continuously criticised as it is seen as proliferating the British arsenal (in violation of the NPT), in 2004 the two allies decided to renew the agreement for another ten years.

The British nuclear strategy was initially based on delivery from its aircraft with free-fall bombs (chronologically the *Blue Danube*, *Red Beard*, *Violet Club*, *Yellow Sun* and the *WE-177²⁷*) and strategic missiles, especially the *Blue Steel* (deployed in 1962). In 1958, the US began the deployment of four squadrons (with 60 missiles in total) of the IRBM *Thor* – launched from mobile platforms - on British soil.

The anticipated successor of *Blue Steel*, the US *Skybolt* missile, was never deployed in the UK because of concerns over the vulnerability of the platforms being so close to Warsaw Pact-countries. The *Thor* missiles were also withdrawn for similar reasons. These concerns led to an increased incentive for the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The first nuclear submarine (SSBN), the *HMS Resolution*, began to patrol in 1968, armed with the SLBM *Polaris* which had been purchased from the US. The four submarines of this class that were built quickly became the central pillar of the British nuclear forces, eventually leading to the dismantling of the air based nuclear capabilities in 1998. Before that, in 1996, the last *Resolution* class submarine had been replaced by the new generation of *Vanguard* submarines which were armed with *Trident* SLBMs (see Table 6). In this sense the UK is unique among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in that it relies solely on the naval pillar of the traditional triad of delivery systems (air, sea and land) for its nuclear deterrent. This also seems to underline the confidence that the country has in continued partnership with its principal transatlantic ally.

27. <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/UKArsenalDev.html>

28. <http://www.parliament.uk/common/lib/research/rp98/rp98-091.pdf>

SSBN	Class	Date of first patrol
<i>Vanguard</i>	<i>Vanguard</i>	December 1994
<i>Victorious</i>	<i>Vanguard</i>	December 1995
<i>Vigilant</i>	<i>Vanguard</i>	June 1998
<i>Vengeance</i>	<i>Vanguard</i>	February 2001
SLBM	Range	Warhead x load
<i>Trident II D5</i>	7.400Km	1-3 x 100Kt

Source: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd05norris)

After the recommendations from the Strategic Defence Review of 1988²⁸ the situation of the British nuclear capabilities has been as follows:

- There has been a reduction in the total number of warheads to “less than 200” (from a maximum of 350 in 1975).
- Three of the four SSBN can be armed at any time with SLBM. There also exists a 15% “reserve” capacity.
- The UK possesses 58 *Trident* missiles (down from the 65 originally ordered).
- It is assumed that each SSBN carries a total of 16 missiles.

29. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030115/debtext/30115-07.htm>
30. "Blair begins push for Trident replacement", *The Guardian*, November 17, 2006.
31. "Reid hints at Trident replacement", *The Guardian*, November 1, 2005.
32. See for example the 9th Parliamentary Report 2005-06, P. 5 (<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmdfence/1558/1558.pdf>).

- At any given time there is at least one SSBN deployed, carrying 48 nuclear warheads.
- Each submarine now has single crew, rather than the double staffing of the Cold War.
- The submarines are on "several days notice to fire", rather than "minutes" during the Cold War.
- There is greater cooperation with the French nuclear forces.

Besides the offensive capabilities that are identified above, the UK has an extensive early warning network which is structured around the *Ballistic Missile Early Warning System* (BMEWS) – basically a radar system – and the *Defence Support Programme* (DSP) – based on satellites -, both of which are directly controlled by the US. The British government has similarly approved²⁹ the use of its territory for the deployment of a US missile defence system (*National Missile Defense System*).

The most recent information that is worth noting about these issues is that in November 2006 Prime Minister Tony Blair began pointing out once again the urgent need to debate the modernization of the *Trident* system³⁰. Joining his effort is Secretary of Defence John Reid who stressed the necessity to maintain a nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future (20-50 years)³¹. However, there are various political obstacles in defending such a significant investment in an era dominated by threats (including international terrorism) very different from those dominating the global security agenda during the Cold War.

UK strategy and nuclear doctrine

As has already been stated above, the British nuclear programme has been relatively one-dimensional, in sharp contrast to that of France. It was designed to guarantee as well as possible territorial integrity, and it depends almost in its totality on US cooperation. Whereas France has always been careful to guard both "acquisition independence" as well as "operational independence"³², albeit at a high financial cost, the UK gave up the first of those long ago, thereby attempting to reduce costs and achieve greater efficiency. However, the operational integration between British and US systems goes so deep that it is difficult to imagine a situation in which London could hypothetically use its nuclear weapons without close cooperation and agreement with the Washington. Furthermore, the fact that it only possesses a single type of delivery system (the SSBN carrying SLBMs) and that it only keeps one submarine on permanent patrol, means that the UK has less operational capabilities and less room to manoeuvre at a tactical level. It is also less ambiguous than France in the calculations of potential adversaries, although this is obviously a lesser issue.

In any case, this does not seem to be viewed as a problem by the UK government and military strategists. On the contrary, its 200 nuclear warheads are considered to be more than sufficient to deter any potential attack from another nuclear state. It should be pointed out here that this number is roughly the same as the arsenal of Israel, a country that is highly concerned with maintaining a nuclear deterrence that is strong enough to guarantee the nation's survival. Finally, it is worth noting that the UK's

transatlantic partner is considered another line of defence and is seen as a powerful deterrence that adversaries need to take into account.

In an attempt to qualify and complicate the British nuclear deterrent equation even further, after the Cold War (a period during which the basis for its nuclear capabilities were the *Trident* missiles), the then secretary of defence Malcolm Rifkind added a “substrategic” role, i.e. one of tactical options. This increased the number of possible scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons significantly. In essence, however, this change in doctrine hardly altered the traditional view of nuclear deterrence and was therefore interpreted as an announcement to avoid a possible confusion in situations of high tension or conflict that could lead to nuclear escalation³³. However, it did create a little more room to manoeuvre, or that is at least the conclusion from analyzing the UK posture on the hypothetical use of its nuclear arsenal towards Iraq before the start of the war in 2003 (in the case that Iraq would use biological or chemical weapons).

It is probably in this sense that one should interpret the Strategic Defence Review 2002, which states that “we also want it to be clear, particularly to the leaders of states of concern and terrorist organisations, that all our forces play a part in deterrence, and that we have a broad range of responses available”³⁴. This posture seemingly is contrary to the official insistence that nuclear deterrence is not a tool to respond to national security threats, but only to be used *in extremis* in situations that truly threaten the very existence of the nation³⁵. However, in reality it is highly improbable that the UK would contemplate the “substrategic” use of its nuclear forces. This is not just because of the strong anti-nuclear movement in British society, but also because it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the US would not be willing to act and the UK would. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that, as a condition of the agreements with Washington on the acquisition of the *Trident* missiles, it was agreed upon that these missiles need to be under NATO control in order to defend the Alliance “except where the UK government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake”³⁶. In other words, the UK neither has the military independence nor the willingness to employ its nuclear arsenal in the way the French do.

What is disturbing, however, is that with a nuclear arsenal that is less relevant than its international position seems to require, the UK government seems unwilling to play a more active role in the creation and support of more effective non-proliferation dynamics. At a time that is dominated by the threat of international terrorism and when the majority of national security concerns do not come from foreign governments but rather from non-state actors and movements, it is hard to imagine an effective role for nuclear weapons in dealing with them. As Nicola Butler argues, “the implication is that the UK is willing, if necessary, to use its nuclear weapons against states of concern and terrorist organisations, raising the question of how this could be done without also killing large numbers of civilians”³⁷. The classical argument of nuclear deterrence could continue to be valid in realist terms, but the use of such capabilities to face the new problems of the 21st Century shows that still the necessary adaptation to today’s realities has not taken place.

33. “Our analysis of deterrence, and the contribution of nuclear weapons to it, now has to relate to a new context. The basic ideas do not change. Deterrence is about sustaining in the mind of the potential aggressor a belief that our use of the weapons could not prudently be altogether discounted”. RIFKIND, Malcolm, *UK Defence Strategy; A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?*, 1993.
34. “Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter”, *Ministry of Defence*, Cm 5566 Vol. I, July 2002.
35. This was reaffirmed by the 8th Parliamentary Report from 2005-06: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmdfence/986/98605.htm#n46>
36. *British American Security Information Council*: <http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/legaln.htm#11>
37. *Military and political aspects of British Nuclear Forces and Defence Policy*, presentation to the British American Information Council, November 6, 2004.

The United States: A source of proliferation in the Mediterranean

Notwithstanding the importance of France and the UK in Mediterranean affairs, their stature in the region with respect to WMD is dwarfed by the United States. It is obvious that the US dominates the international arena, but this is nowhere as clear as in the Mediterranean and nowhere as strong as in issues related to nuclear proliferation. These significant differences and the fact that the US arsenals and programmes are based on a global perspective make it impossible to follow the same structure as the previous two sections. Therefore, the objective of this section is to underline the influence - both directly as well as from a distance - which the US presence in the Mediterranean has with respect to WMD and regional security more generally. Unfortunately, its current posture seems to only accelerate the proliferation tendencies.

Starting with some factual analysis, the dominance of the US military presence in the region is undeniable: Military bases in countries like Turkey and Bahrain, the deployment of roughly 140,000 troops in Iraq, and the presence of the VI Fleet in the Mediterranean and the V Fleet in the Persian Gulf speak for themselves. Moreover, its behaviour with respect to WMD proliferation only strengthens this profile:

- **With respect to Israel** – Even if Israel would not have been a nuclear power in its own right (and one that does not appear to be neglecting other forms of WMD either), its Arab neighbours' concerns and perceptions are undoubtedly negatively affected by the long shadow cast by the US nuclear capabilities that protect its principal ally in the region.
- **With respect to the unsuccessful attempts to create a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFL)** – Even without taking into account that the US nuclear capabilities cover the entire globe, military balance in the region remains impossible as long as US supremacy exists in the Mediterranean and is being used for narrowly defined self-interests. The possibilities for and initiatives of a NWFL are significantly reduced as a result.
- **With respect to possible proliferation by Iran** - As analysed in sections below, there is a long history of suspicions and accusations about the nuclear program of Iran, and it is full of incorrect predictions so far. Part of the explanation behind this lies in endogenous factors, yet there is no doubt that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 - in combination with the blatant lack of military action against North Korea - has been a powerful factor in encouraging members of the so-called "axis of evil" to resort to a nuclear deterrence against what is perceived as a direct US threat.
- **With respect to the safety of ADM arsenals** – The US is in a unique position to promote cooperation and transparency within non-proliferation frameworks. Its reluctant attitude in strengthening the mandate of organisations like the IAEA, however, undermines the agenda of non-proliferation. It has failed to support – at least without double standards - the strict adherence to existing treaties and control structures and has not created any strong new initiatives in this area. If one adds to that the detrimental effects of the "war on terror", it is easy to understand the growing opposition to greater international cooperation with respect to WMD.

To summarise, it is impossible underestimate the impact that the US has on the agenda on WMD in the Mediterranean. This impact starts with the simple observation that the country has the most modern and largest (active) nuclear arsenal in the world³⁸, regardless of the discrepancy between its official non-proliferation advocacy and the practical actions it takes in this area. Although there are various structural obstacles that need to be overcome first (Israel, geo-economic interests, international terrorism) and even if its attitude so far has been less than favourable, Washington remains a potentially vital actor in turning around the negative tendencies in the region with respect to proliferation.

*US nuclear capabilities: a brief summary*³⁹

With the Russian and US nuclear arsenals fully operational, it is difficult to talk about truly nuclear weapons free zones or regions: The two former rivals cover every corner of the globe with their nuclear capabilities and, at least in Washington, their presence and interests can only be described as global. The US nuclear arsenal is unrivalled at the moment, and possesses an impressive scope, both in terms of variety and quality as well as quantity⁴⁰ of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. This is true even with the substantial reductions that were carried out after the end of the Cold War.

Of its 5,521 active nuclear warheads⁴¹ in January 2006, Table 7 shows that 5,021 are strategic – distributed over its triad of delivery capabilities: ICBM (1,050 warheads), submarines (2,016) and bombers (1,955) – and roughly 500⁴² are tactical – *Tomahawk* cruise missiles and *B61* bombs. It is of course impossible to know how many are oriented towards the Mediterranean, especially given that the range and flexibility of the arsenal permits a rapid redeployment and retargeting if necessary. However, there are hundreds of US *B61* bombs deployed in European countries like Turkey, Italy, Germany, the UK, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

- 38. On the one hand, it signed the NPT on June 1, 1968 (ratified in 1970) and it has not carried out any more tests since 1992. On the other hand, however, the Senate refused to ratify the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) in 1999, thereby weakening its leadership potential in non-proliferation matters. In 2002 a similar rejection occurred, when the US unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty (Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile). Also, even if it does not physically test anymore, the US possesses complex computer simulations that certainly go against the spirit of the CTBT, if not the letter. Another polemic situation occurred when in 2003 the president authorized the development of a new generation of tactical weapons.
- 39. For a more detailed discussion, see http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/USA/index.html
- 40. In terms of total warheads (active and passive combined) Russia still has the edge (see Table 1).
- 41. For a detailed list of US nuclear warheads, see: <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html>
- 42. According to Robert S. Norris y Hans M. Kristensen, in "U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2006, pp. 68-71. Other studies, for example the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI, www.nti.org), estimate this number to be around 800.

43. For an updated and detailed analysis, of the US nuclear strategy, see MCDONOUGH, David S., "Nuclear superiority", *Adelphi Paper* No. 383, IISS, London, 2006.
44. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/jp3_12_1.pdf
45. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>

Table 7: US Nuclear Forces				
Delivery Vehicle	Number	Year of deployment	Warheads x load (Kt.)	Active/Reserve
ICBM				
<i>LGM-30G Minuteman III</i>				
<i>Mk-12</i>	150	1970	1 W62 x 170	150
<i>Mk-12</i>	50	1970	3 W62 x 170 (MIRV)	150/30
<i>Mk-12^a</i>	300	1979	2-3 W78 x 335 (MIRV)	750/35
Total	500			1,050/65
SLBM				
<i>UGM-133A Trident II D5</i>				
<i>Mk-4</i>	-	1992	6 W76 x 100 (MIRV)	1,632/80
<i>Mk-5</i>	-	1990	6 W88 x 455 (MIRV)	384/20
Total	336			2,016/100
Aircraft				
<i>B-52H Stratofortress</i>	94/56*	1961	ALCM/W80-1 x 5-150	
<i>ACM/W80-1 x 5-150</i>	1,000/30			
<i>B-2A Spirit</i>	21/16	1994	B61-7, - 11, B83-1	555
Total	115/72			1,955/50
Non-strategic forces				
<i>Tomahawk SLCM</i>	325	1984	1 W80-0 x 5-150	100
<i>B61-3, -4</i>	-	1979	0.3 – 170	400
Total	325			500
Total				5,521/215

*The first number is the total of aircraft. The second refers to those that are operational and assigned to specific missions.

Source: *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (http://www.thebulletin.org/print_nn.php?art_ofn=jf06norris).

*The nuclear doctrine*⁴³

In contrast to the ambiguities that have been created by France and the UK, the US has been much more explicit, formal and rigorous in its national nuclear doctrine. Without needing to go back even further in time, during the Bill Clinton administration the *Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations*⁴⁴ was agreed upon in 1996. It introduced three substantial changes to the US nuclear doctrine which, up until then, had been designed practically exclusively as a deterrent to a possible Soviet/Russian attack. Firstly, it identified non-state actors as legitimate targets for nuclear weapons. Secondly, Department of Defense modified the list of countries that could become nuclear targets, including Iran and North Korea. Thirdly, military commanders on the ground were transferred greater autonomy to be able to react independently in case of a WMD attack. This final issue dramatically changed the thinking about the use of force in defence of national security.

In December 2001, the *Nuclear Posture Review*⁴⁵ created a catalogue of various alternative scenarios for the use of nuclear force, and it identified countries that could be susceptible to such an attack: China,

Russia, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria. The contemplated situations can be summarised as follows:

- Against targets that are resistant to conventional attacks;
- As retaliation in reaction to a WMD attack; and
- “Surprising military developments”.

The same document mentioned the possible necessity to use nuclear force to destroy chemical or biological weapons, and even went as far as to suggest possible uses as part of a military resolution of Arab-Israeli conflict. In 2002, the *National Strategy to Combat WMD*⁴⁶ already considered the threat of using these weapons to avoid WMD proliferation by other states or non-governmental groups. Finally, in 2005, the *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations* stated that the new doctrine contained a certain “expeditionary aura that threatens to make nuclear weapons just another tool in the toolbox. The result is nuclear pre-emption, which the new doctrine enshrines into official U.S. joint nuclear doctrine for the first time, where the objective no longer is deterrence through threatened retaliation but battlefield destruction of targets”⁴⁷.

This official posture by Washington does not only go against the idea of non-proliferation, but also reduces the threshold to use nuclear weapons and even results in a contradiction with the statements towards Iran and other countries about their non-proliferation obligations. However, the most concerning development has been the formal approval of pre-emptive attacks against enemy or “terrorist” states and groups⁴⁸, even if they do not pose a direct threat to the country’s territorial integrity.

In light of the last two documents mentioned above, it can be argued that policy has moved from “mutual assured destruction” – the basic strategic nuclear pillar during the five decades before – to “unilateral assured destruction”, which leads to the need of nuclear superiority. On the other hand, even if the triad concept is maintained, the US nuclear forces are no longer based on the classical land, naval and air capabilities. Instead, they are being converted into 1) strike systems (grouping the three components of the former triad); 2) defensive systems of damage control (which includes the still far-from operational “missile defense shield”); and 3) a revitalised defence infrastructure that allows greater response flexibility and speed in order to create new nuclear (or other) capabilities.

It should be pointed out that, of course, reports and documents of this type, even if officially endorsed, do not always become implemented as policies and that, at the same time, there are clear advantages to maintaining a certain ambiguity (as was already mentioned about France). However, they still have an important impact in the sense that they condition the thinking within military circles and influence political decisions.

With respect to the Mediterranean more specifically, it is useful to mention that the media in the US already became aware in November 2003 that Strategic Command had been developing plans (CONPLAN

46. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>

47. KRISTENSEN, Hans, *The Role of US Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge*, September 2005 (http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/09/00_kristensen_us-nuclear-weapons-doctrine.htm).

48. “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction. (...) To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively”. *National Security Strategy*, White House, 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

49. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051400071.html
50. Norris y Kristensen, op. cit.
51. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-109.htm>
52. Another example would be the US support for the creation of "second strike" capabilities by Israel.
53. According to the Pentagon, the new weapons are "safe" for the civilian population: (<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060217&articleId=1988>).
54. Although it could also be argued that the Korean example increases the need for effective ways to redirect the Iranian nuclear programme.

8022-02) to deal with Iran through a combination of tactical options that included the possible use of nuclear weapons⁴⁹. In the beginning of 2004, the then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld ordered the implementation of the strategy⁵⁰. In 2005, Israel probably received its first generation of tactical nuclear weapons from the US⁵¹, once again accelerating the process of proliferation in the Mediterranean and stimulating other countries to follow its path⁵².

By reducing so dramatically the threshold of nuclear weapons use, the US is creating a tense and unpredictable dynamic, especially in the Mediterranean. In the hypothetical case that one day it will use its new "mini-nukes", it is likely that it would be in the Mediterranean. Including in the unlikely event that everything works as intended (adequate intelligence, precise technology, minimum collateral damage⁵³...) it is difficult to imagine that countries or groups that are attacked would distinguish between "traditional" nuclear deterrence weapons and these new types. This would obviously invalidate any call for restraint or the necessity for diplomacy and cooperation.

Even if the new doctrine does not lead to these types of drastic actions mentioned in the documents, the result of the recent changes in the US nuclear strategy is a clear increase in international tension and unease. It is generating new barriers for cooperation in non-proliferation matters and the fight against international terrorism, and, it gives clear incentives to Washington's adversaries to develop and obtain their own methods of deterrence.

Iran and nuclear proliferation

During the past months, North Korea has taken some of the attention away from Islamic Republic of Iran in the debate about nuclear proliferation, giving the latter greater room to manoeuvre⁵⁴. Still, the diplomatic conflict between Iran and the principal western powers about its nuclear programme remains a priority on the international agenda. Even though the conflict seems to be centred on the rivalry between the US and Iran – thereby giving the issue a global profile – the potential consequences of a nuclear Iran affect the Mediterranean much more than the rest of the planet. The Mediterranean obviously is important to the rest of the world, and Iran has at least 11% of global oil reserves and 14% of gas reserves, making it the second worldwide in both areas. It is, however, more accurate to see the issue as primarily a regional conflict, rather than one of universal and existential proportions.

It is unfortunately impossible to avoid the fact that Iran has become another chapter within the "war on terror" based on the mistaken idea that the world is heading for a cultural and religious clash between Islamic and western civilizations. Within this context, a large part of the discussion about the issue resembles a criminal investigation: it seems clear who is the culprit and now the only thing left to do is finding evidence and weapons used for the homicide. It is probably because of this that most of the debate centres on identifying and denouncing matters related to the non-compliance with the international rules of non-proliferation. This has distracted from finding holistic solutions;

from determining what are the legitimate strategic interests of the conflicting parties; and, especially, what could be the answers that avoid an inevitable slide towards violent conflict.

The debate about the Iranian proliferation crisis is in large part blocked by a number of assumptions that have erroneously come to be perceived as irrefutable facts and common knowledge. For example, it is already taken for granted that Iran has a sophisticated programme in place to develop nuclear weapons⁵⁵, in spite of the fact that there is still no hard evidence, only indications and deductions based on comparative strategic rationale. This goes against the official position of Iran that nuclear weapons are not a national objective⁵⁶. Another common assumption – one of many – is that nuclear proliferation by countries such as Iran automatically leads to nuclear terrorism, even though there are many reasons to believe that this is not the case⁵⁷. Added to this gloomy image are the negative effects that the revelations about the Pakistani scientists A.G. Khan and his illegal nuclear trafficking network had. Although it was officially closed in 2001, Pakistan did not investigate until October 2003 when a shipment of centrifuges destined for Libya was intercepted and for a while it allowed Iran to accelerate its nuclear programme⁵⁸.

Taking into account these initial considerations, the concern about the supposed nuclear programme in Iran is obviously justified. Even if the emergence of a proliferating Iran should not be automatically equated with the end of world order as we know it – something that is argued by many – it is undeniable that the current crisis is seriously threatening Mediterranean security. It is exactly because of this that the diplomatic failures so far to halt Iranian nuclear appetite are so grave. The repercussion of what is happening in Tehran does not only affect the Persian Gulf and the Near East but will also end up affecting global security in a variety of ways. It is because of this that the mayor international players should reconsider their strategies in this regard, and become more effective and consistent in their handling of the situation: The US, in its capacity of world leader and as a country that has very close links with the region; the EU, both as a Mediterranean actor as well as its role as a mayor energy importer from the region; and the UN, as the main organization of reference for the international community and because of its mandate to lead the world in efforts to create peace and security.

A brief summary of the situation so far

There is a long history of declarations, diplomacy, inspections and indications that all seem to suggest that already before the Islamic Revolution of 1979 –that was led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini⁵⁹– there existed a sustained nuclear ambition (peaceful or otherwise) in Iran⁶⁰. In spite of this, international concern and tension did not fully manifest itself until January 2002 when President George W. Bush included the country in his unfortunate “axis of evil”. This was exacerbated when in August of the same year the National Council of Resistance of Iran (an Iranian opposition group) exposed the existence of secret nuclear activities and facilities in Natanz and Arak.

55. In May 2006, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer proclaimed that there could be no reasonable doubt that Iran had the ambition to equip itself with nuclear weapons (“The Case for Bargaining with Iran”, *The Washington Post*, 29 de mayo de 2006). Also, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philippe Douste-Blazy, insisted that the Iranian nuclear programme was illegal (*BBC News*, February 16, 2006, http://news.bbc.c.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4718838.stm).
56. The two most frequent arguments are that such weapons go against the principles of Islam, and that the era of nuclear weapons has reached its end.
57. See Section III of the report for a discussion of terrorism.
58. Khan confessed to have had engaged in Iranian nuclear proliferation between 1989 and 2000. (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm>).
59. The first nuclear activities in Iran started in the 1950s with US support. However, it was not until the 1979 revolution that it came to be considered a threat.
60. See Section V for a detailed chronology.

61. For example in June 2003 and June 2004. (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/laeairan/iran_timeline3.shtml).
62. In fact, there have been various refutations of the US accusations on this issue. For example, in September 2006, Vilmos Cserveny, director of external relations of the IAEA send a letter to the US Congress, rejecting such a report by the intelligence services. The letter called the information in the report "erroneous, misleading and unsubstantiated". (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_09_06_iaea.pdf).
63. www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-nuclear-iran-ahmadinejad.html

From this point on, Iran came to be identified as a primary threat within the "war on terror" framework. Since then, the conflict has been tainted by a permanent exchange of accusatory rhetoric, reports and diplomatic efforts with the US, the EU, the UN, the IAEA, and the so-called EU-3 (France, UK and Germany) as the principal actors in a search for evidence that would allow a true assessment of the Iranian nuclear programme. While Washington has continued to increase its threats in the conviction that Iran is accelerating the process to obtain nuclear weapons, the EU-3 has centred on a diplomatic approach to change Iranian behaviour through incentives. The IAEA, by means of considerable pressure, has managed to gain access to facilities that potentially hide activities illegal under NTP obligations. In this way it hopes to be able to determine the true state of a programme that is only partly known to the outside world.

On various occasions during the past years⁶¹, the director general of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, has criticised Iran for its lack of cooperation. However, he did not openly accuse Tehran of non-compliance with its basic NPT obligations until, in February 2006, the Governor's Board of the organisation voted – suspecting a hidden nuclear programme - to refer the case of Iran to the UN Security Council. This measure led to the Islamic Republic's withdrawal from voluntary cooperation with the IAEA and limiting its actions to only its minimum obligations under current treaties (which do not include the more demanding rules from the Additional Protocol that Tehran signed in 1997 but never ratified). It maintains, however, that its programme is purely aimed at peaceful purposes of nuclear energy. This stance culminated in the declaration of the Iranian president on April 14, 2005, that his country had managed to enrich uranium for nuclear reactors after having linked a total of 164 centrifuges.

Since then, the conflict has centred on the UN, with Iran still rejecting the suspension of its enrichment activities. This situation led the Security Council on July 31 to set a deadline (August 31) for Iran to halt its activities in this area. Iran ignored this demand, using the valid argument that uranium enrichment does not constitute a violation of the NPT⁶². It thereby opens the door to sanctions, although so far, at the moment of finishing this report, no such action by the UN has been taken. The Iranian authorities know the differences that exist about the adoption of punitive measures among the various members of the Security Council. Tehran counts on the continued backing by actors, like Russia and China, which are loath to accept Washington's proposals on this matter.

The EU-3 continues to search for an improbable agreement with Tehran, using economic incentives which do not seem sufficiently attractive to Iran. Moreover, the Islamic Republic understands that the solution to the crisis cannot be found in European capitals but rather in Washington, which refuses to give security guarantees to the Persian nation. Under such circumstances, it should not come as a surprise that President Ahmadinejad reaffirmed on 23 October 2006 that "they (the West) should know that to enjoy nuclear energy is a demand of the entire Iranian nation... All Iranians insist on this right and will not yield an inch"⁶³.

Faced with this Iranian posture, the Western position – under the leadership from Washington but followed by other countries at various levels – is that there is already sufficient evidence that Iran not only has the ambition, but also the specific programme designed to obtain nuclear weapons. These perceptions, combined with its antagonistic behaviour against Israel and the West in general⁶⁴ as well as its support for groups such as Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and even Hamás, all contribute to a willingness to form a common front against Iranian intentions. Although this front has not yet been made explicit – there still are significant differences of opinion in the Security Council between the US and the EU-3 – there does exist a gradual strengthening of the list of accusations that can be used in order to take steps against Tehran. These accusations – and only citing the most relevant ones - can be summarised as follows⁶⁵:

1. Military participation in the running of the uranium mine and facility at Gchine⁶⁶.
2. Experiments with Polonium-210 (an isotope that can be used in nuclear weapons)⁶⁷.
3. Direct military control over the majority of centrifuge facilities.
4. Nuclear research by the Ministry of Defence at the centre at Lavisan⁶⁸.
5. A project in 1987, by means of the network of A.Q. Khan, to produce certain components of nuclear weapons⁶⁹.
6. Designs of the Shahab-3 missiles that allow them to be equipped with nuclear warheads⁷⁰.
7. Documents that show the conceptual phase of designs for high-explosive detonators⁷¹.
8. Partial plans for the conversion of uranium dioxide, possibly for subsequent enrichment⁷².
9. Blueprints for a subterranean facility apparently designed for nuclear tests⁷³.
10. Apparent bureaucratic connections between the armed forces and the nuclear programme.

Adding to the concerns that such a list raises, there are also suspicions about the activities at the following facilities:

- Tehran: 5Mw research reactor (under IAEA control).
- Isfahan: Centre for Nuclear Technology, with four small reactors (with a total of 30Kw) under the control of the IAEA, and a centre for uranium conversion.
- Bushehr: A centre for nuclear energy with a 1,000Mw reactor being currently constructed (planned to be operational in November 2007)⁷⁴.
- Arak: Heavy water facility (inaugurated by President Ahmadinejad on August 26, 2006) and the construction of a reactor planned to become operational in 2014.
- Natanz: Uranium enrichment facility with 164 centrifuges already completed and another 1,000 under construction. This facility draws most attention because of its focus on enrichment.

With respect to the Iranian authorities, it does not seem at the moment as if the international objections and resistance is dampening their spirits in this regard. The speed of its programme is not decreasing, and there

64. "Ahmadinejad warns Europe it will pay for backing Israel", *The Guardian*, October 21, 2006.
65. FITZPATRICK, Mark, "Assessing Iran's Nuclear Programme", *Survival*, Vol. 8: 3, Autumn 2006.
66. KERR, Paul, "IAEA: More Questions on Iran Nuclear Program", *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 35: 6, July/August 2005.
67. OIEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", GOV/2004/11, February 24, 2004, P. 5.
68. OIEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", GOV/2006/38, GOV/2006/38, June 8, 2006, P. 3.
69. OIEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006, P. 5.
70. BROAD, William J. and SANGER, David E., "Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims", *New York Times*, November 13, 2005.
71. KERR, Paul, "Questions Surround Iran's Nuclear Program", *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 36: 2, March 2006.
72. OIEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006, P. 8.
73. Ibid.
74. On February 26, 2006, Russia stated that the facility would be finished by November 2007. It has also agreed to supply 80 tonnes of fuel for the facility's activities.

- 75. Even when the reactor at Bushehr enters into service at the end of 2007, nuclear energy will only cover 3% of the total demand in Iran.
- 76. Iran has admitted to fourteen separate violations of the safeguard protocols.
- 77. It is interesting that, in spite of this wealth, Iran is a net importer when it comes to refined oil products because of a lack of refining capacity.
- 78. While some sources believe this to be only a few years, others set the date somewhere after 2020. See for example "Analysts Say a Nuclear Iran Is Years Away", *New York Times*, April 13, 2006.
- 79. April 7, 2006, during a televised speech in the city of Masad.

is nothing to suggest that any of its programmes will be abandoned in the short term. At the same time, Iran also does not seem to be willing to respond to accusations that given its wealth in natural energy resources⁷⁵, its nuclear problem can only have military ends. In short, while at the same time insisting on civilian purposes, it refuses to convincingly explain its rejection of full cooperation with the IAEA⁷⁶.

In general terms, the official Iranian position can be summarised by its insistence on their lack of interest in nuclear weapons, by its defending of the right to develop an national nuclear programme, and in its maintaining that, besides strict obligations under the NPT, no one can force Tehran to supply more information about its facilities or ambitions in this area. With respect to its isolated violations of the non-proliferation regime, Iran defends itself with the argument that it is only in regard to minor, purely technical issues. Its refusal to allow full access by IAEA inspectors is explained by Tehran as protection commercial and military interests. It does point out, however, that since 2003 it has allowed the equivalent of 2,000 man-hours of inspections. Finally, to explain the fact that it wants nuclear energy despite its wealth in other energy sources, Iran likes to point to the importance of energy independence⁷⁷ and the possibilities of commercial uranium (mineral) activities. All of these issues are mentioned without ever failing to point out that the country accepts and adheres to its international obligations. Similarly, Iran stresses that it is always willing to enter into negotiations and that on various occasions it has already suspended its uranium enrichment activities as a gesture of goodwill.

To those who are certain that Iran is directly moving towards nuclear weapons – the dominant posture among officials and academics, at least in the West – there are only doubts about the exact moment at which Iran will become a nuclear power. To predict that exact moment seems to require magic or prophecy rather than rigorous analysis given the huge disparities that exist among open sources with respect to the subject matter. In any case, it does not seem overly adventurous to state that, at a minimum, there is no imminent danger of this happening. In this light it is also worth noting that obtaining a capacity to make nuclear weapons is not equivalent to actually producing them. In any case, there exists a long time period between testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles⁷⁸, as the North Korean case has made abundantly clear.

In parallel to this disturbing process there is another threat developing that is quickly becoming uncontrollable and which is dominating the headlines at the moment: A war of words that is continuously increasingly escalating towards greater conflict. When President Ahmadinejad declared that Iran had enriched uranium⁷⁹, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reacted the following day by demanding "strong steps" by the UN Security Council. When the president of the Iranian parliament, Gholam Ali Hadaeadeh, claimed the right for his country to develop peaceful application of nuclear technology on August 30, President Bush issued a statement the following day that there would be consequences and that the "radical regime" in Tehran is a threat to the world. Summarising, when Iran seem to talk about energy, the US thinks about weapons. When Tehran mentions

“inalienable rights”, Washington only sees “nuclear threat and terrorism”. Under these circumstances it is unlikely that the main actors will be able to move towards greater mutual understanding and more room for negotiations in order to let the IAEA be able to do its job.

80. An exception to this rule can be found in SOKOLSKI, Henry & CLAWSON (eds.), Patrick, *Getting Ready for a Nuclear Ready Iran*, US Ministry of Defence, 2005: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil>

Possible motives behind a disturbing nuclear programme

In spite of the weakness of the “evidence” accumulated so far, the opponents of the Iranian nuclear ambitions insist that a military nuclear programme is active and that the only thing left to discover are the signs that it has been active for a long time. Unfortunately, this search for details has replaced the geopolitical analysis which tends to be more productive in such situations. It should be pointed out that there are disturbing similarities with the situation related to Iraq in 2002 and 2003. The obvious danger of this behaviour is that it leads to an inevitable confrontation between the actors involved, in this case Iran and the international community under the leadership of the US. The mutual lack of respect of legitimate interests of each side prohibits negotiations at a strategic level, and each new accusation and declaration becomes another step towards the abyss given that any rectification will be seen as an unacceptable defeat.

There are various reasons to believe that Iran does in fact have the ambition to become a nuclear weapon state and that, once this objective is close to becoming reality, the official discourse will change accordingly. The lack of cooperation with the IAEA seems to support this idea, even if it is not conclusive. After all, there are various reasons why a nation would like to maintain a level of uncertainty in this regard, as can be witnessed throughout recent history.

On one hand, it can be advantageous to keep the international community – or some countries - guessing. It can allow more room at negotiations if suspicions about one’s intentions are higher. On the other hand, it could serve as a domestic tool, creating a common cause that leads to national pride and internal cohesion. Finally, similarly to the unsuccessful attempts by Saddam Hussein, a certain level of ambiguity could be a deterrent for potential aggressors, present or future. It is curious that these arguments are not discussed more during the international debate on this theme⁸⁰; instead, the focus is on relative details about Iran’s compliance with international regulations and its failure to cooperate.

When identifying the principal motive behind the possible ambition of Iran to become a nuclear power, three stand out: 1) Geopolitical reasons, i.e. the idea that a country can only “play in the big league” if it has nuclear capabilities; 2) Regional ambitions, i.e. the fact that Iran wants to become a more dominant actor in the region and be a leader of the Persian Gulf nations; and 3) National security, i.e. the necessity of a nuclear deterrent against enemies of the current regime in Tehran.

Before analysing in greater detail these three possible motives, it is worth stressing that, from a realist perspective, none of the above reasons are outside the established norms of behaviour in the

81. "The Iranians are realists. They don't aim to win a set piece battle against the United States. They know it's impossible. Their policy is to deter the United States and its allies by threatening a war that will cause such damage at such a price that this option will become unacceptable to the United States. With this perspective, they are not focusing their efforts on renovating their quite large armed forces. Rather, they are investing very smartly in deterrence enhancers and force multipliers". RUBIN, Uzi, "The Global Range of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program", *Jerusalem Issue Brief*, Vol. 5, No. 26, June 20, 2006.
82. Sokolski and Clawson affirms that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria and Egypt will potentially become nuclear states in the near future. This is argued to be especially like if Iran obtains nuclear weapon capabilities. See Sokolski y Clawson, op.cit.

international arena. Aware of its marginalisation after 1979, Iran – if indeed developing nuclear weapons - would be acting in similar fashion as other states before, both in their attempt to define a new position after the Cold War as well as more recently after 9/11⁸¹. From this point of view, the only justifiable moral criticism would be that Iran is not sufficiently adhering to its legal obligations under the non-proliferation agreements.

However, in the current international climate it is unlikely that this will stop Tehran's appetite for nuclear programmes. The way to halt the process of possible Iranian proliferation rather seems to lie in reforming the legal structures in this area. It is simply unsustainable to continue punishing Iran for its supposed violation of an international agreement (signed in 1968 and ratified in 1970) while other countries, such as Israel, India and Pakistan, have rejected that treaty completely, and have never cooperated with international community in this regard. Consequently, the solution of both the "Iranian problem" as well as nuclear proliferation in general does not come from engaging in a game of give and take with each individual country that is under suspicion, but rather from changing the very infrastructure in this area. An obvious start would be the NPT.

The first possible Iranian motive – moving out of isolation and gaining international influence – has already been a factor for other nations – for example South Africa and Brazil) during the Cold War. Although fortunately the majority of these attempts failed, it seems that nowadays aspiring leaders (regional or global) are once again considering the nuclear option. Moreover, even nations with international ambitions or strategic difficulties are tempted to resort to nuclear weapons programmes. This seems to have happened with Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea, all nations that are already considered *de facto* nuclear powers. The Mediterranean harbours various candidates to reach this position as well, first among them Iran itself⁸². Besides the prestige and a new and potent mechanism of defence of territorial sovereignty, nuclear weapons seem to open doors in the international community. The diplomatic weight and the capacity this type of country has to influence the regional and international agendas is, beyond the shadow of a doubt, incomparably higher than it has before taking the nuclear path.

With respect to the second of possible considerations mentioned above, Iran has already taken mayor steps in becoming a regional leader. In fact, with its historic rival Iraq severely weakened, Iran should already be considered a leader among the Middle Eastern nations. What is at stake, therefore, is the consolidation of this position in order to be recognised as such by all its neighbours, including Saudi Arabia which likes to view itself as the leader of the Sunni world because of its role as guardian of the principal holy places of Islam, as well as its oil-wealth.

In order to achieve this goal, Iran – using the diverse official and non-governmental networks at its disposal - is employing various methods, ranging from its prominence at the Organization of Islamic Conference, to its immense military and hydrocarbon potential. Based on these strengths it adopts a strong rhetorical and populist posture, both

nationally as well as regionally. Israel and the US are the primary targets in this attempt to garner popular support for its ambitions and for external recognition (in the Persian Gulf as well as the entire Shiite world)⁸³.

As the history of the 20th Century has shown, nuclear capabilities facilitate leadership aspirations. Combined with the approval of large parts in the Arab (i.e. not only Persian) and Islamic (including among Sunnis) world, the Iranian nuclear ambitions will be seen as a just balance to Israeli dominance in the region. Clearly, Tehran has a strong position if it does decide to pursue access to nuclear weapons. It would allow the country to leave its old rival Iraq forever behind, it would downgrade the importance of Saudi Arabia, and it would openly challenge Israeli regional power. If it also manages to make the US and the international community recognise its position and stop their attempts of regime change in Tehran, Iran would be richly compensated for the costs that proliferation might carry.

The third strategic reason for Iran to begin a nuclear weapons programme would be pure territorial defence and the survival of the regime that was established in 1979. Ever since the beginning of the regime's Islamic path, and especially since its inclusion in the "axis of evil", Iranian leaders have been aware that they are in continuous sight of powers such as Israel and the US. In the case of the first, the undeclared nuclear arsenals of Tel Aviv have long been regarded as a purely defensive tool that existed to guarantee the state's survival. As such, its devastating powers were not perceived as a direct threat to Iran. However, the evolution of these arsenals – now equipped with "second strike" capabilities⁸⁴ - and the fact that it might be warming to the ideas from Washington about "pre-emptive wars", have made Iran view Israel as a direct existential threat. To these Iranian concerns should be added the declarations by various Israeli government and military representatives that identify Iran as a regional destabilising force and a supporter of international terrorism⁸⁵ (in reference to its direct support for Hezbollah and other groups). In short, Israel is seen as a primary and direct rival in the sense that the behaviour of one could hamper that of the other, and that peaceful coexistence is by no means guaranteed.

Notwithstanding these regional dangers, probably the most worrying threat and the strongest incentive for Iran to "go nuclear" come from Washington. The US perfectly understands the strategic importance of Iran in the region, and it is no coincidence that the Persian nation was one of the main pillars of its local control until the fall of Shah Reza Pahlavi. From the moment it lost this control, the desire by Washington to punish those who overthrew the old regime or, at the very least, to completely marginalise them on the international stage, is well known. After the unfortunate undertaking in Iraq that started in March 2003 and the subsequent situation in which the US is bogged down, it has become even clearer that Iran still has many ways in which it can undermine White House plans for the region.

Consequently, for the last three years there has been a continual attempt at eliminating the Iranian regime from the picture, both

83. This is the way it is viewed by Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations and author of *Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic* - (forthcoming), Times Books/Henry Holt, October 2006. (<http://www.reason.com/rauch/090506.shtml>).

84. The entering into service of the new generation of submarines *Dolphin U212* makes this a much more likely scenario.

85. Besides Iran, the US State Department also identifies Cuba, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea as belonging to this category. (<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm>).

86. "Estados Unidos debe garantizar la seguridad de Irán para superar la crisis", *El País*, March 9, 2006.

through sanctions as well as military threats. From this perspective, it is not surprising that Tehran is moving its pieces, both in Iraq as well as Lebanon and even Saudi Arabia. This not only serves to show its strength internationally but also to reduce tensions on its own territorial integrity.

Within this growing framework, the lessons from Iraq (which as attacked even though it was known that it did not possess nuclear weapons) and North Korea (which was not attacked, at least in part because of the clear signs that it did have nuclear capabilities) have been well understood by Iran. There is probably no better reason for Iran to develop nuclear weapons than to simply avoid the fate of its Iraqi neighbour three years ago.

It is precisely because of this that it is worth pointing the need for a new approach to the case of Iran, as has been argued by Hans Blix, the former chief weapons inspector of the UN in Iraq. This former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the ex-director of the IAEA argue that "if we want Iran not to take the nuclear weapons path, we need to ask why it wants those capabilities and we need to eliminate these motives. No one in the current debate about Iran talks about security, but there are 130,000 US soldiers in Iraq, just on the other side of the Iranian border. And there are US bases in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other neighbouring countries. [...] I am saying that the way to convince Iran to give up its weapons is by guaranteeing its security"⁸⁶.

This is exactly where the key is. A basis for dialogue and cooperation needs to be found in order to clarify and satisfy the interests of each side. Without a drastic shift in course, and without a clear rectification of the model that has led to so many errors and failures over the last years, it is difficult to imagine that Iranian authorities would be willing to renounce their nuclear ambitions.

Notes on the consequences of a nuclear Iran

Given the above, and if the rules of behaviour of the actors involved in the issue do not change, a nuclear Iran would start a new, unstable and dangerous dynamic. This is not only because state actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt could follow the same nuclear path, but also because the tensions in the region could lead to an increase in illegal networks and access to such weapons by non-governmental actors.

It is important to highlight that this latter problem is not directly attributable to the Iranian regime. To the contrary, it is highly improbable that any state would be interested in sharing its "national treasure" with actors that are so difficult to control. Rather, the reasons for this hypothetical increase in illegal activity are the imperfections of the current non- and counter-proliferation systems. The mechanisms that are insufficiently able to avoid the emergence of new nuclear states and, even more so, to ensure transparency, security and maintenance of existing arsenals and the most sensitive materials that are necessary in their production.

Iran – strengthened by the situation in Iraq and weakness of other regional actors; by the international concerns about North Korea; by the growing revenues from natural resources; and by the failures of the international community to build a stable consensus – does not seem willing to modify its current nuclear heading without a high price being paid and the strengthening of its geopolitical position⁸⁷.

Similarly to the situations of other regions on the planet, the great difficulty for the international community is to continue fighting the possibilities of new nuclear arsenals while, at the same time, it needs to open the doors to interstate cooperation between nuclear powers. At the end of the day, there is an alternative worse than an unceasing arms race to obtain nuclear weapons: The development of such programmes without international obligations or control to avoid the spread of such weapons beyond state control. Applying this vision to the Middle East means that the only way to truly advance the agenda would be by recognising Iran as a regional power with legitimate security interests. This requires the acceptance of at least two of the three strategic motives mentioned above: national security and regional influence.

In this way it might be possible to open the door to negotiations with the Islamic Republic by creating an incentive for Tehran to cooperate with other important regional actors in order to maintain security. This would also include nuclear weapons. It should not be forgotten that, if one analyses from a realist rather than ideological approach, Iran has shown to behave along rather traditional patterns of international diplomacy, in spite of its inflammatory rhetoric. Continuing this hypothetical path of negotiations, it is crucial not to consider all desires and objectives to be of equal importance. More specifically, the resolution of the Iranian problem should not fail because of disagreements about other issues, such as Iraq or Hezbollah in Lebanon⁸⁸. A nuclear Iran and the necessary cooperation - both to avoid it happening in the first place as well as if it does become reality – should be a concern that overrides the other issues mentioned.

In any case, the North Korean situation has shown that it will be difficult in the current environment to avoid a nuclear Iran in the long run. It is therefore important to already begin making plans to manage such a future. If this hypothesis becomes reality, it would not only invalidate the NPT – at least in its present form – but it would also shift regional power, with the possibility of other nations following the Iranian and Israeli example. Of primary concern would then be the even weaker mechanisms of control and management of the nuclear stockpiles and associated technologies. The long shadow of international terrorism makes it of fundamental importance to reform and strengthen the current mechanisms and structures - as well as to identify and create new ones – that ensure a state monopoly over nuclear capabilities. The door to such destructive weaponry needs to be closed to non-governmental groups.

In this sense it would be necessary to find a diplomatic approach which is based on two general objectives: 1) Halt, delay or reduce the proliferation of WMD in the Mediterranean; and 2) Improve as soon as possible cooperation, transparency and mutual confidence with respect to nuclear

87. In a speech to Congress (September 19, 2006) Takeyh argued that “the Islamic Republic is seeking to emulate China and India, regional powers whose interests and claims have to be taken into consideration in their immediate neighbourhood. A successful model of engagement has to appreciate that Iran is a rising power and the purpose of the talks is to craft a framework for regulation of its influence. In essence, this model of engagement does not seek reconciliation between the two antagonists, but a means of channelling Iran’s power in the right direction” (http://www.cfr.org/publication/11484/responding_to_irans_nuclear_ambitions.html).

88. SAGAN, Scott D., “Keeping the Bomb Away from Tehran”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 5, September/October 2006.

89. "Terrorist activities in the Middle East and North Africa continued to be a primary concern in the global war on terror [...] Iran presents a particular concern, given its active sponsorship of terrorism and its continued development of a nuclear program. Iran is also capable of producing biological and chemical agents or weapons. Like other state sponsors of terrorism with WMD programs, Iran could support terrorist organizations seeking to acquire WMD." "Country Reports on Terrorism" (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, EE. UU., April 18, 2006, chapters 5 and 6. (<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64344.htm>).
90. For a detailed discussion of "dirty bombs", see ZIMMERMAN, Meter D. & LOEB, Cheryl, *Dirty Bombs: The Thread Revisited*, Defense Horizons, No. 38, 2004. (www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/dh38.htm).
91. Deciding on the meaning of terrorism – and its specific actors – remains a difficult and highly sensitive issue. The report uses the UN definition from November 2004: "intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act".

issues, including with respect to already existing arsenals and programmes. Although it can seem as if there is a certain contradiction between these two goals, they are not mutually exclusive. Both share the same basic elements which always need to be taken into account: Mutual interests; the possibility of participation in international diplomatic and security processes; and the recognition and respect for realist behaviour by each nation. Given its geographic limitations as it is surrounded by western, Russian and Chinese interests, it is unlikely that Iran will ever become a global power. However, it is already a dominant Middle East power with legitimate interests at a strategic level. It is time to recognise that.

Nuclear international terrorism: Myths and threats

The two dominant themes of the international security agenda over the past few years (international terrorism and nuclear proliferation) come together with particular urgency in the Mediterranean⁸⁹, the primary target of US and other powers' foreign policy. Although in principle these two issues are not related – except in the case of the "war on terror", in which they are very much linked –, questions about nuclear (or other WMD) terrorism do naturally form a part of hypothetical threat assessments. What would happen if al-Qaeda or related groups obtain access to "dirty bombs"⁹⁰ or – even worse – nuclear ones? What is the probability of new terrorist attacks like in London or Madrid but this time with WMD? These types of questions are inevitable, especially in the current environment of alarmist behaviour. The reality is, however, that such events are not as obvious as might seem. It is not at all clear that international terrorist groups⁹¹ are either interested or, above all, have the possibility to obtain WMD.

The often repeated arguments that attempt to link the two threats together are mostly products of the "war on terror". As such, they have been used to justify the military campaign against Iraq as well to create a permanent state of fear among the populations of western nations, thereby facilitating the passing of certain laws that restrict the very freedoms that define a state of law. To the many shortcomings of the "war on terror" one can add that it is counterproductive in the fight against WMD proliferation as well as international terrorism. This does not mean, however, that there is no clear necessity to face very real dangers that stem from both.

In some cases the manipulation of facts has been obvious and has generated general fear that permitted measures that would otherwise have been directly rejected (Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib are only a few examples of an extensive list). On the other hand, there are of course legitimate concerns about nuclear terrorism. Even if one accepts that the probability of it happening is very small indeed, the potential repercussions of such a massive and indiscriminate terrorist attack are enough to take strong measures against the threat. It is important for governments and the international community to identify the dangers analyse the probabilities and possibilities of such an event, find appropriate and proportional measures, and inform public opinion adequately. In general terms and applied to the Mediterranean as a whole, it can be safely stated that each of these four obligations has so

far been unfulfilled, and that the overall strategy has failed: Tension in the region has increased; the adoption of necessary measures has become more difficult; and, lastly, insecurity has increased significantly, both in the region as well as on the rest of this planet.

As a result of various dynamics – not always with the right intentions – it has been imprinted into the public’s consciousness that it is only a matter of time before al-Qaeda detonates a nuclear device in a western city. The reality, however, is that an analysis of the existing sources on this topic does not seem to confirm that image. There is currently no evidence that there are either terrorist groups with access to WMD or that they are even trying, despite all the speculation to the contrary. So far, and quite likely in the foreseeable future as well, WMD are the exclusive domain of nation-states. That does not mean that there is not a significant grey area with respect to the definition of WMD⁹², or that the intentions and capabilities of the various terrorist groups are not developing towards these weapons. But the ideas that there exists something like a “terrorist market” to obtain, for example, nuclear weapons are unfounded, both from a demand as well as from a supply perspective.

Traffic in nuclear and radioactive materials: Supply⁹³

The extraction and processing of uranium is within the realm of possibilities for only a few states⁹⁴ and beyond the capabilities of non-governmental groups⁹⁵. This is even more so with respect to its enrichment and other activities necessary to produce nuclear weapons. Even for those that are capable of doing so, the process remains complicated and costly. The number of possible sources for illegal trafficking in nuclear materials is therefore significantly limited. In terms of possession of nuclear weapons and the possibilities to acquire them (legally or otherwise), the list is even shorter: Given that Iran and North Korea do not possess them (the latter having just carried out nuclear tests, something which is of course not the equivalent of having operational weapons), the only country frequently mentioned in this regard is Russia. There exist serious doubts about the safety and security measures, although it is worth pointing out that this gives the false impression that the control systems in the US, Israel, China, France, UK, India, and Pakistan are completely secure.


As far as open sources go, there is no evidence that there have been opportunities to access its nuclear arsenal, even though there are various problems with Russian security of sensitive materials. According to GlobalSecurity.org, “the system for the protection of nuclear munitions is echeloned and generally extremely reliable. Access to them is multilayered, and it is virtually impossible for unauthorized individual to gain access to the warheads. The transport of nuclear munitions is also properly organized. Special security units are in a high state of readiness to thwart any attempt to seize them. To date there has not been a single loss from the nuclear arsenals”⁹⁶. Besides the periodic rumours about supposedly missing weapons⁹⁷, there are no facts available that point to any imminent danger. It also seems that many of the negative rumours are the result of western contempt for Russian security, rather than anything more substantive.

92. Traditionally defined as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, it could be argued that the list is longer and more flexible.
93. This section is based on FROST, Robin, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11”, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 378, 2005. For an opposite perspective, see: PLUTA, Anna & ZIMMERMAN, Peter, “Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent”, *Survival*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006.
94. Countries with significant uranium enrichment activities are, according to the IAEA, France, Russia, China, Japan, UK, Germany and the US. At a lower level, included are Pakistan, India, Argentina and Brazil. To this list could probably be added Iran, North Korea and Israel.
95. It is worth remembering that Khan’s illegal network offered its services to states, rather than non-governmental groups.
96. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/12gumo.htm>
97. In 1997, for example, General Alexander Lebed claimed that Russia could only guarantee the security of 48 (out of a hundred) portable nuclear bombs. After initial panick, many doubts were raised, both about the existence of these weapons as well as their real operational status. SOKOV, Nikolai, “Suitcase Nubes Pack Little Risk”, *Los Angeles Times*, September 26, 2002.

- 98. At Chelyabinsk Oblast (Russia) in 1998. (DCI, "Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces", *Central Intelligence Agency*, December 2004, P. 8. http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_ot/herprod/russiannuke04.pdf)
- 99. "Nuclear watchdog fears terrorist dirty bomb after looting at al-Tuwaitha", *The Guardian*, May 14, 2003.
- 100. Zimmerman and Loeb, op. cit.

Nuclear weapons are of course not the only possibility for mass destruction by terrorist hands. There is enough evidence that shows the existence of illegal trade in nuclear and radioactive materials (see Figure 1). This includes a wide variety, ranging from "contaminated substance" to plutonium and enriched uranium. It should be pointed out, however, that in the majority of cases the quantities detected were minimal (the total confirmed by the IAEA between 1993 and 2003 is only 8.35kg), and nothing seemed to have been destined for nuclear weapon building. Only in one incident⁹⁸ can it be confirmed that there was an attempt to steal a quantity large enough for the construction of a bomb, and only in one other instance was there evidence of organized crime. In this context it is useful to remember that right after the invasion of Iran in 2003, there was significant concern⁹⁹ about the lack of security of its nuclear facilities. However, up to this day there has not been any news about "dirty bombs" being build, either within or outside of Iraqi territory.

There has been an increase in detected case of such traffic during the past decade, although there are doubts about whether this is the result of an increased effort by groups to obtain such material or whether it is because of increased cooperation and international control.



Source: ITDB, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/PDF/fact_figures2005.pdf

If, at any point in time, a terrorist group would decide to attempt an attack using "dirty bombs", the most probable method would be by obtaining the necessary materials from legal sources such as laboratories and civil nuclear facilities that use radioactive substances¹⁰⁰. It seems that in many countries that have such facilities security measures are not as sufficient against this type of threat. It is therefore crucial to make a

sustained effort, both in terms of economic resources as well safety upgrades, to guarantee national and international security.

Another area of concern is the scientific community that is involved in nuclear energy and WMD systems. It is probable that there are scientists and specialised personnel tempted – because of financial reasons or otherwise - to put their knowledge at the disposal of terrorist causes. Regardless, any attempt by terrorist groups in this direction is likely to fail given the enormous complexities and resources required to develop a nuclear programme that is worthy of such a name. This underlines what as stated above, namely that the most likely source of terrorist activity would direct purchase, rather than in-house production.

Everything seems to point, therefore, that the illegal activities that exist in this area are the exclusive domain of states both as protagonists and final destination¹⁰¹, with non-governmental groups by-and-large excluded from the process.

With respect to relationships between terrorist groups and states, the probability that any government would be willing to offer nuclear materials for terrorist uses is very small. There two main reasons for this. Firstly, because it cannot be easy for any government, even those who are relatively close, to control groups such as al-Qaeda. The idea to cede such weapons - which are based on the most guarded technology of a nation - to a non-governmental and unpredictable organisation with a muddled hierarchy would be absurd.

Furthermore, there is currently no country in the world that is recognised as a WMD power which at the same time can afford to be connected to such terrorist attacks, either directly or indirectly. The international repercussions would be too grave to manage, and would turn against the national security of the implicated state itself¹⁰².

This does not mean, however, that there is no legitimate concern about the supply of WMD in international markets. Such supply does exist, including of materials that are required to make a “dirty bomb”. With the growth of nuclear capable countries, it is likely that these markets will expand and that the rules of the game might change.

To return to the case of Iran, for example, there are those who argue that its security systems are not sufficiently controlled and therefore represent a mayor risk in this area¹⁰³. A partial response to such allegations would be that we are still in almost all cases talking about states possessing nuclear weapons in hypothetical terms. With respect to Ira, it should be remembered that it is still no nuclear state, and that its internal security structures do no yet represent those of nuclear powers.

In any case, it seems to be clear that during a process like the current one – with such a high rate of change – it will not be sufficient to rely on the capacity of states themselves. The situation requires a significant expansion of international and transnational cooperation on this issue. Furthermore, more incentives are needed to develop existing programmes in a transparent and safe manner. Even the smallest possibility of a nuclear attack is obviously enough justification for greater vigilance.

101. And even in these cases, no state seems to have been able to buy nuclear weapons on the black market. It seems clear that an in-house nuclear programme would be more cost efficient (and thus showing the clear limitations of the market).
102. It is interesting to note in this context that the explosion of radioactive material leave “fingerprints” about its origins that can be traced by the IAEA.
103. Sagan argues that “there is no reason to assume that, even if they wanted to, central political authorities in Tehran could completely control the details of nuclear operations by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard coros [which is] known to have ties to terrorist organizations”, op. cit. P. 53.

104. P. 12 and P. 18 (www.state.gov/documents/organization/64884.pdf). Similarly, Jonathan Dean argues that “terrorists cannot be easily deterred by threat of retaliation. Therefore, the potential combination of terrorists and NBC weapons represents a serious danger”. (*Coping with the Possible Use of WMD*, WMDC, No. 15, www.wmdcommission.org).
105. 12 people were killed and 6,000 injured using sarin gas in the Tokyo metro system. It is interesting to note that in this case the group could operate relatively freely within Japanese society, and had greater access to financial resources than any of the known terrorist groups today.
106. A US Congress report from 2004 (*Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options*) states that “To date, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Aum Shinrikyo have demonstrated interest in developing weapons of mass destruction”. However, except in the Japanese case, there seems to be little proof to back this up.
107. As Zimmerman and Loeb argue, “while many terrorist groups are incapable of obtaining or using sophisticated technology, some are capable. We cannot rely on the premise that terrorists are unwilling to die attempting a devastating attack, for we know from experience that many are. Also, we know from Osama bin Laden’s videotaped comments about the September 11, 2001 attacks that terrorists will not necessarily know they are about to die. And while most terrorists may not be sufficiently imaginative or skilled to carry out such an attack, enough are to cause concern”. Op. cit., P. 5

Traffic in nuclear and radioactive materials: demand

One of the main reasons that explain the absence of more, better organised and funded networks for nuclear trafficking is lack – or even inexistence – of demand. Contrary to the rumours, there is very little evidence to suggest that there are terrorist groups with a true interest in obtaining nuclear or other WMD weapons. The most recent US National Security Strategy (2006) declares – without offering any facts or other proof – that one of its priorities is to “deny WMD to rogue states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation. Terrorists have a perverse moral code that glorifies deliberately targeting innocent civilians. Terrorists try to inflict as many casualties as possible and seek WMD to this end [...] there are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD”¹⁰⁴.

It is significant that, in contrast to such assumptions, all attacks by al-Qaeda and similar groups have been conducted with conventional explosives. This is all the more revealing given that already in 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo sect showed the possibilities of chemical weapons in terrorist attacks¹⁰⁵. It is an important fact that neither in the Mediterranean (daily violent attacks in Iraq; attacks in Casablanca and Istanbul; the actions by groups like Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas against Israel; attack against the *USS Cole* in Yemen; etc.) nor in other regions (new York, Bali, Madrid, London, Bombay, etc.) international terrorism has used WMD so far.

The reasons behind this lack of demand are the subject of speculation, and it may well be that at the moment there are attempts to obtain WMD by exactly those groups mentioned above. So far, however, they have either not tried or their attempts have been unsuccessful¹⁰⁶. Furthermore, many types of “dirty bombs” are much less complex than classical WMD, and it could well be that there are international terrorist groups that are capable of using such weapons¹⁰⁷. Nonetheless, there are at least three reasons that could make terrorists inclined to choose conventional weapons for their attacks:

1. **They are easier to operate and less dangerous (to the terrorists themselves) than WMD.** Choosing WMD, especially in situations of high alert, increases the chances of being detected and thus complicate the operation unnecessarily. Furthermore, it requires operator that are specially trained, making recruitment more difficult, reducing the probability of achieving the objecting and increasing the costs of failure (even if only because of the loss of such scarce human resources).
2. **It is more difficult to discover the origins of conventional weapons than those of WMD.** Given that there are less potential sources, tighter control of markets, greater overall vigilance and less actors involved, the possibility of discovering the origins and suppliers of WMD is much higher than in the case of conventional weapons. This discourages activity in these markets that could lead to terrorist attacks. It could threaten the survival of actors involved, and carries a prohibitive political cost to those states that are found to have cooperated in such illegal behaviour.

3. **From a terrorist rationale, it is simply not necessary to use WMD in order to achieve the objectives.** Contrary to public opinion and beliefs, relatively successful terrorist groups “are typically neither psychopathic nor psychotic, nor are they driven by mere bloodlust”¹⁰⁸. They have clear objectives and – although willing to die in order to achieve them – the principal goal is not necessarily to kill as many people as possible. In short, if they can achieve their goals in conventional and simpler ways, obtaining WMD which could cause significant complications becomes unnecessary.

This line of analysis does not deny that there is a strong argument that goes against those mentioned above: In order to achieve their goals, it is likely that, from a tactical perspective, terrorists would want to cause as much psychological anguish as possible upon the affected populations. WMD are obviously far more effective in this regard. There is no doubt that a chemical or biological attack by means of the water supplies of a large city, or a nuclear weapon (even if only a “dirty bomb”) exploding in the centre of an urban area, would have a unique effect. However, based upon what we know, there was either 1) no access to the necessary means; or 2) the costs/complications were greater than the perceived benefits, or 3) it did not coincide with the objectives of international terrorism. Whatever the reason, there is a clear obligation and challenge facing the international community: The balance needs to stay in favour of not obtaining/using WMD in terrorist activities, which means that both the supply as well as potential uses of such materials and weapons need to be restricted even further.

Reactions within the “war on terror” framework¹⁰⁹

After the attacks on the 11th of September 2001, the terrorism and the related threats posed by various nations – especially the “sponsors of terror” – morphed, in the eyes of the US, into almost a homogenous entity. This led to the image of an existential fight for the survival of “our freedoms” and prosperity. It is taken for granted that the country and its allies are in a “war on terror” (an exercise of extreme simplistic reasoning in which “terrorism” converts into “terror”, thereby leaving sufficient room to define the enemy according to situational convenience).

One of the problems that this framework creates is that behind its apocalyptic exterior, there is no evidence for anything that justifies such an existential approach. Although the loss of life always constitutes a terrible tragedy, the combined number of people who died in the attacks on New York, London and Madrid combined does not surpass 4,000. It is not that clear, therefore, that we are immersed in a struggle for survival of the western model in the face of enemies that can cause its destruction. In any case, as if the initial framework was not sufficient, new variables were added to the equation: “rogue states” and WMD proliferation. This made the “war” gain importance exponentially. The best example of this was, of course, the campaign against Iraq in 2003. It was first justified by the supposed existence of a nuclear threat, and later, after the initial hypothesis had become unsustainable, by the necessity to avoid the creation of such dangers¹¹⁰.

108. Frost, op. cit., P. 10

109. This section focuses specifically on US policies, both to limit the scope of this report as well as to recognize Washington as the main driving force behind the “war on terror”. Moreover, its strategy is clearly defined, unlike those of European nations which have to move between their own individual policies and those of the Union.

110. President Bush justified the policy by imagining (during a press conference on August 21, 2006) “a world in which you had Saddam Hussein who had the capacity to make a weapon of mass destruction, who was paying suiciders to kill innocent life, who would — who had relations with Zarqawi. Imagine what the world would be like with him in power.”

(<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060821.html>).

111. It is no coincidence that the US National Security Strategy identifies countries like Iran and Syria as “enemies of freedom, justice and peace”, and that the US does not distinguish between those who commit the terrorist acts and those who harbour them. (PP. 9-12)
112. *Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options*, CRS Report for Congress, April 15, 2004 (<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32006.pdf>).
113. Op. cit, P. 59.
114. The US State Department itself has confirmed that there are no credible reports on Libya’s involvement on in terrorist activity since 1994. SQUASSONI, Sharon, *CRS Report for Congress: Globalizing Cooperative Treat Reduction: A Survey of Options*, Congressional Research Service, 2006, PP. 8-9, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32006.pdf>.

It has to be recognised that the combinations of these elements (being at war, fighting against terrorism, and preventing a WMD attack) provides a powerful tool to any government with hegemonic ambitions. The war permits the division of the world in two opposing sides (“with me”, i.e. those that that are fighting for freedom, democracy and prosperity, or “against me”, i.e. those that are identified as dictatorial, fundamentalist and repressive). Terrorism provides the flexibility to identify potential enemies – even if that is done according to double standards – and design incorrectly named “preventive” strategies to defeat them. The fight against proliferation creates a base of strong public support. Moreover, it cause general fear that facilitates the adoptions of policies that limit freedoms and fundamental rights, both at a national as well as an international level, and gives a greater role to military options.

Within this general framework the “rogue states” are, by definition, suppliers to terrorist groups. This means that no real distinction needs to be made between, for example, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Osama bin Laden. Both are enemies that need to be removed from the picture¹¹¹. Unfortunately, evens during the past years have shown that, in spite of its undeniable media qualities, this type of combination and strategies has not led to significant reduction of the existing threats. Looking again at the Iraqi example, Saddam Hussein did not seem to be linked to terrorist groups. Now, in 2006, the country has become one of the main areas of international terrorism. The US strategies are not producing positive results in this regard, and seem to be destabilizing the country even further while at the same time failing to eliminate the terrorist threat.

It is perhaps because of this that the US congress seems to criticise its own government when it argues that “terrorists may gain access to WMD without the authority or knowledge of the host government, either through insider ties or through instability engendered by terrorist activity”¹¹². In the end, the current situation shows contradictions between the “war on terror” and the efforts against international terrorism and the uncontrolled spread of WMD. This is understood by an increasing number of voices who demand mutual respect for certain interests and basic demands of other nations, in exchange for cooperation in the fight against WMD proliferation¹¹³. Iran is obviously the prime example in this respect.

It seems clear that cooperation between strong and secure states is essential to the safety of existing programmes and arsenals. As long as this is generally not understood and the focus remains on the strategy by Washington of confrontation, it should not be a surprise that Iran shows no desire to cooperate with the international community in this area. It has learned the lessons from Iraq, and knows that to be immune to foreign attacks it needs to be in possession of a nuclear deterrent.

Not even the case of Libya can be presented as an achievement of the “war on terror”. After overcoming crises like the one surrounding the Lockerbie disaster (1988), Muammar Gaddafi’s regime had already distanced itself from international terrorism¹¹⁴. Its decision at the end of 2003 to abandon its WMD programmes - which it had been developing

for years - was basically a realist calculation that would allow survival of the regime in response to the events post-9/11. However, even if Libya would still have links with terrorism, be developing nuclear weapons or storing associated materials that could be used in terrorist attacks, the arguments remain the same: Just like in the case of Iran or any other state, governments have no interest in providing such capabilities to groups that are not under their complete control (and complete control is obviously impossible in the case of international terrorism). The case of Libya has demonstrated, on the other hand, that there is room to manoeuvre when basic interests are respected on both sides. With respect to Libya, this required assurances about its regime's survival and the absence of outside interference in its domestic affairs.

Final remarks

It is impossible to completely rule out the possibility of a terrorist attack using WMD. It is also vital to close any doors that may allow access to such weapons by terrorist groups. In order to achieve this, the debate on an issue like this must not be contaminated by other concerns or motives.

At the beginning of this section there was mention of four basic obligations that governments and the international community need to adhere to in this respect. Unfortunately, the situation is not exactly satisfactory for either of those four:

1. **Identification of threats** - Despite the fact that the war against Iraq is the clearest example of this failure, the current state of affairs with respect Iran does not seem to go much better. In order to avoid future disasters, it is advisable to focus on dialogue with states that are developing nuclear weapons.
2. **Analysing possibilities and probabilities** – The obsession with “nuclear terror” has diverted resources and efforts away from other areas that are of greater concern. These include issues such as the root causes of violence, including terrorism. It is important to for the international community to combine its efforts to identify the principal threats to global security without letting excessive ideology blur the picture. These include terrorism and WMD proliferation - as well as a combination of both - but consist of many more and more important issues.
3. **Finding appropriate and proportional responses** – Without the previous step, this type of action would obviously be impossible. The blurring of the struggle against WMD terrorism with other motives and objectives has proved counterproductive. It has permitted some governments to be designated as part of the problem, rather than a substantial part of the solution. At the same time, there is no use to take action in this area without a parallel effort to profoundly reform the structures and systems that control WMD at an international level, as well as the multilateral mechanisms that are needed to fight the terrorist threat. Emphasis needs to be on fighting causes and not just symptoms, and on combining diplomatic, commercial, political and

military capabilities worldwide. In short, a more balanced multilateral approach seems to be the best way forward.

4. **Adequately inform the public** – As the adoption of restrictive measures at airports in August 2006 demonstrated, there exists a dangerous tendency to generate social fear without actually augmenting the real security of people. Rather than regularly informing the general public, all too frequently there is an emphasis on the spread of badly argued ideas that inevitably lead to social tension.

In order to break the vicious circle that imposes itself day after day, it needs to be recognised that:

1. Even though the threat is real, its actualisation is neither inevitable nor as imminent as is often being presented. The probability of the potential disaster, however small, justifies the efforts to avoid such an event. However, it is a mistake to make it into an absolute priority within the general security strategy of nations.
2. The threat does not stem from connections between national states and non-governmental groups. It is far from obvious that a government would be interested in providing WMD capabilities to terrorist groups. Not only would that be an excessively risky step, it would also go against the very motives behind the development of such weapons: regional influence and the sovereign security.
3. The “war on terror” does not reduce the nuclear terrorist threat. On the contrary, it creates counterproductive barriers between states that possess such arsenals or are developing such programmes. If believe that they are a target within the dominant international framework, their cooperation on keeping such weapons from falling into the wrong hands would be highly unlikely.
4. Improving international control and regulation systems to monitor the production and maintenance of WMD is a priority. Similarly, transparency by nuclear states is essential for an effective safety net. This requires the creation of more incentives to explore mutual interests and less focus on international punishment which uses standards that are based on irrational considerations.
5. Multilateral approaches that – specifically designed to manage this matter - are another priority. In order to be effective, they must not be conditioned on other considerations on the international agenda. The starting point should be reform of the current non-proliferation regime, with special emphasis on the NPT - and the similar biological and chemical treaties – and on the IAEA, which requires greater autonomy and resources at its disposal.
6. Internally strong and stable states are the first line of defence against WMD terrorism. Therefore, the international community must reconsider its position towards potentially proliferating nations, and, rather than undermining their domestic authority, it will be increasingly important to engage them through dialogue in order to cooperate in this area.

Factual updates and new realities

Section VII of the 2005 report contains a set of tables summarising (diplomatically and militarily) the situation of WMD in the Mediterranean. One year later, it is appropriate to update their content with the changes that have taken place during this period (basically between September 2005 and November 2006).

The tables included below are, therefore, modified with respect to their initial version. All tables that were created last year are reproduced here. In this way, the reader of this report does not need to refer back to the 2005 version and can simply use the information in this section instead.

In addition to the tables there is a brief update about the most relevant changes and news stories (during the same period) in each of the countries that has experienced significant developments in the area of WMD. The order below is alphabetic, and those countries that are missing did not produce new relevant information relative to the discussion in Section III of the 2005 report. Contrary to the tables, the country-specific updates included below are additive, rather than substituting last year's information.

Added to the list of countries is Turkey – which had not been included last year – in order to complete the list.

Country updates

Saudi Arabia

Shrouded by the usual secrecy that characterises the Wahhabi regime when it comes to security matters, there has been little to report during the last year. The most significant news is the official reiteration in favour of a nuclear weapons free zone¹¹⁵, driven in a large part by the concern about the evolution of the Iranian nuclear programme. Although so far it is only a persistent rumour, it seems that there are indications that Riyadh has begun its own nuclear programme – with Pakistani support¹¹⁶ – which it started in 2003 after a crisis in relations with the US.

Egypt

At the diplomatic level, Egypt continues to be the principal Arab defender of the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in the region¹¹⁷. Its formal posture does not, however, manage to find unanimity on the issue in the Arab world. Nor does it manage to clear the obstacles that are impeding diplomatic movement on the issue. In June 2006, Egypt did sign an agreement with the US on cooperation in their efforts to avoid nuclear trafficking through its waters¹¹⁸.

At the same time, Cairo seems increasingly tempted to restart its own civil nuclear programme. In September 2006, at the annual conference of the leading National Democratic Party, Gamal Mubarak - son of the

115. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/saudi/saudi-051218-voa01.htm>
116. "Pakistan rejects report on N-help to Saudis", *Daily Times*, March 30, 2006.
117. "Egypt Urges Nuclear Weapons-Free MidEast at IAEA Session", *BBC*, October 2, 2005 and "Arab Parliamentarians Discuss Egyptian Strategy on Collective Action", *Middle East News Agency*, February 28, 2006.
118. "Egypt to Cooperate with U.S. on Preventing Nuclear Smuggling", *United States Department of State*, June 22, 2006.

119. The idea is to construct a 1,000Mw plant at an estimated cost of 1.2 billion euros.
120. LINZER, Dafna, "Strong leads and dead ends in nuclear case against Iran", *Washington Post*, February 8, 2006.
121. HELLER, Aron, "Iran gets first North Korean-made missiles", *Associated Press*, April 27, 2006.
122. http://www.nti.org/e_research/pofiles/Israel/Missile/3571_5220.html

current president and candidate *in pectore* to succeed him – declared that Egypt had started the construction of a nuclear centre near El Dabaa (on the Mediterranean coast). It should be noted that after the Chernobyl disaster, Egypt had decided to halt its nuclear programme, although it maintained a small nuclear reactor operational for research purposes. At the moment, however, surrounded by the proliferating tendencies that dominate the Middle East, the country has restarted its discourse on the necessity to possess an alternative source of energy to its oil and gas reserves. Official predictions about a sustained growth at a yearly rate of 7% by the Egyptian economy make the nuclear option feasible.

For the moment, both the US as well as the IAEA itself has given its approval to the formal Egyptian proposal. The reason for this may be that they are aware that so far, at least, there is nothing concrete and it will take at least another ten years before a final decision on the project is made¹¹⁹.

Iran

Besides the information provided in Section II, Iran continues the rapid expansion of its missile capabilities. Its total number of missiles is probably around 550, with the *Shahab* as its central pillar. The *Shahab-3B*, armed with a single warhead, has a range of 2,100km. There is not a lot of open-source information available on the newer versions (*Shahab-3C* and *Shahab 3-D*), although it is assumed that they are already in mass production. There also exist rumours about a new project (*Project-111*) which would be aimed at modifying the *Shahab-3* so that it can carry nuclear warheads¹²⁰.

On the other hand, the *Shahab-4* programme was cancelled and the status of the *Shahab-5* and *-6* programmes is unknown.

The most recent news in this area is about the existence of the *Fajr-3* (MIRV) – unveiled on March 31, 2006, and which is supposed to be Iran's most advanced missile. Finally, in April 2006 it was announced that Iran had received a first shipment of *BM-25* missiles (with a range of 2,500km) from North Korea¹²¹.

Israel

Besides the permanent efforts to modernize its existing arsenal, the Israeli nuclear policy seems to be increasingly centred on Iran, both in defensive terms as well as offensively. Among the issues on the agenda during the past year are:

- The signing of an agreement with India on January 27, 2006, to develop the anti-air missile *Barak*, and the announcement on June 14, 2006, of an agreement between the Israeli Rafael Armament Development Authority and the Raytheon (US) on the creation of a defence system against ballistic missiles. This took place just one week after the decision was announced to update its existing missile defence system (*Arrow Mark IV*)¹²².

- The signing of an agreement (January 24, 2006) to purchase two new *Dolphin* submarines from Germany. They will be added to the existing three - donated by the German government in 1999-2000 - in 2010. These submarines are capable of launching cruise missiles with nuclear warheads (*Popeye Turbo*) which are ideal for the Israeli "second strike" capability.
- The calls for preventive action against Iran, threatening military action to avoid that the Islamic Republic could become a nuclear power (which would be seen as an existential threat by Israel)¹²³.
- An agreement in May 2006 on cooperation with the French nuclear laboratory GANIL (*Grand Accélérateur National d'Ions Lourds*) with respect to various lines of nuclear research and the construction of a new accelerator at the research facility at Soreq¹²⁴.
- The rejection in May 2006 of a US proposal to suspend the production fissile materials that can be used for nuclear weapons¹²⁵.

Lebanon

Emerged in a process of internal deterioration to which the conflict between Hezbollah and Israeli armed forces (on Lebanese territory) was added this past summer, Lebanon has hardly had any news on the WMD front. The most recent mayor development was on September 16, 2005, when the country signed the CTBT.

Libya

Libya remains committed to its renunciation of WMD in exchange for access to international markets and reintegration into the international community, as well as non-interference from outside in its domestic politics and the survival of the current regime¹²⁶. On October 20, 2005, it signed an agreement with the Russian company TVEL to provide uranium for its civil energy reactor at Tadjoura¹²⁷. It also achieved an agreement on cooperation with France on civil nuclear energy (March 16, 2006)¹²⁸.

In June 2006 it was announced that the UK was seeking UN guarantees on protection in the case that Libya were to be attacked by nuclear weapons.

Syria

Syria remains one of the least transparent countries in the region with respect to its WMD ambitions. Its secretive posture – in combination with the political tension surrounding Lebanon and certain ties with North Korea¹²⁹ - has caused a continued cascade of rumours and accusations, most of which did not even deserve an official response from the authorities in Damascus. Officially, Syria has limited its statements to reiterating that it has no proliferating ambitions. On March 12, 2006, its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Waleed al-Mualeem, insisted once again on the necessity of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, as well as the need for Israel to sign the NPT¹³⁰.

123. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2006/iran-060311-voa02.htm>
124. "Israeli Nuclear Research Center, French GANIL Sign Accelerator Construction MOU", *Israel Atomic Energy Commission*, June 7, 2006.
125. BEN, Aluf, "Israel, US 'At Odds' on Nuke Treaty Proposal; Olmert Asked Not to Raise Issue", *Ha'aretz*, May 19, 2006.
126. On May 15, 2006, Washington re-established full diplomatic relations with Libya, for the first time since 1988. BRINKLEY, Joel; WALD, Matthew L. and WEISMAN, Steven R., "U.S. will restore diplomatic links with the Libyans", *New York Times*, May 16, 2006.
127. "Russia to Supply Low-Enriched Nuclear Fuel to Libya", *BBC*, October 20, 2005.
128. GEBLAWI, Afaf el-, "Libya signs nuclear research deal with France", *Middle East Online*, March 16, 2006.
129. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2006/dprk-060516-kcna07.htm>
130. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Nuclear/3635_6262.html

131. "Secret services say Iran is trying to assemble a nuclear missile: Documents seen by Guardian details web of front companies and middlemen", *The Guardian*, January 4, 2006. Also, "German Technology Exported to Russia allegedly sold by Agents to Iran, Syria", *BBC*, November 8, 2005.
132. Information from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

It does seem as if Syria is searching for foreign assistance to replace its *Scud-B* missiles¹³¹.

Turkey

Turkey does not have any military nuclear programme in development. It does have the research reactor TR-5 of 5Mw at Cekmece, and another ITV-TRR of only 250Kw at the Technical Institute in Istanbul. Both are under IAEA safeguards. It has plans to build up to five new nuclear plants with an overall capacity of 5,000Mw by 2015 (the first will be in the province of Sinop).

As a member of NATO, Turkey has had US nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, and it is assumed that it still has 15 *B-61* bombs at the Inçirlik airbase¹³². It signed the NPT on January 28, 1969, and ratified the same treaty on April 17, 1980, as well as having a system of safeguards in place. It has also ratified the CWC (May 12, 1997) and the BTWC (November 5, 1974), and there is no evidence that it has arsenals of this kind or WMD programmes in these areas. Furthermore, it also ratified the CTBT on January 16, 2000.

With respect to its current arsenals, it possesses conventional delivery vehicles (including aircraft, most notably the *F-16* of US origin, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), which, in its most advanced version are of the *Heron* class, with a range up to 1,000km and a load of 250kg). Furthermore, Turkey possesses:

- 120 *MGM-140* ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System), with a range of 160km and a load capacity of 560kg, as well as 12 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) launchers.
- It is developing the "J-Project" which is planned to result in a missile with a range of 1,500km.
- *Harpoon/RGM-84A* cruise missiles, with a 120km range y 220kg maximum load.
- 50 air-to-land *Popeye-1* missiles, supplied by Israel since the year 2000. Soon another 100 additional units will be delivered.

Finally, it is worth noting that there are plans to co-produce (with the Israeli company Rafael) the air-to-land missile *Popeye-2*, which will have an estimated range of 305km and a load of 360kg.

Table Updates (November 2006)

Table 8: Mediterranean Countries in Treaties on Chemical and Biological Weapons

	BWC (1972)	CWC (1993)
Maghreb		
Algeria*	S (2001)	S (1993)
	D (2001)	D (1995)
Libya	D (1982)	D (2004)
Morocco*	F (1972)	S (1993)
	D (2002)	D (1995)
Mauritania*	WFP	S (1993)
		D (1998)
Tunisia*	S (1972)	S (1993)
	D (1973)	D (1997)
Near East		
Egypt*	F (1972)	WFP
Israel*	WFP	F (1993)
Jordania	S (1972)	D (1997)
	D (1975)	S
Lebanon	S (1972)	WFP
	D (1975)	S
Syria*	S (1972)	WFP
Turkey*	S (1972)	S (1993)
	D (1974)	D (1997)
Middle East		
Saudi Arabia	S (1972)	S (1993)
	D (1972)	D (1996)
Iran*	S (1972)	S (1993)
	D (1973)	D (1997)
Yemen	S (1972)	S (1993)
	D (1979)	D (2000)
The North		
United States*	S (1972)	S (1993)
	D (1975)	D (1997)
France*	A (1984)	S (1993)
		D (1995)
United Kingdom*	S (1972)	S (1993)
	D (1975)	D (1996)

* = Member of the Conference on Disarmament of the UN

S = Signed; **D** = Deposited; **A** = Acceded; **WFP** = Without Formal Participation

BWC: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

CWC: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Sources: UNTD, www.opbw.org, www.opcw.org

133. Terminology used by the CNS, <http://cns.miiis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm>

Table 9: Current Situation of Biological and Chemical Programs		
	Biological	Chemical
Maghreb		
Algeria	Unknown	Possible
Libya*	Research; possible production	Known
Near East		
Egypt	Research; without evidence of production	Probable
Israel	Research; possible production	Probable
Syria	Research; possible production	Known
Middle East		
Iran	Probable	Known
The North		
United States	Former	Former (1943-1969)
France	Former	Former (1921-1940)
United Kingdom	Former	Former (1939-1956)

Countries without significant programs: Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Yemen.

* Programmes in the process of being dismantled after its announcement on December 19, 1003 that it renounced all its WMD arsenals. The current state of its capabilities is unknown.

Explanation of Categories¹³³

Former - the state recognizes to have had weapons or programmes of this kind in the past,

Known - where states have either declared their programs or there is clear evidence of chemical or biological weapons possession

Probable - where states have been publicly named by government or military officials as "probable" chemical or biological weapons possessors or as producing chemical or biological weapons

Possible - where states have been widely identified as possibly having chemical or biological weapons or a CBW program by sources other than government officials

Research - possible agents studied; no evidence of weaponization

Sources: CNS, FAS, JCSS, NTI

Table 10: Position of Mediterranean Countries with respect to WMD Proliferation

	TNP (1968)	IAEA	I-AP (1997) ¹³⁴	CTBT (1996)
Maghreb				
Algeria*	D (1995)	M (1963)	A (2004)	F (1996) D (2003)
Libya	S (1968) D (1975)	M (1963)	F (2004) ¹³⁵	F (2001) D (2004)
Morocco*	S (1968) D (1970)	M (1957)	F (2004)	F (1996) D (2000)
Tunisia*	S (1968) D (1970)	M (1957)	A (2005)	F (1996) D (2004)
Near East				
Egypt*	S (1968) D (1981)	M (1957)	WFP	F (1996)
Israel*	SPF	M (1957)	WFP	S (1996)
Jordan	S (1968) D (1970)	M (1966)	IF (1998)	S (1996) D (1998)
Lebanon	S (1968) D (1970)	M (1961)	WFP	S (2005)
Syria*	S (1968) D (1968)	M (1963)	WFP	WFP
Turkey*	S (1969) D (1980)	M (1957)	V (1981)	S (1996) D (2000)
Middle East				
Iran*	S (1968) D (1970)	M (1958)	S (2003) ¹³⁶	F (1996)
Arabia Saudi	D (1988)	M (1962)	WFP	WFP
Yemen	S (1986) D (1979) ¹³⁷	M (1994)	WFP	S (1996)
The North				
United States*	S (1968) D (1970)	M (1957)	IF (1980)	S (1996)
France*	A (1992)	M (1957)	IF (1981) S (2000)	S (1996) D (1998)
United Kingdom*	S (1968) D (1968)	M (1957)	IF (1972) A (1992)	S (1996) D (1998)

* = Member of the Conference on Disarmament of the UN

S= Sign = Signatory; **D** = Deposited; **M** = Member; **IF** = In Force ; **A** = Approved; **WFP** = Without Formal Participation

NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Arms. **CTBT**: Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency **I-AP**: Additional Protocol of the NPT

Sources : IAEA, www.ctbto.org, UNCTD, FAS, NTI

134. The IAEA Additional protocols require approval by its board, which can then be followed by becoming a signatory and, finally, putting the protocol into force. Indication in the table of the latter, therefore, implies completion of the first two requirements.

135. Libya has pledged to apply its Additional Protocols pending entry into force

136. Iran has pledged to apply its Additional Protocols pending entry into force.

137. Deposited with the government of the Russian Federation (in 1979 USSR). In 1986, Yemen also deposited with the government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.

138. Terminology used by the CNS CNS, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/capable.htm>

Table 11: The Overall Situation of Countries with WMD				
Country*	Biological	Chemical	Nuclear	Ballistic Missiles
Maghreb				
Algeria	Research	Development?	Research	No
Libya*	Terminated	Terminated	Terminated	Yes
Morocco	None	None	None	No
Mauritania	None	None	None	No
Tunisia	None	None	None	No
Near East				
Egypt	Development?	Stockpiled U: 1963-67	Research	Yes
Israel	Production capability	Production capability	Deployed	Yes
Jordan	None	None	None	No
Lebanon	None	None	None	No
Syria	Development?	Deployed	Research	Yes
Turkey	None	None	None	Yes
Middle East				
Iran	Development	Deployed U: 1984-88	Development	Yes
Saudi Arabia	None	None?	Research?	Probably
Yemen	None	None?	None	Yes
North				
United States**	Terminated	Terminated	Deployed	Yes
France**	Terminated	Terminated	Deployed	Yes
United Kingdom**	Terminated	Terminated	Deployed	Yes

* Programmes in the process of being dismantled after its announcement on December 19, 1003 that it renounced all its WMD arsenals. The current state of its capabilities is unknown.

** Abandoned programmes. Current capabilities and research unknown.

Explanation of Categories¹³⁸:

Deployed - Nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons integrated in military forces and ready for use in the event of conflict.

Stockpiled - Produced significant quantity of WMD weapons, but these are not stored in close proximity to military units that would employ them.

Weaponization - In the process of integrating nuclear explosives or chemical/biological (CB) agents with delivery systems, such as aerial bombs, missile warheads, etc.

Production capability - Able to produce significant quantity of fissile nuclear material or CB agents, but not known to have done so.

Development - Engaged in laboratory- or pilot-scale activities to develop production capability for fissile material or CB agents.

Research - Engaged in dual-use research with peaceful civilian applications, but that can also be used to build technical capacity and/or infrastructure necessary for NBC development and production.

Terminated - Past production. Has dismantled its arsenal and programme.

U - Used

Sources : CNS, JCSS

Table 12: Chemical and Biological Arsenals		
Country*	Biological Weapons	Chemical Weapons
Maghreb		
Libia	Unknown	- Mustard - Sarin - Tabun - Lewisite
Near East		
Egypt	-- Mycotoxins - Rift Valley fever virus - Tetanus toxin - Encephalitis viruses	- Sulphur Mustard - Nitrogen Mustard - Phosgene - Hydrogen Cyanide - Sarin - VX - Psychotomimetic glycolates
Israel	Unknown	Unknown
Syria	- Anthrax - Botulinium Toxin - Ricin	- Mustard - Sarin - VX
Middle East		
Iran	Access to: - Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) - Yersinia pestis (plague) - Aflatoxin - Variola major (smallpox) - Ricin - Plus other theoretically weaponisable pathogens	- Mustard - Sarin - Hydrogen Cyanide - Cyanogen Chloride - Phosgene - Chlorine Gas - Tabun - V-Series Nerve Agents
North		
United States***	Past Weaponized Agents (includes) - Tularemia - Anthrax Research (includes) - Typhoid - Botulinum toxin ¹³⁹	- Mustard - Sarin - Soman - VX - Lewisite - Binary nerve agents
United Kingdom***	Past Weaponized Agents - Potato beetle Research - Anthrax - Salmonella - Collera - Rinderpest - Botulinum toxin - Ricino	- Mustard - Phosgene
France***	Past Weaponized Agents - Anthrax Research - Plague - Typhoid - Botulinum toxin	- Phosgene - Mustard - Lewisite

139. For the complete list, see <http://cns.mis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm>

* Countries thought to have no significant stockpiles: Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Yemen.

** Programmes in the process of being dismantled after its announcement on December 19, 2003 that it renounced all its WMD arsenals. The current state of its capabilities is unknown.

*** Abandoned programmes. Current capabilities and research unknown.

Sources: CDI, CNS, JCSS

140. JCSS, <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Algeria.pdf>
141. However, in 2004 the IAEA revealed the discovery of unexplained plutonium particles in the vicinity of an Egyptian nuclear facility, the origin of which is currently being investigated. Moreover, there is some evidence of clandestine "nuclear" contacts with Libya since 2002. (Source: NTI)
142. Argentine-supplied 22 MW light water research reactor, Soviet-supplied 2 MW research reactor
143. The program is active since 1950s, controlled by the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and based at Negev Nuclear Research Centre at Dimona (32-40MW) and the Soreq Nuclear Research Centre (5MW) nearby Tel Aviv.
144. There exist widely varying estimates given the lack of official information. The figure stated in the table is based on conclusions by: CIRINCIONE, Joseph, *Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002.
145. Alleged deal with Russia for a 24 Mw reactor. Deals with China for a 27 kw reactor and with Argentina for a 3 Mw research reactor, are probably cancelled (Source: JCSS)
146. Including the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), and the Nuclear Research Center of Agriculture and Medicine.
147. On June 16, 2005, Saudi-Arabia signed the IAEA Small Quantities Protocol, fuelling already existing suspicions about Saudi intentions. See for example DVALI, Akaki, *Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons?*, NTI Issue Brief, March 2004, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_40a.html
148. PERKOVICH, George; TUCHMAN MATHEWS, Jessica; CIRINCIONE, Joseph; GOTTEMOELLER, Rose, & WOLFSTHAL, Jon, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security*, Carnegie Endowment, 2005: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16593>

Table 13: Nuclear Programs and Capabilities

	Programme	Capacity	Plutonium
Maghreb			
Algeria	Suspected intentions but not identified	15 MW thermal heavy water moderated reactor at Al Salam, (probably upgraded to 40 Mw) ¹⁴⁰	No
Libya	Recently terminated (announced)	No identified arsenal, although Libya's programme is advanced. Currently being dismantled.	Yes
Near East			
Egypt	Program/consideration thought to have ended before 1970 ¹⁴¹	Two Research Reactors ¹⁴² and in the process of constructing a Nuclear Power Plant.	NO
Israel	Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons State ¹⁴³ ; suspected program to develop second strike capability from sea (status unclear)	100-200 nuclear explosive devices, possibly some thermonuclear; Two main Research Centres ¹⁴⁴	Yes
Syria	Suspected intentions but not identified	Research ¹⁴⁵	Yes
Turkey	-	Research reactor TR-5 of 5Mw and another ITV-TRR of 250Kw	NO
Middle East			
Iran	Indications of an active programme	Significant research ¹⁴⁶	Yes
Saudi Arabia	Intentions suspected ¹⁴⁷	-	NO
North			
United States	Advanced and Deployed	Over 100 nuclear reactors, advanced research and technology, 5735 nuclear warheads	Yes
France	Advanced and Deployed	59 nuclear reactors, advanced research and technology, 350 nuclear warheads	Yes
United Kingdom	Advanced and Deployed	19 nuclear reactors, advanced research and technology, around 200 nuclear warheads	Yes

*In possession of plutonium or equivalent

Fuentes: FAS, JCSS, ISIS, NTI, Perkovich et al. (2005)¹⁴⁸, SIPRI

Table 14: Nuclear Facilities			
Country	Reactor/Instalación	Capacidad	Sitio
Maghreb			
Algeria	Nuclear reactor	15Mw (possibly 40Mw)	Ain Oussera
	Research reactor	1Mw	Draria
Libya	Research reactor	10Mw	Tajura
Near East			
Egypt	Research reactor	22Mw	Instas
	Research reactor	2Mw	Instas
Israel	Nuclear reactor (heavy water)	150Mw	Simona
	Plutonium reprocessing facility	-	Simona
Syria	Research reactor	5Mw	Soreq
	Research reactor	-	Damasco
Turkey	Research reactor	5Mw	Cekmece
	Research reactor	250Kw	Istambul
Middle East			
Iran	Research reactor	5Mw	Isfahan
	Research reactor	30Kw	Teherán
	Nuclear reactor (under construction)	1.000Mw	Bushehr
	Uranium enrichment plant	-	Natanz
	Heavy water production plant	-	Arak
The North¹⁴⁹			
United States	104 nuclear reactors (103 operational), with a total capacity of 97,452 Mw in 2004.		
France	59 nuclear reactors, with a total capacity of 63 Gw in 2005.		
United Kingdom	23 nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 11,852 Mw in 2005.		

Sources: CNS, GlobalSecurity.org, JCSS, NTI, World Nuclear Association

149. For more detailed information, see <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/info.html>

150. According to JCSS, Scud-C missiles "have been removed"
<http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Libya.pdf>
151. Submarine Launched, capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
152. Operational according to GlobalSecurity.org:
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/missile.htm>
153. Also referred to as DF3.
154. Operational according to Flight International, June 6-12, 1990, PP. 12-13
155. For more detailed information, see <http://missile.index.ne.jp/en/index.html>

Table 15: Missiles

Country*	Ballistic	Cruise	In development
Maghreb			
Libya	- Scud-C Variante ¹⁵⁰ - 100 Scud-B - SS-21 Scarab	- SS-N-2c Styx - Otomat Mk2 - Exocet (AM-39)	Al Fatah (Ittisslat)
Near East			
Egypt	- 100+ Scud-B - ~490 Project T	AS-5 Kelt - Harpoon - AS-1 Kennel - HY-2 Silkworm - Otomat Mk1 - FL-1 - Exocet (AM-39) - SS-N-2a Styx	- Scud-C variante o Vector
Israel	- ~50 Jericho 1 - ~50 Jericho 2 - Jericho 3? - Lance Missiles - Shavit SLV	- Harpy UAV - Delilah/STAR-1 UAV - Gabriel-4 - Harpoon - Popeye Turbo ¹⁵¹	- SLV modernization - Jericho 3
Syria	- 60-120 Scud-C - Hasta 200 Scud-B - 200 SS-21 Scarab o Scud-D? ¹⁵²	- SS-N-3b Sepa - SS-N-2c Styx - Tupolev Tu-243 UAV - Malachite UAV	capacity to produce M-9 [CSS-6 o DF-15] missiles
Middle East			
Iran	- R-17E (Scud B) - 200-300 Shehab-1 (Hwasong-5, Scud-B) - 100-150 Shehab2 (Hwasong-6, Scud-C) - 5-100 Shehab-3 (Nodong) - BM-25	HY-4/C-201 - Harpoon - SS-N-22 Sunburn - HY-2 Silkworm - YJ-2/C-802 - AS-9 Kyle - AS-11 Kilter	- Shabab-3 - Shabab-5? - Shahab-6? - Fajr-3
Saudi Arabia	60 CSS-2 ¹⁵³ "East "Wind" ¹⁵⁴	-	-
Yemen	18 Scud-B - 24 SS-21 Scarab	- SS-N-2b Styx	-
North (selected: missiles deployed with nuclear capability)¹⁵⁵			
United States	500 ICBM LGM-30G Minuteman III, 336 SLBM UGM-133A Trident II D5		
France	84 ASMP, 48 M45 SLBM		
United Kingdom	58 SLBM UGM-133A Trident D5		

*Selected countries with ballistic missiles

Sources: ACA, CNS, GlobalSecurity.org, JCSS, NTI

Appendices

List of acronyms

ASMP - Air-Sol Moyenne Portee.
ATACMS - Army Tactical Missile System.
BMEWS - Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.
BTWC - Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CTBT - Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CWC - Chemical Weapons Convention
DSP - Defense Support Program.
EU - European Union
EURATOM - European Atomic Energy Community
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IRBM - Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile.
MIRV - Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle.
MLRS - Multiple Launch Rocket System.
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NPT - Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWFZ - Nuclear Weapons Freezone.
SLBM - Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile.
SLCM - Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile.
SSBN - Ballistic Missile Submarine.
TNA - Tête Nucléaire Aero-portée.
TNO - Tête Nucléaire Oceanique.
UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations.
US - United States
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Chronology of Iran's nuclear programme

1957. US and Iran sign an agreement on cooperation on civilian nuclear matters.

1963. August 9, Iran signs the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Ratified on December 23.

1967. The Centre for Nuclear Research opens in Tehran.

1968. In July Iran signs and ratifies the NPT.

1970. NPT in force (March 5)

1970-1979. In cooperation with the US, Iran develops plans to construct up to twenty nuclear facilities.

1974. The Germany company Kraftwerk Union (subsidiary of Siemens A.G.) starts construction of a nuclear plant at Bushehr.

1974. Atomic Energy Act of Iran promulgated

1979. Islamic Revolution puts a freeze on the existing nuclear programme and the Bushehr contract with Siemens is terminated as the German firm leaves.

1982. Announcement on plans to construct a nuclear reactor at Isfahan.

1983. Inspections and cooperation with IAEA.

1989. Parliament ratifies the Radiation Protection Act. On April 19 it is approved by the Council of Law-Guardians.

1995. Iran signs a contract with Russia to finish the reactors at Bushehr (under IAEA safeguards).

1996. Iran announces plans to construct a new uranium enrichment facility.

29/01/2002. Iran is designated as a member of the “axis of evil” by President George W. Bush.

8/2002. Alireza Jafarzadeh (detractor of the Iranian regime) exposes two secret nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak.

12/2002. US accuses Iran of pursuing a programme for nuclear weapon development.

16/06/2003. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA declares that “Iran failed to report certain nuclear materials and activities” and requests “co-operative actions” from the country.

10/2003. Negotiations with the IAEA begin on more rigorous inspections.

21/10/2003. Representatives from Iran and the EU-3 announce that Iran is willing to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve all remaining issues in relation to its nuclear programme.

31/10/2003. The IAEA declares that Iran has submitted a “comprehensive” declaration of its nuclear programme.

11/11/2003. The IAEA declares that there is no evidence that Iran is attempting to build an atomic bomb.

18/12/2003. Iran signs the Additional Protocol to the NPT.

6/2004. The Foreign Minister of Iran, Kamal Kharrazi, declares that the Iranian nuclear programme is “irreversible”.

14/6/2004. Mohamed ElBaradei accuses Iran of “less than satisfactory” co-operation during the IAEA investigation of its nuclear program

27/07/2004. Iran breaks seals placed upon uranium centrifuges by the IAEA and resumes construction of the centrifuges at Natanz.

18/09/2004. The IAEA unanimously adopts a resolution calling on Iran to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment.

21/09/2004. In defiance of the UN, Iran announces that it will continue its nuclear programme and converting uranium.

18/10/2004. Iran states that it is willing to negotiate with the UK, Germany and France regarding a suspension of its uranium enrichment activities, but that it will never renounce its right to enrich uranium.

15/11/2004. Agreement between EU-3 and Iran. Iran agrees to temporarily suspend its active uranium enrichment programme for the duration of a second round of talks, in exchange for a package of security incentives and technical assistance to its civil nuclear programme.

15/11/2004. A confidential UN report is leaked. The report states that all nuclear materials within Iran have been accounted for and there is no evidence of any military nuclear programme.

08/08/2005. Iran resumes the conversion of uranium at the Isfahan facility, under IAEA safeguards, but does not engage in enrichment of uranium.

09/08/2005. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issues a fatwa prohibiting the production, storage, and use of nuclear weapons.

11/08/2005. The IAEA governing board adopts a resolution calling on Iran to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment.

5/11/2005. The Iranian government approves a plan that allows foreign investors to participate in the work at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant.

19/11/2005. Mohamed ElBaradei shows his disappointment with the insufficient transparency of the Iranian nuclear programme, and demands improvement.

4/02/2006. The IAEA votes 27-3 to report Iran to UN Security Council. After the vote, Iran announced its intention to end voluntary co-operation with the IAEA beyond basic NPT requirements, and to resume enrichment of uranium

11/04/2006. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had enriched uranium to reactor-grade using 164 centrifuges.

31/06/2006. The UN Security Council gives until August 31, 2006 for Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and related activities or face the prospect of sanctions. The draft passes by a vote of 14-1.

26/08/2006. The Iranian president inaugurates a heavy water plant at Arak.

31/08/2006. Mohamed ElBaradei presents a report that is critical of the safeguard systems in Iran.

26/09/2006. The president of the Russian company Atom Export Company announces that the reactors at Bushehr will be operational in November 2007.

28/10/2006. Iran confirms that it has begun a second cascade of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.

Sources of tables and other websites of interest

Acronym	Name	Website
ACA	Arms Control Organization	www.armscontrol.org
OPBW	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	www.opbw.org
CNS	Center for Nonproliferation Studies	www.cns.miss.edu
CDI	Center for Defense Information	www.cdi.org
CTBTO	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	www.ctbto.org
FAS	Federation of American Scientists	www.fas.org
OIEA	Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica	www.iaea.org
IMF	International Monetary Fund	www.imf.org
ISIS	Institute for Science and International Security	www.isis-online.org
NTI	Nuclear Threat Initiative	www.nti.org
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	www.opcw.org
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	www.sipri.org
The Bulletin	Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists	www.thebulletin.org
UNTD	United Nations Treaty Database	untreaty.un.org

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Reports

Confidence - and security - building measures in the Mediterranean region: An instrument for the advancement of human security.

Jaume Urgell

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION: AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN SECURITY

Jaume Urgell

Collaborator of the Security Programme of CIDOB Foundation

*"We prefer to be political partners and not the objects of a strategy".
Participant from the South at the IV Seminar on Security and Defence in
the Mediterranean, Barcelona, September 2005*

The opening quote of this paper can be said to summarize some of the needs and expectations of the Southern Mediterranean countries with respect to the different political and strategic dialogues existing between several clusters of them and the EU, NATO and the OSCE, as well as individual European countries, which together constitute the main political actors in the field. Indeed, cooperation between the North and the South of the Mediterranean is increasingly becoming a matter of standardized and rigid bureaucratic processes as well as of political rhetoric that seeks to sell, at home and abroad, the image of a generous Europe, instead of the result of political relations that –at least- attempt to address the major political, economic and cultural issues concerning all parties.

However, was not the Barcelona + 10 Conference held by the European Union (EU) and its Mediterranean partners in November 2005 intended to be a political forum in which the different governments could talk about common worries and interests and achieve a more ambitious political agreement in the different pillars of the Barcelona Process, including security? Such might have been the well-meaning desires and hopes of many politicians, diplomats, scholars, NGOs and corporate leaders from the whole region before the conference, but holding a meeting at the highest level every ten years is hardly the recipe for success in any political process. And political and security cooperation is arguably the area bound to suffer the most from the lack of a strong willingness to institute a real Euro-Mediterranean political partnership.

If it existed, such a forum ideally would bring together top leaders to discuss regularly on a variety of topics, as well as generate the conditions for the open and candid discussion of sensitive matters.

This would help create an environment of trust between leaders, would trigger discussions and negotiations between them and their constituencies back home, and would give the public a clear signal that the North-South dialogue in the Mediterranean is being taken seriously by all parties and that the money and the political energies invested are for the best. The spirit of such a partnership would actually be similar to the one proposed at a global level by the Alliance of Civilizations that Spain's Prime Minister is advocating for in the United Nations.

However, many obstacles stand in the way of such a political cooperation and partnership. The main thesis of this paper is that partners across the Mediterranean operate according to fundamentally different political conceptions of international relations, as well as definitions and roles of sovereignty and power. This affects in a direct manner the presuppositions and misconceptions that both Southern and Northern partners have about each others' motives, renders political dialogue difficult and cumbersome, and diminishes the possibility of building a confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM's) regime for the region.

We will start by summarizing the current context of cooperation between North and South in the Mediterranean, briefly identifying the various countries and supra-national and international organizations involved, as well as some of the most important fora and arrangements in place. This will hopefully yield an understanding of the complexity of security cooperation in the region, which is an heir to the historic evolution of the various organizations and actors. Special attention will be given to the EU, NATO and the OSCE, three very different organizations, all of which play an important role in the region.

The second part of the paper will then present a brief analysis of what we consider to be the prevailing views on international relations and security of different clusters of countries in the region. At this point, we will discuss the consequences for security and security cooperation that derive from the conflicting viewpoints and theoretical frameworks that actors use.

The third part will address the role of CSBM's in the various accords, and their significance in the context of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. A standard, traditional definition of CSBM's as measures intended to increase confidence between states (state-to-state, or S2S) is given, while a new concept is developed, in which the different sides in such an agreement can be actors of various types: international organizations, regional entities, states (governments or parliaments), citizens, etc. In fact, some of these new generation CSBM's have already been tried: the NATO-Russia or the NATO-Ukraine agreements are not traditional state-to-state CSBM's regimes, for instance. Finally, some conclusions and recommendations on how to improve security cooperation in the region are put forward and discussed.

Actors

The Mediterranean region has long been a strategic geopolitical area. Both World Wars, which were fought mainly on the European side, had nonetheless significant spill-over effects on the South, and during the Cold War the balance of power and the alliances in the region were very relevant both for the United States and the Soviet Union. It is also a region with a recent history of colonial domination of one side –the North- on the other –the South- that was not resolved in a smooth way. Besides, there is, of course, the prominent Arab-Israeli conflict, that hinders most efforts to find peace and stability in the region.

Throughout the last decades, several initiatives have been put in place in order to establish permanent fora of debate and cooperation between state actors. In 1975, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was created in Helsinki, which then became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The main aim of this initiative was to reduce tensions between the East and the West through a set of agreed measures enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and updated in further documents, dealing mostly with exchange of information on security and defence plans and budgets, prior notification of certain manoeuvres, as well as setting a ceiling for the procurement of weapons and the concentration of troops and weapons. In 1994, the OSCE initiated a dialogue with the Southern Mediterranean countries, which was formalized with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The dialogue was intended to include these countries in a network of security agreements and practices that had been useful for Europe, and to allow them to participate in the meetings of the Forum for Security Cooperation. The partner countries from the South, however, have been slow in responding to the OSCE offers and not enthusiastic in general, although some of them participate in meetings and have diplomatic offices in Vienna (where the headquarters of the OSCE are located).

NATO was created in the aftermath of World War II as the pre-eminent forum for Western security, under the aegis of the United States. In 1994, NATO decided to create a framework of cooperation with Southern Mediterranean countries. The Mediterranean Dialogue of this organization includes Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. In 2004, the Alliance took a step forward and boosted its cooperation policy with the wider Middle East through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which was interpreted by some as a reinforcement and enlargement of the Mediterranean Dialogue, by others as a slight change of focus. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, NATO went through a process of change which ended up in the 1999 Strategic Concept, which reaffirmed the need for the existence of a Western security alliance and redefined its priorities by giving more importance to regional conflicts and the role of NATO in solving them. This was the year of the Kosovo War and the end of a decade that had seen many regional-scale horrors worldwide, but particularly in Africa (Rwanda, Somalia). International terrorism was a threat that NATO analysts, as well as pundits around the world and in

many governments, were well aware of, but the threat had remained relatively contained, and the impact on human life was incomparable with other forms of violence such as ethnic cleansing.

After 9/11, priorities changed again. Although international terrorism has accounted for limited victims if sheer numbers are compared, the execution of terrorist acts in Western soil and their symbolic dramatism have forced NATO and the whole world to grant a good deal of attention to this problem. Since international terrorism is mainly inspired by an extremist Islamic ideology, it is no wonder that the Muslim world has become the centre of this attention. The background of this ideology, however, is not new; it goes back well into the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But for reasons that are not the purpose of this paper to discuss, its apogee in terms of impact and world attention has had to wait until the end of the Cold War, the emergence of an uncontested leadership in the form of a hegemon, the revolution in telecommunications and coming of the information society, as well as the existence of haven countries. The importance of the Mediterranean to the strategic goals of NATO is clear. High-ranking officials of this organization have recently mentioned the possibility of structuring a Partnership for Peace initiative for Southern Mediterranean countries, which would mean greatly enhancing cooperation.

The European Union is the third main organization in the Mediterranean region that has a strategy to deal with security issues in the area. Its Mediterranean dialogue is called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona Process, and was initiated in 1995. Its members are Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian National Authority and Turkey. The year 2005 saw the celebration of the 10th anniversary of this Process with a summit of Heads of State and Government in Barcelona in November, under the British presidency of the Union. The scarce presence of the top leaders of the Southern countries was interpreted as a negative sign, particularly regarding the first pillar of the EMP, namely political and security issues. In fact, the economic and the cultural pillar have done much better, and the instruments created have rendered positive results. However, the lack of effective cooperative schemes between Southern countries, the unwillingness to participate in security fora in which Israel is also present and a *real-politik* concept of international relations, power and sovereignty have so far rendered impossible a serious effort to develop a system of CSBM's. Some exchanges have taken place in order to foster mutual understanding and, in some cases, we have seen the participation of Southern forces in humanitarian operations of the EU, as is the case of Morocco in the Balkans.

There are, in addition, some sub-regional cooperation initiatives in the area of security that have had some success, such as the 5+5 agreement, signed in Rome in 1990 and formed by Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta, from the North, and Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Tunisia, from the South. Perhaps the low-profile (at least as far as public opinion and the media are concerned) of this arrangement has allowed it to overcome the difficulties it faced in different moments of time due to crises in Algeria and Libya and become a point of reference for larger scale cooperation schemes that are, to this date, still wishful thinking.

Perceptions of Security in the Mediterranean

Some of the threats to regional security that have been identified in the early years of the 21st Century by organizations such as the EU or NATO include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and failed states. Combating them is bound to mark the priorities of the security and defence communities of big countries in Europe. These countries fear the impact of Islamic terrorism on their soil (including the possible use of weapons of mass destruction –WMD-) as a punishment for some of their policies which go against fundamental interests of extremists. Besides, permeable borders and flexibility in the movement of persons, capitals and goods in European democracies (something that the citizens of these states are proud of and do not want to renounce) account for the increase in the activity of organized crime networks. These networks share some characteristics in their goals and mode of action with the mafia, that has existed in Italy for many decades but which already operates at a global level, and are usually born in Eastern countries before they can operate in the West. So far, these threats tend to be assessed according to the domestic impact that they might have on the countries mentioned. In addition, when these countries look around and see their Mediterranean neighbours, including the Middle East, they fear that unknown governmental policies in some of them might include the development of some sort of WMD (since not all the international conventions have been signed by each one of the Southern countries). Finally, political instability can lead to the weakening of state institutions and to chaos, which everybody agrees is a recipe for the increase in crime rates with potential spill-over effects, not the least important of which are terrorist activities both in the South and in the North. Large nations in Europe are thus concerned with their narrow national interest when it comes to security, even though the development of a European Security Strategy allows them to mirror themselves in that strategy and cover theirs with a curtain of Europeanness.

Other European countries –usually smaller and richer- might address regional and domestic security with a more holistic approach that includes the well-being of their own populations at large, but also the projection of their cherished principles to the international sphere. More idealistic than the previous group (and also lacking a significant colonial past that provides them with a role to play as post-colonial powers) these countries seem to believe in the existence of an international community of human beings with common rights, and would like to see peace and stability, as well as decent human economic, social and political conditions everywhere. When one looks at the Mediterranean region from this perspective, the assessment is obviously a very negative one. The fear of being the object of a terrorist attack or of having organized crime networks operating at home is often overcome, from the smaller countries' point of view, by the concern about the situation of the people living in developing countries in the Southern shore. Malnourishment and poverty, disease, lack of basic freedoms and authoritarian and corrupt regimes are all threats to the human security of those populations.

Finally, when we look at the regimes in developing countries in the Mediterranean region, one sees a world often marked by pride and prejudice, host to its own contradictions and incapable of delivering

many of the demands coming from within or without. Lack of economic development and investments in the region is aggravated by the low level of education and of cultural autonomy of large segments of the population as well as by economic and legal institutions that hinder the flourishing of markets, and a just distribution of natural wealth. The pivotal role of spirituality and religion among large parts of the population in Southern countries, as opposed to a civic demand for human rights protection, is encouraged by the state, which at the same time fears the resurgence of political fundamentalism and the autarchic tendencies it brings with it. The concept of security from the standpoint of these countries does not fit into the holistic view of human security or into the realistic one. Security is not even a differentiated policy with clear objectives and institutions that govern it. Rather, it is meshed up with other domestic and international policies and issues, such as the labour market (there is a need to maintain a large military and police workforce, however outdated training and equipment might be), the economy, the use of security instruments to serve the state propaganda, the feeling of national pride, and so forth.

In this scenario, it is clear that the concept of security in the Mediterranean is not a crystal-clear or a shared one. No single solution can bring together the different perceptions and frameworks into a system that addresses the collective concerns. There are, as we have seen, not many common concerns at the policy level, let alone common rankings of priorities at the strategic and tactical levels. When the Helsinki Final Act was signed, at a time when the Mutual Assured Destruction paradigm was dominant, the two contending blocks shared a common interest in a series of matters concerning security and defence in Europe and worldwide. This is not the case in the Mediterranean region nowadays: concerns and perceptions vary a lot, states are no longer the only sources of threats to security, there are no easily identifiable sides or sub-regional alliances in the South, and the benefits of cooperating (if a common set of security issues was agreed upon) might not be balanced. The European Union, under the influence of the larger countries, has adopted for the first time a security strategy that only three years after its establishment is outdated by a new global vision of security that brings to the forth what some think are more strategic and long-term potential problems such as climate change, access to natural resources including energy and water, the emergence of new nuclear powers, etc. Meanwhile, the South is still far behind schedule in what should be the current most important concern for guaranteeing a viable future for security and defence, and that is security sector reform.

Building Confidence and Security

CSBM's have traditionally been the instruments that the international security community has developed in order to increase the level of cooperation among state actors and reduce the risk of violent action. According to the democratic peace theory (democracies do not resort to war to resolve their conflicts), CSBM's regimes might be irrelevant. This is probably true for advanced democracies, and some of the rhetoric

regarding the future of the OSCE and its recurrent crises has to do with this argument. However, the rationale behind and the type of such measures as included in the Vienna Document of 1999 still constitute a tremendous system of data exchange and guarantees that the security community should and does value. Perhaps, stronger emphasis should be placed in compliance, including a set of incentives, since in practice some members of the OSCE have not acted according to the rules (Russia, Turkey and others, not to mention the Balkan wars).

One of the difficulties in implementing a CSBM's regime for the whole Mediterranean region is the reticence of Southern countries to give away even small doses of sovereignty in the form of access of others to what is perceived as vital information for the country's stability and survival. This fear is probably bigger between Southern countries themselves, who might not rule out a foreign invasion or attack of some sort if they give away military data. This could be diminished if additional rules of constraint prevent any single country to move around troops and weapons within its boundaries as it wishes, as in the case of the OSCE. Already such a measure would signify an important detachment from the non-intervention principle, so dear to authoritarian regimes.

There is as well a corresponding lack of interest on the part of certain European countries that see the Mediterranean as a far off region. This is partly natural, especially in the case of the new EU Member States. However, a change in the order of priorities started to take place during and after the "cartoon crisis" in 2006. The need to cope with such cultural misunderstandings has brought to the forefront in Europe the increased need to address Mediterranean issues more strategically. In this sense, the countries that have traditionally exerted influence in the region and fostered the dialogue with the South, such as Spain and France, are seen as experts.

There has been some talk of soft CSBM's vs hard CSBM's. Initiatives sometimes also related to as Partnership Building Measures, such as the ones developed within the Barcelona Process (the Anna Lindh Foundation, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, the Euromesco network and the Malta seminars), would be soft CSBM's as opposed to the hard CSBM's of the 1999 Vienna Document type.

In the context of Mediterranean security in the 21st Century, CSBM's should be adapted to the particular threats and sources of instability that are more common in the region. A WMD-reduction -control and -elimination initiative should be created to deal with the known and unknown programmes of countries in the region. Policing measures should play an important role in the prevention of and action against organized crime, including community policing that helps identify regional havens and illicit practices. In this sense, new generation CSBM's might include as actors not only states, but also regional organizations, citizens, legislative bodies, and even religious communities, each of whom has a role in combating particular threats. One can even imagine, in extreme situations, the involvement of adversaries in CSBM's schemes, in attempts to negotiate the end of terrorism or other threats to security that have political motivations.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This last section presents a set of recommendations for a more fruitful political and security dialogue in the Mediterranean region, which integrates the arguments and ideas presented so far.

Working on Perceptions

A lot has been said about mutual learning and understanding and indeed efforts are put on the part of European and Southern Mediterranean countries to develop exchange programmes for students and to foster cultural activities that bring other cultures closer to their citizens. This is a step in the right direction, but it is obviously insufficient. Perceptions of otherness are deeply rooted in people's minds as well as in cultures and traditions. Clichés, prejudices and images of the East have been taking form in people's minds in the West at least since Ancient Greece, and vice versa. Negative and/or biased perceptions of the Other translate, both in democratic and in authoritarian regimes, into political attitudes that might question the investment of public resources in cooperation above a certain level (for instance, in Europe), or taking steps towards openness in national security (for instance, in Arab countries).

Nonetheless, there are ways to counter automatic thinking about the Other, and democratic and open societies know a good deal about this. Education at school, attitudes transmitted by the media, official discourses and travel are good ways of dealing with stereotypes. Investment in and control of education projects should be a key priority in cultural sensitization programmes.

Working on a Shared Conception of Human Security and Human Dignity

The concept of human security is becoming the new theoretical and practical framework under which the liberal-idealist theory of International Relations is taking form at the beginning of the 21st Century. Human security was popularized by the United Nations in 1994 in one of its documents, and it defines security as a state in which individuals are free from fear and free from want. In the context of the Mediterranean security, this concept should be expanded to include a notion which is very much present in the public psyche of Arab nations, namely dignity, shame and pride. These need not be negative feelings or motivations; rather, human security could be seen as including also freedom from shame as an individual feeling caused by actions taken by states and institutions, either at home or abroad. This would probably strike a cord with the concerns of many countries in the region, without departing from a liberal view of human rights, democracy and human security.

Working on Smooth Relations

Europe –particularly certain countries- has a significant percentage of Muslim and Arab nationals some of which might be interested in pursuing diplomatic careers and the like. This could be a positive factor in diplomatic contacts and in the promotion of a Mediterranean policy for individual countries, as well as for the Mediterranean dialogues and strategies of the EU, NATO and the OSCE. A Euro-Mediterranean negotiation need not be conducted only in English or French, it might be possible that European diplomats of Arab origin speak fluent Arabic thus improving the sense of proximity of Southern countries to Europe.

Working on Institutions

There should be a common fund to address issues of security in the Mediterranean, managed by a Foundation for Human Security in the Mediterranean. The patrons of this Foundation would be the EU, some of its Member States (namely those with a larger interest in the Mediterranean), NATO, the United States and perhaps Russia, as well as a group of Southern Mediterranean countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey). Other members, perhaps with a different standing should be the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the OSCE and the World Bank. The fund would provide the necessary resources to plan and implement those security-enhancing activities that by their very nature are trans-national and that need the cooperation of two or, often, more countries.

In addition, a Mediterranean Political and Security Forum should be established with yearly meetings, which build on the achievements and proposals of the Foundation described above. A Mediterranean Forum exists since 1994 but it has hardly accomplished its goals. The new Forum could do a lot to create a shared regular arena for political discussion and to generate confidence in the populations of all countries involved.

Working on a Common Political Agenda

Taking into account all parties' security concerns should be a must in the future of the Mediterranean dialogues. Up until now, it has been the West and its institutions (the EU, NATO, the OECD) and individual states the ones who have established priorities in the struggle for security. An inclusive political strategy that identifies threats and carves solutions should take into account the broader context of Southern Mediterranean countries. These countries are part of a larger continent with a recent history of turmoil which affects Arab countries in many ways in spite of the real and imaginary divide that the Sahara desert represents.

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security

Seminar programme.

SEMINAR PROGRAMME

The initiative of jointly organising this international seminar goes back to the year 2002. Since then, and on a yearly basis, the Ministry of Defence and the CIDOB Foundation have brought together, in Barcelona, the principal experts, both academic and governmental and both civil and military, who are involved in the study and practice of security and defence in the Mediterranean.

The main objectives of this encounter are, in the first place, to increase transparency and knowledge in the development and implementation of different initiatives in the field of security; secondly, to promote spaces of relationship and mutual knowledge among figures from different backgrounds and disciplines; and thirdly, to contribute to the political and academic debate on security and defence in the Mediterranean.

In this edition the Seminar has incorporated the dimension of committee work in order to discuss issues related to energy, migration or governance. This will allow us to analyse the multidimensional challenges of the security in the Mediterranean.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 3

20:00 RECEIVING OF PARTICIPANTS AND DINNER
AT THE HOTEL SENATOR

INAUGURAL LECTURE

Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of IEEI, Lisbon

MONDAY, DECEMBER 4

8:30 PARTICIPANT REGISTRATION, PEDRALBES PALACE

9:00 INAUGURATION

Narcís Serra, President of the CIDOB Foundation

Celia Abenza, Director-General of Institutional Relations,
Ministry of Defence

*Inaugural conference The Barcelona Process and the
European Neighbourhood Policy*

Rafael Dezcallar, Director General of Foreign Policy,
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

9:45 BALANCE 2005-2006

*The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Co-
operation Initiative*

Pablo de Benavides Orgaz, Spanish Ambassador to NATO

The ESDP and the Mediterranean

Sven Biscop, Senior Research Fellow, Royal Institute for
International Relations, Belgium

5+5

Jean François Coustillièrre, Rear Admiral 2s, France

The Alliance of Civilisations

Máximo Cajal, Representative of the Presidency of the
Government for the Alliance of Civilisations

Debate

11:30 COFFEE-BREAK

12:00 THE PRACTICE OF CO-OPERATION
IN THE AREA OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Moroccan Participation in Bosnia

Coronel Mokhtar Marsou, Morocco

The Mission of the ESDP in Rafah

Jesús Castilla Paz, Captain of Guardia Civil,

La FINUL 2

Luis Mélendez Pasquin, Colonel of the Spanish Marine
Corps

13:00 TOWARDS A SHARED APPROACH ON MEDITERRANEAN
SECURITY

Pinar Bilgin, Lecturer at Bilkent University, Ankara
and visiting researcher at Wilson Centre, Washington

Debate

14:00 KEYNOTE SPEECH: SPAIN AND THE SECURITY
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

José Antonio Alonso, Minister of Defence

14:30 LUNCH

16:30 WORKING COMMITTEES

Those attending will be divided into three groups; committee work will consist of a frank discussion, under the hatham House rules, preceded by three or four brief interventions orientated toward sparking debate and laying out the main lines of discussion and analysis.

COMMITTEE A: ENERGY AND NON-PROLIFERATION:
AN OLD OR NEW CHALLENGE?

Moderator: **Narcís Serra**, President, CIDOB Foundation

Speakers: **Jorge Segrelles**, Managing director, Repsol YPF
Foundation

John Roberts, Platts Energy Group, Jedburgh

Bichara Khader, Professor, University of Louvaine

Alberto Bin, Responsible for NATO's Mediterranean
Dialogue

Reporter: **Haizam Amirah Fernández**, Research fellow,
Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid

COMMITTEE B: MIGRATION FLOWS AN OPPORTUNITY
FOR COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Moderator: **Senén Florensa**, Director General, IEMed,
Barcelona

Speakers: : **Mehdi Lahlou**, Professor at INSEA, Rabat
Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Co-director, Mediterranean
Migrations Observatory, Athens

Gil Arias, Deputy Director, Frontex

Reporter : **Ricard Zapata**, Professor, Universitat Pompeu
Fabra, Barcelona

COMMITTEE C: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN
THE MEDITERRANEAN

Moderator : **Leopoldo Stampa**, Spanish Ambassador

Speakers: **Claire Spencer**, Head of the Middle East
Programme, Chatham House, London

Clare Lockhart, Director, State Effectiveness Programme,
Agora

Yahia Zoubir, Professor, Euromed Marseille, École de
Management

Reporter : **Stuart Reigeluth**, Project Manager, Centro
Internacional Toledo para la Paz

18:30 COFFEE BREAK

19:00 CONCLUSIONS AND CLOSING SESSION

Presentation of the Report on Weapons of Mass Destruction
Jesús Núñez Villaverde, Director, IECAH, Madrid

Interventions by the three reporters

Haizam Amirah Fernández

Ricard Zapata

Stuart Reigeluth

20.00 FAREWELL DINNER

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Multi-Dimensional Security



COLECCIÓN MONOGRAFÍAS

This publication seeks to reconstruct the international meeting "5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean. Multidimensional Security", organized by the Spanish Ministry of Defence and the Mediterranean Programme of the CIDOB Foundation and held on the **3rd and 4th of December, 2006**.

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